Kinship terminology as a deictic system : An evaluation of ethnolinguistic methodology. by Horsten, Petrus Fredericus Marie
Kinship Terminology As A Deictic System. 
An Evaluation Of Ethnollnguistic Methodolo
A Thesis Submitted 
For The Degree Of 
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Petrus Fredericus Marie HORSTEN.
School of Oriental and African Studies 
University of London.
ProQuest Number: 10672905
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10672905
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
A B S T R A C T
This work presents a critical examination 
of the methodology of the analysis of kinship terms 
over the last 100 years3 gives a global evaluation 
of the Tstate of the art1,, and proposes a new, deictic 
interpretation of kinship terminology.
The methodological survey Is divided into 
three sections devoted to: the historical approach 
(section 2), which explains kinship terminology in terms 
of historical causes- the structural/functional approach 
(section 3), which relates it to present structures or 
functions^ and the formal approach (section 4), which 
concentrates on the internal structure of sets of kinship 
terms. For the first two of these sections a number of 
representative authors are chosen and their views on kin­
ship terminology are examined. The formal approach and 
the discussions connected with It are presented in the 
form of a survey of the study .of English kinship terminology.
The global evaluation (section 5) assesses the 
major issues arising from each of these approaches. In 
conclusion a new proposal is formulated for approaching 
kinship terminology as a deictic system.
In a final section (section 6) this proposal is 
elaborated theoretically, and applied concretely to Dutch 
kinship terms. .
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1. Introduction.
1.1 My Interest in kinship terminology came
about by accident. In teaching textual interpretation 
of the Bible to future missionaries I was forced to 
reflect more particularly upon those aspects of the 
text which were culture-specific, with a view to 
discussing their translatability. In searching for 
ways of dealing with these problems I discovered the 
theories of linguistic relativity, particularly in the 
work of E. Sapir and B.L. Whorf, and German thinking on 
the concept of "Weltbild" with its roots in W. von 
Humboldtfs ideas.
Though the claims made by these theories 
were fascinating, the actual discussion of particular 
cases did not yet sebm very convincing. One would
expect the facts to be more difficult with regard to 
grammatical aspects of language but easier in the lexical 
domain. Concentrating then on the lexicon I found little 
enlightenment in the fact that Eskimos have many more 
words for snow than the English, that Bedouin Arabs have 
an abundance of words for camels, etc. My attention was 
drawn to kinship terminology as an ideal example, a 
particularly instructive case of correlation between 
language and culture (cf. e.g. Porzig, 1950: 118). This 
seemed to be a well documented case, studied intensively 
for a whole century. Yet, the more I studied the avail­
able accounts, and the deeper I went Into the different 
methodological claims, the more confusing it became.
I did not doubt that it was an ideal test case, but I 
was puzzled by the inconclusive outcome of so much 
effort. As a result I began to wonder whether there 
was perhaps no satisfactory answer possible, or whether 
the wrong question was being asked.
I then undertook to examine the question 
of the social relevance of kinship terminology systemat­
ically. I decided that the best way of doing this would 
be to examine first the different methodological approaches 
and establish exactly what had been done and against which 
background to place this. I would then evaluate the major 
lines of research in the hope of bringing out clearly 
both the achievements and the points which would seem to 
block further progress. And I hoped that looking at the 
results of that research I might be able to propose a way 
out of the problem, in line with recent developments In 
linguistic thinking/
1.2 It seems appropriate to explain in greater
detail how I set about this task. The study of kinship 
and kinship terminology has always been central to the 
interests of anthropologists. This makes it inevitable that 
we should pay attention to a fair amount of anthropological 
literature relating to our subject. Moreover, it would 
hardly seem realistic to study the possible relations 
between language and culture without trying to acquire at 
least a basic knowledge of the social and cultural^aspects 
of one's subject. I take the view that we need an inter­
disciplinary orientation in this kind of study. ' I do not 
deny that each of the disciplines involved does exist in
its own right; however, unless we keep in touch with other 
disciplines concerned in the same subject it will be very 
difficult to integrate the different points of view at 
some later stage.
X shall first discuss extensively some of 
the major contributions to the study of kinship terminology.
I believe that it is essential to do this at considerable 
length for the simple reason that we. have to know the 
relevant facts in order to be able to formulate a good 
diagnosis. I do not know of any study which has examined 
this century of studies on kinship terminology from a 
primarily linguistic point of view: the first aim 1 have 
set myself Is to provide such an examination. I have not 
been content to look simply at what scholars did when 
analysing kin terms - I have also tried to understand why 
they approached their .subject the way they did. A proper 
evaluation cannot ignore such background information. At 
times this may seem to make the discussion a bit long, and 
not every aspect of the different approaches will have a 
bearing on our final evaluation and diagnosis. Both respect 
for the scholars concerned and my desire for presenting a 
verifiable account rather than an overall impression made 
it necessary, however, In my opinion.
This decision brought certain difficulties 
with It. On the one hand 1 wanted to present all the facts 
before giving a global evaluation. On the other hand I 
foresaw that many details of the work of different scholars 
or schools of thought would not come up specifically in such 
a global evaluation which aimed at diagnosing the 'state of
the art* - so that a wrong impression of uncritical 
acceptance could be given by ignoring some of these 
points altogether. I have tried to minimize as much 
as possible this disadvantage of my approach by placing 
a few critical remarks or question marks at the end of 
each section, not by way of a fully fledged criticism of 
a particular theory or method, but as preliminary remarks 
before the more global evaluation. I accept this difficulty 
as a minor evil, justified by the positive, indeed 
essential value of an extensive research into, and 
presentation of the facts.
The next point I had to consider was what 
to include in my survey of the study of kinship terms; 
for the amount of case-studies and theoretical publications 
is such that full coverage is humanly impossible. A way 
out of this dilemma would possibly have been a thematic 
approach, a discussion of some major Issues and the way 
they had been dealt with by different, representative 
authors. I did not choose this way because there is a 
double element of uncertainty built in, vis. how to 
determine which issues are major ones, and who are repres­
entative authors for each one of them. Instead I decided 
to concentrate upon a selected number of scholars and 
look at their work without prejudice as to what are major 
issues in their study of kin terms. Some repetition is 
unavoidable when one considers the work of several scholars 
in succession. I decided, however, that this was not too 
high a price to pay for as fair and as verifiable an 
account as possible.
The difficulty of making a good, representative 
.selection of authors still remained, of course. I solved 
this by accepting the view that one can distinguish three 
phases in the history of the study of kinship terms, a 
view which is presented, for example, by J. Goody (1971).
One distinguishes a historical approach, followed by a 
period In which structural or functional approaches were 
dominant, and finally a formal type of analysis which 
studies kin terms as a well-defined set in its internal 
coherence and organizing principles.
For the historical approach I selected L.H. Morgan, 
the founding father of the subject; J.F, McLennan, who 
was a contemporary critic of Morgan’s; F. Boas, because of 
his influence on a whole generation of ethnolinguists and 
anthropologists; E. Sapir, because of his views on lingu­
istic relativity.as well as kinship terminology; A.L. Kroeber, 
because he was the first to point to psychological rather 
than sociological factors In the explanation of kin term 
systems, and even more because he laid the foundation for 
what was to become feature analysis of kin terms; W.H.R. 
Rivers, because of his influence on anthropologists on 
this side of the Atlantic, and because of his genealogical 
method; and finally I included a section on historical 
comparative linguistics and the study of kinship terms 
since this still remains an acceptable and respected 
branch of the field.
For the structural/functional approaches I 
selected B.K. Malinowski as a representative of'a typically 
functional approach, with a predominantly psychological 
interest; A.R. Radcliffe-Brown for his strictly structural
and social approach; K. Davis and W. Lloyd Warner, 
because of their clear discussion of the genealogical 
basis of kinship, and because they are the fore-runners 
of modern formal analysis; G.P. Murdock, because of his 
cross-cultural Interest and his method of establishing 
statistical correlations between features of terminological 
and of social organizational systems; C. L^vi-Strauss, 
because of his revolutionary challenge to many traditional 
points of view; and finally L. Weisgerber, as a repres­
entative of Humboldt's heritage.
The formal approach presented a special problem.
It is not different from the previous phase, in that a 
formal analysis works on the assumption of the structured 
nature of the set of kinship terms. It is more a matter 
of emphasis: less attention is devoted to external factors
in explaining the structure of a set of kin terms; instead 
one tends to concentrate on the internal structure of a 
set. A complicating factor is the greatly Increased 
number of practitioners of kin term analysis, not least 
among linguists who become increasingly more interested 
in semantic questions. The style of study changes too: 
we no longer find ao much the comprehensive type of study 
which was possible In earlier days. Types of analysis 
proliferate, and particular analyses increase In number; 
Issues of methodology are under continuous scrutiny in all 
this work, not so much in global expositions, but rather 
In discussions of specific points. In order to bring some 
unity to these latest developments I have chosen to 
present a near complete survey of the study of English 
kinship terminology. Apart from the more anthropologically
orientated work of Talcott Parsons and D.M. Schneider, 
we find here a full picture of all types of formal 
analysis and the main issues discussed in connection 
with these developments. This part will be particularly 
concerned to bring together all these analyses and 
discussions: I feel that this is of value In itself and 
justifies its length. Inevitably there is some repetition 
here and there. I hope, however, to have been successful 
in keeping it to a minimum.
After completing the survey of the methodologies 
used in studying kinship terminology I give a global 
assessment of the major issues which have arisen in each 
of the three types of approach. In the light of what 
appear to be the remaining problems concerning the social 
relevance of kin terms, we shall try to reconsider the 
"status quaestionis" „ This will lead us to the formulation 
of a more modest proposal on the relatioh between language 
and culture in the field of kinship terminology, a proposal 
which will place the issue among the phenomena of deixis 
within linguistic theory.
In a final chapter I elaborate on the latter 
theoretical viewpoint, and show by analysing kin term 
usage in my native Dutch how this new Insight might result 
concretely in a more flexible view of the social relevance 
of a particular part of vocabulary.
2.. The Historical Approach
2.1 Lewis H. Morgan.
2.1.1 Lewis H. Morgan is a typical representative
of the 19th century: his orientation in his scientific
work is clearly historical and evolutionary. In his
summary of the results of his major work, Systems of
Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family (1871),
we find such statements as the following:
"It remains to notice the order of 
origination of these customs and 
institutions as a great progressive 
series founded upon the growth of man's 
experience. ... The establishment of 
this series as a means of recovering 
the thread of man's history through the 
primitive ages is the principal result 
of this solution of the origin of the 
classificatory system". (1871: 487).
What started off as an interesting discovery 
- the peculiar and seemingly unique kinship system of 
the Iroquois - very soon appeared to be a very common 
system, not just in the other Algonkin speaking tribes 
of North America, but right across the Indian population 
of that area. Once he had established that in all prob­
ability this type of kinship system was universally 
distributed throughout the Indian Family, he began to 
extend his enquiries to the rest of the world. In all 
this he was not free from the prejudices of the 19th century, 
assuming without proof or justification a monogenetic origin 
of mankind, and considering non-Western forms of culture as 
inferior and primitive:
"Mankind, if one in origin, must have 
become subdivided at a very early period
into,independent nations. Unequal 
progress has been made by their 
descendants from that day to the 
present; some of them still remaining
in a condition not far removed from
the primitive, and now revealing
many of the intervening stages of 
progress1' (1871: 479).
His ideas are clearly evolutionary, assuming a scale of
growing perfection leading up to our Western kinship system,
and he tried to bring some order into this development by
drawing up a classification of types of relationship systems.
In this way he wanted to continue the work of classification
which philology had begun (I87I: V). Once Morgan saw how
common the Iroquois type of relationship system was among *
the Indians of North America, he began to work along the
lines of the following hypothesis:
This system is prevalent among all the American
aborigines.
If so, the system must be coeval, in point of time, 
with the commencement of their dispersion over the 
American continent, and - as a system transmitted with 
the blood - it might establish their unity of origin.
-r It could then be assumed that they brought the system 
with them. Assuming furthermore that they came from 
Asia, finding the system in existence there would 
possibly furnish some evidence towards the Asiatic 
origin of the American Indians (cf. 1871: 4).
After completing as thorough an inventory as possible of 
relationship systems from all over the world, he concluded 
that there were only two radically distinct systems: he 
named these the descriptive and classificatory‘systems 
(cf. 1871: 468 ff.).
"In the descriptive system consanguinei 
are, in the main, described by a combin­
ation of the primary terms of relation­
ship, the collateral lines are maintained 
distinct and divergent from the lineal, 
and the few special terms employed are 
restricted to particular persons, and 
to those nearest in degree".
This is the form found In the "Aryan, Semitic, and Uralian
families"; It means (to take the example of English) that
uncle and aunt are terminologically distinguished from father
and mother, cousin from brother or sister, and nephew
and niece from son and daughter.
"Under the classificatory system consanguinei 
are not described by a combination of primary 
terms, but each and all, however remote in 
degree, fall under some one of the recognized 
relationships. By comprehensive, as well as 
apparently arbitrary, generalizations they 
are reduced to great classes or categories, 
the members of each of which, irrespective 
of nearness or remoteness In degree, are 
placed upon the same level, and admitted 
into the same relationship".
What this means concretely is shown by Morgan’s Seneca
data, here quoted In the grouping made by Lounsbury (1964 a:
195 f•) :
Hakso:t, "my grandfather" FF, MF; FFB, FMB, MFB, MMB
FFFBs, etc.; also FFF, MMF, etc.
akso:t, "my grandmother" FM, MM; FFS, FMS, MFS, MMS;
FFFBd, etc..; also FFM, MMM, etc.
ha?nih, "my father" F; FB; FMSs, FFBs, FMBs, FFSs;
FFFBss, etc.
no?yeh, "my mother" M; MS; MMSd, MFBd, MMBd, MFSd,
MMMSdd, etc.
hakhno?seh, "my uncle" MB; MMSs, MFBs, MMBs, MFSs;
MMMSds, etc.
ake:hak, "my aunt" FS; FMSd, FFBd, FMBd, FFSd;
FFFBsd, etc.
-LX
hahtsi?, "my elder brother" B; MSs, FBs; MMSds, FFBss,
MFBds, FMSss, MMBds, FFSss, 
MFSds, FMBss; MMMSdds, etc., 
when older than Ego. 
he?ke^: ? , "my younger brother" Same,' when younger than Ego, 
ahtsi?, "my elder sister" S; MSd, FBd; MMSdd, FFBsd,
MFBdd, FMSsd, MMBdd, FFSsd, 
MFSdd, FMBsd; MMMSddd, etc., 
when older than Ego.- 
khe?ke:? , "my younger sister" Same, when younger than Ego
akya:?se:?, "my cousin"
he:awak, "my son"
khe:awak, "my daughter"
heye :wo:te?, "my nephew" 
hehso?neh, "my nephew" 
kheye :wo:te?, "my niece"
MBs, FSs; MMSss, FFBds, MFBss, 
FMSds, MMBS3, FFSds, MFSss, 
FMBds; MMMSdss, etc.; and MBd, 
FSd; MMSsd, FFBdd, MFBsd,
FMSdd, MMBsd, FFSdd, MFSsd, 
FMBdd; MMMSdsd, etc. 
s; Bs; MSss, FBss, MBss, FSss; 
MMSdss, etc, of a man; but: 
s; Ss; MSds, FBds, MBds, FSds; 
MMSdds, etc., of a woman, 
d; Bd; MSsd, FBsd, MBsd, FSsd; 
MMSdsd, etc., of a man; but: 
d; Sd; MSdd, FBdd, MBdd, FSdd; 
MMSddd, etc., of a woman.
Ss; MSds, FBds, MBds, FSds; 
MMSdds, etc., of ayman.
Bs; MSss, FBss, MBss, FSss; 
MMSdss, etc., of a woman.
Sd; MSdd,. FBdd, MBdd, FSdd; 
MMSddd, etc. of a man.
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khehso?neh, "my niece" Bd; MSsd, FBsd, MBsd, FSsd;
MMSdsd, etc., of a woman. 
heya:te? , "my grandson" ss, ds; Bss, Bds, Sss , Sds;
FBsss, etc.; Also sss, dds, etc. 
kheya:te?, "my granddaughter” sd, dd; Bsd, Bdd, Ssd, Sdd;
FBssd, etc.; also ssd, ddd, 
etc. (1)
Morganrs own tabulation is based on descent lines, the 
crucial point in his definition of a classificatory system.
He distinguishes six groups: the lineal line, four collateral 
lines, and marriage relatives. The Seneca word labelled 
"grandfather" (hoc/-sote) in Morgan’s transcription) thus 
appears four times in his list (1871: 167-169) :
- in the lineal line as: FaFaFaFa, FaFaFa, FaFa.
- in the third collateral line as: FaFaBr, MoMoBr*
- in the fourth collateral line as: FaFaFaBr, FaFaFaBrSo, 
MoMoMoBr, MoMoMoBrSo.
- among the marriage relatives as: WiFaFa.
Having established what exactly constitutes a classificatory 
system, and having established equally that this system is 
found all over North America, Morgan goes on to prove his 
second point: the unity of origin. Four explanations are
1. Since Morgan it is customary to reckon kinship relations 
from an Ego since "each person is the centre around whom 
a group of consanguinei is arranged" (op.cit.: 15).
The abbreviations used to indicate relatives vary among 
authors, but basically they are the first letters of 
the English kinship terms. The difficult point is the 
distinction between "sister" and "son"; ways of solving 
this are:
S vs. s (so in Lounsbury)
Z vs. S 
Si vs. So.
I adopt the last convention but when quoting from authors 
I shall do so in the convention they use.
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possible for the similarity of system (op.cit.; ^95 f•3 
and 500 ff.) :
- by borrowing from each other: but domestic 
institutions are not propagated by borrowing*
~ by accidental invention in disconnected areas:
but as there are only two major types ~ descriptive 
and classificatory - chance cannot possibly be a 
sufficient explanation.
- by spontaneous growth in disconnected areas under 
the influence of suggestions springing from similar 
wants in similar conditions of society. Here Morgan 
begs the question, he rejects this possibility as 
difficult to reconcile with the evolutionary sequence 
which is part of his final conclusion.
- by transmission with the blood from a common original 
source. Assuming that there are no other possibilities 
but these four, and accepting that the other three
are unacceptable as explanations (all of which Morgan 
does assume), this fourth solution is a foregone 
conclusion.
Kinship terminology plays a crucial part in Morgan's 
reasoning. He assumes that at some time, 
when a system of relationship is initially developed, a 
terminology is adopted which fits in with the social system. 
Moreover he assumes that "once [a system] had come into 
practical use, with its nomenclature adopted, and its 
method of description or classification settled, it would, 
from the nature of the case, be very slow to change" (op.cit.: 
15): in other words, the form of a set of terms may change
14
with time3 but its meaning i.e. its descriptive or 
classificatory structure, will remain pretty well stable.
Of course, Morgan was not interested primarily in language, 
he wanted to explain the different systems of relation­
ship embodied in sets of kin terms, he was interested in 
reconstructing history, the path of evolution, and he 
thought he could do so from the kinship terminologies and 
at the same time explain the variations in kinship termin­
ology that we now find (cf. Tax, 1955: 499)* This is 
what Tax calls Morgan's circular argument (ibid., p.457): 
that kinship terms can be used to reconstruct history 
because they remain constant, that they must remain 
constant because they are structurally the same among 
people who once were one and who have otherwise changed, 
and that these people once must have been one because 
they have the same kinship system.
2.1.2 I would say "that any argument of a hypothetical 
nature like the one Morgan develops at great length, can 
easily look circular. The test as to its validity would 
depend on two things: whether it is carried through to
its proper conclusion by verification against established 
facts, and whether the implicit assumptions, present in 
most arguments, are not positively wrong.
The verification of Morgan's thesis has to be done 
by anthropologists as his main thesis is anthropological. 
While there is much in his work of lasting value, -his 
basic evolutionist theory does not stand up to the con­
frontation with the facts.: ”0n the whole, the ethnographic 
evidence fails signally to support the evolutionist 
contention that the matrilineate is primitive, the
patrilineate intermediate, and bilateral descent 
associated with higher civilization” (Murdock, 1949: 
186 - 18?).1
As to Morgan’s implicit assumptions, I would like 
to concentrate on the ones about language in as far as 
these can be deduced from the scant references to this 
subject in his book. Briefly this is what his thoughts 
boil down to. A system of relationships is invented to 
regulate relations between a group of human beings; 
basically two such systems have evolved. Each system 
adopts a nomenclature to express the relationships which 
obtain within it. Morgan cannot conceive how the class­
ificatory system as a social system could change into 
the descriptive system; and, he sees the terminological 
systems as equally stable: "A change of any of these
relationships, or a subversion of any of the terms invented 
to express them, would be extremely difficult if not 
impossible; and it would be scarcely less difficult to 
enlarge or contract the established use of the terms 
themselves" (op.cit.,p.15)» Every person who speaks the 
common language is as it were the trustee of the system.
It would seem that If changes in the terminology do take 
place, it will be, in the case of the descriptive system,
1. This is a different way of stating what Morgan (op.cit. 
480) presents as the evolution from Promiscuous inter­
course via the Communal Family, the Tribal Organization 
the Barbarian Family, and the Patriarchal Family, into 
the Civilized Family in the case of the classificatory 
system, with the nuclear family of the descriptive 
system quite separate from this.
that descriptive terms worn out by long usage, are 
being replaced by compound terras, and, in the case 
of the classificatory system, that changes probably 
only lead to greater complexity in line with the 
existing system. An evolutionary sequence of the 
various stages starting from Promiscuous Intercourse 
is postulated for the classificatory type: while this 
kind of change occurs only very slowly and at long 
Intervals, language which Is indicative of the system, 
is subject to a continuous process of very gradual 
change. But even when the form of language thus changes, 
the ideas and conceptions they represent are independent 
of the mutations of language. Where philology has been 
unable to solve the problem of the linguistic unity of 
mankind by conclusive linguistic evidence, the constancy 
of the systems of relationship might help provide the 
answer, (cf. Morgan, 1871: esp. 14,15*506).
2.1.3 As we progress in this historical survey we
shall see how his theory has been challenged on various 
points: his circular reasoning, his major distinction 
between descriptive and classificatory systems itself 
or Its rigidity and oversimplification, his use of kin 
terms as an argument. For the moment I would simply like 
to make a few general observations from the linguistic 
point of view.
While Morgan works on the meaning of kin 
terms disregarding their form, he draws conclusions as 
to genetic links between language communities. This 
goes right against the concept and method of philology.
A genetic classification must be based on criteria of 
sound-meaning resemblances of linguistic forms: only 
then are the results unequivocally conclusive as to 
any genetic link. When one works equally on the basis 
of criteria of sound without meaning or of meaning 
without sound (as Morgan does), the result will be a 
typological classification. Such a classification can 
be trivial or of great value but is always arbitrary in 
the sense that any criterion or combination of criteria 
may be used provided they are clearly defined. In fact 
it would seem that Morgan uses mainly one criterion, 
the classification of collateral kin as embodied in the 
meaning of kinship' terminological systems: from this 
typological argument he draws genetic conclusions.
Morgan seems to suggest that a system of 
relationships develops and that subsequently a terminology 
for it is adopted. In my view language is what makes 
the human animal human; consequently I would not accept 
that anything human could develop separate from language, 
ideas are not operative unless they are, in some way, 
verbalised. Moreover I would hold that relationships 
within groups of human beings are, In the same way as 
language is, co-extensive in time with mankind itself: 
any theory about the origin of kinship terminologies would 
for all practical purposes coincide with, or at least be 
part of, a theory about the origin of language. Any such 
theory is, in the present state of our knowledge, meaningless.
It is implied that adequate nomenclatures are 
adopted for each type of kin classification. But as the
formal aspect of the terms is left out of consideration, 
there is no way in which the value of recognised lingu­
istic mechanisms can be assessed, such as metaphor, the 
use of sound-symbolism, processes of association, the 
use of compounding. As for the process of language 
change, the possibility of change in vocabulary 
through borrowing is dismissed far too lightly, and 
inversely the fact that sometimes lexical items just 
cease to be used and disappear from the lexicon of a 
language is not even considered. In connection with this 
it is important to state that proof *e silentio linguarum’, 
from the absence of linguistic categories or linguistic 
forms, must be handled with extreme caution, and never be 
considered absolute by itself. Even if one is careful 
and avoids sweeping statements and global solutions where 
the facts do not warrant anything of the kind, all one may 
be able to conclude to might be that at some time certain 
common concepts did exist. But one does not know anything 
more precise yet as to the exact nature of such concepts, 
e.g. the content of a certain relationship. The temptation 
Is always there to simply identify It with the present-day 
meaning. Somehow it seems much more relevant, even in a 
historical perspective, to ask, not at what precise 
moment language and culture did match on this or any other 
point, but what the nature of their relationship was.
2.2 John Ferguson McLennan.
2.2.1 Although John F. McLennan published his work
Primitive Marriage in 1865, six years ahead of Morgan's 
Systemsi , I have preferred to discuss his contribution 
after Morgan's for reasons which will soon become clear.
At first McLennan did not discuss kinship at all when
he studied social organisation: his main interest lay in
the evolution of marriage and types of descent. In this 
respect he Is one of the most influential forerunners 
together with J,J. Bachofen who published his 'Das Mutterr- 
echt in 1861. While Bachofen took a more theoretical 
line , McLennan broke new ground by basing himself on ethno­
graphic material, accounts of strange customs brought back 
by an ever increasing number of travellers. The view he
so arrived at was that marriage started from promiscuity;
gradually this led to polyandry. This situation came to 
be experienced in due course as a lack of women, which led 
to women being captured from neighbouring groups. It was 
this custom of marriage by capture which in McLennan*s view 
constituted the beginning of marriage proper.
McLennan did not discuss kinship In his work; 
but when he read Morgan's Systems- where a different 
account was given of the evolution of marriage, he was 
forced to consider Morgan's arguments based on kinship 
terminology, and thereby to state his interpretation of 
Morgan's ethnographic facts. He did this in Studies in 
Ancient History , published in a new edition in 1886, in 
which Primitive Marriage was reprinted. Morgan’s work 
is discussed in a study, entitled "The Classificatory 
System of Relationships" (p.247-315)* We shall only 
report here on his reflections which would seem to have
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some bearing on the problem of kinship terminology.
He interprets Morgan’s views on classificatory 
terms as implying a claim that several persons are referred 
to by only one term (e.g. in the Hawaiian system all 
the women relatives in the generation above Ego are 
called "mother") because the languages in question lack 
terms to denominate their exact relation to Ego. McLennan 
refuses to accept this view: "This is an explanation on
the ground of poverty of language (of which no proof is 
adduced - nay more, which there are facts to disprove), 
not an explanation from the nature of descents" (1886: 259). 
McLennan does not deny the facts, but he would seem to have 
hit implicitly on such notions as ’structure* and ’balance* 
when he said about the Hawaiian system: "While the language 
is thus poor in terms to denote persons of the highest 
importance in a system of blood-ties, it is rich in terras 
required in a nomenclature of courtesies" (ibid.,279* foot­
note 3) *
McLennan*s main contention was that Morgan was 
wrong "to have so lightly assumed the [classificatory] 
system to be a system of blood-ties" (ibid. 269). Even 
if one - as McLennan himself does - accepts an original 
phase of promiscuity, one cannot help feeling that McLennan 
is right in saying that there could be no difficulty in 
proving conclusively a blood-tie at least with the mother: 
if therefore the classificatory term ’mother’ is given to 
other women as well, it will not be on the basis of some 
blood-tie. And anyhow, there are in the ways in which 
various peoples trace descent, sufficient means to indicate
blood-ties so as not to. have to rely on classificatory 
terms to fulfill this function. This leads him to 
this ’nomenclature of courtesies': "What duties or 
rights are affected by the ’relationships' comprised 
in the classificatory system? Absolutely none. They 
are barren of consequences, except indeed as comprising 
a code of courtesies and ceremonial addresses in social 
intercourse" (ibid. 273). This is not Just a way of 
getting round an awkward; problem, he sees positive 
reasons for his interpretation. "In their intercourse 
they must have terms by which to address one another; 
and personal/individual names not being in use - an 
invincible prejudice against the use of them being 
general among backward races - the terms employed must 
be general terms, applicable ’to the members of the family 
in classes’ " (ibid. 283). This reluctance to use proper 
names was observed by Morgan too among the American Indians 
(op.cit.: 132). McLennan thought that what was required 
for use in address were terms which were fairly general 
and which at the same time took into account the age and 
sex of the person speaking in relation to the age and sex 
of the person spoken to. And the answer to this need he 
saw in the classificatory system. To illustrate his 
view he refers to the so-called Hawaiian type of class­
ification in which type all cousins are equated with 
brother and sister which makes for generality, while all 
the men of the first ascending generation are grouped 
together as are the women of that same generation. This 
generalisation can go far: In the case of the Fanti of
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Ghana even sex is not always specified in Ego’s genera­
tion, as is shown in the following table:
Female Ego Male Ego
G +2 nana ’grand relative’
G +1 egya Fa
na . Mo
wo.fa MoBr
G 0 nua ’sibling’ nua ’sibling’
akynraba ’sister’
G -1 ba 'child' ba ’child’
awofasi 'sister’s child’ 
G -2 nana ’grand relative’
(Kronenfeld, 1973: 1579)
Elsewhere an age distinction is made within Ego’s gener­
ation, but only a partial sex differentiation (for elder 
siblings) while no distinction is made between brothers 
and sisters on the one hand, and cousins cn the other, 
e.g. the Njamal of North Western Australia:
Kurda EBr, FaBrESo, MoSiESo, etc.
Turda ESi, FaBrEDa, MoSiEDa, etc.
Marage YSi, YBr, FaBrYSo, FaBrYDa, MoSiYSo,
MoSiYDa, etc.
(Burling, 1970 b: 22)
The first ascending generation is sometimes purely 
generational, .in other cases it is of the type called 
’bifurcate merging’ grouping together Fa and FaBr, and Mo 
and MoSi, while singling out MoBr and FaSi.
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: Samoa (cf. Panoff, 1965: 63)
Here the generational terms cover both the 1st 
and 2nd generations.
Tama FaFa, FaPaBr, FaMoBr, MoFa, MoFaBr, MoMoBr;
Pa, FaBr; HuPa, WiFa; eBr (when the 
difference in age with Ego is 15 years or 
more)»
Tina FaMo, FaMoSi, PaPaSi; M0M0 , MoMoSi, MoFaSi;
Mo, MoSi; HuMo, WiMo; eSi (when the 
difference in age with Ego is 15 years or 
more).
Futuna (cf. Panoff, 1965: 72)
This Polynesian system illustrates the bifurcate 
merging type.
Matua Pa, Mo, and all relatives of the first
ascending generation 
Tamana Fa, FaBr; MoSiHu
Tinana Mo, MoSi; FaBrWi
Tuatinana MoBr 
Masaki FaSi
The range of meaning in the bifurcate merging type is not 
the same everywhere, as the following data from the Mara 
in Australia show:
(cf. Korn, 1973, 117, after Warner, 1933) 
lur-lu F, FB
kai-djir-ri M, MZ “
bar-nan-a FZ 
gar-di-gar-di .MB , MBSS , MBSD
While Morgan continued to' maintain that kin terms were
never used except between people who knew they were
each otherfs relations, and never used by such people
except to denote that relationship, McLennan could quote
many ethnographic accounts stating explicitly the
contrary, beginning with a quotation from Lafitau:
nEn se parlant les uns aux autres,^Lls 
se^donnent tous des noms de parente, de 
frere, de soeur, d'oncle, de neveu, etc., 
observant exactement les degres de 
subordination et^toufes Tes proportions de 
I 1 age & moins qu* il n'y'alt une parente ' 
reel'le par le sang ou par ^adoption. ...
Ils gratiquent la meme civilite a l'egard 
des etrangers, k qui ils donnent, en leur 
parlant, des noms de consanguinite, comme 
s'il y avait une vraie liaison du sang, plus 
proche ou plus eloignee a proportion de l Thonneur 
quTils veulent leur faire” (cf. McLennan, 1886: 
306) .
2.2.2 A few short observations and comments would 
seem appropriate with regard to what I consider to be an 
extremely interesting contribution to the subject. First 
of all it is worth noticing that a new concept is brought 
in: address. Later on it will be generally accepted to 
make a distinction in kinship terminology between terms 
of reference and terms of address. For many languages 
this distinction is not of great importance: it is often 
the case that there are no specific terms of address, only 
a way of using some kin terms (or special forms of kin 
terms) as terms of address, though there may be terms which 
are on the whole used more often in address than in refer­
ence. This would seem to be a matter deserving of more 
attention, whether the distinction between reference and 
address is necessary or at least useful, or whether the
differences can be dealt with as a matter of usage.
The question of use vs. reference is an important one 
which arises in any study of semantics which pays 
attention to contextual and situational factors. And 
once one starts taking into, account non~linguistic 
factors, it may well prove necessary to consider the 
distinction- between semantics and pragmatics in this 
context and to try and see if the distinction is a 
necessary and useful one or if it needs re-definition 
to be acceptable. As in systems of address kin terms 
alternate or combine with proper names, the status of 
proper names and their position vis-a-vis common nouns 
may have to be considered. Social factors of role and 
status, and psychological factors of intimacy and respect, 
distance, may come up in this connection. The issues 
raised by McLennan*s views deserve serious consideration, 
for if he is right in claiming that classificatory 
relationship systems have no consequences whatsoever 
for the social system, the whole hypothesis of linguistic 
relativity would become more difficult to define and 
formulate since the case of kinship terminology and its 
social relevance is normally regarded as one of its best 
examples in the lexical domain.
2.3 Frana Boas.
2.3.1 The contribution made by F. Boas to our field 
of interest is twofold: as an anthropologist he examined 
critically and, to a large extent, refuted, the methods
and assumptions of his predecessors; and as a student . 
of American Indian languages he developed interesting 
views on the relation between language and culture, 
on ethnolinguistics.
The 19th century was the century of history, 
and Boas who began his scientific career in that century, 
subscribed to the importance of the historical point of 
view.
"We may perhaps best define our objective 
as the attempt to understand the steps 
by which man has come to be what he is, 
biologically, psychologically, and 
culturally. Thus it appears at once 
that our material must necessarily be 
historical material, historical in the 
widest sense of the term" (1932: 244).
"To understand a phenomenon we have to 
know not only what it is, but also how 
it came Into being. Our problem is 
historical" (1936: 305).
But this does not mean that he made this historical bias
his without any reservation or change. For while he
accepted the historical point of view, he rejected the
evolutionary variety of it.
"The evolutionary point of view pre­
supposes that the course of historical 
changes in the cultural life of mankind 
follows definite laws which are applicable 
everyxvhere, and which bring it about 
that cultural development is, in its main 
lines, the same among all races and all 
peoples" (1920b;28l).
He sees it as a misleading principle to assume that wherever
similarities of culture are found, there must have been
connections: it is a hypothesis which simply cannot be
proved and therefore is without foundation and usefulness.
Others had pointed out this weakness before him; but in
order to account for the similarities of culture found all
over the worid, some scientists, had introduced a
different historical explanation, viz. that such
similarities must always be due to migration and
diffusion. As Boas points out, this explanation too
rests on unproven and unprovable assumptions and hence
must be considered as of no value. He enumerates some of
its weaknesses:
"On this basis historical contact is 
demanded for enormously large areas.
The theory demands a high degree of 
stability of cultural traits such as is 
apparently observed in many primitive 
tribes, and it is furthermore based on 
the supposed coexistence of a number of 
diverse and mutually Independent cultural 
traits which reappear in the same combin­
ations in distant parts of the world"
(ibid.: 282).
His own approach to history .is much more careful. He too 
wants to trace the history of growth of human culture, 
but before feeling able to deal with such a vast subject 
he first wants to establish histories of growth of diverse 
tribes, based on fact, not on hypothesis or speculation. 
This means: to take account of whole cultures, not just 
the one aspect under observation in isolation, and to take 
account of the geographical situation of a tribe among 
other tribes as a possible factor of explanation. It is 
then that the various elements which may have helped to 
shape a history of growth, will become clear: the environ­
mental conditions with their modifying influence, psychol­
ogical factors at work In the development of a culture, 
and historical connections. In this manner anthropology 
will be able to discover the processes which in definite 
cases led to the development of certain customs. This
alone will provide a sound enough basis for further 
comparison and generalization, (cf. Boas, 1896: 270-280). 
2.3-2 Boas1 thoughts about the relation between 
language and culture are stated very clearly and succinctly 
in his Introduction to the Handbook of American Indian 
Languages (1911). He first discusses the various 
attempts to establish classifications of mankind (op.cit.:
2 ff.), and he points out that classifications have been 
made on the basis of anatomical characteristics, of culture, 
and of language, with very different results. One would 
obviously want to correlate these various classifications 
but this proves impossible as the three aspects develop 
and change at a different rate. We see at present cases 
where the physical type has not changed noticeably while 
language and culture have changed completely according 
to geographical position: the clearest example Is that
of the Negro population of the various parts of the 
American continent. Alternatively the language can main­
tain its special position while the physical type changes 
and adapts to the environment: the standard example
are the Magyar speaking people. Even If both language 
and physical type change at the same time, such changes 
do not necessarily run parallel to one another as is 
proved in the case of the Arab conquest of North Africa 
where the Arabs kept their language but through inter­
marriage were Immersed into the local population gmd 
changed their type, while the original population preserved 
their type but changed their language. Finally we see 
many examples where physical type and language remain
permanent while culture changes, through diffusion:
Boas gives here as one of his examples California 
where we find great diversity of language and a certain 
degree of differentiation of physical type, with a 
considerable uniformity of culture.
While this is the present day picture, it 
might still be possible to assume an original close 
association of type, language, and culture: but there
Is nothing to prove such an assumption of close correl­
ation, it is not even plausible given the fact that we do 
see now that language changes more rapidly than physical 
type, and this Is even more true of culture. Not only is 
it impossible then to establish any correlation, there 
may never even have been one.
Boas* extreme caution in formulating explanatory 
theories for social phenomena and in assessing the 
relationship between language and culture did not prevent 
him from trying to define his view of the matter; and 
in doing so, he also mentioned the study of kinship terms. 
Towards the end of his Introduction (1911: 52 ff.) he 
speaks of the special importance which should be attached 
to the study of language in the work of an ethnologist, 
not only for practical reasons but also from a theoretical 
point of view. First there is the problem of language 
and thought, i.e. the question whether all languages are 
capable of dealing with abstract thought, or whether 
restrictions stemming from the language could hold a 
culture down at a level of lesser cultural sophistication. 
Boas concludes quite rightly that any such direct relation 
between language and culture Is very unlikely. At the most
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one might say that a language does not produce linguistic 
forms which are not required in the general state of a 
culture. One could almost call this a beginning of 
functionalismj where he says; nIt seems much more likely 
that the lack of these forms is due to the lack of their 
need" (loc.cit,: 53-5^)*
While ruling out a direct relation of a 
relativist nature, Boas, with all his usual caution and 
reservation, comes up with an explanation of how the 
understanding of linguistic categories and elements can 
be useful in understanding ethnological phenomena (loc. 
cit.: 56 ff.). The essential difference between lingu­
istic and ethnological phenomena is, that the linguistic 
classifications never rise into consciousness, while 
in other ethnological phenomena, although the same 
unconscious origin prevails, these often rise into 
consciousness3 and thus give rise to secondary reason­
ing and to re-interpretations. Both the linguistic 
and the ethnological phenomena have in common the 
feature of grouping together a considerable number of 
activities under the form of a single idea, without the
1
necessity of this idea itself entering into consciousness. 
But while in ethnology secondary explanations often tend to 
obscure the real history of the development of ideas, the 
categories in language always remain unconscious, and so
1. It is not difficult to see some similarity here with 
the theories of E . Durkheim for whom society is in 
essence a complex of ideas: collective life is made
up of representations, collective representations, 
i.e. ways of acting, thinking, sensing, which are 
external to the individual, and these exist in the 
collective conscience.
the processes which led to their formation can be
followed without the interference of secondary explanation. 
For this reason It is worthwhile to analyse linguistic 
concepts and to see how each language has its peculiar 
way of grouping ideas; this applies not only to the 
morphological-grammatical characteristics, but also to 
the vocabulary. In connection with this last aspect Boas 
says:
"Inferences based on peculiar forms of 
classification of ideas, and due to the 
fact that a whole group of distant ideas 
are expressed by a single term, occur 
commonly in the terms of relationship of 
various languages; as, for instance, in 
our term uncle, which means the two 
distinct classes of father's brother and 
mother’s brother. Here also, It is 
commonly assumed that the linguistic 
expression is a secondary reflex of the 
customs of the people; but the question 
is quite open In how far the one phenomenon 
is the primary one and the other the
secondary one, and whether the customs of
the people 'have not rather developed from 
the unconsciously developed terminology"
(1911: 60-61).
To show how customs might have developed from language,
Boas refers to cases In which the use of descriptive terms
for certain concepts, or the metaphorical use of terms,
has led to peculiar views or customs:
"it seems plausible to my mind, for 
Instance, that the terms of relationship 
by which some of the eastern Indian tribes 
designate one another were originally 
nothing but a metaphorical use of these 
terms, and that the further elaboration 
of the social relations of the tribes 
may have been largely determined by trans­
ferring the ideas accompanying these terms 
into practice" (1911: 61).
When we look at Boas’ actual treatment' of social 
organisation including kinship terminology, we are faced
with a picture which is not wholly consistent or clear.
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In one place he says: "The fundamental difference 
between the organisation of the Kwakiutl and the northern 
tribes appears also in the terminology of relationship",
"The terms correspond to a loose organisation in which 
relationship is counted equally on both sides" (192Qa:368). 
These quotations seem a fairly neutral way of stating 
that there is some link between language and culture on 
this point without specifying the direction of dependence, 
if any. In another article on the Tribes of the North 
Pacific Coast (1924) he is less careful, though perhaps 
unintentionally. At one point he says: "These differences 
are expressed in the systems of the terms of relationship" 
(loc.cit.: 371)3 implying, I would have thought, that 
the differences in social structure precede the terminologies 
which express these, while a bit later he speaks of "the 
terminology of relationship which underlies the social 
system of the Bella'Bella and of the more northern Kwakiutl 
tribes" (ibid. 373). Unless I read too much into the word 
'underlies1, Boas here seems to have inverted the order 
of precedence. The least one can say is that he did not 
really apply his full critical attention to the problem 
of linguistic relativity, notwithstanding his earlier 
theory - quoted above - of transferring ideas contained 
in terms into social practice. Anyhow, even this idea 
of metaphorical extension as the starting point for a new 
social practice, is not adhered to very consistently.
When discussing the origin of totemism he clearly holds 
that a social fact - the desire to be able to identify 
an incest group - is at the root of a set of kin terms
being extended in meaning (cf. 1916: 321). When he 
discusses the Relationship system of the Vandau of Mozambique 
(1922), he speaks again of the system of relationship 
terms being "founded on the following principles", and 
goes on to enumerate social factors, mainly questions of 
status and role. But to be fair I think it might well be 
that, as a rule, he does not Intend to discuss the 
question of linguistic relativity and in particular the 
matter of priority between language and culture. He 
clearly accepts that there is some sort of correspondence, 
and as he appears to be a social scientist first and . 
foremost, his reasoning usually starts from the social 
side. But even so he remains cautious: kinship terms are 
for him only one ethnological factor, one cultural feature 
among others. And while he accepts some correspondence, 
he never does so In an absolute way, drawing general 
conclusions from what Is only one aspect; he always is 
very factual and intent on relativising his conclusions by 
taking into account all known facts. As he said for 
instance at the end of his study of the Vandau relationship 
system: "I am far from maintaining that the present 
explanation corresponds to the historical development 
of the system" (loc.cit.: 395). What he did prove was 
that one of the generalizations of the evolutionists, viz. 
that avunculate^ always goes with maternal succession, 
is not true in its absoluteness.
1. Avunculate: the rights and duties the maternal uncle
has towards his sister's sons, and his power over them.
2*3*3 In conclusion we can say that Boas brought 
the issue of language and culture, including that of 
kinship terminology, down from the level of speculative 
history and unwarranted hypothesis, to that of fact 
and verification* While admitting that evolutionism 
and diffusionism were the wrong kind of theory, one 
would not want to rule out theory and hypothesis altogether. 
But it Is quite clear that we must know what the theory is 
supposed to explain. We need, in other words, a clear 
picture of our problem, based on fact. Boas, by his 
painstaking analytical work, has made contributions of 
Importance here. The notions of metaphor and even more 
so of extension will gradually become crucial issues in 
the study of kinship terminology. And in his analysis of 
the Vandau system he mentions such things as forms of 
address, social rank,and respect owed, all of them notions 
which play a role In the on-going debate on the nature of 
kin terms and the correct way of analysing them.
2.4 Edward Sapir.
2.4.1 The name of Edward Sapir is one which must 
figure in any study concerned with problems of language 
and culture: some of his ideas are at the basis of what 
has come to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. In 
fact, as we have seen, Boas too had formulated similar 
thoughts in his Introduction (1911: esp.6l), but it was 
left to Whorf to try and work out a concrete model of 
the dependence of thought and culture on language, working
on the basis of a comparison between the grammatical 
forms and categories of Hopi and SAE. It is too easily 
forgotten that Whorf's hypothesis had nothing final 
about it: as Stuart Chase said In his Introduction to
Whorf's Selected Writings (Whorf, 1956: P*X), Whorf 
definitely felt that more research was needed and "theor­
etically this might mean the end of linguistic relativity". 
Sapir's thinking has nothing final about it either. On 
the contrary, one often feels that he is still trying to 
find a balance, so much so that some of the things he 
saidt seem almost contradictory.
There is no doubt that some of his writings 
point to linguistic relativity:
"Language Is not merely a more or less 
systematic Inventory of the various Items 
of experience which seem relevant to the 
Individual, as is so often naively 
assumed, but is also a self-contained, 
creative '-symbolic organization, which not 
only refers to experience largely acquired 
without its help but actually defines 
experience for us by reason of Its formal 
completeness and because of our unconscious 
projection of its implicit expectations 
into the field of experience" (Sapir, 1931:
128) .
"It Is quite an illusion to imagine that 
one adjusts to reality essentially without 
the use of language and that language is 
merely an incidental means of solving 
specific problems of communication or 
reflection. The fact of the matter Is 
that the 'real world* is to a large extent 
unconsciously built up on the language 
habits of the group. ... The worlds In which 
different societies live are distinct 
worlds, not merely the same world with ; 
different labels attached" (1929: 162).
Whether Sapir changed his mind on the subject or whether
he simply approached the same problem from totally opposite
angles and never really got round to reconciling the two,
I do not know. What is certain is that, when, he
published Language • in 1921, he stressed mainly the
negative point of view: "It is easy to show that language
and culture are not intrinsically associated" (1921: 213).
In that tenth chapter of Language he develops an
argument similar to the one of Boas on the distinction
between race, language, and culture. Language, he argues,
Is not related to "national temperament" or race (op.cit.:
216 ff.)3 nor is language in any way causally related
with culture (op.cit.: 218). But the fact that they are
not necessarily correlated, does not mean that they never
are. "There is some tendency, as a matter of fact, for
racial and cultural lines of cleavage to correspond to
linguistic ones" (op.cit.: 215). However, Sapir makes
it quite clear what he sees as the Importance of such
coincidences of racial, cultural, and linguistic divisions
"[their] significance is not one of inherent psychological
relation ... The coincidences of cleavage point merely to
a readily intelligible historical association" (op.cit.:
216). So we are back again with the historical Interest,
but with a word of caution, for history of culture and
history of language are non-comparable processes:
"The drift of culture, another way of 
saying history, is a complex series 
of changes in society's selected inventory 
- additions, losses, changes of emphasis 
and relation. The drift of language Is 
not properly concerned with changes of 
content at all, merely with changes in 
formal expression" (op.cit.: 218).
Two words In this last quotation are worth
noting, viz. 'content* and 'formal expression*. The
correlations Sapir is talking about, are between cultural
traits and linguistic features of grammar and morphology:
this is clear both in his 'pro-relativity' article from
1931 and in Language■ (p.219). But in Language he
then continues:
"It goes without saying that the 
mere content (emphasis mine) of 
language is intimately related to 
culture. ... In the sense that the 
vocabulary of a language more or less 
faithfully reflects the culture whose 
purposes it serves it is perfectly true 
that the history of language and the 
history of culture move along parallel 
lines."
However, Sapir calls this kind of parallelism "superficial
and extraneous and of no real Interest to the linguist".
It would be a mistake for a linguist, he says, to identify
a language with Its dictionary. Still, this statement too
is mellowed somewhat, again in a perspective of history:
"Many cultural objects and ideas have 
been diffused in connection with their 
terminology: so that a study of the 
distribution of culturally significant 
terms often throws unexpected light on 
the history of inventions and Ideas"
(1929: 162-163),
provided one does not pretend to trace history to its very 
origins:
"It may be that originally the primal 
cries or other types of symbols developed 
by man had some connection with certain 
emotions or attitudes or notions. But a 
connection is no longer directly traceable 
between words, or combinations of words, 
and what they refer to" (ibid.: 164).
2.4*2 Undoubtedly, Sapir's general ideas are of great
interest for our study. Fortunately we also have his
thoughts on the precise subject of kinship terminology
in his article "Terms of Relationship and the Levirate"
(1916). On the whole he subscribes to the main argument
developed by Rivers "that many groupings of kinship terms
are best understood as expressiye of particular types
of marriage" (loc.cit.: 327)* In a footnote he briefly
explains his personal view of the matter:
"Personally I believe that the factors 
governing kinship nomenclature are very 
complex and only in part capable of 
explanation on purely sociological 
grounds. In any event, I do not seriously 
believe that thoroughly satisfactory 
results can be secured without linguistic 
analysis of kinship terms. Moreover, 
for the proper historical perspective we 
must have some feeling for the lack of 
strict accord between linguistic and 
cultural change. This means that an 
existing nomenclature may be retained, at 
least for a time, in the face of sociol­
ogical developments requiring its modif­
ication. Direct sociological interpretation 
of descriptive kinship data may be as 
unhistorical as any other mode of direct 
interpretation of descriptive cultural 
facts".
More in particular he then goes on to deal with one 
specific form of marriage, the levirate1 , to see how it 
finds its expression in kinship nomenclature of two given 
groups of American Indians, the Upper Chinook in Southern 
Washington, and the Yahi (or Southern Yana) In northern 
California. One would expect the levirate to affect the 
terminology for step-relationships and filial and fraternal 
relationships, as potentially real relationships. In 
fact this potential identification is present in the 
terminology, for Instance:
- in Upper Chinook (loc.cit.: 329)
I-mut FaBr and StFa
• a-gutx MoSi and StMo
1. Levirate: a custom whereby a widow preferably marries 
a brother of her deceased husband.
i-wulx
a-wulx
BrSo (m.s.), SiSo (w.s.) and StSo 
BrDa (m.s.), SiDa (w.s.) and StDa
- in Yahi (loc.cit.; 330)
galsi Fa and FaBr
mucdi FaSi and BrSo or BrDa (w.s.)
ganna Mo ' and MoSi
u'dji'yauna MoBr and SiSo or SiDa (w.s.) 
’i'sipla So and BrSo (m.s.) + SiSo (w.s.)
mari’mipla Da and BrDa (m.s.) + SiDa (w.s.) 
Sapir*s data bear out a similar correspondence for terms 
for fraternal relationship while the Influence of the 
levirate also appears in Yahi terms of affinity.
The fact that the Southern Yana have this 
bifurcate merging system while Northern and Central Yana 
have distinct terms for each of the four types of uncle 
and aunt, confirms for Sapir that one has to look for 
some such influence’ as the levirate marriage to explain 
the special development in the case of the Yahi. How the 
Yahi came to attach such an importance to this form of 
marriage is a different problem; it probably is a matter 
of influence from outside, but lack of factual information 
makes it Impossible to verify this.
Sapir makes It very clear that, what is an 
acceptable explanation of a certain type of terminology in 
one case (as the levirate for the Upper Chinook or the 
Yahi), is not necessarily an explanation which therefore 
must hold generally for all cases with a similar termin­
ology. Each case has to be examined on its own merits and 
the most appropriate explanation be selected (loc.cit.: 335)* 
But he feels that It does show the importance of paying
attention to the terminology of step-relationship.
2.4.3 This is not the moment to give a full-scale 
evaluation of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, hut 
a few concluding remarks and observations seem indicated.
The question of the 'original meaning' keeps cropping up with 
the tension between what can be positively established as 
fact and what can be tentatively stated as working hypo­
thesis. Sapir does not oppose the two points of view in 
this way but I think he gives them all the same In different 
places. In his 1929 article (p.164) he said that a conn­
ection between words and what they refer to, is no longer 
directly traceable; in the 1931 one he wrote: "Such 
categories ... are, of course, derivative of experience at 
last analysis". He said this admittedly of grammatical 
categories, but I see no reason why not to understand it 
about language generally, especially as the linguistic 
relativity of grammatical categories Is commonly accepted 
to be the more difficult to establish. Reading Sapir 
against this contemporary background of the distinction 
between hypothesis and verified fact may well turn his 
sometimes seemingly self-contradictory statements into 
a useful starting point and source of inspiration for 
further research.
In the passage I just quoted from the 1931 
article, Sapir said that categories were "derivative of 
experience", and he continues:
"but, once abstracted from experience, 
they are systematically elaborated in 
language and are not so much discovered 
in experience as Imposed upon it because 
of the tyrannical hold that linguistic 
form has upon our orientation of the 
world".
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Sapir here clearly points to. language's own structure 
in its systematization of fundamental concepts from the 
grammatical point of view* This notion of structure 
has since been applied to vocabulary as well, e.g. in 
linguistic field theory. X think this insight must 
affect the validity of Sapir’s opinion on the relevance 
of vocabulary in establishing a parallelism between 
language and culture. In . Language (1921: 219) he deems 
vocabulary as "of no real interest”. While one might 
agree that isolated lexical items are of little or no 
interest in this respect, lexical structure must be 
given much more serious attention.
A last remark: Sapir, in his study on relation­
ship terms, makes much of step-relationshlps. Whenever 
one sees this labelling of terms of very different systems 
in terms of their nearest English equivalents, one feels 
hesitant because of the ever-present danger of interpreting 
the other'system in function of one’s own system Instead 
of evaluating it as a system in its own right. And I see 
a link here with another problem, viz. the question: which 
terms are kin terms? Do we define them with reference to 
blood-ties basically and consider non-blood-tie relations 
as extensions, or do we define them socially? And, if 
the latter, how do we avoid circularity In explaining a 
system by reference to social factors if we define the 
set of our terms socially in the first place? Whatever 
the answer to these questions is going to be, I would like 
to give Sapir credit for stimulating reflection on these 
matters.
2.5 Alfred Louis Kroeber.
2.5.1 The importance of A.L. Kroeberfs work in
connection with the study of kinship terminology lies
in the fact that he continued to stress the value of
the historical view-point throughout a time when
structuralists and functionalists made their Impact
with new and enlightening theories (cf. below Ch.3),
while he drew attention at the same time to what were to
become some of the basic orientations and concepts of
modern formalism.
Kroeber!s claims for the value of the historical
approach were less exclusive than those made in the 19th
century. In a discussion with Radcliffe-Brown on the
subject he is quite ready to admit that a different approach
can be justified though he 'had obviously given a different
impression before. >
,fWhat I should have expressed was my 
conviction that the factors at work in 
the phenomena in question are numerous 
and variable enough to make It seem 
highly questionable whether determinations 
of constants other than of narrow range or 
vague nature can be made, or at any rate 
have yet been made, while historical 
considerations are omitted" (Kroeber, 1936:
338).
One year later he made a similar claim for the necessity 
of a historical dimension to any really valuable study 
of kinship systems, this time from the angle of linguistic 
history: "the analysis and comparison of such systems 
without reference to their linguistic history, so far as 
this may be available, is an arbitrary limitation on 
understanding" (1937: 607). All this fits in with his
view of the aim of the investigation of human society
or culture: to determine the constants, the abstractions
extricated from phenomena as they occur in space, time,
and variety of character (cf. 1936: 3^1). As far as
linguistic history is concerned his interest was in turn
predominantly typological, areal, or genetic.
2.5.2 What has been said here about his historical
orientation in his study of culture in general applies
equally to the study of kinship: "the patterns have had
each a history of Its own as a pattern, just as the
languages in which they occur have had each a history of
its own'1 (1952: 200). I think that this thought that
each system has a pattern of its own, is crucial for a
correct appreciation of Kroe.ber’s Important article,
"Classificatory Systems of Relationship" (1909). In it
he wants to show that Morgan’s basic distinction between
classificatory and- descriptive systems is wrong:
"According to the prevalent belief 
the systems of certain nations or 
languages group together distinct 
relationships and call them by one 
name, and are therefore classifying.
Other systems of consanguinity are 
said to indicate secondary differences 
of relationship by descriptive epithets 
added to their primary terms, and to be 
therefore descriptive. Nothing can be 
more fallacious than this common view"
(1909: 77).
It Is true that, understood in this sense, such English 
kinship terms as brother, uncle, cousin, etc., are class­
ificatory because they do not distinguish elder and 
younger brother, paternal and maternal uncle, all possible 
kinds of cousins, etc.. There is a complication, however, 
In that Morgan did not define classificatory that way: for
him it refers to the merging, terminologically, of 
lineal and collateral kin, Leslie A. White (1958) 
has discussed this point in defence of Morgan as many 
people had come to accept Kroeber’s criticism on this 
point. Of course, part of the blame for this con­
fusion must rest with Morgan himself who could have 
distinguished more clearly between the semantic question 
of reference (how many referents does a term have for Ego) 
and the morphological question of descriptive devices 
(how to specify relationships by using kin terms plus 
a specifying adjective or some such device). While White 
is right in insisting that Morgan should be read properly, 
one gets the impression that he also wants to defend 
Morgan’s evolutionary point of view, be it in an updated 
version. And I feel that Kroeber1s criticism of Morgan, 
though unfortunately ill-founded in its point of attack, 
remains valid in a wider context. It t^ould seem to me 
that what Kroeber in fact is attacking is implicit racism, 
a view whereby race, inferior type of culture and social 
organisation, and the linguistic terminology used to 
express that culture, are linked and are substantially 
different from one part of mankind (classificatory) to 
the other part (the descriptive elite). This basic 
criticism is wholly in the tradition of Boas, Sapir, and 
others, and by itself would not warrant separate discussion 
but Kroeber also put forward constructive new Ideas.
Morgan classified relationship systems on the 
basis of one criterion only, vis. lineal vs. collateral, 
ending up with a very weak and disputable typology. If 
one wants to avoid the trap of ethnocentrism or racial
prejudice, more criteria are required. Kroeber saw 
that every term had a certain range of referents, 
different from language to language. To account for 
this fact he put forward his theory about the principles 
or categories of relationship underlying these terms,
He touches here upon a basic problem in semantics: 
the range of referents of words; and he solves It in 
the way many people would approach the problem at present, 
by pointing at a distinctive feature model. He distin­
guishes eight components of meaning: generation, lineal/ 
collateral, relative age within one generation, sex of 
relative, sex of speaker, sex of linking relative, blood 
relationship/affinity, and the condition of life of 
the linking relative. Each language uses Its own combin­
ation of features, some use many, others fewer. If 
Morgan’s distinction is to have any validity, Kroeber 
feels It will have to be on the basis of the categories 
described. It appears that Morgan’s descriptive systems 
express a small number of categories of relationship in 
every (or almost every) term of the system, while the 
so-called classificatory systems express a larger number 
of categories but with less regularity* This feature-based 
approach to relationship systems makes It possible to 
single out the main characteristic of a system, to compare 
systems, and to classify them typologically in a sound way.
When we look at a particular analysis we- see 
both Kroeber’s interests combined. For instance in his 
"Kinship in the Philippines" (1919) he aims at 'a recon­
struction of the ancient kinship system while using, in 
the analysis of his data, the sort of category we have been
discussing, and characterising the reconstructed system 
in terms of these categories. In the light of these 
findings it then appears that inter-tribal divergencies 
are considerable but that departures from the general 
logical scheme are much slighter: in fact, given the
differences of level or type of culture they are pro­
portionately small.
When Kroeber criticised Morgan’s concept of a 
classificatory system, he saw as the root of this mis­
conception the fact that terms of relationship had been 
regarded principally as material from which conclusions 
could be drawn about the organisation of society and 
conditions of marriage, rather than as elements determined 
primarily by linguistic factors. This is not to say that 
he ruled out all social relevance of language. In line 
with Boas and Sapir he argued the case for the distinction 
between race, language, and culture. Race stands clearly 
apart in a separate position; but, "Speech and culture do 
tend to form something of a unit as opposed to race. (...) 
The cultural differences tend to crystallise around language 
differences, and then in turn are reinforced by language, 
so that the two factors interact completely" (1948: 226). 
Kroeber Is very cautious not to conclude too hastily or 
too easily to historical connections. Organisation or 
structure in both language and society takes place according 
to unconscious or covert or implicit patterns. ,
"The number of such linguistic and social 
patterns or forms being limited, there is 
some tendency for them to repeat in 
different cultures with a degree of 
similarity, though without historical 
connection or without attaining actual 
Identity" (1948: 249)*
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On the whole, It would seem, Kroeber would be inclined
to look for congruences in the matter of language and
culture correlations, not for determinism.
This generally cautious point of view can be
observed equally when he discusses the "terrn-usage
correlation" of kinship terms (1936: 339)- He gives
the analogy of the relation of dress to the human body:
there are various degrees of fit, differences of style.
"Similarly with the fit of kin terminology 
to social usage: it may be close or wide.
Expectably there will always be some fit, 
and there may be a great deal, but it may 
also be remarkably partial".
"A normally large amount of play or give in 
fit is evident. Portions of a naming 
system can be indifferent from the point 
of view of social structure, or vice versa"
(ibid: 3^0).
In this paper he views the matter slightly more positively 
than in his earlier work where he wrote, for instance: "To 
connect the institutions and the terms causally can rarely 
be anything but hazardous" (1909: 83; cf. also 1919t 84).
Up to this point his position may have been a 
bit stricter and more cautious than that of others: but 
it was not this that attracted most attention and drew 
extensive comment and reaction. What caused most controversy 
was his insistence that factors other than the social one, 
played a role, indeed, were more Important: "Terms of 
relationship reflect psychology, not sociology. They 
are determined primarily by language and can be utilized 
for sociological inferences only with extreme caution"
(1909: 84). His insistence on the linguistic factor was 
most welcome; in his paper on the Philippines ha paid 
attention to the changes within kinship vocabulary,
distinguishing such different possibilities as adoption
of other words as kin terms, extension of meaning of
existing kin terms, and formation of totally new words,
while he recognised that etymological and semantic
development, and dialectal divergence, may go their own
way and diminish the possibility of predicting any
specific term-usage correlation (cf. 1919: 82-84).
But his reference to psychology led to confusion,
yet Is perhaps his most interesting contribution together
with his feature analysis. The confusion Is clear from
the reaction of someone like Rivers:
"In social, as in all other kinds of 
human activity, psychological factors 
must have an essential part. (...)
These psychological elements are, however, 
only concomitants of social processes 
with which it is possible to deal apart 
from their psychological aspect" (1913: 93).
So psychology is seen by Rivers, and by many others in 
his wake, as the study of the ideas, beliefs, emotions, 
and sentiments which act as the immediate motives of 
people’s actions. I believe that Kroeber must be under­
stood differently. In Kroeber (1909) three factors are 
enumerated: sociological, linguistic, psychological. In 
Kroeber (1919) and in Kroeber (1936) we find again a 
three-way division: the social and linguistic factors are 
there; the third factor, the ’psychological’ one, is now, 
however, differently and more explicitly defined as "a 
system of classificatory thought", "styles of logic, in a 
limited field of universal occurrence", "a logical scheme". 
Defined in this way Kroeber*s claim for the overriding 
importance of the psychological element becomes easier to 
understand, whether one accepts his view or not.
"Institutions and terminologies 
unquestionably parallel or reflect 
each other at least to the degree 
that a marked discrepancy of plan Is 
rare. Institutions probably 
shape terminologies causally, but 
in the main by influencing or permitting 
a logical scheme. In a sense this 
logical scheme underlies both 
institution and terminology, so that 
the correlation between them, although 
actual, can be conceived as indirect"
(1919: 84).
2.5.3 In conclusion we can only wonder at the strange
way in which things turn out. Kroeber’s Influence in
anthropology has been enormous, and rightly so. Yet on
this particular point of the methodology of the study of
kinship terms he pointed the way to two key issues of the
sixties and seventies, and he was never taken up seriously
on either of them. These two issues are his ’categories
of relationship’, basically what is now known as ’formal
analysis’, and his ’logical scheme’ which resurfaces to
my mind In present day ’cognitive anthropology’:
"Cognitive anthropology is based on the 
assumption that Its data are mental 
phenomena which can be analyzed by 
formal methods similar to those of 
mathematics and logic. Each particular 
culture consists of a set of logical 
principles which order relevant 
material phenomena. To the cognitive 
anthropologist these logical principles 
rather than the material phenomena are 
the object of investigation" (Tyler, ed. ,
1969: 14).
It Is not difficult to see here a parallelism with the 
universalism and mentalism of much of recent linguistic 
theory. But in those early days the time clearly was not 
ripe yet to take up and develop fully all the possibilities
Implicitly contained in Kroeber’s work.
2..6 W.H.R. Rivers.
2.6.1 W.H.R. Rivers held as a cardinal assumption 
that systems of kinship terminology give a valuable 
Instrument for studying the history of social inst­
itutions, especially forms of marriage:
"I had reached the belief that in the 
systems of relationship we have, like 
fossils, the hidden indications of 
ancient social institutions and that 
their study is essential for advance in 
our knowledge of prehistoric sociology"
(1914: 1,3).
Prom this, point of view there is little new in his position. 
Like Morgan he attached great importance to terminological 
systems:
"My chief object in making the survey 
was to obtain systems of relationship 
together with such other facts concerning 
marriage, descent and other social inst­
itutions as would assist the interpretation 
of the system" (ibid. 5).
But his field-work, more specifically his study of the
Hawaiian system, made him abandon Morgan’s evolutionary
orientation. He supported Morgan, however, against
McLennan, by showing that kinship nomenclature was more
than just a system of address: "the designations of the
[classificatory] system carry with them all. kinds of duties,
privileges and restrictions and are evidently of the utmost
social importance and significance" (1914: 1,6; cf. 1913:
44-48). And while he accepted Kroeber's criticism.of
Morgan’s terms ’classificatory’ and ’descriptive’, he
refused to accept the place accorded by Kroeber (cf. above
2.5.2) to psychology:
”In social, as in all other kinds of 
human activity, psychological factors 
must have an essential part. (...) '
These psychological elements are, 
however, only concomitants of social 
processes with which it is possible 
to deal apart from their psychological 
aspect" (Rivers, 1913: 9*1; cf. pp. 48-5*1 
and 75 ff.) .
2,6.2 RiversT influence has been enormous, he can be
said to have established the study of social organization 
as a recognised field of study. Even if some of his 
enthusiasm was slightly naive, some of his claims over- 
optimistic and exaggerated, his method of approach and 
lines of research continued to form the basic pattern of 
most research work for a long time.
His method in the field was what he called the 
genealogical method (Rivers, 1910). It consists in 
establishing for a given individual his pedigree, and then 
enquire by what terms Ego would refer to and address each 
of the persons forming part of the pedigree. These terms 
then form the object of a twofold analysis: a morphological 
one, considering the system of relationship as the express­
ion of principles of classification to find the structure 
of the system, and a linguistic one which looks at the 
system of relationships as a collection of linguistic items 
(cf. 191*1: II ?9)* The morphological analysis leads to a 
double conclusion:
"The chief general conclusion to be drawn 
from the survey of this chapter is that 
the forms of Oceanic systems of relationship 
are directly dependent upon features of - 
social organisation, and especially upon 
forms of marriage". "Another generalisation 
reached in this chapter Is that there is a 
connection between distinctions In nomenclature 
and the presence of functions associated with 
relationship" (ibid.: 43 and 45).
The link between relationship systems and forms of
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marriage has been Rivers' central point of argument, 
and one can only admire his grasp of complex systems 
and his ability to translate them into requirements 
of some anomalous form of marriage. His second 
conclusion about functions associated with relationship 
served a double purpose: it intended to prove McLennan 
wrong by concrete examples and, as all the functions 
enumerated centered upon marriage, it reinforced his 
first and basic conclusion.
The linguistic argument consists of a comparative 
survey of relationship terms in Melanesia, and goes on to 
claim that the area at first had a multiplicity of languages 
till foreignndomination after invasion gradually imposed 
uniformity. It is in this light that the relationship 
terms are compared and assigned to different strata: the
terms common to all or many languages are supposed to date 
from a later time while local variations are assumed to be 
survivals of an earlier diversity. This in turn makes it 
possible to discover the development of the social organ­
isation, especially the forms of marriage (191*1: II, ch.23). 
He returns to this point when he devotes a chapter to 
language (ibid. ch.36) to argue that language and social 
structure must be studied together: he sees no point in 
treating language as if it were independent and self- 
sufficient, to be studied merely for its own sake (191*1: II, 
*195/6).
2.6.3 Rivers established a new style in ethnographic 
description which made a world-wide impact. He also 
established the study of social organisation on a sound 
basis: he describes his method as the
"formulation of a working hypo­
thetical scheme to form a frame­
work into which the facts are fitted, 
and the scheme is regarded as 
satisfactory only if the facts can 
thus be fitted so as to form a 
coherent whole, all parts of which 
are consistent with one another"
(1911): II, 586) .
He even sees such a hypothesis as more than a way of 
accounting for known facts for it must be "capable of 
accounting for all the known facts and for new facts 
discovered after the scheme has been fully formulated" 
(ibid.: 587) . As a formulation of method there is not 
much here one would disagree with, yet looking at his 
work the impression prevails that he Is looking for 
confirmation of his thesis rather than for verification 
of a hypothesis. It would seem that the idea of the 
connection with and dependence upon social organisation 
of the system of relationships pre-empts the final inter­
pretation by being,” unconsciously no doubt, selective in 
collecting the evidence. When one asks for kin terms on 
the pattern of a genealogical chart, one is unlikely to 
get much information about the usage of kin terms in 
different universes of discourse. And why this limitation 
should be imposed, is a question which never even seems 
to cross Rivers’ mind.
Another weak point is that he accepts a close 
"interdependence of language and social function" : the 
two have to be studied In combination. Yet he never even 
considers, to the best of my knowledge, the logical 
possibility that the social structure might depend on 
language rather than the other way round, nor the 
possibility of an influence working both ways.
While one might feel in sympathy with Rivers 
when he urges that language should not be studied in 
total separation from the culture it is part of, one 
would want to claim enough independence for linguistic 
studies to have at least equal rights*
2.7 The historical comparative approach*
2*7*1 A survey of the historical approach to the study 
of kinship terminology would not be complete without an 
account of the achievements of historical comparative 
linguistics.
While originally the scholars of the 19th century 
only wanted to examine and establish relations between 
certain languages, the growing influence of natural science 
brought a change of perspective. The example of the 
classifications arrived at especially in botany gave the 
Impetus to considering language as an organism, a living 
organism, subject to change and evolution. In the light 
of this concept classification meant something different 
from establishing relations between certain languages: it
meant tracing back their history to their common point of 
departure, the "Ursprache", At one time this ’Ursprache’, 
deduced from the languages under comparison, was seen as 
representing a real language, so much so that in 1868 A. 
Schleicher wrote a fairy-tale in Indo-European, "The sheep 
and the horse". Scholars were increasingly concerned with 
the strict scientific quality of their method; this led 
to a mechanistic view of language where determinism reigned 
rather than creativity. It is not difficult to see that
absolute claims and theories could flourish in this 
climate..
Prom ’Ursprache* it was but a step to a
common culture.
"Wissen wir, dass Volker sprachverwandt 
sind, so glauben wir zunachst, dass 
sie stammverwandt seien, dass heisst,
dass es eine Zeit ga^, wo sie zusammen
ein Volk bildeten" (von der Gabelentz,
1901: 293).
Von der Gabelentz sketches the reasoning behind this 
idea: What various peoples call by the same name,
they must have known in the same way, a common vocabulary 
points to a common stock of ideas, Including the original 
form of civilization. To a large extent these discussions 
were connected with the question of trying to locate the 
place of origin of the Indo-Europeans; but other matters 
were considered as well, notably social organization.
It is here that the work of B. Delbruck must be mentioned,
"Die indogermanischen Verwandtschaftsnamen, ein Beitrag 
zur vergleichenden Alterthumskunde" (1390).
In the study of lexical items and their cultural 
implications two approaches can be distinguished. There 
was an anthropological orientation, either positivist or 
philosophical, intent on reconstructing the path of 
history by taking so-called primitive societies as earlier 
stages, or by measuring our present forms of social life 
against ideal forms and concepts. More important for us 
is the other approach, the philological one, which proceeded 
by reconstructing the original roots and by interpreting
the meaning of those roots. An example of such a root in
r > t
the field of kinship would be pa = to protect, or m  = to
create, bring forth1, roots which are .at the origin of 
father and mother terms in the various Indo-European 
languages.
2.7.2 Delbruck*s claims in his work on IE kinship
terms are in fact very modest and restrained: this is
In line with the generally prudent method of the group 
of Junggrammatiker of which he was a prominent member.
He does not indulge in giving a rosy picture of a happy 
and almost perfect community at the origin, nor does he 
assume such initial stages as free sexual intercourse 
developing into matriarchy. He simply wanted to recon­
struct the ’Urform*, the original form, without wanting 
to explain such forms. Pie no longer tried to trace 
etymologies to roots but he followed meanings in their 
historical development in tradition. This does not mean 
that not much can be discovered any more; the restrictions 
imposed upon reduction to roots do not affect the study 
of the etymology of derived words, and often it is quite 
valuable to know whether or not a word occurred at all 
in IE times. And anyhow, comparative philology is only 
one aspect for Delbruck, one which has to be complemented 
by "comparative archaeology".
Delbruck concludes that for the following 
relationships terms must have existed in IE: husband and 
wife, the woman as chlld-bearer, widow (not widower), 
father and mother (also terms derived from infants-1 babble) , 
son and daughter; probably too child, brother, and sister; 
nothing for father!s father, but possibly for mother’s 
father and his wife; next grandson and granddaughter, 
and father’s brother (= second father); mother’s brother
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is less certain, as is aunt; nephews, nieces, and 
cousins are not represented; a whole set of terms 
covering relationships between a daughter-in-law and 
her husband’s family: a similar set may have existed 
for a son-in-law but cannot be traced.
When complementing his philological work with 
archaeological evidence Delbruck relies totally on what 
he could ascertain about social organisation in ancient 
India* The combination of the two leads to his picture 
of the IE family as a patriarchal monogamous union where 
the man possessed all authority, married sons kept in 
close relationship - even locally - with their father’s 
family, and the women left their own families to join the 
men’s families* Originally no relationship between two 
families resulted from marriage.
The position taken by Delbruck, his method, 
and his conclusions particularly in the field of kin 
terms, are representative of their kind with differences 
on points of detail only, and with some elaboration on 
points of detail as gradually more information became 
available. A good example of the method applied to many 
aspects of culture. Including social organisation, is 0. 
Schrader’s fascinating book Sprachvergleichung und Urgesch- 
ichte in the 3rd revised edition of 1907. Both the 
general ideas (op.cit.: 11,123-132) and his treatment of 
kinship, ’’Die Eamilie" (ibid.: 303-369), do not differ 
substantially from Delbruck’s; and the same approach and 
arguments are used by Galton (1957) In his criticism of 
Isacenko’s theories about an original "happy little sex 
community” as Delbruck used in his criticism of, for
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instance, J.J. Bachofen.
2.7*3 An account of the study of kinship systems 
in the IE field would not be complete without discussing 
the work of E. Benveniste in his book Le vocabulalre 
des institutions indo-europeennes (1969). Benveniste 
stresses in his opening remarks (op.cit.: 1,7 ff.) that 
the concept of IE is based on the language factor, and 
on the language factor alone. While he sees the usefulness 
of considering common vocabulary as an illustration of a 
common culture, his own preoccupation is different. Instead 
of concentrating on the reconstruction of the broad lines 
of the common vocabulary he directs his attention to 
specific languages to see how they form and organize their 
vocabulary for social institutions, and to try and re­
establish the context in which what is language-specific, 
originated. This will show hidden structures, the 
principle of unity behind divergency, but it will also 
show how languages go about reorganising their system of 
distinctive oppositions and renewing the mechanics of 
their semantics. In an earlier article Benveniste (195*0 
had insisted already that the context of words had to be 
used to show how different forms can be meaningfully related: 
but this is not enough, one has also to explain the differ­
ence, point out the elements which are at the origin of a 
new kind of meaning. He shows this very well, for instance, 
with the example of caput : testa >  a.fr. chef : ~teste, >• mod.
tete : crane. While etymological dictionaries usually 
explain the change from caput to tete as originating in 
joking usage, Benveniste proposes a different - one might 
say: an intra-linguistic - explanation on the basis of a very
careful consideration of the contexts of use of caput.
In this, as in all his examples, he makes it clear 
that what Is at stake, is a semantic structure consisting 
of relations. We have here a combination of the 
historical and the structural In a Saussurean sense.
It is in this sense that we must understand: ’'Nous 
eclairons par la la signification; d ’autres se chargeront 
de la designation" (1969: I 5 10). The 'signification1 
refers to the Internal structure of the sign, the ’design­
ation* to the fact that a sign refers to an object, a 
process, a quality, etc., of the extralinguistic reality 
as structured by the culture and experience of a given 
group of men. This means that he does not want to consider 
the historical and sociological aspects of the process of 
change In meaning and in the structure of vocabulary, 
just the linguistic structure itself. Yet it is possible 
to discern in those changing and developing vocabularies 
for institutions .a reflection of a profound evolution of 
those Institutions, the emergence of new activities or ideas.
It will be clear now that Benveniste does not 
intend to repeat simply the work of his predecessors on 
IE kinship terms (cf. 1969*. 1,205 ff.)* The facts of 
the common stock in this domain are sufficiently well- 
known since Delbruck, but there has been little progress 
since then In terms of a better understanding of those 
facts. Delbruck had reached two conclusions, first that 
the kinship structure reflected in the vocabulary Is that 
of a patriarchal society based on descent In the male line 
and resulting in the so-called extended family,with an 
ancestor around whom all male descendants are grouped;
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and secondly; that kin terms relate to the man; terms 
which concern women are not numerous, of uncertain 
meaning, and often morphologically unstable. But the 
general understanding of kinship systems has improved 
greatly, and Benveniste wants to reconsider the IE kinship 
system with these new insights in mind, especially with 
the view of trying to throw some light on certain anomalies 
which persisted, in other words looking at what is language 
specific rather than at the common denominator, though 
always with reference to the underlying unity of the IE 
linguistic stock.
His close examination of all the terminological 
material, available in various sources, leads him to a 
number of interesting conclusions (ibid.: 274-276). IE 
society certainly was patriarchal but with remnants of a 
system where mother’s brother dominated; there is e.g. 
the fact that In Latin mother’s brother is called ‘avunculus’ 
i.e. 'little avus’ while avus strictly speaking means 
father’s father (ibid.: 223-231)* The common phase of IE 
was characterised by classificatory terms which tended to 
be replaced in different degrees in different languages by 
descriptive terms. In classical Greek the two co-existed, 
from the common stock and newly
formed. ^ d ^ y ^  does not refer to a brother by blood, 
descendant of the same father, but to those who are linked 
by a mystical parentage, while o S e k ^ > o s points to individ­
ual descent; Is practically always In the
plural, for the singular is quite common (ibid.:
213-214).
6Bub it becomes clear when we look at modern 
IE languages that a change in terminology does, not 
necessarily imply a change in relationship, nor does 
the continued existence of a term prove the continuity 
of a given relationship: sometimes terms have changed 
to effect a clarification by morphological circumlocution 
but without change in the reality, e.g. French *bru*
1belle-fille*, while matrilateral Tavunculusf is continued 
etymologically by bilateral *onclef in French, 1 unclet in 
English.
Benveniste*s work complements in a very fortunate 
manner previous work on IE kinship terminology In two ways. 
First It shows how the structural approach does not replace 
the historical approach, but rather offers something of 
its own, and something which in turn helps a better under­
standing of the findings of historical research. Secondly 
it has given a very 'useful reminder, if ever one was needed, 
that there are no clear-cut types and systems because so 
many factors play a role, and what we are looking at usually 
is a delicate balance, maintained under a variety of 
influences and pressures. And whatever link there may be 
between vocabulary and institutions, sometimes they just 
go their own way.
2.7*4 It is not just by chance or neglect that I have
spoken up till now under this heading of historical 
comparative linguistics, only of studies in the field of 
IE languages; this reflects the privileged position of 
this group due to the fact that it has written records 
going back more than three millennia. Characteristic of 
Benveniste*s work was his use of context in the study of
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meaning, the kind, of context provided by and presupposing
written texts. Language families without such a heritage
are far more difficult to reconstruct though it is not
impossible to achieve results. One recent example of
how this can be done, and done more particularly with
reference to kinship terminology, is given by I. Dyen
and D.F. Aberle in their study Lexical Reconstruction.
The Case of the Proto-Athapaskan Kinship System (1974) ,
which sums up and takes further all the work done on PA
previously. It would be impossible to review this book
here In its entirety, but I would like to record, and
briefly comment upon, a few issues of methodology.
The authors define lexical reconstruction as
follows: (op.cit.: 7):
"Given that a proto-language had a 
particular meaning, which one of its 
reconstructible morpheme sequences 
most probably had this meaning? The 
determination of the proto-morpheme 
sequence which probably had a particular 
meaning is lexical reconstruction".
This is of particular interest in the area of kinship
terminology. There are in a relationship system really
two systems: a set of patterns of behaviour, and a
terminological system. These two are correlated, behaviour
is patterned in relation to the terminological system.
Now anthropologists are interested In reconstructing the
kinship system as it might have existed at the time of a
proto-language, but it is impossible to Infer the patterns
of behaviour directly: . the terminology, however, can
be reconstructed at least in large part, hence this
particular interest.
Methodologically, therefore, the principal 
interest of such a lexical reconstruction lies in the 
possibility that other features of culture can be 
predicted from a knowledge of kinship terminology 
(op.cit.: 71 ff»). The authors justify this possibility 
by saying that, if other features can in fact be predicted 
in cultures we have ethnographic records of, it seems 
reasonable to consider reconstructed systems as living 
systems and consequently make a similar kind of prediction 
possible for these proto-systems.
Inferences can be made from kin terminology 
about kinship organisation either through Intuition and 
experience, or through predictions based on statistical 
data concerning the co-occurrence of certain terminological 
and social features. The latter is preferred as being 
more secure in its outcome, the former fails mainly because 
the results are never put to the test of the falsification 
principle. It is. not as though any inference from 
statistics would be an acceptable prediction. First of 
all it must be correct in more than 50$ of the cases, 
secondly the predictions must represent an improvement 
over the base rate of the phenomenon being predicted, 
thirdly the difference between the base rate and the rate 
predicted must be a significant one, fourthly the prediction 
must be one that aligns all positive associations between 
terminology and the other attribute in question. It is 
only when all these criteria are met and secure predictions 
emerge that it can be argued that terminological systems 
do serve as useful predictors of other cultural attributes.
It would seem, however, that we do not know enough
to justify us speaking about systems of terminology and 
of relationships; this would in fact mean that changes 
°f any given kin type would imply changes of all 
other kin types, and we know too little to be able to 
say that. It would seem more likely that there are 
several systems within so-called kinship systems (op.cit.:
119). Consequently, inferences will be about various 
features of social life from terminological features (op. 
cit. : 120f.). These inferences will be on the basis of 
statistical demonstration, showing an association of a 
particular pattern of kinship classification with certain 
social features in a large enough number of cases, or 
being kble to attach probability to a single event. Only 
when statistical exploration has not been completed for 
certain terminological patterns does one rely on inference 
based on experience and intuition. In this way one can 
arrive at secure conclusions about the social organisation 
of the PA speech community (op,cit.: 133 f.).
2.7.5 I have not gone into the wealth of data and 
the extensive elaboration of argument of the book so that, 
obviously, any real criticism would be unjustified and 
meaningless. But I would like to conclude with some 
reflections which came to mind while reading in the book, 
and some of which are also conclusions for the whole of 
this section.
It would seem that the term 'reconstruction* 
is unfortunate though It would be useless to try and 
change it. The word always suggests something real if no 
longer in existence; but, strictly speaking, 'reconstruction* 
only says: two ( or more) languages are related and their
actual differences can be explained in some regular 
way, It does not say anything positive about the 
precise reality the proto-language must have been, 
though it will show up certain features. Bloomfield 
pointed out already (1933: 318 f.) that a reconstruction 
is made on the assumption of absolutely uniform speech- 
communlties and sudden, sharp cleavages. Neither of 
these conditions is ever fully realised.
If the linguistic reconstruction does not 
represent reality, cultural inferences must be interpreted 
with similar reservation. Delbruck and Schrader were 
already aware of the problem up to a point and Insisted 
that conclusions drawn from linguistic premises need 
to be confirmed by archaeological evidence, archaeological 
taken in its widest possible sense. All we can do is to 
construct a hypothetical world In which all known facts 
make sense, and this hypothesis must be tested by every 
possible means. But the available facts and means are 
so restricted that we can never hope for a complete 
picture, just some sketchy lines.
A very awkward problem is that of 'meaning*.
Dyen and Aberle say in their definition of reconstruction: 
"Given that a proto-language had a particular meaning ..." 
(op.cit.: 7). While it is quite clear that the domain 
of kinship terms is very stable, universal as a domain, 
and somehow related with biological facts, it does; seem 
to me that even in this domain one must be very careful 
not to transfer present meanings of daughter languages 
onto the proto-language: this is always very dangerous.
It prejudges moreover the outcome of the debate If, 
or to what extent,, kinship meanings are socially 
based and language specific, or biologically based 
and more universal.
The use of statistical techniques in Dyen and 
Aberle is inspired by the work of G.P. Murdock. I hope 
to come back on this aspect when discussing Murdock's 
contribution. Similarly their claim on ethnographic 
records showing that other features of culture can be 
predicted from a knowledge of kinship terminology (op.cit. 
71) has to be properly understood and carefully weighed. 
But this is a matter I intend to deal with in the overall 
evaluation.
3. The Structural and Functional Approaches.
3.1 Bronislav Kaspar Malinowski.
3.1.1 It would seem that no other figure Is more 
suited to head a survey of structural-functional method 
than B. Malinowski. The reason for this is not that 
his theoretical work would be of everlasting value, for
it is not. But his influence on the study of anthropology
in Britain, including kinship, has been enormous even If
not always in a direct, positive manner. Moreover, if
a distinction is to be made between functionalism and
structuralism there can be no doubt as to who should
represent functionalism but the man who called himself
"the Arch-Functionalist1'. Not everybody liked the label,
clearly not e.g. someone like Radcliffe-Brown who did not
want to be associated with the Functional School of Social
Anthropology:
"This Functional School does not really 
exist; it is a myth invented by Professor 
Malinowski. He has explained how, to 
quote his own words, 'the magnificent 
title of the Functional School of Anthro­
pology has been bestowed by myself, in a 
way on myself, and to a large extent out 
of my own sense of irresponsibility' "
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1940: 188).
Radcliffe-Brown clearly was not amused by
Malinowski's flippancy, though Malinowski did go on to
define his Idea in a more serious manner:
"This type of theory aims at the explan­
ation of anthropological facts at all 
levels of development by their function," 
by the part they play within the integral 
system of culture, by the manner in which 
they are related to each other within the 
system, and by the manner in which this 
system is related to the physical
surroundings. It aims at the under­
standing of the nature of culture, 
rather than at conjectural recon­
structions of its evolution or of 
past historical events" (Malinowski,
1932: XXIX f.).
This theory hinges completely on field-work: to 
observe what exists, how it works, and what it 
means to the native. The culture a field-worker studies 
must be viewed as a self-contained reality: evolutionary 
and diffusionist theories are bound to distort reality.
If the quality of a definition depends on its 
brevity and precision, Malinowski's definition of 
functionalism cannot be considered as totally satisfactory. 
Greenberg has studied the notion of function as used in 
the social sciences and distinguished various uses (1957:
75 ff.). There Is the function seen as the contribution 
to the maintenance of the functioning of a structure as 
a whole, or organic 'function. There is the common every­
day understanding of the word function whereby it Is 
identified with activity, or 'activity function; as Malinow­
ski said: "What functions must have a function" (1932: 
XXXVIII). And there is the internal function where the 
functional effects are being considered not in their 
bearing on the functioning of the total structure, but 
rather on that of some other part which participates in 
the same structure. Of course, there is nothing necessary 
about these distinctions; in fact they might have gained 
by singling out first the rather loose usage of the 
'activity function' before distinguishing organic and 
internal functions. In Malinowski no systematic distinct­
ions are made at all, in fact we find the notion of function
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used in all its possible senses, and as a result with 
a fair degree of vagueness.
I think Malinowski was well aware of this 
vagueness, and up to a point such vagueness is inevit­
able in the first stages of a new theory. Perhaps this 
lack of precision might even be due to the fact that 
Malinowski’s stance was to a certain extent a reaction 
against evolutionary and diffusionist theories as much 
as, and perhaps even before, being a new theory. While 
Malinowski was groping his way towards formulating what 
he considered to be a satisfactory theory different 
intellectual streams influenced his thinking. Like the 
people of the 19th century he was fascinated by the 
achievements of biology and he continued to use the concept 
of "organism” in social science, albeit no longer in a 
historical evolutionary sense. This resulted in his 
functional theory being "holistic”, i.e., considering 
functions as referring to the whole organism, and in the 
basic needs - to which functions relate in his view - being 
biological needs. Malinowski also was a rationalist in 
the 19th century style who rejected the idea that people 
of technologically less advanced cultures would be 
illogical or prelogical: though he refers to them all 
the time as "savages”, he claims for them a rationality 
underlying their behaviour which at times seems exaggerated 
to the point of being superhuman. But while Malinowski 
was firmly established in the biological, materialist, and 
rationalist ways of thinking into which he was born and 
educated, he shared with others a feeling of uneasiness 
about some of the consequences and effects of it all,
especially the mechanistic (and collectivist) way in 
which the individual human mind was supposed to work.
Leach (1957: 121 ff.) has pointed out
similarities between the work of the American psychologist- 
philosopher William James and that of Malinowski. James 
popularized the philosophy of C.S. Peirce, known as 
pragmatism. In James’ version pragmatism holds roughly 
that ’truth* is ’what works’, a very inadequate inter­
pretation of Peirce’s criterion for testing the truth of
statements or beliefs by the ’effects that might conceiv­
ably have practical bearings’. W.B. Gallie has summed up 
James’ fundamental point as follows (1952: 25):
"from the plausible thesis that certain 
biological interests underlie, or provide 
some of the necessary conditions of, all 
our thinking, he passed to the more 
exciting (and more ambiguous) thesis that 
the sole function of thought is to satisfy 
certain Interests of the organism, and 
that truth consists in such thinking as 
satisfies these interests".
Leach suggests that by replacing ’thinking* by ’behaving’ 
and ’thought’ by ’behaviour’ one obtains a perfect summary 
of Malinowski’s functionalism. And I suppose - though 
Leach does not say so - that ’truth’ could be replaced 
by ’correct or adequate behaviour*. As a philosopher 
James remained the psychologist he was by training and 
as such was interested In thoughts as elements or phases 
in the life-history of this or that particular individual; 
he had difficulty in transcending the particular. Malinow­
ski showed the' same interest and preference in his social 
studies, strong on description, weak on theory .and 
generalisation.
3»1.2 Against this general background it becomes
much easier to understand Malinowski's view of kinship.
There is no single comprehensive work by him on the
subject: the book he kept promising, "The Psychology of
Kinship"3 was never written. But the subject is present
throughout his work, and in his article in Man (1930),
entitled "Kinship" we have .-a clear if perhaps slightly
extreme, summary of his views. In it he takes to task
not only his predecessors with their gratuitous historical
explanations but also his contemporaries for what he
considers to be almost an obsession with, an unwarranted
indulging in, long and complicated terminological systems
of kinship. For, while everyone continued to feel that
the matter of terminological systems was all-important,
Malinowski wanted to get away from this formalising and
hypothesising. "After all" he said, "kinship is a matter
of flesh and blood, °the result of sexual passion and
maternal affection, of long intimate daily life, and of a
host of personal intimate interests" (1930: 19)*
I have said before that Malinowski was like James
in his interest in the life-history of this or that
particular individual. In kinship this resulted in what he
called the "biographical method" (ibid, , 23 footnote). In
this respect he is truly pragmatic:
"The modern or functional anthropologist 
proposes, therefore, to understand what
kinship really means to the native: he •
wishes to grasp how terminologies of kin­
ship are used and what they express" (ibid.,
22).
The word 'really' is significant in this quotation, it 
illustrates a recurrent theme in Malinowski’s writings,
the opposition between 'real* and 'ideal*. Structures, 
laws, rules are all 'ideal1; what people do, say, 
experience is 'real'. Malinowski's approach is 
psychological rather than sociological; consequently, 
questions of right and duty are seoondary to emotion and 
sentiment.
This very same question determines his view on 
kinship terminology, where he asks: Can we come nearer 
to the real core of kinship by the mere use of mock-algebra? 
And his answer is: "There is a vast gulf between the pseudo-
mathematical treatment of the too-learned anthropologist 
and the real facts of savage life" (ibid., 20). Where 
anthropology went wrong to his mind was in basing kinship 
on the clan rather than on the family, and in its inter­
pretation of the significance of classificatory systems, 
especially in connection with anomalous forms of marriage.
As far as kin terms are concerned Malinowski holds that 
their linguistic nature has been misunderstood. They are 
not the petrified remains of a previous social state, they 
are in fact "the most active and effective expressions 
of human relationship, expressions which start in early 
childhood, which accompany human intercourse throughout 
life, which embody all the most personal, passionate, and 
intimate sentiments of a man or woman" (ibid., 22).
Before specifying Malinowski's Ideas on kinship 
terminology, particularly on classificatory terminology, 
it Is necessary to explain first his view on the other moot 
point, the place of clan and family In anthropological 
discussion. Malinowski refuses to see the clan and family 
as domestic institutions which would occur at distinct stages
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of development: for him they appear invariably together.
And while the family can exist alone, the clan cannot and 
is therefore an additional institution. The family is 
the domestic institution par excellence, bonds of clan- 
ship develop only much later in life, out of the primary 
kinship of the family. Seen in this way, kinship as 
observed in an adult tribesman is the result of a long 
process of extensions and transformations, starting in 
early life with the physiological event of procreation, 
but profoundly modified in human society by cultural 
influences. This calls for kinship to be studied in all 
its aspects - including terminology - as a process in 
development and not merely as a fixed product. This 
process starts off with the two parents and their off­
spring's much a cultural as a physiological reality: 
Malinowski calls this the initial situation. In his analysis 
of the facts he finds that the communal interpretation of 
this initial situation Is definitely erroneous: "every 
human being starts his sociological career within the 
small family group, and (...) whatever kinship might become 
later in life, it is always individual kinship at first" 
(ibid., 25). But parenthood is interesting not only in 
itself, but more so in that it is the starting point of 
most other relationships between men. This consequently 
is what the study of kinship is about: to examine the 
processes of the extension of kinship from its extremely 
simple beginnings in plain parenthood, to its manifold 
ramifications and complexities in adult membership of 
tribe, clan, and local group. There are really two 
correlated processes. The first process is one of
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consolidation and extension of family ties. What is 
meant by this is that the individual relation of off­
spring to their parents always remains one of the 
dominant sentiments in human life , manifesting itself 
in moral rules, in legal obligations, in religious 
ritual; this relation undergoes shocks and diminutions 
at times, at other times becomes reaffirmed again, from 
the initial physiological dependence of the infant through 
the age of education, adolescence, marriage, right up to 
old age. The second process is one of disruption, in 
which the group or communal character of human relations 
is emphasized at the expense of the individual character: 
for Malinowski this is not really a negation of kinship, 
rather a one-sided distortion of the original parental 
relationship when clan identity becomes more prominent 
in certain phases of tribal life. But as the clan is 
essentially a non-reproductive, non-sexual and non- 
parental group, it never is the primary source and basis 
of kinship: its functions are mostly legal and ceremonial,
at times also magical and economic. Kinship always rests 
on and begins with the family, the parents and their off­
spring: the function of this institution is the procreation, 
the early cares, and the elementary training of the off­
spring. I have given this summary of Malinowski's thoughts 
on kinship because it is essential to understand his claim 
that "any problem starting from the classificatory, nature 
of kinship terminologies, must be spurious because the plain 
fact is that classificatory terminologies do not exist and 
never could have existed” (ibid., 21-22). Though he does 
not elaborate on this point, I think the following quotation
from his expose on kinship clarifies his thinking 
perfectly:
"Words grottf out of life, and kinship words 
are nothing else but counters or labels 
for social relations. Even as, sociologically, 
kinship is a compound and complex network of 
ties, so every native nomenclature consists 
of several layers or systems of kinship 
designations. One system is used only 
to the parents and members of the household.
Another stratum of kinship appellations is 
extended to the next nearest circle of 
relatives, the mother's sister and brother, 
the father's brother and sister, their off­
spring and the grandparents. Yet another 
type of kinship words applies to the wider 
relatives of the immediate neighbourhood.
Finally there are kinship words used in a 
truly classificatory sense, based partly but 
never completely on the distinctions of clan­
ship. The sounds used in these different 
senses are the same, but the uses, that is 
the meanings, are distinct. Each use, moreover, 
the individual, the extended, the local and 
the classificatory, are differentiated by 
phonetic distinctions, however slight, by 
fixed circumlocutions, and by contextual 
Indices. It is only through the extraordinary 
incompetence of the linguistic treatment In 
kinship terminologies that the compound 
character of primitive terminologies has, 
so far, been completely overlooked. 'Class­
ificatory terminologies' really do not exist"
(ibid., 28-29)-
This is not just a tentative statement by Malin­
owski, it is a recurrent theme:
"To 'correlate' kinship terms with kinship 
facts is based on the mistaken assumption 
that when there is one term for two people 
these two people must somehow be lumped 
together or telescoped or united in the mind 
of the native, or even that they must be one 
and the same person" (1935”. 11,65* footnote 2).
And his treatment of Trobriand kinship terminology is
wholly done along these lines. In the Table of the
Genealogical Chart (1932: 435) he writes in capital letters
the terms for the nearest family relationships: Fa, Mo, e
and y Br, Si, Ch, GrCh. With these relationships go precise
patterns of behaviour, especially concerning sexual taboos.
Gradually other persons enter into this circle of 
kinsmen, and kin terms are extended to refer to them.
"But there can be no doubt that the new use of the 
word remains always what it is, an extension and a 
metaphor" (1932: 443). With this gradual extension in 
meaning goes a corresponding change in emotional content.
And as one passes from the "secondary" relations to more 
distant relatives, the intimacy of the bond and the 
stringency of the taboo falls off rapidly. And this 
extension goes as far as the whole clan, or even beyond 
as in the case of tabugu which not only means GrPa, GrCh,
FaSi, FaSiDa, but eventually even "lawful woman", so 
extending over three clans.
3.1.3 Malinowski gave a lot of thought to linguistic
matters, and he came up with some quite surprising ideas,
though perhaps not as surprising as all that in the light
of his general intellectual views. As his interest was
more psychological than sociological, one could expect him
to see the interest of getting at thought, at a mentality,
through language:
"The study of the linguistic aspect Is 
indispensable, especially if we want to 
grasp the social psychology of a tribe, 
i.e. their manner of thinking, in so far 
as it is conditioned by the peculiarities 
of their culture" (1920: 33).
It is not so much that language would express ideas or
embody concepts and categories: but It stands in some
definite relation to the life of the people who speak
it and to their mental habits and attitudes (cf. 1935: 11,6).
Malinowski remains vague here: in both publications quoted.
he makes clear that this correlation is not too well under-
stood. He is notably unclear on the idea of language 
mirroring reality: in Coral Gardens (1935: 11,65) he
says unequivocally "Language does not simply mirror 
reality", while in the Supplement to The Meaning of 
Meaning: (1923: 327) he had written "Language in its
structure mirrors the real categories derived from pract­
ical attitudes of the child and of primitive or natural 
man to the surrounding world". Perhaps there is less of a 
contradiction than some people have thought: the second 
quotation, I think, refers not to the external reality, 
but to "real categories", or as he put it elsewhere in 
Coral Gardens : language reflects or duplicates "the 
mental reality" of man (1935: 11*7).
While this psychological interest in thought 
and mentality remained, there was an ever increasing 
interest in behaviour. Malinowski became very insistent 
that language is not about communicating ideas because 
that was one step removed from the immediate reality: in 
line with his empiricism, his insistence on direct observ­
ation and fieldwork, his pragmatism, he sees language as a 
"mode of action and not an instrument of reflection". 
Language serves a practical purpose, has a function: and 
this function is Its meaning: "It is the function, the
active and effective influence of a word within a given 
context which constitutes Its meaning" (1935: 11,52). All 
his concerns with language eventually lead back to-meaning, 
even his grammatical considerations, and meaning in the 
sense of 'translation-meaning1, I.e. meaning for the 
ethnographer-outsider who is trying to understand another 
culture. There is a basic ethnocentrism about his approach
In this sense we must see his rejection of the Saussurean 
type of structuralism where "langue" counts, not 
"parole". For Malinowski it is "parole" which matters 
(cf. 1937: 63), and this explains his reference to an 
actual context. The study of language cannot be autonomous 
but must be done in the actual context of situation. 
Utterances have meaning through a context of culture or 
of reference, i.e. they refer to a definite subject- 
matter, and they have meaning through a context of 
situation in which they achieve an immediate practical 
effect (cf. 1935: II, 51 f.). This meaning in context 
which could be called the pragmatic meaning, is considered 
to be the primary meaning. It is in relation to this 
notion of primary meaning that we have to see Malinowski's 
treatment of the multiplicity of meanings, of homonyms, 
among other things in the field of classificatory kinship 
terms. He distinguishes cognate homonyms which are used 
in different but allied meanings, from accidental homonyms 
which have nothing to do with each other semantically but 
have the same sound by sheer accident. Kinship terms 
belong to the latter group where one should not try to 
find a common, vague, confused, meaning by lumping homonyms 
together: they should be considered as a series of distin­
guishable linguistic units (cf. 1935: II, 20,28). While 
he calls them accidental homonyms, he does not say that 
they are not in origin the same words, the same sound-
V
complexes: It Is here that his notion of extension comes in. 
What happens, according to Malinowski, is that a'new meaning 
is created by use in a different context, but this is 
achieved by extending the meaning of an existing sound-
complex. This has the advantage of creating an atmos­
phere of familiarity within which-the new element can 
be placed in a satisfactory way, conducive to the 
necessary pragmatic response (cf. 1935: II, 68-72).
It would be tempting to call Malinowski's 
cognate homonyms examples of polysemy, and his accidental 
homonyms instances of homonymy. In that case, however, 
kinship terms would be homonymous in the sense linguists 
generally use this word; that would hardly be acceptable 
to anybody. I am not sure that this is what Malinowski 
wanted to say. He was probably talking about extensionism 
in terms of a theory of social learning, not of linguistic 
semantics (cf. Buchler and Selby, 1968; 4 ff.). One 
might possibly reproach him, though, that he thought that 
a study of the way children learn extended meanings was 
a proper linguistic analysis of those meanings.
Malinowski’s attention for the Individual and 
the psychological as opposed to the collective and sociol­
ogical, was influential though it remains to be seen 
whether It is a matter of temperament and preference, of 
emphasis, or something more far-reaching.
The matter of extensionism is equally of lasting 
importance though the nature of this extension process 
will be defined in a different way (cf. below 4.4.3). The 
matter of how to determine what should be considered as 
the primary meaning has not yet been solved conclusively.
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3*2 . A.R. Hadeliffe-Brown,
3.2.1 A.R. Kadcliffe-Brown was completely at one with 
Malinowski in opposing what he called "conjectural 
history", but - as I have indicated - he did not like 
to be called a functionalist (cf. Radcliffe-Brown, 1940:
188). He differed from Malinowski on two points: he was 
marked more deeply by ideas of the natural, exact sciences, 
and he preferred a sociological to a psychological approach.
He defined Social Anthropology as the theoretical 
natural science of human society, i.e., the investigation 
of social phenomena by methods essentially similar to 
those used in the physical and biological sciences; and 
as he understands by natural science the systematic invest­
igation of the structure of the universe as revealed to us 
through our senses, so anthropology must study the social 
structure which gives unity to the social phenomena we 
observe in human society (cf. 1940: 189 ff.). This involves 
a careful collecting of data through field-work, and 
these data must then be interpreted. Here it was thought, 
both by e.g. Rivers and Kroeber in the Historical School, 
and &y Malinowski in the Functional School, that the psycho­
logist would be the proper person to undertake this systematic 
interpretation, an interpretation in terms of processes of 
individual mental activity; Radcliffe-Brown disagrees, 
he sees it as the task of sociology, a sociology which - in 
the line of the' French School of Durkheim - interprets 
data of culture by relating them to universal laws. And 
as these laws can only be discovered by the comparative 
method, by the study and comparison of many diverse types
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of culture3 he likes to call his approach ’Comparative
Sociology’ (cf. 1931: 9 ,l2* ,17-18).
While Radcliffe-Brown disliked being called
a functionalist 3 the notion of ’function’ played a
role in his method next to the concept of structure:
"The social life of the community is 
here defined as the functioning of 
the social structure. The function 
of any recurrent activity, such as the 
punishment of a crime, or a funeral 
ceremony, is the part it plays in the 
social life as a whole and therefore 
the contribution it makes to the mainte­
nance of the structural continuity.
The concept of function as here defined 
thus involves the notion of a structure 
consisting of a set of relations amongst 
unit entities, the continuity of the 
structure being maintained by a life-process 
made up of the activities of the constituent 
units" (1935: 180,) .
This concept is clearly based on the hypothesis of the
functional unity of,a social system, i.e. of the total
social structure of a society, together with the totality
of social usages in which that structure appears and on
which it depends for its continued existence.
3.2.2 It is these general ideas we find reflected in
Radcliffe-Brown's views on kinship and kinship terminology.
"To understand any kinship system it is 
necessary to carry out an analysis in terms 
of social structure and social function.
The components of social structures are 
human beings, and a structure is an 
arrangement of persons in relationships 
institutionally defined and regulated.
The social function of any feature of a 
system is its relation to the structure ‘ 
and its continuance and stability, not its 
relation to the biological needs of 
individuals" (1950: 82).
The last remark about the ’biological needs’ is clearly
directed against Malinowski though he does not mention
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him by name; he only mentions Kroeber’s name as a 
matter of fact when attacking the psychological approach 
to kinship terminology (cf* 1930/31: 427)* Where 
they agree is in rejecting Morgan's hypothetical
historical approach (ibid. 426), as well as Rivers'
version of it. Radcliffe“Brown points out that the 
claim that certain forms of social life, of marriage, 
are at the origin of a certain type of terminology cannot 
be proved, in fact it might just as well be assumed that
it was the terminology that called forms of marriage into
being: this would be just as valid a hypothesis and
just as unprov^able (cf. 1941: 57 f.). What is needed is 
an explanatory structural principle, not a hypothetical 
causal link (ibid.: 75> 81).
While for Morgan kinship terms were the crucial 
elements of his theory, Radcliffe-Brown tends to give a 
far less prominent position to matters of terminology: 
several times he insists that kin terms are "part of 
the system" (e.g* 1930/31: 427; 1941: 53) but only one 
part among others. They do hold a special position only 
in so far as they offer "the best possible approach to 
the investigation and analysis of the kinship system as 
a whole" (1941: 62), "because they frequently, or indeed 
usually, reveal the method of ordering relationships"
(1950: 10). This role of importance presumes obviously 
that there exists some sort of link between kinship term- 
inology and social practices, and such is indeed Radcliffe- 
Brown’ s position: "There are important correspondences
between kinship nomenclature and social practices” (1941: 61), 
"there is a very thorough functional cori’elation between the
kinship terminology of any tribe and the social 
organisation of that tribe as it exists at present"
(1930/31: 427). Radcliffe-Brown also makes it clear 
that such an assumption must be demonstrated by field 
work and comparative analysis, which he claims to have 
done throughout his studies. And while he does show for 
a great many cases that the kinship nomenclature is "one 
very obvious and natural means of distinguishing and 
classifying a person's kin" (cf. 1950: 23) 3 he does, not 
show (if indeed it can be shown) that there is a necessary 
correlation. Of course the number of cases in which the 
correlation can be established, is generally (though 
usually implicitly) esteemed to be high enough to claim 
the existence of such a correlation as a general rule, 
but neither Radcliffe-Brown nor many others seem to have 
reflected upon the implications of the lack of correlation 
in certain cases, though Radcliffe-Brown1s use of such 
expressions as "normally" and "as a general rule" v/ould 
seem to indicate he was aware of the existence of 
exceptions. In a way it is to be expected in human 
sciences that theories are seldom without exception as 
they are dealing with fluctuating, ever-changing realities, 
all the more unstable because of the ever-present unpred­
ictable element of rules being broken by man, voluntarily, 
or involuntarily through error or forced by circumstances. 
But ignoring the incongruities too easily may well lead 
to circular reasoning and begging the question. There 
is some suspicion in my mind that this is what happened 
in the case of Radcliffe-Brown. He claimed that the study 
and analysis of terminology for kinsmen afforded the best
possible approach to. the study of kinship, and he 
then went on to say: "This,of course, it could not do
if there were no real relations of interdependence 
between the terminology and the rest of the system"
(1941: 62), an interdependence he finds confirmed in 
his studies in the field. While appreciating the 
difficulties in coming to terms with the analysis of 
systems so foreign to our understanding, one would have 
liked to see more caution expressed, or else one might 
say: No wonder one finds the interdependence confirmed 
in one's analysis if the presumption of it provided the 
key to the problem in the first place.
When looking in more detail at his way of 
dealing with kin terms, we notice some similarity with 
Malinowski, on the point of primary meaning and its 
extensions, in Malinowski clearly linked with his psychol­
ogical approach to the problem. Radcliffe-Brown, who, as 
we have seen, rejected the psychological approach, seems 
to have a comparable approach at times: "Every term in an 
Australian system of terminology may be regarded as having 
a primary meaning" (1930/31: 45), or:
"This extension from the mother's brother 
to the other maternal relatives is shown 
in the Ba-Thonga tribe in the kinship 
terminology. The term malume, primarily 
applied to the mother's brother, Is 
extended to the sons of those men, who 
are also malume" (1924: 29 footnote).
But though they are referred to by the same term and a
similar customary behaviour is required towards them,
they are not totally equal In all respects: "Within the
class of persons denoted by one kinship term, the individual
distinguishes degrees of nearness or distance" (1930/31: 45)
"The attitude and behaviour of a person towards a 
particular relative is affected not only by the category 
to which he belongs but also by the degree of nearness 
or distance of the relationship" (1950: 9)* But apart 
from these points Radcliffe-Brown formulated thoughts 
which reflect much more clearly his brand of structuralism 
in connection with classificatory terminology. The 
function of this kind of terminological system is to 
serve as a means of establishing and recognising categorie 
of relatives (cf. 1941: 6l), this is the "functional 
correlation between the kinship terminology and the 
social organisation of a tribe" (cf. 1930/31: 427), a 
function which allows the social system to work and 
continue to exist. The precise form of a classificatory 
terminology has the function to be primarily "a mechanism 
which facilitates the establishment of wide-range systems 
of kinship" (1950: 9)* In simple language this means 
that this system assures that all the people one comes 
into contact with are classifiable and classified, in 
terms of social structure, in terms of expected behaviour 
and of rights and duties. But Radcliffe-Brown has been 
much more specific about the social functions of class­
ificatory systems (cf. 1930/31: 428 ff.). The most 
important point about such systems is what he calls the 
principle of equivalence of brothers: this means that if 
someone stands in a certain relationship to Ego, that 
person's brother stands in the same relationship € o Ego. 
So in Zulu (Radcliffe-Brown, 1922: 6)
ubaba means Pa and FaBr and PaPaBrSo, 
umama means Mo and MoSi and MoMoSiDa.
This implies that all children of all ubaba and umama 
are Ego's brothers and sisters, umfo watu and udada watu.
This function of sociological solidarity brings about 
stability, it makes the continued existence and 
efficiency of a social organisation much safer as it 
does not depend on a bond between individuals but between 
an individual and a group. In the case of the death of 
a marriage partner this principle may become operative 
in such institutions as levirate and sororate. Sapir, 
as we have seen, saw in the levirate the explanation for 
the grouping together of a number of men under one kin 
term in as far as they were all potential husbands to the 
same woman. Radcliffe-Brown makes it clear that there is 
no causal link between terminology and special forms of 
marriage (such as the levirate): "they are both applications 
of the one structural principle" (1941: 81).
A second principle is the distinction between 
the father and the mother, and therefore between relatives 
through the father and relatives through the mother. This 
distinction can be observed in the difference in closeness 
in relation between Ego and his father and mother respectively 
It also appears in the fact that they clearly belong to 
separate groups, which is often expressed In the terminology 
for MoBr and FaSi: to continue with the example from Zulu 
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1922: 6 f.):
PaSi - Ubaba i.e. "father" ‘
MoBr = umaluma i.e. "male mother"
Another principle is that of distinction as to generation: 
in simple societies there is a definite need for a clear 
authority, life depends on unwritten rules and customs being
handed down from one generation to the next. The 
very survival of the group depends on this. This 
importance sometimes results in a distinction being 
made even within one generation, e.g. in Zulu:
umna = eBr (or any son, irrespective of age 
vis-a-vis Ego, of FaeBr)
umnawa - yBr
Often this necessary strong authoritarian relationship 
between parents and children is counterbalanced and 
compensated for by a very relaxed, familiar relationship 
between grandparents and grandchildren, a familiarity 
which almost seems to--imply being on a foot of equality. 
This too can come through in terminological features, 
e.g. in Panti, a tribe in Ghana, where there is a recipr­
ocal term nana, 'grandrelative1, indicating both GrPa 
and GrCh (Kronenfeld, 1973: 1579)*
Finally there is the important principle of 
reciprocity in marriage, again a question of maintaining 
a balance: a group which provides a bride must receive
compensation. Sometimes this is achieved by giving a 
bride-price, sometimes by exchanging women systematically 
between groups or sub-groups ("moieties") in a highly 
regulated manner. If the latter option is taken, it may 
be the case that this reciprocity Is also perceived in 
the kinship terminology: we then often see for example 
the same term being used to refer to FaSi and MoBrWi, 
e.g.: In Dieri (South Australia) papa - PaSi and MoBrVJi 
(cf. Korn, 1973: 147 f .)*
3-2.3 As I have indicated above, the nature and 
the extent of the interdependence of terminology and 
social system is - to my mind - insufficiently clarified.
The importance of the study of kinship terms was stressed, 
some correlation was observed though not a necessary one, 
more a possible application of an underlying principle: 
but one had the feeling all the time that much remained 
to be specified.
Looking at the same question from what Radcliffe- 
Brown says about language and about meaning may give us 
some interesting complementary insight into his thinking, 
but basically we are left with the same impression of a 
need for further elaboration. The social relevance of 
language is based on the link between language and a 
speech-community (cf. 1940: 196). Radcliffe-BrownTs 
general orientationaand his linking speech with a community 
make his interest in language sociological.
In a general sense he mentions the existence 
and size of speech-communities; more particularly he 
discovers social relevance where certain features of a 
language In a society are not a matter of accident but 
of history: the spread of language, the unification of 
a number of separate communities into a single speech- 
community, the reverse process of subdivision into 
different speech-communities, difference of speech usage 
according to different social classes. But what Radcliffe- 
Brown rejects explicitly is a link of one-sided or mutual 
determination between the characteristics of a language 
(phonology, morphology, and even to a great extent 
vocabulary) and the characteristics of the social structure
of the community within which the language is spoken.
Any coincidence here is historical accident. I have 
difficulty in reconciling this point of view with the 
importance he attached to the study of that part of 
vocabulary which is the kinship terminology, as the 
"best possible approach" to the kinship system as a whole. 
Radcliffe-Brown*s failure to reflect on the consequences 
of the lack of correlation between the terminology and 
the social structure to which I have pointed already, 
may well be at the root of these possibly conflicting 
statements. On the whole his views on language are not 
systematically developed. He has dealt briefly with the 
problem of meaning, setting in parallel the meaning of 
words and the meaning of elements of culture (cf. 1931: l6f.), 
but no clear picture emerges about his views on language.
He speaks about meaning of a word as "the set of assoc­
iations that it has" with other things in his mind, and 
therefore the place it occupies in his total thinking, 
his mental life as a whole. (...) The meaning of a word 
in a language is constituted by the associations normally 
clustering around the word within that community". There 
is a psychological ring about this definition which would 
have suited Malinowski more than it does the sociologically 
minded Radcliffe-Brown, it would seem that Radcliffe-Brown 
may well be reproducing ideas which he really had not 
digested properly. Sometimes one gets the Impression he 
sees meaning in terms of life of a speech-community, a 
functional Malinowskian outlook; at other moments he 
stresses the interrelatedness of the various elements 
which carry meaning (be it In language or in culture) as
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the crucial aspect, a properly structural attitude.
The absence of clearly developed thoughts 
about language, the fact that he collected kin terms 
systematically but used them only sparsely in his writings, 
seem to bear out a criticism which has sometimes been 
levelled at Radcliffe-Brown that he was interested in 
kinship terminology only as a means to an end, not as 
a subject deserving attention for its own sake. And 
while it would be wrong to deny anthropology the right 
to look at kinship in terms of social structure primarily, 
any use made of language material in such a pursuit 
must respect the special nature of such material.
3.3 Kingsley Davis and W. Lloyd Warner.
3.3.1 When I include a paragraph on the contribution 
made by K. Davis and W.L. Warner to the development of 
the study of kinship terminology, I do not want to discuss 
the whole work of either of them in this respect.. I just 
want to discuss an article they wrote jointly and which 
constitutes a landmark, pointing the way from Kroeber’s 
thoughts on categories of relationship to present-day 
formal analysis (Davis and Warner, 1937). it would not 
seem to have had an immediate impact, but as a witness to 
an ongoing, tradition it cannot remain unmentioned. At 
the same time it touches explicitly on several points of 
great importance, points which were rarely dealt with 
explicitly or assessed on their real significahce in • 
earlier studies. We shall consider briefly the views put 
forward by Davis and Warner in their article, first on the
issue of kinship, then on language and terminology 
approached from the field of kinship.
3.3*2 In trying to clarify the discussion about
kinship the authors wanted to come back to what they 
saw as the essentials. They were notably unhappy about 
kinship always being studied as an index of something 
else rather than for its. own sake: they intend to
take up where Kroeber left off in 1909, by presenting 
a purely internal analysis of kinship. But while their 
attention is focussed on internal structures, their wider 
interest lies very much with comparison and typology. 
Comparison only makes sense on a basis of partial simil­
arity and partial difference: some sort of general frame­
work is required to serve as a yard-stick with which 
systems can be measured and their differences be established. 
If one wants to compare the kinship systems of mankind, a 
universal basis is needed. And the comparative approach 
is precisely what we are looking for, so that these 
observations are very relevant. For it would seem that 
the thesis of the interdependence of language and culture 
by its very essence is bound to explain how similar things 
are expressed differently from one language to another; 
by definition this implies comparison.
The comparative approach was strongly advocated 
by Radcliffe-Brown and in fact interest in non-Western 
cultures, in any aspect of those cultures, has always 
been triggered off by wonder at differences, at the 
unexpected, which invited closer inspection and comparison. 
And it has always been assumed in our particular field of 
kinship that we were studying something basically similar
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though different in form and appearance. Where Davis 
and Warner have special merit, is in making these under­
lying assumptions explicit and in trying to develop 
from there a scheme of systematic analysis.
"Kinship is a concept that touches 
two levels of phenomena. On the one 
hand it refers to a relatively fixed 
biological structure, on the other to 
a relatively variable social pattern 
based on this biological structure.
Hence the place to look for universal 
elements is on the biological plane.
Then an endeavour can be made to find 
out how these elements are used to build 
the different concrete sociological 
structures represented by terminologies"
(1937: 62).
Consequently it is this biological structure which they 
study first, though they mention that the distinction 
between the biological and the social is "purely theoret­
ical" (ibid.: footnote), the cultural can never be excluded 
from the biological,4 They distinguish five elements in 
this biological order. First there is birth and birth- 
cycle, connected with reproduction, relationship through 
birth. As a rule man participates in this process of 
reproduction in two ways, as a child and as'a parent, 
separated by a cycle of time, by a generation. This 
parent/child link is the most fundamental one in kinship 
structure. The next element in kinship structure is the 
link between siblings. Thirdly comes birth-order between 
siblings, an element of less significance. Another element 
is difference in sex, an important one, but a special one 
in that it extends beyond the kinship group. Finally 
there is the procreative union of marriage. These five 
elements provide the skeleton around which a systematic 
conception of kinship is built:
"Every terminological system will give 
recognition to them in its own 
characteristic way. (...) They thus 
furnish an intrinsic basis for dist­
inguishing between kinship types"
(ibid., 64).
They can be divided into two sets, along two axes. Along 
a vertical axis, indicating time, ascending/descending 
order, we have the elements of birth-cycle and birth- 
order; along the horizontal axis we find sibling-link, 
sexual union, and sex similarity or difference. The 
sibling-link is not unconnected with the factor time as 
one has to know at what birth-cycle the sibling-link is 
situated which binds collateral lines to the central line 
of Ego. The union of marriage will exist normally between 
partners of the same birth-cycle or generation, or else 
it will make the partners equal in this respect socially, 
in the appreciation of the community.
With the help of these five elements relatives 
can be located in biological space, measuring their 
distance to Ego. While there is, statistically speaking, 
a rough approximation between biological and sociological 
kinship distance, social space and distance are more 
difficult to measure. This is the reason why the authors 
limit themselves to the study of terminological space only, 
because they see terminology as being closely related to 
social organization as it is the instrument in which 
people think about kinship (cf. p.69 ff.).
3,3.3 Davis and Warner do not offer any further direct
proof of the close link between terminology aid social 
organisation: this kind of proof can only be found in
the testing of hypotheses about the way in which the two
relate. For this kind of testing they provide the 
analytical framework though their own objectives may be 
slightly different.
The background to their thinking is that 
language creates a socially experienced world, using part 
of reality only: language is not a mirror-image of 
reality. Each language does this in its own way: this 
is where comparison is useful (as well as the universal 
biological framework) to see which elements of reality 
are selected, which ones are excluded, and on the basis 
of what principle (p. 69-70). They also draw the 
conclusion, quite rightly, that if the linguistic order 
is sui generis, it is imperative that each term should 
be seen as part of the whole set of terms and not in 
isolation: we have here, inoother words, the essence of 
the concept of a linguistic field (cf. p.80). But there 
is a certain Bloomfieldian flavour about their conception 
of linguistics when they seem to consider the study of 
meaning as being outside linguistics. When discussing 
primary and combined terms ("merely a linguistic device" 
in their words) they say: "It is extrinsic to kinship 
logics, a question of linguistics or word structure rather 
than of semasiology or word-content" (loc.cit. 7*0 *
In their analysis they then proceed along the 
lines of Kroeber's categories of relationship, using 
their five biological elements. And in the same way in 
which they tried to make the enumeration of elements 
more fundamental and systematic, they now proceed to 
clarify first some basic points which had caused much
discussion and misunderstanding following Kroeber’s 
article. They stated that the discussion about the 
appropriateness of the term ’classificatory’, challenged 
by Kroeber, failed to distinguish between two different 
conceptions, whether in fact terms were seen as design­
ating persons or relationships. I have pointed out 
already that Kroeber challenged Morgan on something he 
never said, and this effort at reconciliation is more 
directed toward the discussion which had followed Kroeberrs 
article than toward clarifying the original problem. But 
Davis and Warner have done more than trying to put an end 
to a discussion; they have developed their line of 
thought into a more refined distinction between isolating, 
descriptive, and classificatory terms. They base this 
distinction on their five biological categories: isolating 
terms designate one person only and are specified with 
regard to all five categories (e.g. English "father"); 
descriptive terms are specific for all major categories, 
i.e., all except birth-order (e.g. English "son"), while 
classificatory terms are not specific for one or more of 
the four major categories (e.g. English "uncle").
Separate from this classification on the basis 
of word-content come a number of what they call ’linguistic 
devices1, to do with word structure. Here they distinguish 
primary terms, i.e. single kinship terms that can be used 
alone or can be combined with other primary or categorical 
terms; categorical words that are not by themselves kin­
ship terms but merely symbolise one category of relation­
ship (e.g. ’ grandT, ’in-law*); and combined terms that
are formed by combination of other elements.
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An actual analysis of kinship terms will be 
carried out with reference to the way in which terms 
represent the biological categories, and must answer 
the following questions:
- how many categories of relationship does 
each term in the nomenclature express?
- how many categories does the system as a 
whole rely upon?
- how does the system combine the categories and 
subcategories on which it does rely?
Once these questions have been answered and for practical 
purposes carefully symbolized, one can develop a typology, 
and correlate types of nomenclature with types of societies 
and features of kinship with features of social organisation. 
3.3*^ In conclusion I think one cannot stress enough
the importance of the issues raised by this article. The 
opposition between the biological and the social aspects 
of kinship is a crucial but delicate point. I have 
pointed out already the importance of some kind of frame­
work for objective reference to enable comparison between 
systems, comparison being essential to any thesis on 
linguistic relativity. This ‘objective* frame-work would 
also seem important in relation to the question of primary 
and secondary or extended meanings of kinship terms, as 
well as for the precise delimitation of the domain of 
such terms. This point will have to be carefully.examined, 
for unless the necessary reservations are made and the 
underlying assumptions clearly perceived, one could only 
too easily be begging the question.
One of the points to be clarified must be what
to understand by ‘biological*. This is not just 
quibbling about words: I do have the feeling that there 
is something unsatisfactory about the grouping together 
of these five elements as 'biological*. Apart from 
the category 'sex' which is admittedly different in 
that it extends beyond kinship boundaries, all categories 
have, or can have, to a greater or lesser extent a 
social side to them. And even when we consider 'sex' we 
could take the view, with Radcliffe-Brown, that classif- 
icatory systems are wide-range systems which determine 
our possible sexual relationships with all the people we 
are likely to meet: in this sense there could even be a
social side to the category 'sex' in so far as it 
contributes to regulate marriages.
Prom a more strictly linguistic point of view 
some equally important, and partly related, matters 
are raised. Several remarks made stress - often implicitly 
only - the autonomous character of linguistics, and this 
point of view is worth remembering even when one would 
want to include semantics in linguistics* The mention 
of kinship terms forming an interdependent set of terms 
is a good indication of this. In a similar vein the 
authors speak of the terminology "bridging the gap" 
between the biological and the social. In a way this is 
a fortunate expression because it stresses the link with 
both without identifying it with either. But it may be 
useful to deepen this idea and to try to examine how it 
links up with both and what it achieves in doing so.
There is however the problem in the background that the 
distinction between biological and social may be merely
an analytical-theoretical one (Davis and Warner, 1937 •*
62; cf. above 3.3.2).
The notion of ‘linguistic device* as distinct . 
from kin terms proper is attractive and useful: but one 
may have to define it more carefully and for each language 
specifically. For all linguistic signs are arbitrary and, 
in a sense, devices: there are no existential links
between words and realities. What we will want to know 
is: what can be called a ‘device* in a particular language 
given its process of word-formation, its word-classes, 
its own internal structure.
3.4 George Peter Murdock.
3.4.1 G.P. Murdock is a figure of some importance in
the study of kinship and while his views on the linguistic 
side of kinship - the kinship terminology - or on the 
nature and role of language in relation to social structures 
are not terribly original, there are good reasons for 
including him in a survey of the study of kinship terminology. 
These reasons are his influence on students in this field, 
his particular method, and the assumptions and implications 
of this method. It is in fact his method which has earned 
him his influential position.
Murdock did his own anthropological fieldwork on 
kinship and social behaviour but the main bulk of his work 
is perhaps best characterized by the epithet ‘eclectic’ in 
the sense that he gets his material from various sources, 
from published data and research reports. It is eclectic 
furthermore In quite another sense, in that he gets his
methodological inspiration from different sciences, viz.
sociology, historical anthropology, behavioristic
psychology, and psychoanalysis (cf. Murdock, 1949; XII-
XVII). But there is more to Murdock’s work than
eclecticism: he uses his material with a specific aim of
his own in mind, what he has called the "cross-cultural 
survey". And it is here that Murdock’s original
contribution lies.
Cross-cultural studies are a variety of compar­
ative studies; they are, in the words of Francis Hsu 
(1969: 52), "works involving a few variables In a large 
number of societies employing statistical techniques".
This ’genre’ of comparative study represents a respectable 
tradition in scientific work: the search for explanatory 
factors and theory which transcend the anecdotal and have 
a universal value. In social science its field of interest 
is the whole of human social life in all its dimensions, 
the dimension of time, of geography, of form of culture.
It was this universal interest which was at the root of 
his work of establishing the "Cross-cultural Survey", 
later to develop into the "Human Relations Area File", a 
coded abstract of all available ethnographic material.
For what Murdock wanted to establish in social science was 
the equivalent of the "laws" of natural science. He 
realised, however, that in social science ’laws' would 
be more like 'tendencies’, verified statements of correlation 
between social phenomena. And the Cross-cultural Survey 
was his means of drawing up those statements and' putting 
them to a quantitative test. This quantitative test Is 
necessary in Murdock’s yiew because there is no hope of
discovering laws without exceptions In social science, 
and experiments on human beings and human society are 
not possible. A quantitative test is done with the use 
of statistics, statistics require the tabulation of 
data, and for this the Cross-cultural Survey provides 
the means.
It may come as a surprise perhaps to see that 
Murdock combines an assumption.of universality with 
behaviourism, I.e., with a stimulus/response theory where 
certain types and forms of culture are the response to 
stimuli of biological and other needs, a response which 
is learned through experience after birth and is In fact 
inculcated through teaching (cf. Murdock, 1940). Murdock 
reconciles these two things - universality and learned 
culture in response to given needs - by posing a theory 
of learning which works on the same principles everywhere 
as the principles of learning are the same, the results 
should reflect a universal common factor; If societies 
survive there must be something they have in common which 
makes them survive. Moreover, culture is what Murdock 
calls "ideational", I.e., it has ideal norms (as distinct 
from actual behaviour) which are conceptualized - or: 
verbalised - group habits: the universality of these 
mental processes guarantees some universality in culture. 
While Murdock thus assumes that certain factors contribut 
to the universals underlying all human culture, and con­
sequently make comparison possible and meaningful, other 
aspects of culture contribute In their way to making the 
comparative approach recommendable. First there is the 
fact that culture is what Murdock calls "adaptive”, i.e.,
culture changes when adapting to geographical and 
social environment and to the biological and psychol­
ogical demands of the human organism. This explains 
why cultures are different or, if it comes to that, why 
a surface similarity between two cultures does not 
necessarily point to both cultures having undergone an 
Identical process of change; for the number of actually 
used adaptations in the face of social and other demands, 
tends to be limited. Another aspect of culture is that 
It is "integrative", i.e., the elements which make up a 
given culture tend to form a consistent and Integrated 
whole. But as integration takes time, there always is 
a "cultural lag" (cf. Murdock, 1949: 118).
This is the background to Murdock’s Cross- 
cultural Survey: the assumption of universal elements 
combined with the adaptive and Integrative qualities of 
culture. And the objective of the Survey Is to formulate 
and test generalizations on the basis of correlations 
found in different unrelated cultures. The method Murdock 
uses to present and test the correlation between a 
particular kinship determinant and the terminological 
features that It tends to produce, is the postulational 
method of enquiry (cf. Murdock, 1940; 1949: 127 ff.).
This method requires the elaboration of hypotheses which, 
after rigorous logical analysis, lead to a basic postulate 
or set of postulates. A postulate will be far too. general
V
to be capable of direct validation: therefore one deduces 
from a postulate as large, as diverse, and as representative 
a group as possible of testable theorems. Only after 
having performed all logical or deductive operations does
one apply the empirical tests to verify the theorems 
quantitatively. An anticipated correlation between 
two aspects of culture is thus tested in the whole 
sample and the results, positive and negative, are 
tabulated and expressed statistically in some way.
If the positive correlations prevail in a significant 
enough quantity, the postulate is considered tentatively 
verified. Correlation due to historical factors should 
be discerned and taken Into account: a valid cross- 
cultural hypothesis must hold true under any circumstances. 
The negative cases must equally be examined: if no 
explanation can be found for the divergence (such as e.g. 
cultural lag), the whole principle is weakened and becomes 
suspect. Basically there are then two tests to be passed 
for valid generalization: a quantitative statistical test, 
and an analytical historical test.
3.4.2 The key word, when we come to consider Murdock’s
analysis of kinship, is adaptation, the adaptive force In 
culture which is behind the correlations that can be 
established between different forces at work in the kinship 
system. At one time Murdock accepted three types of 
explanation for co-occurrence of elements: genetic (common 
origin), diffusionist (borrowing as a result of geographical 
contact), and functional-adaptive (cf. Barnes, 1971: 16/17)* 
More recently he has rejected the validity of results If 
genetic or diffusionist ties are not ruled out first: 
cross-cultural studies of a quantitative nature require 
the comparison of mutually independent cultures in order 
to ensure that the associations established are truly 
objective (cf. Murdock, 1967: esp. 111-112).
Even before Murdock developed his thinking to 
this point he felt that previous types of analysis of 
kinship were too incidental (cf. 1949: 113 ff-)* He 
sees Kroeber as one of the leading figures among those 
who explain kinship terminology from multiple historical 
influences: he agrees to the multiplicity, he is not
happy with Kroeber seemingly excluding other than 
historical factors, especially sociological ones. Beeause 
there are limitations de facto to the possible responses 
which people make to the demands of social life through 
their systems of kinship terminology, historical explanations 
alone are Inadequate. Differential principles of word 
formation or linguistic morphology are insufficient explan­
ation by themselves as well: for one thing there are too 
many examples of related languages with different principles 
of classification, while the phenomenon of cultural lag 
reduces moreover considerably the possible use of linguistic 
indices In this matter. Elementary psychological or log­
ical processes have also been put forward: some people
have held that the terms of relationship are expressive of 
a manner of thought, of association, and of generalisation. 
Murdock does not accept that psychology can explain any 
cultural phenomenon, it only provides a mechanism by which 
historical and other influences are translated into patterns 
of behaviour under particular social conditions; as Murdock 
puts it:
"The social scientist must resort to the 
psychologist for answers to the question 
’how?1-. But for a solution of problems 
concerned with ’what?', ’when?1, ’where?1 
or even ’why?’ he must look to history 
for the independent variables" (1949: 131)*
While Murdock comes down clearly on the side 
of sociology, against psychology, he has no time for 
the so-called ’universal sociological principles' from 
e.g. Radeliffe-Brown: he calls these "mere verbalizations 
reified into causal forces". He refuses equally to 
reduce the explanation of determinants of kinship termin­
ology to the influence of a single particular social 
institution, be it special forms of preferential marriage, 
or the constitution of kin and local groups. But it is 
in social institutions - provided they are general, not 
exceptional like the re-marriage of a widow etc. - that 
Murdock sees the source of the various types of classif­
ication, albeit not in just one institution: the causal 
factors are always multiple.
We have seen that Murdock saw culture as being 
integrative, in search of balance: in this same sense we 
have to see these multiple factors at work, often balancing 
one another out. The one which, finally tips the scales 
may be fairly insignificant but the real cause is to be 
found in the whole field of forces. With so many factors 
operative simultaneously it is to be expected that the 
statistical correlations will often be far from perfect, 
further affected by the time lag which we referred to when 
discussing this integrative character of culture. A 
moderate statistical coefficient may therefore still 
reflect genuine and very significant causal relations.
Murdock's understanding of kinship terminology 
takes as Its starting point the nuclear family with its 
eight characteristic relationships between husband and 
wife, parents and children, and between elder and younger
siblings. Here the first interpersonal relationships 
are learned, and this behaviour tends to be ’extended' or 
’generalized’ to persons outside this nuclear family as 
time goes on and one’s personal contacts are broadened. 
Normally each human being is part of two nuclear families 
In different roles at some time during his life, a family 
of orientation and a family of procreation. This fact 
gives rise to kinship systems. The relatives within one 
nuclear family are primary relatives, the primary relatives 
of one's primary relatives outside the nuclear family are 
secondary relatives, the primary relatives of secondary 
relatives who are not primary or secondary relatives to 
Ego are tertiary relatives, beyond that it Is sufficient 
to speak of distant relatives. Of all these relationships 
some are affinal, some consanguineal. Of course, a 
distinctive behavicjjral pattern towards each potential 
relative would be impossible; consequently, to make the 
whole thing manageable the number of categories is reduced
by grouping or coalescing. The various ways in which this
is done result in the different kinship structures; the 
behaviour characterizing relationships also contains a 
verbal element, the terms used to refer to relatives.
These kinship terms can be classified in three ways:
- as regards mode of use, a distinction can be made 
between terms of address and terms of reference; 
the latter ones are not part of the relationship 
itself;
- as regards linguistic structure, one can distingu­
ish elementary terms, derivative terms (a kin
term plus some other lexical element, not
primarily with a kinship meaning) , and 
descriptive terms (compounds of two or more 
elementary terms);
as regards range of application, we have 
denotative terms which apply only to relatives 
in a single kinship category as defined by 
generation, sex, and genealogical connection, 
and we have classificatory terms which apply 
to persons of two or more kinship categories as 
these are defined by generation, sex, and 
genealogical connection. It should be noted 
that it is particular kinship terms, not whole 
systems, which are called Tclassificatoryf, and 
it is this device especially which reduces the 
number of kinship categories.
Classificatory terms are possible only if one 
ignores one or more ’fundamental distinctions between 
relatives. Following Kroeber and Lowie, Murdock recognizes 
nine criteria in kinship terms, six major ones (generation, 
sex, affinity, collaterality, bifurcation, polarity), and 
three subsidiary ones (relative age, speaker's sex, decad­
ence) . Ignoring any one of these produces classificatory 
terms. Important as these criteria are for the analysis 
of kinship, they do not of themselves explain differences 
in kinship terminology: such explanation can only be derived
from discovering which factors led people to select the 
particular set of criteria they use for differentiating 
or equating certain categories of kinsmen.
Meanwhile it remains true that kin terms play 
a role in the relationship between relatives. The terms
of reference denote a status, and status can be defined
in terms of expected behaviour: this is sufficient reason
to assume that there must be some sort of fairly close
functional congruity between terms of reference and
the way people interact. This congruity is an empirical
generalization but is not absolute: behaviour may be
different towards people referred to by the same kin term,
or in other cases a different term may be used to refer
to different people towards whom one behaves in identical
fashion. Moreover, behaviour patterns are not as sharply
differentiated from one another as the associated terms
are, nor are their differences across cultures necessarily
comparable: bilateral societies tend e.g.,to have far less
differentiated behaviour patterns than unilinearly organized
societies with their complex forms. This is how Murdock •
concludes and summarises his findings:
"That kinship nomenclature Is closely 
correlated with culturally patterned 
norms of behavior toward relatives must 
be assumed. This assumption accords 
with ’a priori’ reasoning, with the 
overwhelming testimony of the data sur­
veyed for the present study, and with 
the experience and the declared or 
admitted views of nearly all competent 
anthropological authorities. Further 
exploration of the subject would become 
primarily an exercise in semantics, a 
study of the relation between words and 
the things they denote. Moreover, it 
would be irrelevant, for the real 
scientific problem is not to derive termin­
ology from patterned behavior,or»vice versa’, 
but to explain both phenomena on the basis 
of causal factors lying outside of the 
kinship complex. (..») Such factors can be 
expected to exert an influence on both 
behavior patterns and nomenclature. In 
some cases they may affect both at the same 
time and in like degree. In others they may 
change Initially only the patterns of kin­
ship behavior, setting in motion an adapt­
ive process which with the passage of time
produces congruent modifications in 
terminology. Sometimes, perhaps, 
they may even alter first the kinship 
terms, with behavior undergoing subsequent 
adjustment, but this is probably 
relatively rare since new words and new 
meanings of old words do not ordinarily 
precede the things they designate. In 
any event, the ultimate effect of an 
outside causative factor is to alter 
both relationships and terminology, which 
always retain their essential integration"
(Murdock, 19^9: 112).
It is by these outside causative factors that we can account
for the cross-cultural differences in kinship terminology,
and these factors must be non-universal features of social
structure, especially in Murdock's view, economic factors
(cf. 19^9: 137)* These factors are called social
differentials and social equalizers. The interplay of
the inherent analytical categories and the cultural factors
accounts for the extension and differentiation of kinship
terminology. This is the essence of Murdock's Postulate
(19^9: 138) which he then puts to the test quantitatively
In 30 theorems and propositions (ibid., p.139-179)*
3.^.3 In assessing Murdock's work on kinship two points
must be noted. The first is that, although the analysis
of kinship terminology holds a place of some importance
in his studies, there is not much that would Interest a
linguist directly, not in his analysis of terminological
systems nor in his ideas about the nature and role of
language generally. But on the other hand there are aspects
in his contribution which highlight to my mind real problems
in the methodology of a certain type of study, not just in
Murdock's field of anthropology but also, mutatis mutandis,
in the field of linguistics. I am thinking here especially
of such issues as comparativism, universals (cultural or
linguistic), and what constitutes an explanation or 
what Is mere restatement of facts.
Murdock's concept of culture has come in for 
a fair amount of criticism and though it would be 
possible to establish a parallel with problems In 
delimiting the notion of language, I prefer to confine 
myself to pointing out those points of criticism which 
would appear to be more relevant in the framework of this 
present study. Murdock does not always make a clear 
distinction between culture and society but in fact the 
two do not always coincide. There may be more cultures 
within one society. Equally there may be more than one 
language In one cultural area, or the same language or 
variants of one language may be spoken over a culturally 
diversified area. In Murdock’s case this is at least 
partly explained by his exclusive concentration on small, 
simple, societies, bypassing our more complex industrialized 
societies. The study of kinship terminology would seem to 
suffer from a similar lack of balance: the amount of work 
done on the kin terms of simple societies, certainly from 
the point of view of a possible link between terminology 
and social structures, would seem to outweigh too heavily 
work done on those matters In respect of complex societies. 
Related with this is Murdock’s implied assumption that 
cultural norms and actual behaviour coincide: while life 
at close quarters in a small society certainly leaves less 
room for deviations from standard behaviour, it still 
remains a question in how far this assumption is justified. 
What is of interest for us is that Murdock holds that culture 
is adaptive where others might feel that it is rather in the
actual behaviour that the .adapting takes place: this
insistence on ideal norms rather than on actual behaviour 
(though not consistently pursued) clearly is predominant 
in his view of kinship and kinship terminology. Murdock 
tends to neglect the importance of environment in a wide 
sense in various aspects of culture, something which cannot 
be neglected, I feel, when studying the social relevance 
of kinship terminology.
As regards his method and his type of comparatlvism 
Murdock has been accused of not making comparisons but just 
providing illustrations (cf. Evans-Pritchard, 1963). This 
is not entirely fair. There are basically two ways of 
doing comparative work. One can work on the basis of a 
few cultures and formulate generalizations which are 
gradually refined to be ever more widely applicable, or 
one can simply state general associations between elements 
of culture and measure the strength of these associations. 
Murdock favours the latter approach, he looks - as Barnes 
(1971) put It ~ for "Safety in Numbers", and in order to 
achieve this he uses a statistical method. It may be good 
to point out briefly the possibilities and limitations of 
the use of statistics.
In general methodology statistics comes under 
the simplest form of scientific method, what Max Black (1962: 
220) has called the ’scale model’. Such a model is a 
representation of the real thing with which it has a like­
ness and of which it preserves the relative proportions: 
but it changes the size by either reducing or magnifying it. 
By definition this Implies that there is no such thing 
as a perfectly faithful model: it only is possible to produce
a scale model by being unfaithful, i.e., by ignoring 
some irrelevant or unimportant features. There is a 
partial identity only of properties combined with an 
invariance of proportionality. Black describes the 
usefulness of this type of model as follows (op.cit., 
p.221): "We try to bring the remote and the unknown
to our own level of middle-sized existence". But one 
has to be very careful in ’reading* such models, for a 
change of scale inevitably introduces some distortion 
and, more seriously, it may upset the balance of factors 
in the original. Hence inferences from any scale model 
to the original are always precarious and in need of 
supplementary affirmation and correction. Murdock knows 
this, and that is why he does not speak of ’certainties’ 
but of ’tendencies’. I wonder if we should not approach 
it from the other side altogether and say that the certain­
ties we do obtain in this way are negative: for a negative 
outcome is conclusive, a positive one is only provisional 
or partial and in any case requiring interpretation. One 
of the factors which make such reservations necessary is 
the fact that an element which is identical in external 
appearance in two cultures, may not be suited for compar­
ison and association because of a basic difference in its 
underlying cause. And the final question remains: is a 
statistical association really an explanation or rather a 
way of re-arranging the facts and making them more'access­
ible while they still require an explanation? I would be 
Inclined to accept the latter answer; and if this is true, 
it would reduce the value of the statistical method and 
put it into perspective.
Apart from these general reflections on the 
use and usefulness of the statistical method there are 
some particular points which have attracted much 
attention. A basic problem is that of the sample used.
The one used for ' Social Structure'- (Murdock, 1949) was 
not satisfactory and Murdock has worked on Improving it 
since (cf. Murdock, 1966/1967/1968), but the way he went 
about it has brought a new wave of criticism. And one 
could even ask the more fundamental question whether 
there really is such a thing (either a natural or an 
analytical unit) as a universe of human cultures. But 
these questions are beyond the scope of this work.
Another question is that of coding, of the 
choice of categories according to which cultures are 
compared, I.e., the columns in the ’Human Relations Area 
File’. This obviously is a particular problem of Murdock’s 
venture, but It would seem there is a general lesson to 
be drawn from it. From a practical point of view it 
reminds us of the dangers of ethnocentrism in selecting 
features in a feature analysis. All too easily categories 
are selected for convenience of application cross-culturally 
in the process a great deal of information may be lost 
as less attention is given to what is particular to one 
or a few cases only in favour of what is universally found. 
Related to this is the requirement of a universal frame­
work for cross-cultural comparison. It has been suggested 
by Kluckhohn (1962: 314) that, in order to validate 
cross-cultural comparison in Anthropology, biological, 
psychological, and sociosituational universals must be 
established. I believe the same requirement holds for
comparative ethnolinguistic research, though the precise 
nature of this universal frame of reference will have 
to be specified further, and specified ad hoc.
Finally Murdock's theory of balance between 
the elements of a social system draws attention to the 
problem of synchrony vs. diachrony. For on the one hand 
his analyses are so to speak a-temporal or, as it is 
sometimes phrased, in the ethnographic present. But the 
notion of balance introduces a time factor since changes 
take place all the time and a new balance has to be found 
after each change. Murdock’s interest Is indeed very.much 
in the evolution of social structures: this is shown by 
the fact that he sees no point in internal structural 
analyses. An analysis only makes sense If it refers to 
causes outside the structure itself. This, by the way, 
rules out the usefulness of ’linguistic field’ studies 
in Murdock's view, at least by implication (cf. 19^9: 135). 
This means further that imperfections, deviations from the 
balanced Ideal, are seen as by-products of a process of 
transition rather than as a proper element of structure 
to be accounted for: this focuses our attention on the
problem of the exceptions for which any cross-cultural 
theory must account.
Summing up then, I would say that Murdock's 
great merit lies in the range of material he opens up and 
in the challenge of his assumptions, rather than in the 
depths of his insights.
3*5 Claude Levi-Strauss,
3*5*0 There are two reasons for Including Co Levi-
Strauss in this survey. One might perhaps think here 
of the fact that he is a figure of major importance 
in the study of kinship; this fact alone, however, 
would not he sufficient to justify inclusion: other 
prominent scholars in the field have heen left out. But 
first of all Levi-Strauss has made a highly original 
contribution - albeit a highly controversial one as well - 
to the study of the link between linguistics and anthro­
pology, of how they must be integrated to provide an 
understanding and interpretation of human society and 
communication. And secondly discussion of his work is 
required to complete the picture of universals and cross- 
cultural research represented in G.P. Murdock’s work.
B. Scholte has compared the two approaches 
(Scholte, 1966), and though his aim of bringing the 
representatives of both schools of thought closer together 
may not have been an unqualified success, the value of 
his description of the state of the problem in its broad 
outlines cannot, to my mind, be questioned. He distinguishes 
an empiricist and a rationalist tradition. The empiricist 
tradition concentrates on the observable behavioural acts 
and favours quantitative and descriptive procedures; 
explanation Is a question of quantitative statistical 
evidence, to explain is to anticipate. Empiricism is 
inductive and insists on verification. For rationalism 
ideas and actions derive from fundamental categories of 
the human mind: the permanent structure of the human spirit
ultimately explains human behaviour. Observable data 
are not of themselves intelligible but require a supra- 
empirical model for their explanation: eventually one
has to return to the data, but the usefulness of models 
lies precisely in the fact that they tell us something 
more and differently from the initial data. Verification 
and falsification against the observed facts are not the 
ultimate. In last instance this goes back to the problem 
of the subjective/objective distinction, or more precisely 
to its denial: it is held that all our observation Is
coloured by subjectivity, there is no such thing as object­
ivity, and consequently there is no possibility of objective 
verification through reference to observed facts. The 
only way we can overcome our subjectivity is not by going 
across to an empirically established objectivity which is 
Illusory but by transcending our subjectivity. It is in 
this non-empirical pre-subjectivity that we find reality 
according to Levi-Strauss, not in what we observe; the 
variations we observe are but transformations of this 
ultimate reality.
3.5*1 Though Levi-Strauss has contributed directly to 
the philosophical discussion and, indirectly, has set into 
motion a much wider debate, it would lead too far to discuss 
all the relevant issues here. Instead I would like to sketch 
briefly the more concrete ideas which guided L£vi-Strauss 
in his work and which would seem to be crucial for a proper 
understanding of his views on kinship which we shall discuss 
in the next section.
Levi-Strauss differs from his fellow anthropologists 
in that he does not ask the question how society works: he
wants to study man, gain a deeper understanding of the 
mystery of man. This is a search for what Is universal.
He recognizes as an anthropologist - what others in their 
way have recognized, say, as linguists - that there is a 
great variety of phenomena in the world: people are 
different, they are organized differently in social life, 
they speak differently. These differences can be seen 
along two axes, one of time and one of place. The mistake 
of the historically orientated scholars of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries was to equate people living in our 
time but in far-away places with the people living in our 
place a long time ago. In his own, rather abstract way 
Levi-Strauss is so repeating what other critics of hist­
orical methods have been saying or are saying: but Levi- 
Strauss does not reject history, on the contrary, he claims 
to subsume history under his new universalist approach 
which wants to study man in his totality. He has written 
about this on many occasions, in connection with kinship
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studies notably in chapter VII of -Les structures elament-
aires de la par&nte (L^vi-Strauss, 19^9)3 entitled
"L1illusion archalque", and It is possibly the most
important theme of his book La pensee sauvage (1962).
Synchronic structure and diachronic historical Interest are
not in opposition, they are complementary, but history Is
less fundamental than the systematic in human phenomena
(cf. Levi-Strauss, 1962: 308):
"Loin done que la recherche de 1 fintelligib- 
ilite aboutisse a I'histoire comma a son 
point d ’arrivee, e ’est l’histoire qui-sert 
de point de depart pour toute qu£te de 
1 :intelligibility. Ainsi qu'on le dit de 
certaines carrieres, 1’histoire mens a tout,
mais a condition d Ten sortir" (1962: 348).
The difference of perspective between history and ethnology 
(and this can be extended to social sciences generally 
which, for Levi-Strauss, would include linguistics) is 
that history deals with events, with what is conscious, 
while ethnology - and the social sciences - concentrate 
on what is permanent and fixed and unconscious, "l'histoire 
organisant ses donn^es par rapport aux expressions con- 
scientes, l’ethnologie par rapport aux conditions incon- 
scientes de la vie socials" (1958: 25). Passing from the 
conscious to the unconscious means passing from the 
particular to the general (Ibid. 28), It bridges the gap 
between the subjective and the objective mentioned above 
(cf. 1950: XXX): In fact the unconscious underlies all 
social activity of man, individual behaviour is but a 
modality in time of the universal laws which make up the 
unconscious activity” of the human mind (cf. 1958: 67 and 
224) .
This notion of the unconscious has come to Levi-
Strauss from linguistics:
"Car c'est la linguistique, et plus 
particulierement la linguistique 
structural^, qui nous a familiarises (...) 
avec I’idee que les phenomenes fondamentaux 
de la vie de I’esprit, ceux qui la conditionn- 
ent et determinant ses formes les plus generales, 
se situent a l'etage de la pensee inconsciente" 
(1950: XXXI).
Levi-Strauss sees a double usefulness in linguistics: 
language is a choice field in which to trace those ; 
"structures mentales inconscientes" (ibid. XXXIX), and 
linguistics, as the most advanced and most scientific of 
social studies, may point the way as far as method is 
concerned for the other social sciences. For Levi-Strauss
there is more to this than just a similarity of interest 
or the fact that some fresh inspiration may be gained 
from looking at some successful other science. Linguists 
and social scientists "s1attachent a 1*etude du meme objet" 
(1949: 612). This is because they are all working at 
what one day will be "une vaste science de la communica­
tion" (1950: XXXVI), based on what is specifically human, 
the symbolic function (cf. 1958: 224). What Levi-Strauss 
here refers to as ’linguistics* without any further speci­
fication is in fact phonology - "la linguistique, congue 
comme une etude phonologique" (1949: 611) - more precisely 
the Prague school of phonology as founded by Trubetzkoy and 
developed by R. Jakobson: and through the intermediary of 
these linguists Levi-Strauss,discovered the work of F. de 
Saussure. Levi-Strauss1s understanding of Prague phonology 
made him conclude there were four basic aspects of phon­
ology which could revolutionize social science generally 
as they had revolutionized linguistics: the unconscious 
nature of the underlying structure, the fact that the 
important thing is not the elements but the relations 
between the elements, next the fact that these elements 
in their mutual relations form a system, and finally that 
there are universal laws which underlie all specific 
(sound-) systems. What further attracted Levi-Strauss 
about linguistics was the formal way in which rules could 
be phrased, especially the binary choice coding of^the 
Jakobson/Halle distinctive feature analysis.
3.5.2 When we come to consider more particularly
Levi-Strauss’s views on kinship, his conception of the 
four major tenets of Prague phonology is reflected exactly
in this field:
"come les phonemes, les termes de 
parente* sont des elements de signification; 
coirane eux, ils n ’acquierent cette signif­
ication qu’a la condition de s ’int^grer en 
systemesj^les *systemes de parente1, comme 
les ’systemes phonologiques*, sont elabores 
par 1*esprit a l’etage de la pensee incon- 
sciente; enfin la recurrence, en des regions 
eloignees du monde et dans des societes 
profondement differentes, de formes de 
parente, regies de mariage, attitudes pareille- 
ment prescrites entre certains types de parents, 
etc., donne a croire, que, dans un cas comme 
dans 1Tautre, les phdnomenes observables 
resultent du jeu de lois generales, mais 
ca.ch/es" (1958: 40-41).
Though it would be tempting to equate phonemes and kinship
terms and study the latter along the lines of a distinctive
feature analysis of the type initiated by Davis and Warner
(cf. 3.3) > Levi-Strauss rejects this approach for various
reasons (1958: 42-43). He esteems that this kind of
analysis is too abstract and instead of bringing us closer
to reality moves us away from it; moreover instead of
simplifying the system and making it more transparent, it
complicates it and makes it more difficult to interpret;
and finally it does not explain anything, neither the nature
nor the origin of the systems. Basically the reason for
rejecting the equation is that kinship terms may be like
phonemes but iw.tWa- end they are words, arbitrary signs,
carriers of meaning (ibid. 44).
But a kinship system does not consist of a
terminological system only, it is also a behavioural system;
and in relation .to this Levi-Strauss comes up with an
interesting thought. When the subject of phonology was
developed, the function of language - communication - was
known; the new discovery concerned its structure. Since
Morgan the structural aspect of kinship terminology has been
known, what we ignore is its function; of the behavioural 
system we know the function which is one of assuring the 
cohesion and equilibrium of the group, what we do not 
understand is the nature of the structural relations 
between the various forms of behaviour. So the parallelism 
exists, not between phonemes and kin terms, but between 
forms of behaviour and phonemes (ibid. 44-45). It is this 
assumed similarity of function, namely communication, 
between language and social behaviour which Levi-Strauss 
develops at length in his major work on kinship, Les 
structures elementaires de la parente (19^9) 3 in a very 
ingenious way, It is all based on the idea of exchange, 
launched by Marcel Mauss in his Essai sur le don: of 1923:
man exchanges words in order to communicate through language, 
he exchanges goods and so creates an economy, and he 
exchanges women in order to assure, through marriage 
regulations, the continued existence of the group, which 
might be threatened by the universal incest prohibition 
(see for a summary Levi-Strauss, 1949: 615 f*). Although 
this theory is interesting in an indirectway for its Inter­
disciplinary character involving linguistics, it does not 
bring us any further on our topic of kinship terms.
Levi-Strauss admittedly does not have much to 
say on this topic but with some difficulty we can piece 
together some basic ideas which I hope to illustrate 
further with a contribution by Pierre Maranda. In the 
light of Levi-StraussTs epistemology as outlined in 3*5-1 
it should not surprise us to read that "the study of kinship 
systems should remain first and foremost a study of models 
rather than of empirical realities" (19&5: 17)* The core
of all kinship systems Is the elementary structure of 
relationships defined in terms of social structure, 
this in contrast to complex structures where individual 
appreciation comes In, allowing for a certain freedom 
of choice. The elementary structure consists of four 
terms: the wife-giver (MoBr), the wife-receiver (Hu), 
the wife herself, and - as marriage is orientated towards 
procreation - the child; between these four persons three 
kinds of relationship obtain, those of siblingship, of 
marriage, and of generation (cf. Maranda, 1963 and 1964).
This definitely implies that for Levi-Strauss 
a kinship system Is a means to an end, viz. "to generate 
marriage possibilities or impossibilities" (1965: 1*0 •
In taking this line Levi-Strauss separates himself from 
some students of the kinship field while directly reject­
ing others. He separates himself from those who concentr­
ate their efforts on studying the Internal coherence of 
kinship systems, mainly those scholars who are working on 
componential analyses and other forms of formal semantic 
analysis. He directly rejects the opinions of a number 
of scholars who, like himself, are interested in the 
meaning and purpose of kinship systems. He groups the 
answers given in this matter into three categories: the 
first group sees a kinship system as the product of one 
or several efficient causes, psychological or sociological 
but always external and heterogeneous; the second category 
(e.g. Radcliffe-BrownTs) point of view is that of a homo­
logous social configuration, i.e., there Is a close corres 
pondence between, on the one hand, the structure of a kin­
ship system and its terminology, and, on the other, the
network of rights and obligations; the third opinion, 
his own, is that of a kinship system as a final cause, 
i.e., acting as an operating agent to a system of 
matrimonial exchange within the community (cf. 1965: 13-14). 
It is in this context of the element of kinship as a 
teleological operational unit that we must see his scant 
references to kinship terminology.
A kinship system regulates marriages which are 
either prescriptive or preferential: in both cases there
is a certain randomness, for in a prescriptive marriage 
there is still some flexibility as there are normally 
several possible candidates for a given marriage, while 
in the case of a preferential marriage a certain type of 
marriage, though statistically more likely, is not 
absolutely imposed. Opposite these two factors of random­
ness there is a third factor which makes up the kinship 
system, viz. what Levi-Strauss calls "the rigid terminology" 
(cf. 1965: 18 and 20). It is not the case that patterns 
of behaviour reflect the nomenclature automatically, on 
the contrary,
"elles (sc. ’the behavioural patterns') 
apparaissent souvent comme des elaborations 
secondaires destinees a resoudre des contra­
dictions et a surmonter des insuffisances 
Inherentes au syst&me des appellations"
(1958: 46).
These rather vague suggestions about terminology 
as a complement and counterbalance to behaviour make it 
quite clear that kinship terminology is not among the 
real preoccupations of Levi-Strauss, his main interest 
lying with kinship as a way of regulating marriages.
Pierre Maranda has worked more dix’ectly on kinship term­
inology starting from Levi-Strauss's concept of the element
123
of kinship: I would like to add his contribution here
to show at least one way in which the ideas of Levi-Strauss 
can be used in the study of kinship terminology {Maranda,
a woman, her brother, her husband, and her child. Between
these four terms three relations obtain, two simple ones,
viz. that of sibling and that of alliance, and one complex
one, viz. generation. To refer to these he uses the symbols
S, A, and G. S and A are fsynchronic! and can be written
on a horizontal axis; G is ’diachronic1 and can be written
on a vertical axis. G can take the values + and -, or G 
- 1and G. Strictly speaking S and A should be written S and 
S, but S and A are preferred because they are less abstract.
Kinship terms are essentially relational, they 
express the state of relatives, "Accordingly, a kinship 
term (w) is always the dependent variable of the independent 
variable x in f (w)" (loc.cit. 519)* In kinship analysis 
x will be the relation R which will have to be rewritten 
every time according to its specificity:
If x-0, then w- unspecified man or woman.
It now becomes possible to draw up a basic set of kinship
v
relationships which generates kinship terminologies (loc.cit. 
520). This set will consist of relationships of'the first
1964) .
Maranda starts from the four elementary terms:
S(ibling)
•p
k G(eneration)
1. G and G mean "generation and its converse" or "parent of 
and child of".
order, f (w) , of the second order, f (w) , and of the x xy
third order, f (w) . One could give the following xy z
examples:
first order, ^x(w)
x
A spouse
second order, f (w)? Xy \ /
xy
AA spouse's spouse 
+GA . stepparent 
+2G grandparent
third order, f rt(w) 3 xyz '
cf
Hu
cf
WiHu
MoHu
FaFa
MoFa
w
w
?
Wi
?
HuWi
FaWi
FaMo
MoMo
xyz
+GSA avuncular by 
alliance
FaBrWi
cf w 
FaSiHu 
MoSiHu MoBrWi 
The second order relationship AA does not occur in monogam­
ous societies.
In the first order four relationships are possible. 
In the second order there are eleven possibilities, viz.
AA, A+G, A-G, AS, +GA, +2G, +GS, -GA, -2G, SA, S-G. For 
the third order the number is 32, for the fourth 92, etc.
The four elementary components are not equally 
powerful In generating relationships. Maranda claims that 
+G is more often a dimension of a relationship than is -G, 
presumably because kinship is a previously established 
network into which one enters. A is said to be more power­
ful than S. This is the result, as far as I can see, of 
the fact that - in the second order and upwards - certain 
combinations containing S are excluded, viz. SS (-3),
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S+G (=*G), and -GS (- -G) . He claims in fact that A 
occurs twice as often as 3, and +G twice as often as -G 
from a combinatorial point of view. Particular kinship 
systems could be examined from this angle and comparisons 
made as to their degree of divergence from the abstract 
model. No kinship terminology will express all the 
possible relationships. This type of analysis makes it 
possible to rank different terminologies according to the 
ratio of actual expressions to potential expressions (loc. 
cit.: 522 f.). It can also help to establish correlations 
between type of marriage, type of descent, authority, 
and other forms of behaviour, in as far as the axis of 
deviation from the model found in a given society brings 
out the major factors which give rise to certain patterns 
of behaviour and structure (loc.cit.: 526).
Maranda opposes the denotative meaning unveiled 
by componential analysis, to the connotative meaning of 
the system of attitudes (loc.cit.: 518), and he concludes 
that "the systemic relationship of connotation and denota- 
tion can be tackled more easily if approached denotatively 
first" (loc.cit. 526). Apart from Maranda*s suggestion 
about the heuristic value of the axis of deviation from 
the terminological model, it would seem that much remains 
to be done to evaluate in a more precise manner this 
systemic relationship which Maranda mentioned in conclusion.
3.5.3 This is not the place to give an overall .assess­
ment of Levi-Strauss1s work: I shall limit myself to the 
way he has transplanted methods from linguistics to 
anthropology, the kind of linguistics he has been relying 
upon, and generally the prospects and chances of the kind
of all-embracing theory he has been advocating. This 
In itself Is already so vast a matter.that I shall only 
be able to offer a few comments rather than write a 
fully fledged critique.
G. Mounin has discussed the work of Levi-Strauss 
from the point of view of a linguist (Mounin, 1970: 191-214) 
and, after some flattering opening remarks, has criticised 
him very severely. He reproaches him first of all for not 
being very clear about what exactly he is trying to do in 
referring to linguistics, secondly for having misunderstood 
most of the linguistic theories he has been using, and 
finally, where he did understand theories correctly, for 
having followed theories which were wrong, viz. certain 
theses of Jakobson Mounin disagrees with. Apart from this 
subjective preference for a certain type of linguistic 
theory many of the points of criticism are fairly predict­
able: the four principles Levi-Strauss gives are not a
good summary of Trubetzkoy’s phonology; it is misleading 
to say that the function of language was known before its
structure was perceived; phonemes as such (this in oppos­
ition to kin terms) do not have meaning.
There are, however, two things which must be 
noted here. Levi-Strauss repeatedly expresses reservations 
about the use of this linguistic model, "le caractere precaire 
et hypothetique de cette reconstruction" (1958: 7*0 > and he 
insists that verification of his hypothesis against the facts 
Is essential. But it is true that he does too little to 
verify his theories; he Is somehow more of a visionary than 
a man of science. And his masterful and suggestive prose, 
while making for compulsive reading, easily distracts the
mind from the substance of the argument. I suppose 
this contributed to the suspicion which led Mounin to 
consider the real L^vi-Strauss to be the man who mis­
understood and misused linguistics, and to treat his 
reservations and warnings as little more than pro forma 
protestations of good will and restraint. I would be 
inclined to give Levi-Strauss more credit than Mounin 
seems to do for concern with the factual truth, not­
withstanding his seeming disregard for negative evidence: 
after all, the scope of his hypothesis is so wide that 
it will take a much longer time either to prove or dis­
prove it. But the second point in Levi-Strauss1s defence 
is that the value of his main thesis does not depend on 
the quality of his linguistic knowledge as he does not 
reduce social life to language, nor derive the former 
from the latter as from its origin: he reduces social
life to the symbolic processes of the human mind, and it 
is from this point of view that he considers social life 
to be similar to other systems of communication, all der­
iving from the same unique source. Linguistics simply 
happened to be the most advanced branch at one given moment 
in time; but when at a later stage L^vi-Strauss thought 
that another parallel would be more fruitful, he abandoned 
the linguistic model: in his study of mythology it Is
from music that he draws his model (cf. Simonis, 1968: 2 94).
While I am satisfied that this interpretation of 
Levi-Strauss exonerates him up to a point of the charge of 
misuse of linguistics I am well aware of the fact that it 
may also diminish the value of Levi-StraussTs work towards 
an understanding of how language and culture/society
interrelate. This brings me to the value of his trans­
plantation method. Levi-Strauss uses the term ‘analogy1: 
examining the notion of the analogy model may help us 
to see more clearly the advantages and dangers of this 
method of scientific inquiry. Moreover, if our assess­
ment of Murdock's model being a scale model (cf. above 
3.4.3) and Levi-Strauss's an analogy model is correct 
there would be no question of a clash between the two 
approaches from the methodological point of view - they 
might possibly be complementary with the latter being 
the more powerful of the two. I shall follow again Max 
Black (1962) for the general notions of types of model 
with this proviso that I incorporate the re-arrangement 
proposed by Bertels and Nauta (1969: 133 f.) who introduce
an extra general distinction between empirical and
1
theoretical models resulting in the following present­
ation .
Black's ’analogue model' (op.cit., 222 f.) now 
becomes the empirical analogue model., his ’theoretical 
model’ (op.cit., 226 ff.) the theoretical analogue model 
or transplantation model. In both kinds of model a change 
of medium is involved while the structure is being preserved 
one could think of the example of the simulation of life 
processes on the electrical circuits of a computer though 
this is an example of dynamic analogy or isomorphism of 
operations rather than the static analogy or isomorphism 
of structures Levi-Strauss would seem to be concerned with. 
In the case of an empirical analogue model the aim simply
1. Empirical models consist of concrete entities, 
theoretical models of conceptual entities.
129
is to make It easier to manipulate something. In the 
case of a theoretical model there Is a transplantation 
of a familiar3 well-understood theory onto a new field 
of study. Significant similarity of structure justifies 
this procedure but such analogy cannot just be assumed*
It must be demonstrated. There are degrees of application 
of this model: when we describe a thing as if it were
in a certain way* we are on the level of fictitious 
interpretation3 there is no explanatory power, just a 
heuristic value; when we describe a thing as being the 
other medium* we have an existential interpretation, we 
get a real explanation but at the same time expose ourselves 
to a considerable danger of self-deception. With scale 
models and empirical analogue models we create hypothetical 
constructs which will never show us how the things work 
in their total reality; the theoretical model is not 
built, the heart of the method consists in talking in a 
certain way: the model, in other words, is described. This 
leaves a greater freedom, there is no hindrance from 
accidental or irrelevant properties; but the controls 
which come from actual construction are equally lacking 
and unless independent tests are available, it is easy 
to go astray. Such a test must ultimately establish to 
what extent there is in fact isomorphism between model 
and field of application. If this works we shall discover 
new connections which a separate analysis of either the 
model or the field of application would not have born out.
Looking at Levi-Strauss I am satisfied that 
there is a prima facie case for assuming the required
significant similarity in structure between parts of 
language and aspects of social organization to justify 
the use of the theoretical analogue model. At the same 
time I must say that to my mind the scale at which L£vi- 
Strauss has worked was too grandiose for proof or dis­
proof ever to be possible: if more attention had been
given to detail, to work on a smaller scale, it might 
have become possible to make specific and define more 
precisely Levi-Strauss*s basic intuition. In that case 
he might have gone beyond one form of phonology to discover 
perhaps a more useful model within the field of linguistics.
Talking of what might have been implies that 
there is hope for a general theory of communication. Chomsky 
has said that in kinship systems and folk taxonomies 
nothing so far has been discovered that Is even roughly 
comparable to language (1968: 65). It is right to Insist 
on the unique character and quality of human language and 
there is nothing to be gained by blurring real distinctions. 
But there Is the tradition of which Saussure is probably 
the best known representative, a tradition which sees 
linguistics at the same time as autonomous and as integrated 
into a wider field of study, semiotics, the study of sign 
systems, of systems of communication (cf. Jakobson, 1973:
32 ff.). While maintaining the individual, separate 
character of the various branches of this study, the concept 
of semiotics would seem to provide the justification on 
the one hand for the continued search for a better under­
standing of the relation between the various communication 
systems, and on the other hand for the special position of 
language within semiotics and consequently within our
interdisciplinary study: a special position, because 
the pre-existence of language is always implied, verbal 
performances often accompany all forms of communication, 
and all these forms are or can be verbalized. But this 
is just a starting point: all remains to be done.
We have this intuition that there is some special relation 
between systems of communication, and language would 
seem to provide the best entry into the problem; but 
what relation is there? It certainly is not a relation 
of identity, at the most one of similarity. But, as Levi- 
Strauss suggested, this similarity could in fact just as 
well be a similarity of function based on a complementary 
opposition in the way of working. There certainly will 
be no easy, simple answer: the answer given will have to 
allow for flexibility and degree, yet provide a really new 
insight and throw light on aspects which otherwise might 
have remained in the dark. There is still a long way to go: 
and while Levi-Strauss1s fundamental intuition has not 
resulted yet in firm results, there is enough reason to 
continue this particular type of research. Gradually we 
may come a bit nearer to the truth, in whichever direction 
It may be found.
3.6 Leo Weisgerber and Neo-Humboldtianism.
3.6.0 Some of the crucial issues which were at the
root of structuralism as presented by Levi-Strauss were 
also very prominent In Germany though they have been dealt 
with there in a very different manner. They were the problem
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of the unity of mankind with the diversity of culture 
in all its forms of expression, and the question of
the subjectivity or objectivity of our knowledge of
reality in all its forms and manifestations. Levi-Strauss 
rejected empirical knowledge as too subjective and not 
leading to the universally human. The Kantian tradition 
is equally wary of empirical knowledge, as e.g. Cassirer 
shows :
"Truth ... is not to be attained so long 
as man confines himself within the narrow
circle of his immediate experience, of
observable facts. Instead of describing 
detached and isolated facts science strives 
to give us a comprehensive view. But this 
view cannot be attained by a mere extension, 
an enlargement and enrichment of our 
ordinary experience. It demands a new 
principle of order, a new form of intell­
ectual interpretation. Language is the 
first attempt of man to articulate the 
world of his sense perceptions" (Cassirer,
194*1: 208-209).
In this German tradition, then, the problem is seen as an 
epistemological question as far as philosophers are con­
cerned though linked with the question of language, 
especially in connection with a priori knowledge, and as 
a question of linguistic relativity as far as linguists 
are concerned. The most important names on the philosoph­
ical side are I. Kant and E. Cassirer, and among the 
linguists W. von Humboldt and L. Weisgerber.
3,6.1 Very briefly the points which concern us in
all this can be put as follows. Every word is a word about 
something, some part of reality, material, spiritual, or 
social. The question then arises, which is the-primary 
element: language which creates our Image of reality, or 
reality which is reflected (mirrored, copied) in language?
Those who hold the last view will accept the objectivity 
of reality; the first view is held by idealists like 
the Kantians: instead of an objective reality they speak 
of the creative mind which creates a ‘Weltanschauung1.
Though inevitably oversimplified this option between two 
mutually exclusive alternatives would seem to be a basically 
correct reproduction of the argument. The fact that there 
may well be a third option (language being a subjective 
copy of an objective reality) is worth remembering for 
future reference but need not concern us here where we 
are simply trying to sketch the facts about the back­
ground of Neo-Humboldtian linguistics.
The clearest philosophical statement in the Neo- 
Kantian tradition has been made by Ernst Cassirer in his 
various publications, one of which actually has the title 
"Le Langage et la Construction du Monde des Objets" (1933) 
where he said among other things:
"La representation ’objective* ... n ’est 
pas le point de depart du processus de 
formation du langage, mais le but auquel 
ce processus conduit" (loc.cit. 44).
Cassirer turns Kant’s critique of pure reason into a
critique of culture (1953: 80) and here, as there, objectivity
is guaranteed by the human spirit;
"Thus, with all their inner diversity, 
the various products of culture - language, 
scientific knowledge, myth, art, religion - 
become parts of a single great problem-complex: 
they become multiple efforts, all directed 
toward the one goal of transforming the ; 
passive world of mere Impressions, in which 
the spirit seems at first imprisoned, into 
a world that is pure expression of the. 
human spirit" (ibid. Ho’-'Bl)'.
Reality, as Cassirer has pointed out elsewhere (1944: 23) >
is not a unique and homogeneous thing for different organisms:
their experiences, and consequently their realities
are incommensurable with one another. It is a matter
for each living organism to come to terms with the
surrounding world, to make the world its world; and man
does so by using symbolic systems (cf. 1944: 23-25):
"In language, in religion, in art, 
in science, man can do no more than to 
build up his own universe - a symbolic 
universe that enables him to understand 
and interpret, to articulate and organize, 
to synthesize and universalize his human 
experience" (Ibid. 221).
A. Schaff, discussing Cassirer’s theory, explains his 
concept of symbolic forms (cf. Schaff, 1973: 33 f.): 
symbolic forms are a special mental energy and their 
function consists in creating our image of the world.
There are various symbolic forms, various forms of spirit­
ual energy, that produce the various images of the world.
These forms Include language, myth, art, and scientific 
cognition, and they differ from one another. Language is, 
for Cassirer, the fundamental symbolic form since it is 
used both by myth and by science, and it is interpreted 
as a kind of spiritual energy which creates the image of 
the world a priori, i.e. loose from empirical observation.
It is this view - though in a less extreme form - 
which we find in the linguistic work of W. von Humboldt, 
and later in that of L. Weisgerber and other Neo-Humboldtians.
3.6.2 The work of W. von Humboldt is very extensive,
very rich in ideas and far from simple. There can be no 
question of presenting his linguistic theory here in a few 
words. On the subject of linguistic relativity and related 
matters several studies have been published over the last
years (see e.g. R.L,. Brown, 1967; R. L. Miller, 1968;
Julia M. Penn, 1972) which have thrown light on a
difficult matter from different angles. All I want
to do here is to present some of the major themes of
his great posthumous work Ueber die Verschiedenheit
des menschlichen Sprachbaues (1836) in the light of
what we have seen about the general background of this
school of thought.
Humboldt accepted that language had originated
suddenly: one moment it was not there, the next moment it
was. Obviously the question which then arises is how to
explain the differences in language structure, their
"Verschiedenheit", and to determine what is proper to
each one. The answer to this question is to be found in
the "Geist", the creative spirit which Is at work in and
through the language.
"Ihre wahfe Definition (i.e. of language) 
kann daher nur eine genetische sein. Sie 
1st namlich die sich ewig wiederholende 
Arbeit des Geistes, den artleulirten Laut 
zum Ausdruck des Gedanken fahig zu machen"
(op.cit. 4l).
These differences extend well beyond just the language, 
they affect whole nations in their total being: but this 
own character of nations is expressed most clearly In the 
language.
"Die Geisteseigenthumlichkeit und die 
Sprachgestaltung eines VoIkes stehen in 
solcher Innigkeit der Verschmelzung in 
einander, dass, wenn die eine gegeben 
ware,, die andere musste vollstandig aus - 
ihr abgeleitet werden konnen. Denn die 
Xntellectualitat und die Sprache gestatten 
und befordern nur einander gegenseitig 
susagende Formen. Die Sprache ist gleichsam 
die aiisserliehe Erscheinung des Geistes der 
Volker; ihre Sprache Ist ihr Geist und ihr
Geist ihre Sprache; man kan sich betde 
nie identisch genug denken" (op.cit. 37)*
Because the presence of the spirit can only be thought
of in activity and as an activity, language too must
be seen as an activity, not as something static: it
is in this context that Humboldt says that language
is not an Ergon but an Energeia, "kein Werk, sondern
eine Thatigkeit" (op.cit. 4l).
This dynamic quality is present throughout his
theOry of language. In common with many 19th century
scholars he saw language as an organism, an organic
whole, after the example of biology; and it was the
example of comparative biology which inspired his
comparison of languages. His dynamic view prevails
here too: language is not a kind of dead weight in the
dark of our minds while having the inner coherence of an
organism. It does have that Inner coherence, and we
must study the parts which make up the whole, i.e. the
static side of language, but there is more:
"Da sie, in unmittelbarem Zusammenhange 
mit der Geisteskraft, ein vollstandig 
durchgefuhrter Organismus ist, so lassen 
sich in ihr nicht bloss Theile untersch- 
eiden, sondern auch Gesetze des Verfahrens, 
oder ... veilmehr Richtungen und Bestre- 
bungen desselben. Man kan diese, wenn 
man den Organismus der Korper dagegen halten 
will, mit den physiologischen Gesetsen 
vergleichen, deren wissenschaftliche 
Betrachtung sich auch wesentlich von der 
zergliedernden Beschreibung der einzelnen 
Theile unterscheidet" (op.cit. 105).
So language Is like a law which regulates the functioning
of our power of reflection. This link between language
and thought is crucial to Humboldt’s thinking:
"Die Sprache ist das bildende Organ 
des Gedanken. Die Intellektuelle 
Thatigkeit, durchaus geistig, durchaus 
innerlich, und gewissermassen spurlos 
vorubergehend, wird durch den Laut in ■ 
der Rede ausserlich und wahrnehmbar fur 
die Sinne. Sie und die Sprache sind 
daher Eins und unzertrennlich von 
einander" (op.cit. 50);
and this congruence between language and thought, claimed 
here for sound-complexes, is also assumed for grammatical 
categories (ibid. 180). This inner and purely intellect­
ual aspect is the essential part of language, the so- 
called inner form of language (op.cit. 91). Language 
is a synthesis of the outer and inner form of language, 
of the "Lautform" and the "innere Sprachgesetz" (op.cit. 
lol ff.), or put in another way: language is a manifest­
ation of the ’spirit’ after the example of its inner 
form. It is through language that man can turn subjective 
perception into objectivity (op.cit. 52): one can think 
of language as "eine zweite, von dem Menschen nach den 
Eindruclcen, die er von der wahren empfangt, aus sich 
selbst heraus objectivirte Welt" (ibid. 7*0* Language 
is thus not just a means of communication allowing mutual 
understanding, it is a real world, "eine wahre Welt 
welche der Geist zwischen sich und die Gegenstande durch 
die innere Arbeit seiner Kraft setzen muss" (op.cit. 205). 
Through language man comes to terms with the world at 
large, and each language does so in its own way, creates 
its own particular way of looking at the world: "so liegt 
in jeder Sprache eine eigenthumliche Weltansicht" (op.cit. 
58). This ’Weltansicht’ is the basis of Humboldt’s 
linguistic relativity, and it is a recurrent theme among
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German linguists, as illustrated, for example, by the 
following quotation from Georg van der Gabelentz (1901:
76) :
"Jede Sprache verkorpert eine Weltan­
schauung, die Weltanschauung einer Nation.
Sie stellt eine Welt dar, das heisst 
zunachst die Gesamtheit der Vorstel- 
lungen, in denen und uber die sich das 
Denken eines Volkes bewegt; und sie ist 
der unmittelbarste und bundigste Ausdruck 
fur die Art, wie diese Welt angeschaut, 
fur die Formen, die Oranung und die Bez- 
iehungen, in denen die Gesamtheit ihrer 
Objekte gedacht wird. Wer sie so versteht, -
- und nur der versteht sie wissenschaftlich,
- zu dem redet durch sie das Volk: Dies ist 
mein Standpunkt, dies also mein geistiger 
Gesichtskreis und die Perspektive, in der 
sich fur mich die Dinge gruppiren, - und 
dies ist die Eigenart meines geistigen Auges, 
womit ich die Welt betrachte, und das sich 
an und in dieser Welt geschult hat".
3.6.3 The man who has most systematically elaborated 
Humboldt’s ideas and, in doing so, has regularly used 
kinship terminology to illustrate his point, is Leo 
Weisgerber. He recognizes that many people have tried 
to deal with the phenomenon of language,yet no one seems 
to have come up with the right approach, providing all 
the answers. As he sees it, it is the starting point 
which matters, from what point of view one looks at lang­
uage ; and his answer is formulated in terms of what he 
calls "Das Menschheitsgesetz der Sprache" (Weisgerber, 1964).
Language is a law, something imposed; from the 
point of view of the individual there is "das Gesetz der 
Muttersprache", and the study of this aspect is "Spraeh- 
psychologie" ; from the point of view of the community 
we find "das Gesetz der Sprachgemeinschaft", covered in 
the "Sprachsoziologie"; from the point of view of mankind
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as seen in its basic existence we discover "das Gesetz 
des sprachbedingter* Dasein" in a "Sprachphilosophie". 
Together these three laws make up the "Menschheitsgesetz 
der Sprache". For our purposes it will be enough to 
look at the "Sprachsoziologie": it is here that we 
shall discover the contribution made by the Neo-Humboldtians 
to our field of interest.
The main ideas behind Weisgerber1s theory are 
taken from Humboldt though Weisgerber has added new elements 
to complete and systematize his thoughts in a synthesis 
of his own. The most basic point is the fact that language 
is not an ^rgon1 but an 1Energeia1, not a !WerkT but a 
‘Wirkende Kraffc1, not static material but an active, 
dynamic force (cf. Weisgerber, 19^2a:9 f»)* This implies 
two things. First of all it means that language has the 
"Daseinsform einer 1Wirklichkeit1 " (1962a:ll f.), in 
other words, is a reality, something real. While in the 
past a two-way distinction was made between "real things" 
and "mere abstractions", Weisgerber claims that sociology 
has revealed to us a third possibility, the reality of 
the *soziale Objektivgebilde", the reality of which lies 
not in observable appearances but in what they achieve, 
more specifically in what they do to make possible and 
sustain forms of human social life. Playing on German 
synonyms Weisgerber says that what we have here is not 
"Realitat" but "Wirk-lichkeit". And this leads to., the 
second implication, the "Leistung einer mitgestaltenden 
Kraft bei allem geistig bestimmten Tun der Mitglieder 
(einer) Sprachgemeinschaft" (ibid.): language is present 
as a creative force in every spiritual activity of a
speaking community, and this force can take three
forms, "geistschaffende, kulturtragende, und geschich-
tsmachtige Kraft" (1964: 33).
At present we are interested in the first form
only, the principal one:
Die primare Leistung jeder Mutter- 
sprache besteht darin, dass sie 
ihrer Sprachgemeinschaft den Weg 
eroffnet, die Lebenswelt in das 
Eigentum ihres Geistes um.zuschaffen"
(1962a:12),
or to adapt a sentence from Basilius: to reconstitute 
human experience ideally and to make this idealization 
overt (cf. Basilius, 1952: 98). This refers to Humboldt’s 
"sprachliche Zwischenwelt" or "intermediate world" (cf.
Bynon, 1966: 470). This force is at work on the level 
of the lexicon as well as on that of grammar, it concerns 
the meaning of words as well as the meaning or function 
of grammatical categories and constructions.
Restricting ourselves to the realm of words we 
find that Weisgerber subscribes to the now generally 
accepted opinion on the conventional nature of language : 
there is no direct link between sound-complexes and things. 
Words are arranged in a special way which produces as a 
result the "gedankliche Zwischenwelt". It is here that 
Weisgerber gives the example of kinship terminology (1964;
35 ff.). There is, he says, a general scheme of possible 
kin relationships between men, and this scheme is 
objectively the same for all; this scheme is built up 
with five relationships: "Vater, Mutter, Gatte .(Gattin) ,
Sohn, Tochter". When we look at a particular language we 
see how the manifold possible kin relationships are regrouped
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in a "gedankliche Ordnung" , an order created by the human 
mind.
Looking in this way at just one language
certainly gives us some idea of how the world is being
Reconstituted ideally1 in it, but the full impact of
this notion does not become clear unless and until the
specific character of each language is brought out by
comparison: historical comparison with earlier stages
of the same language, or a-temporal comparison with the
languages of other"Sprachgemeinschaften":
"Im Vergleich wird das sprachliche 
Weltbild offenbar, die Bindung der 
'geistigen Zwischenwelt' jeweils an 
eine Muttersprache einsiehtig, und 
die Moglichkeit, Richtung und Ergebnis 
der in.jeder Sprache wirkenden weltgest- 
altenden Kraft zu erkennen und zu beur- 
teilen, greifbar” (1964: 97)*
Weisgerber shows how contemporary German kin terms compare
with the Middle High German system and, within the confines
of Indo-European languages and cultures, with the classical
Latin system. Using Kirchhoff's typological classification
of kin terminological systems (Kirchhoff, 1932) he then
illustrates the diversification in "Weltgestaltung" on a
world-wide scale (cf. 1964: 45-50).
This world-view is unconscious and Weisgerber has
developed his own style of analysis to examine this
phenomenon, an analysis in four stages which he has explained
at length in his book Die vler Stu-fen in der Erforschung
der Sprachen (1963), taken up again in his Menschheitsgesetz
(1964). The four stages are (in the translation of the
terms as given by T. Bynon, 1966): formal analysis, content
orientated analysis, creative potential orientated analysis,
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and effect orientated analysis. The first two are
static in nature, they are a "notwendiger Umweg" (1964;
75) : "diese statische Arbeit schafft die Unterlagen,
die notig sind, um zu der energetischen Betrachtungsweise
uberzugehen" (1962: 183). Our interest begins
with the second stage which "deals with the structure
of content in its own right" (Bynon, loc.cit. 472). To
establish what the content of a word is we cannot go to
reality for there is no direct link between word and
reality; nor can it be done through parallelism between
sound pattern and content given such things as homonomy
and metaphorical extension.
"Der Inhalt eines solchen Wortes muss in 
erster Linie aus der intern sprachlichen 
Bestimmtheit abgeleitet werden, auf der 
seine Geltung beruht" (1964: 64).
This is achieved through the concept of linguistic field, 
generally attributed to J. Trier and with slight modific­
ations used by many German scholars (cf. S. Ohman, 1953): 
in different ways the notion has gained wide usage (cf.
A. Lehrer, 1974). The set of kinship terms Is such a 
field: the definition of the content of items of a field 
has to be seen in the light of the interdependence of 
item and total field.
In the third stage this field must be re-interpreted 
"energetically"; instead of "Sprachinhalte" this stage 
deals with "Sprachzugriffe", i.e., "Wfrkungsformen der 
Sprachkraft" (1962b:176) or the process of "wording the 
world" (das Prozess des Wortens der Welt, cf, Bynon, loc. 
cit, 475). In this stage the linguist examines in what 
direction this process develops, what forms it takes, and
also in relation to which reality it operates, i.e. 
what reality Is being ’worded1*
In the final stage ’life’ is brought back 
Into the centre of our attention for language is not 
an aim in itself. In this effect orientated analysis 
one studies the influence of language on society and 
culture. Words have a ’value’ and we tend to experience 
these values of our own language as natural, as self- 
evident. Here Weisgerber refers once again to his 
example of kinship terms, especially seen comparatively, 
to prove that these values are not natural or self- 
evident (1964: 89). "Language", as Bynon concludes, "is,
In fact, no mere mirror of culture but one of its most 
active and effective participants" (loc.cit. 477).
3.6.4 It is inevitable that these few remarks do not 
do justice to the full complexity of Humboldt’s thinking or 
Neo-Humboldtian systematization, but I believe that the 
essential points have been indicated. If J. now give some 
reflexions and observations one should keep in mind both 
the limitations and the purpose of this survey.
Weisgerber does not share Levi-Strauss’s reserv­
ations about the nuclear family as the objective frame of 
reference, he does not even mention it as a problem. Yet 
In anthropology the debate on the interpretation of kinship 
as a system of genealogy or of marriage regulations continues 
I am convinced that, for scholars interested in the relation 
between language and culture, this is an issue one cannot 
avoid; the relevance of the linguistic field theory for this 
topic depends on it.
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For some people there has been a problem of 
cause and effect In the matter of the interdependence 
of language and culture/society. Weisgerber works 
with a "totality concept" which might seem to transcend 
that question by integrating all those elements 
simultaneously. Yet, as may be concluded from the phil­
osophical presuppositions to which he subscribes implicitly 
and explicitly3 there is a priority of the "Geist" and 
this "Geist" is identical with language. The combination 
of3 on the one hand, this priority given to the human 
mind and, on the other hand, the acceptance of an objective 
frame of reference in the outside reality, viz. the 
nuclear family, seems slightly inconsistent; it also 
seems to cover up a basic weakness of idealistic philosophy. 
And though our prime interest is not in philosophy, it 
may make us wary of .the systematic side of Neo-Humboldtian 
theory however much one might feel attracted by some of 
its ideas and intuitions.
The very special terminology of this school of 
thought makes it difficult to assess it properly: it 
is easy to do it injustice by judging it in terms of a 
different theory, but it is only too easy as well to get 
caught in the net of a system which - on its own terms - 
shows a strong internal coherence. All the same one keeps 
wondering what real value is added to the static analysis 
by the "energetic" stages: these are supposed to be more 
fundamental, yet in some ways they would seem to be much 
more ephemeral or marginal, more part of language use, 
of performance5 of pragmatics. I find it difficult to 
see how this would give us the final and deepest insight
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Into language even if one is ready to admit that it is 
part of it: I could see that it might tell us more about 
man and the human mind in a philosophical way within the 
framework of a given philosophy, but that is not 
really what we are after. Accepting that the Ergon/
Energeia distinction seems useful at first sight with 
regard to the matter of linguistic relativity one has to 
say that it still lacks clarity and needs to be examined 
further.
I have spoken on occasion of the importance of 
exceptions (cf. 3*4.3) in- connection with explanatory 
theories for types of kinship terminologies. The notion 
of linguistic field, invaluable in itself, has suffered 
initially from a lack of attention to what might also be 
called ’exceptions’: it is generally admitted now that we 
have to expect such things as gaps or overlaps in a field, 
that fields are not always the closed, well-defined sets 
they were thought to be, and that associations linking words 
can sometimes be rather loose and unpredictable. And even 
then we are only dealing with the paradigmatic relations 
between words: the syntagmatic aspect is hardly touched 
upon. It is unfortunate that Weisgerber did not pay more 
attention to the implications of the weaknesses of field 
theory: it might have formed a good counterbalance against
a tendency towards absolutist idealism.
Humboldt is considered to be one of the most original 
and inspiring thinkers about language, and I would subscribe 
to that. But I am equally convinced that the value of his 
Intuitions about language is In no way a confirmation of the 
Kantian idealistic philosophy which influenced him and which,
in part, determined his way of formulating his ideas. 
Weisgerber chose to be both a Neo-Humboldtian and a 
Neo-Kantian: I would settle for being Humboldtian in 
inspiration.
1^7
^• Recent Developments: Theoretical Issues and 
Applications to English Kinship Terminology.
^.0 In the previous chapters we have followed the
development of ideas by singling out some of the main 
contributions to the study of kinship terminology. In 
each case we have tried to specify the intellectual 
assumptions from which the respective authors operated; 
and we have concentrated, even though passing through an 
Inevitable amount of anthropology, on what they had to 
say about kinship terminology and, to some extent, on 
their views on language. As quite a few of those scholars 
were primarily anthropologists, they tended to be more 
concerned with the meaning of kinship in the sense of 
kinship’s relationship to the whole of society: in such a
perspective the linguistic side is bound to get less 
attention and must, in some cases, be reconstructed indirectly.
It would have been possible to continue along 
the same lines, i.e. by selecting a few representative 
authors and evaluating their work. The names of such 
scholars as P. Lounsbury and W. Goodenough come to mind.
But for a number of reasons we will not follow this 
procedure any longer. First of all - now that the main 
outlines of the problems have been sketched - it might 
become too much of a repetition, especially since quite a 
few of the practitioners of kinship terminology analysis share 
similar basic assumptions. Furthermore, there would seem 
to be a change in style: kinship terminology is often no 
longer a fairly small aspect or part of a much wider, more 
global study of a given society. It now tends to be studied
for its own sake, as a system of classification, or as 
part of the lexical component of the grammar of a 
language. This greater "autonomy" of the study of 
kinship terminology has somewhat diminished the need 
for a wider background knowledge which was necessary 
as long as opinions on kinship terminology were contained 
in the wider framework of a global theory of kinship and 
its meaning in society. Finally It can be said that 
scientific discussion takes place in a different way: 
periodicals are at least as important as large size books, 
and articles often tend to be complementary.
The study of the subject, though slightly 
changed in character, is still as Intensive and as wide­
spread as ever. Given the increase in the number of 
field-workers and researchers it has now reached the 
point where the sheer amount of published material makes 
it impossible to present anything like a complete picture. 
Our main interest, however, lies with methodology: In
this respect we are very fortunate in that all recent 
forms of analysis have been applied to (American) English 
kinship terminology. By concentrating in the. present 
chapter on these studies we shall get a complete picture 
of recent developments with the added bonus of the extra 
clarity of insight gained by dealing with familiar material.
4.1 Preliminary Remarks. ^
4.1.1 No subdivision of so rich a field of study as 
kinship terminology can do justice to all the factors 
involved. While a classified grouping according to major
themes may provide a more coherent view of the matter, 
details of individual contributions will sometimes stand 
out less clearly. I have nevertheless opted for a more 
thematic treatment. Without claiming perfection for 
the order here adopted it would seem to be an adequate 
and reasonable way of grouping the various contributions.
Levi-Strauss in his lecture on the future of 
kinship studies (1965: 13 f.) made a two-way division in 
that field. Some scholars are interested in the meaning 
and purpose of kinship systems, others in the internal 
coherence of kinship nomenclatures. The latter group 
consists of those engaged in the various forms of formal 
analysis, the former of those who try to explain the 
meaning of kinship systems by causal factors. It is here 
that Levi-Strauss's own work has brought about the clear 
and explicit separation between the supporters of an 
efficient cause theory and his own final cause explanation.
Frank Wordick (1973) has proposed a slightly 
different distinction between types of analysis. He 
distinguishes a cultural type of account, a causal one, a 
cognitive one using componential analysis, and a generative 
one. The causal one is the one which has been dominant in 
one form or another from Morgan to Murdock. The cultural 
type is found in Schneider’s work. Componential analysis 
was developed and applied to kinship terminology by both 
Goodenough and Lounsbury in the mid-fifties, while :the 
generative approach was originally developed by Lounsbury 
and first presented in his "The Structural Analysis of 
Kinship Semantics" and "A Formal Account of the Crow- and 
Omaha-Type Kinship Terminologies" (1964 a and b). The
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causal type needs, after the preceding chapters , no 
further explanation; the cognitive and generative 
types are the kind of analysis which concentrate on 
what Levi-Strauss called "the internal coherence of 
kinship nomenclatures". Wordick associates componential 
analysis and cognition: this connexion has in fact existed 
from the beginning when, for instance, Goodenough wrote 
about paradigmatic structures: "their analysis can in 
turn tell us much about human cognitive processes" (1956:
97)* 'Cognitive processes' refer to the ways in which the 
minds of men who use a given language work, the ideas and 
concepts they have, and the way in which they classify these.
I shall conform to this historical association and deal 
with the problems of cognition and kinship terminology 
immediately after the discussion of componential analysis. 
After that I will discuss what Wordick calls the "generative 
type" of analysis: I will take this to include all types 
of formal analysis by means of sets of rules. In that 
section I shall deal both with anthropologically inspired 
analyses and .with work done in connection with Transform­
ational Generative Grammar.
There remains the question of what Wordick calls 
the "cultural analysis" as practised by D. Schneider. 
Levi-Strauss classified Schneider with the advocates of 
efficient cause explanation (Levi-Strauss, 1965: 1*0 > 
understandably so since Schneider, in collaboration, with 
G. Homans, had attacked Levi-Strauss's final cause approach 
(Homans and Schneider, 1955)* I am not sure what made 
Wordick classify him separately, but I will follow his lead 
for the following reasons. One reason - though from my point
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of view not a very important one - is that Schneider 
claims his position to be different from the one taken 
by all other anthropologists (cf. for example Scneider,
1972). From my point of view the really decisive 
reasons for including Schneider's work here rather 
than in the preceding chapter are the following. Firstly, 
Schneider has made a substantial contribution to the study 
of American English kinship terminology. Secondly, the 
discussion of some of the crucial issues dealt with in 
this chapter - polysemy, primary and secondary meaning, 
denotation and connotation - would not be complete and 
perhaps not even fully intelligible without taking into 
account what Schneider has to say on the subject.
It is with the cultural analysis that we shall 
begin this survey of analyses of English kinship terminology. 
But before doing so I would first like to mention briefly 
some publications of general interest and Importance for 
the study of kin terms.
4,1.2 In 1968 I.R. Buchler and H.A. Selby brought out 
their book Kinship and Social Organization. An Introduction 
to Theory and Method, a book not unlike my present work in 
some ways but with a quite different orientation all the 
same. First of all their book is meant to be a handbook 
in anthropology. This is particularly clear from their 
survey of the study of kinship and social organization: all 
purely linguistic contributions are absent and so are the 
exclusively linguistic aspects of the work of anthropologists. 
The greater part of the book is about recent developments.
The authors take the view that one should aim at a study of 
social organisation done "more mathematico1'. However, the
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subject is too vast to be tackled in its entirety from 
the start; instead, they say, one should start from 
the most formalized part and advance from there. Since 
World War II this means beginning from the various types 
of formal analysis of kinship terminology in the hope 
of achieving eventually a high degree of formalization in 
the study of social organization at large. It is in this 
context that they discuss theoretical background and 
techniques of analysis by reviewing the work done on 
American English kinship terminology. Their book is not 
recent enough to take fully into account the implications 
of the development of extensionism though they discuss 
extensively the descent and alliance theories from the 
anthropological point of view'. Their account seems to be 
extremely well-balanced and, while they recognise that 
descent theory based on Rivers’ genealogical method definitely 
has the edge over the alliance theory, they do point out 
quite rightly that most of the available evidence was 
originally collected with a genealogical orientation in 
mind. The genealogical method stresses the opposition of 
the lineal vs. the collateral relatives, thus singling out 
the nuclear family: this leads almost naturally to the 
notion of extension.
The authors are equally prudent in their assessment 
of the issue of a correlation between terminology and social 
organization: they prefer to use the word "hope” in^this 
context rather than making too firm statements which their 
good sense tells them to be insufficiently supported or 
demonstrated.
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Very valuable would seem to be their attention 
to the element of choice in all forms of behaviour, to 
what is not totally predictable. To deal, for example, 
with the sections system'*’ which determines who may marry 
whom, they use methods taken from information theory to 
show how the uncertainty, contained in that question, is 
gradually reduced. Elsewhere they bring in a useful 
distinction from Games Theory between ground rules and 
strategy rules: the former account for what is universal 
and completely predictable, the latter for what is only 
partially predictable. And they point out that eventually 
the relationships between these two sets of rules will 
prove to be a crucial issue. One may be slightly sceptical 
as to whether a treatment "more mathematico" is really 
going to work in these delicate areas of social interplay: 
but there is no reason why the authors should not pursue 
such a hypothesis: and I cannot find fault with the prudent 
way in which they have approached the subject.
Another book of a fairly general nature is 
Lawrence E. Nogle, Method and Theory in the Semantics and 
Cognition of Kinship Terminology. Though the book is dated 
197  ^ it does not contain references to literature published 
after 1968. It is limited moreover to the study of American 
English kinship terminology. The book only deals with 
componential analysis and with Bock's' generative analysis 
(Bock, 1968). From this point of view alone there "would 
be sufficient reason to try and bring this survey up to date.
1. A section system is a way of dividing a tribe up Into 
groups; it results from marriage arrangements.
There Is even more reason to do so as the author has 
concentrated on a very specific approach and on one ■ 
particular problem mainly. The approach is what is known 
as ethnosclence, or ethnographic semantics, or New 
Ethnography. According to W. Sturtevant who has discussed 
this direction In anthropological studies, ethnoscience 
"refers to the system of knowledge and cognition typical 
of a given culture” (Sturtevant, 1964: 99). Research in 
this field has concentrated on classification as reflected 
by native terminology, in order to discern how people 
construe their world of experience from the way they talk 
about it. The principal concern of this method was to 
overcome the tendency to superimpose one's own analytical 
categories onto another culture. This concern explains 
the emphasis which Nogle lays on the problem of psychological 
reality and on the place of folk definitions. The author 
does not add anything to the description by previous 
analysts: in effect he adopts Goodenough’s analysis (see 
below 4.3*2.): but he has introduced new tests to investig­
ate the link between semantic analysis and other facts.
His conclusion contains more questions than answers, some 
of which will occupy us later, e.g. variation of usage in 
kin terminology, secondary meanings, the genealogical vs.. 
sociological basis of classification.
A book which does not deal with English kinship 
terminology but- must be mentioned, is -A Study in Structural 
Semantics. The Siriono Kinship System by Harold W. Scheff- 
ler and Floyd G. Lounsbury .(1971)* This is an extremely 
important book on the subject of kinship terminology in 
general where the case for the extensionist theory Is put
very extensively and very ably. I shall return to it 
when I discuss the extensionist theory (cf. below 4.3.3.).
 ^*2 The Cultural Approach.
The cultural approach is very much a social 
theory rather than a linguistic theory; but the attention 
given in it to kinship terminology obliges us to look at 
it carefully. The method owes much for its theoretical 
background to the work of Talcott Parsons who sees society 
as a system of action. This general system of action 
has four constituents: a social system, a cultural system, 
a personality system, and a behavioural organism (cf. e.g. 
Parsons, 1971)* The distinction between social and 
cultural systems is important, as we shall see, for an 
appreciation of Schneider's position.
Parsons’ own work is sociological but in his 
article on "The' Kinship System of the Contemporary United 
States" (1943) he has made a few remarks about the termin­
ological aspects of Kinship which are worth quoting:
"It can perhaps be regarded as established 
that, with proper precautions, analysis 
of kinship terminology can serve as a 
highly useful approach to the study of the 
functioning social structure" (loc.cit. 22).
He goes on to point out that extra precautions are called
for In the case of English. There Is no significant
terminological difference between British and American English
In the domain of kinship so that it is difficult to bring
out what Is distinctively American (or British) by this
means. In fact there are only a few minor differences
between modern European languages In this respect: all analysis
of terminology can do is indicate a very broad type.
This leads Parsons to the question: "How far can this 
distinctive terminology be said to ’reflect' the actual 
Institutional structure of kinship?" (loc.cit. 27).
Parsons says it does so in a broad way, but all his 
illustrations are negative in character, e.g.: we have 
no extended kin groupings, no rules for exogamy, no 
preferential marriage rules. If, however, one wants to 
get a clearer idea about the specific structure of kinship 
in our Western societies one has to turn to a different 
order of evidence, in Parsons’ view - which he does by 
giving a sociological account of American social structure 
in the remainder of his article,
I think Parsons’ remarks are a very important 
reminder of how difficult the problem is of the social 
relevance of vocabulary. The size of the problem can 
easily be obscured by what may look like perfect examples 
of isomorphism between the structure of society and that 
of kin terminology In so-called primitive societies: and 
even there the matter Is not straightforward at all, as 
I hope to show later. But the main challenge of Parsons’ 
remarks would seem to be whether a meaningful linguistic 
account which is at the same time socially relevant can 
be given of kinship terminology, regardless of the type 
of society one is dealing with.
D. Schneider, in the article he wrote together 
with G. Homans (Schneider and Homans, 1955) and in his 
later work on kinship, owes much to Parsons’ theoretical 
work. It all revolves around American kinship, the American 
Kinship System, in a society where other institutions such
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as the economy and technology have become dominant to 
the point of "pushing kinship to the wall". This is 
his main interest; he has studied American kinship 
terminology for the light it may throw on the problem 
of the American kinship system.
In order to understand Schneider*s ideas
correctly I think it is worthwhile to see what exactly
he Is trying to explain. He has made this clear on several
occasions, e.g. very explicitly in his 1972 article "What
is Kinship all about?". Parsons distinguished, as I
mentioned before, between social.and cultural systems. The
primary function of the social system is integration and
the components of this system are norms, rules. The primary
function of the cultural system is pattern maintenance, to
provide a meaningful social order: the components of this
system are values. Schneider claims that all scholars
whose names have been associated with the study of kinship
have been interested in the facts of human reproduction
and how man integrates this into society: this is the
social system or social organization point of view. He
himself concentrates on the cultural system, the system
of symbols and meanings embedded in the normative system.
On the cultural level one asks: What does this world
consist of?, whereas on the normative level the question
would rather be: Given the world to be made up the way it
is, how does a man proceed to act in it? It is on the level
of symbols and meanings that Schneider situates his study
of kinship and of kinship terminology.
"Our problem is not to see what correlation 
the cultural symbols called kinship terms 
have to the functional roles. Rather it 
Is to see how the whole cultural-symbolic
system is differentiated and how one 
set of symbols - kinship terms - 
relates with other sets of symbols - 
the norms, for relations among kinsmen"
(1965: 294).
Culture, as Schneider sees it realised in 
American society, is the outcome of the action of human 
reason on nature. What is good in nature is selected, 
discovered, chosen; and rules and regulations (the order 
of law) are established to maintain and perpetuate what 
is good.
"The classification of relatives in 
American kinship is built on the same 
set of premises set in the same 
relationship to each other. The relative 
In nature is at one extreme, the relative 
in law is at the other extreme. The first 
is bub a relationship of nature, funda­
mental as that Is. The second is but a 
set of artificial rules or regulations 
fox'1 conduct, without substantive or 
natural base. But the blood relative, 
related in nature and by law, brings 
together the best of nature modified by 
human reason; he is thus the relative 
in the truest and most highly valued 
sense" (1968 : 110).
This basic distinction between 'substance* and *code-for-
conduct1 can be found in every aspect of the kinship
system In one way or another. Its most important example
Is the fundamental distinction between the relative as a
person and the person as a relative.
The person as a relative is so characterized by
a set of distinctive features which are defined and
differentiated by a single symbol,
"the central symbol of sexual intercourse/ 
love. It defines what a relative Is in 
the abstract. It states what the relation­
ship between relatives is by definition.
It consists of a set of conceptual elements 
and their interrelationships" (1968: 59)*
These distinctive features are the same as those which define
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the family. Love has a double, opposite function:
it unites opposites, and it separates what is united.
It unites the opposite sexes, male and female, in the
husband/wife relationship; this unity gives birth to
a separate entity, the child, son and daughter. In
this way husband and wife become parents, father and
mother. This unity of the family is bound to be undone,
for the brother/sister relationship . falls under the
universal incest prohibition so that the children will
leave their family to found one of their own (cf. 1968:
39-40). The family is a paradigm for how kinship relations
are to be conducted and to what end: those relations are
specified as relations of love, or - as Schneider has it
In his favourite formula - of enduring diffuse solidarity
(ibid. 50).
"Solidarity, because the relationship 
is supportive, helpful, and cooperative; 
it rests on trust and the other can be 
trusted. Diffuse because it is not 
narrowly confined to a specific goal or 
a specific kind of behavior. Two athletes 
may cooperate and support each other for 
the duration of the game and for the 
purpose of winning the game, but be 
indifferent to each other otherwise. Two 
members- of the family cannot be indifferent 
to one another, and since their cooperation 
does not have a specific goal or a specific 
limited time in mind, it is enduring"
(1968: 52).
"Quite apart from the distinctive features 
that define the family and its members, 
each member is also a person and as a 
person is constructed out of not one, but 
many different elements, each drawn frorrn 
many different sources" (1968: 43).
The relative as a person is the personification
In actable terms of a variety of different symbol systems,
including the symbol system of sexual intercourse/love
(cf. 1968: 111).
"The person has either male or female 
sex as defined by the sex-role system.
The person has age attributes as defined 
by the age-role system. The person has 
class characteristics as defined by the 
class system. The person may have occup­
ational, religious, political, or a 
variety of other attributes, each defined 
by reference to its own self-contained 
set of symbols from its domain" (1968: 59-60).
The relative as a person is made up of distinctive features
other than just those of kinship whereas the person as
a relative is defined exclusively by the distinctive
features of kinship. Schneider has said repeatedly that
one of the major problems of the description and analysis
of the American system is that of variance, the variety
of alternate terms (cf. e.g. Schneider and Homans, 1955:
1195; Schneider, 1968: 16 f.). The difference between
the person as a relative and the relative as a person is
precisely that in the former case there is no variance
in the use of kin terms whereas in the latter there is.
In fact, we really have two systems here, one restricted
to a set of distinctive features, the other encompassing a
variety of symbol systems.
The concept of ’person' can be both concrete
and abstract,
"On the one hand, the relative as a 
person is a concrete construct in that 
it refers to the person as a living 
human being, a real Individual. On the 
other hand, the relative as a person is 
a normative construct, a construct 
consisting of normative guides and stand­
ards in terms of which behavior should 
proceed" (1968: 76).
The matter of kinship terms at the level of the 
relative as a person can best be approached by means of 
the classic question ’Who calls Whom What?1. Looking at 
It in this way from the angle of the person both as a
concrete and as a normative construct, one is allegedly 
able to give a satisfactory account of the variance in 
American kinship.
We have to remember that there are two distinct 
elements in American kinship, substance and code-for- 
conduct: as these elements are distinct, each can occur 
alone or they can occur in combination. On the level of 
the concrete person the question ’Who calls Whom What?’ 
comes down to a decision as to whom to count and whom not 
to count as a relative. This decision can be based either 
on the element of substance, or the element of code-for- 
conduct, or on both. Another element which comes into the 
decision-making is the notion of distance. The two elements, 
substance and code, are not of equal value: substance is 
higher in value than code, while the combination of both 
has the highest value,s This means that a person at some 
distance will more easily be counted as a relative if there 
is only the substantive element present than if there is only 
the code-for-conduct element present. The notion of ’dist­
ance’ used here is simply
"the statement of kinship in quantitative 
terms. That is, on the one hand it is a 
measure of the degree to which two persons 
share common biogenetic substance, and on 
the other hand It Is a statement of the 
magnitude of the claim on diffuse, enduring 
solidarity1' (1968: 65).
The reason why this notion comes in in answering the question
whether or not a relationship obtains, is a characteristic
of the American kinship system which Schneider has indicated
with the two phrases 1 fuzziness of boundary" and "fade-out
principle" (1965: 289 f.). ’Fuzziness of boundary’ points
to the fact that there is no clear, categorical limit to the
domain of kinsmen, while ’fade-out principle’ defines 
the real limit beyond which people are too distant to 
be counted as relatives. In American kinship distance 
means three things: physical distance, where people 
live, how often one sees them if ever; socio-emotional 
distance, a feeling of identity or difference, emotionally 
or socially; and genealogical distance, going back to a 
common ancestor (1968: 72 f.). So much for the delimit­
ation of the domain of kinship by personal decision from 
a 'cultural* rather than a 'social organisational' point 
of view.
Now from the point of view of the person as
"a construct consisting of normative guides and standards
in terms of which behavior should proceed" (1968: 76),
'Who is called What and by Whom?'. It is here that both
the earlier article by Schneider and Homans (1955: 1195) and
Schneider's book (1968: 83 ff») point to the fundamental
characteristic of the wide variety of alternative terms
in the American kinship system; for there are far more
kinship terms and terms for kinsmen than there are kinds.
of kinsmen, or categories of kinsmen,
"Mother may be called 'mother', 'mom',
'ma', 'mummy1, 'mama', by her first 
name, nickname, diminutive, 'old woman', 
and a variety of other less commonly 
used designations. Father may be called 
’father’, ’pop’, ’pa', 'dad', 'daddy', 
by his first name, nickname, diminutive,
'old man', 'boss', and a variety of less 
commonly used designations. Uncles may ■ 
be addressed or referred to as uncle-plus 
-first-name, first name alone, or uncle 
alone. Similarly for aunts" (Schneider 
and Homans, 1955: 1195)*
The use of possessive pronouns and specifying whom the
relationship Is to, increase the variety still further.
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The variation, it is claimed, depends on the situational 
context, not on the traditional distinction between 
terms of reference vs. terms of address: for it is not 
possible to give a single form of reference or a single 
form of address for a given class of kinsmen that would 
be used in all contexts of reference or of address.
While the variety might give an impression of 
uncertainty or ambiguity, nothing could be further from 
reality. Speakers know exactly which one to use, and the 
differences^in practice among various speakers are accepted 
as legitimate alternatives, not as deviant usage. For 
the explanation of this fact one has to come back once 
again to the two distinct elements which can be there, 
each one separately or in combination. In this light the 
word ’relative’ can be considered to have three meanings: 
and the word is often* used without a sharp distinction 
being made between these three. In this way, it can be 
Just as correct to say that someone is a relative as to say 
that he Is not a relative. At all events, kinship terms 
can be applied to persons who are definitely not relatives 
by blood or kinsmen; in many cases this will be indicated 
by some such modifier as step , in-law, foster, added on 
to the basic kin term. These modifiers, however, are by 
no means required, for the terms by themselves can indicate 
the code-for-conduct alone. This means that, for Schneider, 
the set of step-mother, mother-in-law, and foster mother, 
also contains den mother, mother superior, etc. Yet, 
father, mother, etc., remain kinship terms because, as 
distinct from any other kind of term, they have as one of 
their many meanings the biogenetic relationship, (cf. Schneid­
er, 1968: 100-101).
Kinship terms, then, are not restricted in 
their use to kinsmen; the other way round It must be 
said that kinsmen are referred to or addressed by non­
kinship terms. This throws wide open again the 
question 7Who calls Whom What?' (ibid.: 102 ff.). Non­
kinship terms can be names, words, or phrases, while 
kinship terms can combine with names. Both kinship and 
non-kinship terms divide into formal and informal or 
intimate terms. The concept of equality has to be intro­
duced here. Symmetrical usage of terms is the mark of 
equality, asymmetrical usage of inequality. As far as 
kinship terms are concerned, their use as markers of 
status difference or equivalence is a special aspect of 
the more general rule that they mark a code for conduct.
The cultural relevance of this system of design­
ation of relationships seems to be the following. The 
fairly frequent use “of first names brings out as the 
dominant quality of the system considerations of a 
personal kind (Schneider and Homans, 1955: 1201). But 
this requires a qualification: it is elders who use first 
name towards a younger generation while these use kinship 
terms for the older generation. Even vis-a-vis higher 
generations the use of the name plays a role In personal­
ising the more "classifIcatoryn terms such as uncle: they
practically become descriptive in this way. This same 
concern for individual persons is born out by the frequent 
use of possessive pronouns with kin terms, so personalisin 
them (ibid.: 1203). This value of personal qualities, of 
the individual, is also stressed within the over-all 
social arrangements (ibid.: 1206).
"American culture is oriented about 
achieved rather than ascribed status ....
Ascribed status as a family member is 
Insufficient to carry most people through 
life. If status is to be achieved, it
has to be achieved, according to American
values, on the merits of the person, 
his qualities and accomplishments 
as a person".
The senior, designated by the kinship term, represents 
the established system, the achieved status; the junior, 
referred to by name, is the individual who still has to 
carve out his position. This dominant cultural value'of 
personal achievement has to be transmitted, to be taught 
to children. In a social setting. The first social system 
every human is part of is the kinship system: in this
reduced system those dominant values are present for the
children to be initiated into. Kinship teaches them more 
than mere kinship: it teaches them the fundamentals of 
the whole culture astwell (ibid.: 1208).
I have spoken earlier on of the challenge cont­
ained in Parsons1 remark that kin terminology only reflects 
social structure in a broad manner: he clearly did not
expect much light from the study of kinship terms for his 
social studies. Schneider too is interested in social 
studies, but he expects more from the study of kinship 
terminology, perhaps because he does not expect a simple, 
not to say simplistic, one-to-one relation between concrete 
features of the terminological and social systems.
Schneider has certainly faced up to some real and important 
problems, notably the delimitation of the domain of relat­
ives, and the existence and use of alternative terms and 
forms of reference and address. However, I do not think 
that his idea of doing away with the reference/address
166
distinction is particularly fortunate* It is true, 
of course, that there is an enormous area of overlap 
between the two and only rarely, if ever, does one find 
a clear-cut division of kin terminology along these lines. 
But this does not mean that this distinction is not 
an effective factor in the process of choosing the correct 
term for a relative in a given situation. L.S. Lewis has 
tested some of the Schnelder-Homans ideas in the area 
of terms for parents in American English (Lewis, 1963), 
and, while roughly in agreement with Sehneider-Homans, he 
did object to the rejection of the reference/address 
distinction and to the fact that the notion of "situational 
context" (Schneider-Homans, 1955: 1195) had not been 
developed. Lewis first tested the preference for various 
alternative terms in the system of address, in four types 
of situation, vis. neutral. Intimate, conflict, and casual/ 
joking; then he repeated the test for the terms of 
reference, again in situations of different degrees of 
formality, viz. reference in the presence of close relat­
ives, close friends, college professors, etc. I would 
agree that the reference/address distinction is too import­
ant to be ignored, but I equally feel that to speak of 
two sets of terms Is, with such a high degree of overlap, 
artificial. I would rather call them two different modes 
of use of kinship terms, two types of context. Considered, 
however, as type of context reference and address are not 
quite the same thing as the various degrees of formality 
of which Lewis spoke. The specification of this notion of 
Ttype of context1 is certainly something to be looked into; 
for the moment it will suffice to recognize that Lewis has
made a valuable point In a practical manner.
Returning to Schneider’s contribution I feel 
he did make a good point when he Introduced his concepts 
of •distance* and of kin terms as status-markers: for It 
Is concepts like these, over and above basic distinctive 
features, that are required to be able to deal with such 
facts as fuzzy boundaries and fade-out, and with the 
variety of alternative terms. On this point Schneider 
takes a different view from the practitioners of compon­
ential analysis of which he has said:
"It is not an analysis of terms for
kinsmen. It is not an analysis of
kinship terms. It is an analysis of 
the way in which kin types are classed
by kinship terms" (1965: 30*0 :
this, he says, is due to the fact that the domain which 
componential analysis deals with, is defined by the narrow 
control question *What kin-relationship, if any, is he (she) 
to you?1. Schneider'does not deny the validity or useful­
ness of this approach. What he does say is that it copes 
with this particular analytic domain: but this analytic
domain is not identical with the semantic domain. I think
the limiting influence of the control question is generally 
recognised, Indeed intended. Another matter is if it is 
very helpful to deny the label ’semantic* to this kind of 
analysis. The question what is part of semantics and what 
is not, is certainly important. For the moment, however,
I shall limit myself to Schneider's ideas about semantics.
When we come to discuss the extensionist theory 
we shall see that its main claim is to have taken fully Into 
account the polysemic nature of many words. Schneider 
starts from exactly the same premise:
"[Words] have one fundamental character­
istic which must be taken into account.
A word never has a single meaning except 
in one, limiting set of circumstances.
When a word is being used within the very- 
narrow confines of a rigidly controlled 
scientific utterance where the meaning 
Is explicitly defined in unitai’y terms 
for that particular occasion or that 
particular usage, any other meanings that 
word might have are suppressed and the 
defined meaning is its only meaning.
But since words are seldom used in this 
way, and rarely if ever In ’natural* 
culture, this limitation can safely be 
Ignored while the polysemic nature of 
words Is kept firmly in mind" (1968: 4).
We have seen what this means in practice when we mentioned 
that Schneider holds that there are really three meanings 
to the word "relative". He agrees that It is not enough 
to know that there are several meanings: one still has 
to know which meaning applies when and under what circum­
stances - this Schneider has shown very well in my opinion - 
and how the different meanings of the word relate to each 
other. On this last point Schneider will be attacked by 
the extensionists: and one has to admit that Schneider’s 
case is perhaps not totally convincing. At first sight 
the logical possibilities would seem to be that, when there 
are several meanings for a word, these meanings are either 
all on the same level and depend on some more general 
covering concept, or they are not on the same level but 
organised hierarchically with respect to each other. 
Schneider’s view would not seem to fit either of these 
possibilities, though it is closer to the first than to 
the second. His view is of a kind of juxtaposition of 
meanings of different value or strength, held together,
I would say, not by a more abstract cover concept but by 
a cultural theory about values in society.
There are various matters which require 
further attention: the role of theory, the place of non- 
linguistic considerations in semantics, the nature of 
metaphors. Having considered the good things and the 
weaker points of the Cultural approach, I think we 
should now hear the case for other approaches.
4*3. Componential Analysis and Cognitive Linguistics.
4.3.1 The Beginnings and Methodological Basis of 
Componential Analysis.
The form of semantic analysis known as compon­
ential analysis has had strong links with the analysis 
of kinship terminologies from the very beginning. In 
this field it served basically as a translation procedure, 
i.e. a way of explaining a body of unfamiliar kin terms 
by relating them to more familiar ones through the inter­
mediary of shared components. I think it is fair to say 
that the original impetus came from anthropological 
quarters though there has been a linguistic side to it 
from the start. For one thing, concepts to be analysed 
are known through or in language:
"The categorizations of phenomena and 
events ... by which a community's 
members deal with one another and with 
their surroundings ... are represented 
largely, though far from completely, 
by the words and expressions in their 
language” (Goodenough, 19&7: 1204).
Moreover, anthropologists tend to stress the fact that
language is part of culture: "The relation of language to
culture Is that of part to whole” (Goodenough, 1957* 169) .
But the strongest, clearest link comes from the fact that
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linguistics has provided the model for this type of 
analysis*
In fact, analysis into constituent components
has a long tradition in the study of language, most
notably perhaps in the Prague School of Phonology,
but the main Influence in this present development has
come from the work of American distributionalists on
phonemics and morphemics, as Goodenough has put it:
Mfhe methodological problem of 
ethnography thus viewed seems to 
me to be identical with that of 
descriptive linguistics’1 (1957: 168).
Lounsbury has equally referred to the work by Hockett 
and Harris on morphemics, with portmanteau morphs, a 
submorphemic level of features, and paradigmatic sets 
(1956: 160-161), and has drawn a parallel between kin 
classes and phonemes (ibid.: 191-192). American lingu­
istics did not pay much attention, however, to the study 
of meaning: yet, for a cultural anthropologist the aim 
Is noo to know culture as a material phenomenon but to 
know the organisation of things, the forms of things 
which people have in mind as signified by what people say 
and do, by their social arrangements and events* That 
is why linguistics does not provide the whole of the 
background: a supplementary inspiration came from the 
work of Charles W. Morris on the theory of signs (esp.
Morris, 1938). From this work came a wider, fuller view 
of the study of language, not only covering ’syntactics’
(the relations of signs to one another), but also ’semantics’ 
(the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs 
are applicable), and even ’pragmatics1 (the relation of 
signs to interpreters)(cf. Morris, 1938: 6). The further
explication by Morris of the notion of semantics is
important because it is at the root of a certain 
amount of the criticism levelled against componential 
analysis. It is easiest displayed in the form of a 
diagram (cf, Brekle, 1972: 3*0:
or, to put it briefly in words: the meaning of a term Is 
the set of conditions which must be fulfilled if the term 
Is to denote. Meaning is referential, referring to all 
members of a class. Apart from denoting objects or 
events an expression can also connote other images or 
concepts that people associate with the expression's 
designatum, but this is disregarded in componential analy­
sis: it deals only with signification (cf. Goodenough, 1967: 
1204). Lounsbury has summarized it as follows:
"A term belonging to a paradigm can be 
defined componentially In terms of its 
coordinates in the paradigm. The 
definition represents a bundle of 
features: one from each of several, or 
of all, of the dimensions of the pa&adigm. 
This bundle of features states the nec­
essary and sufficient conditions which 
an object must satisfy if it is to be a 
denotaturn of the term so defined. Terms ‘ 
having single denotata are the exceptions; 
multiple denotation is more generally the 
case. The class of all possible denotata 
of a term constitutes its designatum. The 
defining features of this class - i.e. the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership in it - are its significatum.
signifies
linguistic form 
applicable
constitutes
"Objects) 
Events J 1 x.n fulfills
->Set of features or
(Significatum or semantic
rule)
The componential definition of a 
term is the expression of its 
slgnificatumu (Lounsbury, 1964 a: 194).
It is good to realize that one obtains minimal definitions 
in this way; the rules obtained will only generate back 
the original data. And in fact the whole operation is 
carried out on a restricted, carefully delimited domain: 
this is given as a prerequisite by Lounsbury (1956: 193)*
The field has been delineated as an "Ideal space ... a 
genealogical one" (Goodenough, 1967: 1204), for which 
Goodenough has recourse to Rivers’ genealogical method, "In 
order to minimise problems arising from metaphorical usage” 
(Goodenough, 1956: 98). There.is nothing particularly new 
about this: J. Trier had already posited the need for the 
semantic field as a closed unit by way of working hypo­
thesis in order to make analysis possible at all (cf. Ohmann, 
1953: 127). My reason for stressing this point here is that 
it has attracted the criticism of circularity: certain terms 
or meanings are excluded from the analysis because they do 
not form part of the field which has been delineated to 
cover only certain terms and meanings. We shall have to 
return to this point.
The actual practice of the technique of compon­
ential analysis consists of two steps: ”to make a record 
of the specific images or concepts that Informants say an 
expression may denote" and "to find a set of definitive 
attributes that will predict what informants say may and 
may not be denoted by the expression” (Goodenough, 1967:
1204). Another way of putting It would be that one proceeds 
from extensional definitions (definitions by listing of 
denotata) to intensionai definitions (definitions by
specification of distinctive features)(cf. Lounsbury,
1964 a: 194).
In previous chapters we have seen how various
scholars have tried to relate kinship terminology to
social institutions of one kind or another. In a strict
understanding of formal feature analysis It could be
argued that this point does not arise:
"Since a formal analysis emphasizes 
internal consistency, completeness, 
and form, it must first be evaluated 
in these terms. ... The question of 
external relevance is no more significant 
at this stage than is the question: ’Does 
the "real world" correspond to the operations 
of algebra?’ ” (Tyler, ed., 1969: 192).
Tyler may reflect a view here of formalism which prevailed 
ten years after the epoch-making articles by Goodenough 
and Lounsbury of 1956: but there is no unanimity on the 
point and certainly at first no such outspoken position 
was taken. From early on Goodenough has stressed the link 
between language and culture: language is part of culture 
and a major instrument for learning it (1957: 172). 
Sometimes kinship terminologies reflect not only properties 
of genealogical space but also features of social organ­
ization, In such cases it would be Impossible to carry 
out a componential analysis without referring to social 
matters (1967: 1208). Lounsbury saw things in the light of 
the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, semantics 
dealing with referential meaning, pragmatics with behav­
ioural meaning; for an anthropologist the first would 
merely be a tool for the second. Eventually the different 
kinds of meaning would be related to one another, this 
being "the essence of the ’language and culture’ problem" 
(1956: 189). But there never was any doubt in his mind,
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I think, that there is a link: from the outset he stated:
"A language reflects the spirit or 
the culture of a people. ... The 
reflection, in language, of such 
distinctive features of the real or 
the cultural world, then, must he 
taken for granted" (1956: 159)*
He also, however, refers in this article to Kroeber’s
opinion that kin terms reflect psychology rather than
sociology (ibid.: 184). Lounsbury himself felt quite
justified in positing a social explanation, viz. a marriage
rule, for the Pawnee terminology he was analysing. But
the fact that he did make this reference to Kroeber is,
to my mind, very important for a proper understanding of
the way attention was shifting from sociology to psychology.
Kroeber’s categories of relationship are .among the factors
which have stimulated distinctive feature analysis of
kinship terminologies. As such forms of analysis result
in ’minimal meaning’*, the meaning of items within a set
in relation to other items in that set, there would seem
to be no scope for external factors tc be taken into
account. The result achieved is rather a conceptual model,
reflecting the logic of the mind. Kence, I believe, it
was inevitable that recent research should predominantly
be interested in the psychological relevance of kin
terminological structure rather than in its sociological
relevance.
The concept of ’minimal meaning’ has another 
consequence which is at the origin of much discussion: it 
leads to metaphorical uses of terms being disregarded, at 
least for the time being, in a componential analysis (Louns­
bury, 1956: 193; 1964 a: 206). For componential analysis 
requires unitary definitions for each cla.ss; composite
classes are really two classes:
"Were we to compromise on this point 
and admit disjunctive definitions (class 
sums, alternative criteria for membership) 
as on a par with conjunctive definitions 
(class products, uniform criteria for 
membership), there would be no motivation 
for analysis in the first place" (Lounsbury,
1964a: 194).
What is required then, Is to limit oneself exclusively to 
the terms that fall within the field defined as genealogical 
kin. Unfortunately Lounsbury discusses at one point an 
example of emotional extension of class by both a kin 
relationship and a non-kin metaphorical extension (1956: 175) 
which would seem to confuse the issue. But he has discussed 
multiple denotation within a field separately from metaphors 
in a later article (1964 a: 207). All this, however, leads 
on to the question of the extensionist hypothesis which 
will be discussed below (4.4.3*), For the time being it 
will suffice to have shown how the premises of componential 
analysis require conjunctive unitary definitions.
4.3.2. Componential Analyses of English Kinship Terminology.
The componential analyses of English kinship terms 
start off in a fairly simple, basic form; then gradually, 
they become more comprehensive, more sophisticated. But all 
along they share a common aim: they want to establish which 
conceptual criteria are being used by the native speakers. 
Semantic processes are, therefore, cognitive processes. 
Inevitably the discussion of cognitive and psychological 
aspects holds a prominent place in these analyses. As there 
are a number of studies which deal exclusively with this
subject I have preferred to bring this whole discussion 
together in the next section (4.3,3.).
The first analysis is the one by Anthony Wallace 
and John Atkins (i960). Anthropologists have traditionally 
rendered kinship terms by matching them with primitive 
English terms or relative products of two or more of 
these English terms. This way of proceeding is based on 
Rivers’ genealogical method and the results are given in 
one of several - very similar - forms of kin-type notation. 
The danger of ethnocentrism in basing oneself on English 
kin-types is obvious though it may be useful as a tool for 
anthropologists, especially those with a typological 
Interest. But, as I have pointed out already, the emphasis 
switched from ’meaning to the ethnologist’ to ’meaning to 
the users of a set of terms’: and here it is precisely 
the principle of grouping relatives which is the crucial 
point, so that this 'is the one thing above all else which 
must not be prejudged.
Wallace and Atkins proceed In a straightforward 
manner (i960: 60): recording a set of terms, defining the 
terms in kin-type notation, Identifying - in the principle 
of grouping - the conceptual dimensions with their values 
(’components1), defining each term as a combination of 
components, and stating the semantic relationship among 
the terms, the structural principles of the terminological 
system.
For the first step - recording a set of terms - 
Wallace and Atkins limit themselves to a restricted set 
of consanguineal relatives: grandfather, grandmother, 
father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, grandson,
-Lf (
granddaughter, uncle, aunt, cousin, nephew, niece. Their 
reasons for restricting the set are practical, "for 
simplicity of expression" (loc.cit.: 6l). In a second 
step they define these terms in kin-type notation (loc. 
cit. : 6l) :
; FaSi, MoSi, FaFaSi, 
MoFaSI, etc.
: FaBrSo, FaBrDa, MoBrSo, 
MoBrDa, FaSiSo, FaSiDa, 
MoSiSo, MoSiDa, FaFaBrSo 
FaMoBrSo, MoFaSiDa, etc. 
: BrSo , SiSo, BrSoSo, 
SiSoSo, etc.
: BrDa, SiDa, BrDaDa, 
SiDaDa, etc.
Br ,
FaFaBr, MoFaBr, etc.
Next they identify the conceptual dimensions of the set:
(A) sex of relative for all terms but one (cousin)
(B) generation, specified in some terms
(C) lineally or nonlineally related to Ego 
xvith the following values:
grandfather : FaFa, Mo Fa aunt
grandmother : FaMo, M0M0
father : Fa cousin
mother : Mo
brother : Br
sister : Si
son : So nephew
daughter : Da
grandson : S0S0 , DaSo niece
granddaughter: SoDa, DaDa
uncle : FaBr, Mo
(A): al male
a2 female
(B) : bl two generations above Ego
b2 one generation above Ego
b3
Ego !s own generation
b4 one generation below Ego
b5
two generations below Ego
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(C): c^ lineal (ancestors or descendants of Ego) 
c2 co-lineal (non-lineals all of whose
ancestors include} or are included in3 
all the ancestors of Ego) 
c^ ab-lineal (consanguineal relatives who 
are neither lineals nor co-lineals).
In the fourth stage one defines the selected terms by 
components; the absence of a subscript in the notation 
indicates that the term does not discriminate on a given 
dimension.
grandfather : aibici grandson ' : alb5Cl
grandmother : a2bl°l granddaughter: a2b5cl
father : alb2cl uncle : alblc2 and axb2c2
mother : a2b2Ci aunt : a2blc2 and a2b2C2
brother :
alb 3°l
cousin : a b
sister : a2b3°l nephew : a^b j |c and alb5c2
son : niece : a2b4c2 and a2b5C2
daughter : a.~,b 1. c, 2 4 1
The same thing can be r-epresented in the form of a paradigm
(loc.cit. : 62) :
C1 c2 c3
al a2 al a0 al a2
bl grandfather}, grandmother‘...... . ... i ........
1
uncle . aunt
b2 father 1 mother
t
b3
[EGO]
..... t . .... -..  ...
brother 1 sister cousin
b4 son | daughter nephew niece
'
b5
grandson
i
, 1 granddaughter 
i
This analysis shows the semantic relationship among 
the terms and the structural principles of the termin­
ological system, Wallace and Atkins do not claim that 
theirs is the best representation; only that It Is 
adequate to define the- set of terms chosen.
Wallace and Atkins have devoted the major part 
of their article to unsolved problems In relation to 
componential analysis; and they have seen very clearly 
that these depend at least to some extent on Implicit or 
explicit assumptions about componential analysis (loc,cit.:
63 ff.). They mention in the first place the problem of 
homonyms and metaphors * distinguishing non-kinship homonyms 
or metaphors from kin extensions. The former are excluded 
by definition, the latter only, as was claimed from the 
beginning by Lounsbury and Goodenough, when a term cannot 
be given a unitary definition. This kind of definition is-... 1 1 —'
either a single value on one dimension, or a simple class
product, i.e. a combination of one value from each of two
or more dimensions; in other words, it is a simple class
or relative product without the words (or their corresponding
operators) "and/or" being used In the definition. Lounsbury
and Goodenough tried to avoid as much as possible composite
definitions, either by introducing extra conceptual variables
(Goodenough, 1956: 118 f.), or by hypothesising that the
choice of label is contextually determined, e.g. that formal
or informal context might lead to a classification .on the
> 1
basis of different features (Lounsbury, 1956: 180) . But,
1. An example would be the use of grandparental terms for 
affinal relatives of the second ascending generation 
In familiar use but not when properly defined.
as Lounsbury admits, it would seem to be na blemish
in the system1' (Ibid.). Wallace and Atkins therefore
suggest that 'unitary definition1 is an absolutely
inadequate criterion for homonym.y •' and they define
homonyms instead as
"two or more words, phonemically or 
graphically identical, which cannot be 
economically defined on the same set 
of dimensions without overlap or incl­
usion of one by the other" (Wallace and 
Atkins , i960 : 66).
I think that the approach by Wallace and Atkins Is much 
more realistic than the rather rigid insistence on unitary 
definition. Whether it brings us any nearer to an adequate 
treatment of homonymy and polysemy in practical terms is 
another matter. A fuller discussion of these problems Is 
better postponed till we discuss the extensionist theory.
Wallace and Atkins also discuss the problem of 
definition and connotation, related, as we have seen, 
to the delimitation of the domain. They do introduce, 
however, the related matter of synonymy (loc.cit. 67 f.) 
or what Schneider referred to as the "wide variety of 
alternate terms11. Father, dad, daddy, pop, and old man 
can all be defined as ^ 2 ^ 2 ° !  anb an serLse are synonyms.
But they clearly do not mean the same thing. Again the 
problem is created in part by the assumption of minimal 
meaning within a given set of terms. Wallace and Atkins 
do not offer a solution: they do, however, propose three 
different options. One can consider them as same-'language 
synonyms with different connotations: the connqtata have 
then the force of significata, at least as long as one is 
dealing with culturally or linguistically enjoined conno­
tations, not of course when dealing with idiosyncratic or
optional connotations. Alternatively, one could regard 
the terms as belonging to different (English) languages: 
this gets rid of the problem of synonymy but creates a 
(rather unlikely) problem of translation with a prospect 
of a multiplicity of componential analyses. Finally, 
one could make the terms non-synonymous, i.e. give them 
different significata: this would greatly increase the 
number of dimensions in the matrix.
The authors discuss the matter of regular 
reduction of terms in connection with the possibility of 
displaying them in a single paradigm (loc.cit.: 69 ff.), 
and finally they go on to discuss noncommutative relational 
concepts (loc.cit.: 73 f*)* It appears that, though it 
may be possible for the ethnographer to analyse terms as 
class products, users of many kinship lexicons may well 
define, cognitively at least, some of their terms relation- 
ally, I.e. by means of possessive relational concepts, for 
example, "my husband's father" for FaLa. It may well be 
profitable to use a combination of both class and relational 
calculi: much depends on how one defines the purpose of 
one’s investigation. And it is at this point that Wallace 
and Atkins reaffirm their view of the aim of componential 
analysis: "to state the meaning of the terms to the native 
users of the terms" (loc.cit.: 75)« At the same time, 
however, they recognise that their own psychological Interest 
is not the only one possible. There must equally be room 
for a social-structural type of analysis. This leads to 
their distinction between psychological reality and 
structural reality, i.e. the reality which an individual 
perceives in his own terms, as opposed to a world of meanings
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applied, to a given society or individual which is real 
to the ethnographer but which is not necessarily the 
world of any other individual* Yet, in the field of 
the semantics of kinship terminology the two must be 
related extensionally as they cover the same sets of 
persons or kin-types denoted by expressions. This points 
to two problems: ethnocentrism, and indeterminacy or 
the possibility of a multiplicity of extensionally valid 
solutions. This is the problem we shall consider in the 
next section (4*3*3*)*
The next description of English kin terms by 
means of componential analysis was done by A. Kimball Romney 
and Roy Goodwin D TAndrade (1964). Again we shall only go 
into the actual analysis here, leaving the second'part of 
their article which deals with the cognitive implications 
of the various analyses till the next section*
Romney and D 1Andrade have introduced a new not- 
ational system, not in order to convey a different kind of 
information from the traditional systems : "The difference 
is that in this notation, all information is represented 
explicitly1' (1964: 151).
They start with a basic set of symbols (loc.cit.:
148) :
m represents male 
f represents female 
a represents persons of either sex 
= represents marriage bond
0 represents sibling link (used only where 
individuals share both parents, i.e.
"full" siblings)
+ represents parent link
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represents child link 
( ) represents an expansion 
superscripts represent number of expansions 
subscripts represent sex correspondences 
When this notation is applied to the set of terms with 
their kin-types analysed by Wallace and Atkins we get
the following list:
grandfather: a+m+m
a+f+m
grandmother: a+mtf
a+f+f
father: a+m
mother: a+f
brother: aOm
sister: aOf
son: a-m
daughter: a-f
grandson: a-m~m 
a-f-in
granddaughter : a-m-f 
a-f ~f
uncle: a+mOm 
a-f fOm 
a-fm+mOm 
a+f+mOm 
etc. 
(also the
not included 
a+mOf=m 
a+fOf=m 
etc .
nephew: aOm-m
aOf-m 
aOm-m-m 
aOf-m~m 
etc.
(also the following 
not included by Wallace) 
f-mOm-m 
m-fOm-m 
etc,
niece: aOm-f
aOf-f 
aOm-m-f 
aOf-m-f 
etc,
(also the following 
not included by Wallace) 
f^mOm-f 
m-fOm-f 
etc.
cousin: a+mOm-m
a+mOm-f 
a+fOm-m 
a+fOm-f 
a+mOf-m 
a+mOf-f 
a+fOf-m 
a+fOf-f 
a+m+mOm-m 
a+m+fOm-m 
a+f+mOf-f 
etc.
aunt: afmOf
a+fOf 
a+m+mOf 
a+f+mQf etc.
(also the following 
not included by Wallace) 
a+mOm-f 
a+ fOm-f 
etc,
I«4
The list of kin-types following each term is called
the range of that term. The next step will be to reduce
the range of each term to a single notational expression,
by means of the following rules (loc.cit.: 1*19):
Rule 1. Rule of minimum difference within range.
"Where two kin types within a range 
are identical except for a difference 
in sex markers in the same position, 
the two kin types may be written as 
one with an a in the contrasting 
position". This rule applies first, 
e.g. Grandfather (a+m+m and a+f+m) may 
be written: a+a+m.
Rule 2 . Rule of sequence difference within range.
"Where two expressions are identical 
except for one additional 'link1 
(i.e. a pair consisting of one sex 
and one relation marker), the 'link' 
may be written in parentheses".
In this second rule the parentheses indicate an optional
expansion. The rule may be applied In sequence but must
be labelled with a superscript indicating the number of
reductions made, e.g.:
m+fOm n i p
m+fOm-m m+fO(m-) 5 5 m
m+fOm-m-m
This second rule Is necessary to be able to complete the 
reduction to a single expression for uncle, aunt, nephfew, 
niece, and cousin. If one were dealing with other kinship 
systems two more rules might be required, a rule of paired 
sequence difference within ranges in systems with a parallel 
vs. cross distinction, and a rule of reciprocals within 
ranges where one finds complete reciprocals *
The application of Rules 1 and 2 to the ranges 
of the English system gives the following result (loc.cit.: 
150) :
grandfather a+a+m
grandmother a+a+f
father a+m
mother a+f
brother aOm
sister aOf
son a-m
daughter a-f
grandson a-a-m
granddaughter a-a-f
uncle a+a(+a)0 j,10( f=)m
aunt a+a (+a)0 5 f
nephew 0 ia(=a)0(a-) ’“a-m
niece a(-a)0(a-)° ****a-f
cousin a+a(+a)0 313^ 0(a-)
The analysis must be completed by a structural analysis 
which is to reveal structural principles rather than 
produce reduced expressions of ranges. The analysis 
must proceed on the basis of the following set of ordered 
rules to be applied to the reduced expressions (loc.cit.: 
151 f.):
- sex of relative. Symbol R with two values, R^ and R2 . 
e.g. grandfather and grandmother differ only by the
final sex marker. This value can now be taken out 
and the expressions rewritten as a+a+a, or more 
simply + + .
- sex of speaker. Symbol S, with two values. This variable
does not occur in English.
- relative sex. Symbol D, with two values, (different)
and (same).
- relative age. Symbol A, with two values, (older) and
A2 (younger).
- reciprocity. Symbol P, for polarity, with two values,
- sex of intervening relative. Symbol C, with two values,
(cross) and C2 (parallel).
Application to English (loc.,cit.: 152):
(senior or ascending generation) and P2 
(junior or descending generation).
Term Extracted Components Remaining Expression
grandson
grandfather
grandmother
granddaughter
/ + + /
father
mother
V / + /
son
daughter
nephew niece
uncle
niece
aunt
/ + ( + ) 0 /
cousin R P + ( + ) 0 ( - )
brother
0
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There are various ways of classifying and 
arranging these five remaining expressions or range-sets.^ 
Parsons used to stress the distinction between the nuclear 
family or "primary" relatives3 and those outside the 
nuclear family* This would give the following paradigm: 
Primary Secondary Tertiary
/ + / / + + /
+ ( + )
0 / + ( * ) 0 /
Wallace and Atkins based their main groupings on the 
principle of lineality3 which results in the following 
paradigm:
Lineal Co-lineal Ablineal
+2 
+1
0
Romney and D*Andrade prefer a solution which emphasises 
the core or kernel kin type : this is particularly clear 
from the fact that cousin is given as a zero generation 
relative. In the following paradigm the range-sets are 
contained within the solid lines (cf. loc.cit.: 153):
ego
1. A range-set is a group of kin-type expressions which 
share characteristic features.
Direct Collateral
male female male female
+2 GrFa GrMo
1
1
Un 1 Au
-2 GrSo GrDa i1
+ 1 Pa Mo
1
Ne j Ni
-1 So Da 1
*
0 Br Si Co
The possibility of several adequate analyses 
raises once again the problem of cognitive validity and 
psychological reality. What Romney and D 1Andrade think 
about this matter, and indeed the tests which they have 
introduced to argue their position, will be discussed in 
section 4.3*3.
The third major componential analysis of American 
English kinship terminology was produced by V/. Goodenough 
(1965). In the beginning of his article he refers to the 
lineality feature which forms the basis for the principal 
subdivision of the set of terms In the analysis by Wallace 
and Atkins. They had in fact found this concept in Goodenough 
but he himself is no longer satisfied with this way of 
grouping relatives, basically because - as the paradigm 
given by Wallace and Atkins shows - the terms brother and 
sister get classified away from the nuclear family repres­
ented by the terms father, mother, son, and daughter, and 
this is intuitively felt to be unsatisfactory. Goodenough 
acted as his own Informant for this analysis. On the whole
his study is very much in line with the basic approach 
of componential analysis in the sense that he only deals 
with terms used in reference, and used in a carefully 
controlled context of elicitation. He holds the view 
that kinship follows from biological procreation though 
It is assumed that biological procreation, marriage, and 
social responsibility for progeny all go together according 
to the ideal pattern and usual expectation. The basic 
denotata are represented in kin-type notation (Hu, Wi, Sp, 
Fa, Mo, Pa, So, Da, Ch, Br, Si, Sb); all other denotata 
are represented as relative products of these. When Godd- 
enough gives the complete list of English kin terms (1965: 
264 ff.) he notes not only the denotata In kin-type not­
ation but adds descriptions of how the kinship terms are 
used when the usual expectations about biological pro­
creation, marriage, dr social responsibility for progeny 
are not met, Goodenough*s list is, to the best of my 
knowledge, the most complete one available for English.
I shall limit myself to reproducing from this list what 
is essential to follow his argument plus here and there a 
specimen of the kind of information he gives about certain 
terms over and above their denotatum.
My father: Fa. A male who has succeeded ego’s genitor 
by virtue of legal adoption, or who otherwise has 
fully assumed the genitor*s place, provided ego has not 
previously established a positive relationship .with 
the genitor as my father and provided the genitor has 
fully abdicated (by death or otherwise) all public 
responsibility for ego, and provided further that ego 
has been incorporated into the nuclear family of the
genitor's substitute.
2* My mother: Mo. A female who has succeeded ego's
genitrix by virtue of legal adoption, or who otherwise 
has fully assumed the genitrix' place etc. (as under 
My father, mutatis mutandis).
3* My son: So. Male adoptee.
4. My daughter: Da. Female adoptee,
5. My brother: Br, FaSo, MoSo. This designatum is given
as brother^ and has three sub-classes:
5 a) My brother^ : Br
5b) My full brother or my fullbrother: Br 
(synonymous with 5a))
.5 c) My .half-brother: FaSo, MoSo^
6* My sister: Si, FaDa, MoDa. (as under My brother, mutatis
mutandis).
7-12. My stepfather, -mother, -son, -daughter, -brother, 
-sister.
13™l8. My father-in-law, mother-in-law, etc.
19-24. My foster father, foster mother, etc.
25» My husband
26. My wife
27* My uncle: PaBr, PaPaSo, PaSiHu, PaPaDaHu. Anyone to
whom ego's Pa refers as "my brother” , or "my brother- 
in-law". A PaSi’s or PaPaDa's second Hu is less 
assuredly "my uncle" than the first Hu if ego has 
already established a relationship with the first Hu 
as "my uncle".
28* My aunt: PaSi, PaPaDa, PaBrWi, PaPaSoWi. (As under my
uncle, mutatis mutandis).
1, It seems unfortunate to use two different criteria In 
making this subdivision: a lexical distinction between 
brother and full brother, and a kIn-type notational one 
between Br and FaSo/MoSo.
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29* My nephew: SbSo, PaChSo, SpSbSo, SpPaChSo. Anyone who 
Is So to anyone who is egofs Br* Si, BrLa, or SiLa.
30. My niece: (as under my nephew, mutatis mutandis).
31* My grandfather: GrFa (is actually one word as is shown
by juncture and stress accent).
32. My grandmother (one word)
33* My grandson (one word)
3^* My granddaughter (one word)
35* My cousin: PaSbCh, PaPaChCh. Any "descendant" (cf. 4l) 
of the Br or Si of any Pa, Mo, GrFa, GrMo, "ancestor" 
(cf. 39)> or "ancestress" (cf. 40), without regard to 
whether ego and alter are in the same or different, 
generations.
36. There is a theoretically infinite set of expressions 
involving terms 27-3  ^modified by the adjective great 
or repeated applications thereof.
37* There is another set of kinship expressions that may be 
formed with 35 and the numerical adjectives "first, 
second, third, etc.".
38. The expressions "once removed, twice removed, three
times removed, etc." may be added to expressions con­
structed with "first, second, etc." in combination with 
term 35*
39• My ancestor 
40. My ancestress 
^1* (My descendant)
Owing to the formulation of the control question 
("What kin relationship, if any, is he (she) to you?") such 
kin terms as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild,
sibling, spouse, forefather, are excluded; likewise
am
excluded^relative products of the enumerated terms 
since they are not unit lexemes.
I mentioned earlier on Goodenough1s concern 
for not breaking up the integrity of the group of terms 
associated with the nuclear family. It is with this 
principle of the integrity of blocks of terms in mind 
that the analysis Is organised. The set of terms for 
primary consanguines serves as a base for handling the 
affinal terminology; the distinction between the nuclear 
family and the group of personal kindred beyond it - which 
Includes relatives to whom lifetime obligations are owed - 
is based on the same principle.
The terms listed fall into five obvious groups, 
with some derivative groups (loc.cit.: 270):
- group 1: terms 1-6. None of these terms combines with 36 or 
37* Derivative groups: 1 a) terms 7-12: "step-"
1 b) terms 13-18: "-in-law"
1 c) terms 19-24: "foster"
- group 2: terms 27-34. All and only the terms In this group 
may enter into constructions with the adjective "great 
(grand)" (36). None of the terms in this group may combine 
properly with "step-, -in-law, foster", or enter into 
constructions with the numerical adjectives "first, 
second, etc.".
Derivative group 2 a): terms formed with "great", e.g.
great grandparent.
- group 3: term 35. This term alone may enter into con­
structions with the numerical adjectives "first, second,
third, etc." and with the expressions "once removed, 
twice removed, etc.". It may hot enter into construct­
ions with "step-, -in-law, foster" or "great (grand)".
- group 4: terms 25 and 26. They denote only affinal 
kin-types and do not combine with any modifier.
- group 5: the secondary set of terms 39—41*
The major lines of division run between terms 
denoting consanguineal kin-types (groups 1, 2, 2 a), 3, 5) 
and terms denoting affinal derivatives (groups 4, 1 a), 1 b) ,
2 in part, 2 a) in part), with group 1 c) apart on its own.
Rather than trying to propose a comprehensive 
solution for all the terms from the very beginning Goodenough 
first sets out to establish what variable or; variables 
differentiate the various groups. Looking first at the 
ones denoting consanguineal kin-types, one sees that group
3 stands out from groups 1, 2, 2 a), and 5 by the degree of 
collateral distance. To differentiate further groups 1,
2, 2 a), and 5 one has to Introduce as variable the degree 
of genealogical distance between ego and alter, with four 
values. The next step will be to define variables which 
will differentiate terms within the several groups. Here 
Goodenough remarks: "It is at this point that alternative 
ways of conceptualizing the semantic structure become 
readily feasible" (loc.cit.: 274). For example, to deal 
with the terms for the nuclear family one could introduce 
a variable Generation seniorityT with three values: 
senior generation (father, mother), ego’s generation 
(brother, sister), and junior generation (son., daughter). 
However, if one introduces another variable ’Lineality of 
relationship’ in order to single out brother and sister,
two values will be sufficient for the variable ’Gener­
ation seniority1. If, on the other hand, one were 
dealing not just with the terms of group 1 but also 
with those of group 2, one could envisage another var­
iable instead of ’Lineality of relationship1, viz.
’Relative nearness of alter’s generation to ego’s": this 
is a matter of emphasising generational rather than 
collateral distance. It is difficult to decide which 
solution to prefer: Goodenough, who acts as his own
informant, confirms that he can think about the data in 
either model. Therefore both have cognitive validity 
(loc.cit.: 276), The decisive factor then becomes which 
emphasis fits the rest of the data better: for the present 
problem, to opt for the (relative) generational emphasis 
would make It impossible to treat group 5 terms as sub­
stitutes for expressions in group 2 a). And as this sub­
stitution would seem to be perfectly reasonable it is 
better not to press the generational aspect (ibid.: 280 f.). 
But sometimes various ways of looking at the terms will 
provide equally "true" models, bringing out different 
aspects of the semantic structure (ibid.: 285 f.)*
One variable which Is fairly obvious but has not 
been mentioned before because it is not relevant for group 
3 Is ’Sex of alter’; this variable also applies in the 
case of terms for affinals to which we shall turn now.
A variable is needed first of all to identify
the affinal terms, i.e. the terms of groups 4, 1 a), 1 b),
2 in part, 2 a) in part. After that It will be a matter
of establishing whether or not - and If so: to what extent,
with what restrictions - there is a structural equivalence
between certain affinal kin-types and consanguineal ones.
This equivalence in fact exists in, and accounts for 
groups 1 a) and 1 b). There also are occurrences of 
equivalence in the case of some group 2 or group 2 a) 
terms, e.g. when a PaSIHu is called uncle: the condition 
is, however, that the senior partner to the relationship 
is directly involved In the affinal, marital tie. In other 
cases descriptive constructions must be used, e.g. "my 
wife’s uncle". And normally the kin term will be reserved 
to the first person known to fill a certain affinal position: 
this restriction becomes operative in cases of divorce, 
for example. If one wants to integrate the affinal and 
the consanguineal sets the variable dealing with "the degree 
of genealogical distance between ego and alter" must be 
enlarged with "or alter’s structural equivalent". An extra 
variable added to the’ one of ’Lineality of relationship’ 
will take care of the distinction between full brother/ 
sister and half-brother/sister.
There would seem to be a certain inconsistency 
in the application of the variable of ’Degree of geneal­
ogical distance’ in that the terms uncle, aunt, nephew, and 
niece may be extended up and down the generations to any 
non-lineal consanguineal relatives (excepting group 3) 
other than ego’s own generation, i.e. brother and sister, 
while for the lineal relatives the modifier "great" must 
be used the appropriate number of times. This can be 
rectified by adding an extra variable to deal with "great".
The description of a few terms will suff'ice to 
Illustrate the basic procedure. I have selected the following 
terms: [ego], husband, father, mother, stepfather, father-
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ln-1-aw a brother^, son, grandfather, grandson, uncle, 
nephew, and cousin. The following discriminant variables 
are necessary to analyse these terms, with their number­
ing as given in Goodenough (1965):
1. Degree of collateral distance, with two values: 
less than two degrees, and two or more degrees.
12. Degree of genealogical distance, with three values: 
zero distance, one unit of distance away, and more 
than one unit away.
8. Absence/presence of marital tie.
9. Structural equivalence to a primary consanguineal 
kin-type, with two values: equivalent/non-equivalent,
4. Lineality of relationship, with two values: lineal/ 
non-lineal.
5. Generation seniority, with two values: senior/Junior.
6. Sex of alter,6With two values: male/female.
13* Number of units of genealogical distance beyond one, 
or "great" rule: this rule is in theory open-ended.
Kin terms Variables
1 12 8 9 4 5 6
[ego] 1.1 12.1 8.1
husband 1.1 12.1 8.2 6.1
father 1.1 12.2 8.1 4.1 5.1 6.1
mother 1.1 12.2 CO *
J 4.1 5.1 6.2
stepfather 1.1 12.2 8.2 9-1 4.1 5*1 6.1
father-in-law • 1.1 12.2 8.2 9-2 4.1 5.1 6.1
brother^ 1.1 12.2 8.1 4.2 6.1
son 1.1 12.2 8.1 4..1 5.2 6.1
grandfather 1 . 1 12.3 8 . 1 4.1 5.1 6.1
grandson 1 . 1 12.3 8 , 1 4.1 5.2 6.1
13
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1 12 8 9 4 5 6 13
uncle 1.1 12.3 8.1 4.2 5.1 6.1 13.1
nephew 1.1 12.3 8.1 4.2 5.2 6.1 13.1
cousin 1.2 8.1
(cf. Goodenough, 1965: 285).
Goodenough1s treatment of English kinship terms 
covers a remarkably wide range: this is reflected in the 
number of variables required. Yet in his actual analysis 
he does not touch upon alternative kin expressions (dad, 
mummy, etc.), let alone upon matters of connotation or 
metaphor. It is difficult to see how such matters could 
be dealt with in the framework of a componential analysis 
and still keep the analysis within manageable limits.
Not unrelated to this reflection is the way I 
feel about the foster, step, and in~law relatives which 
Goodenough includes in his analysis. Generally speaking,
I would be in favour of including these terms in an analysis 
as I have reservations about delimiting the domain artifi­
cially. But to treat them all on the same level by enlarging 
the matrix and number of discriminant variables.would seem 
to falsify the relative importance of the various terms 
within the one domain. This way of proceeding causes a 
term like cousin, after all one of the consanguineal kin, 
to be overshadowed by foster or stepkin: the relative 
importance of variable 1 compared with, e*g- variable 9 is 
In no way marked and cannot be marked easily, I would think, 
in this kind of framework.
Robbins Burling (1970 b: 27-33) has given a 
slightly simplified analysis of Goodenough*s material. He
uses only five dimensions of semantic contrast. The 
first one, which he calls ’genealogical distance’, is 
based on which modifiers English kin terms can combine 
with: step and In-law, or great/grand, or first, 
second, etc. and once removed, twice removed, etc..
This categorization is based upon grammatical rather 
than semantic principles but, when applied, it appears 
semantically reasonable. The concept of genealogical 
distance combines those of both generational and collateral 
distance, and is given the following values: 0 = ego;
1 - Pa, Br, Si, So, Da; 2 - GrPa, Un, Au, Ne, Ni, GrCh; 
great-2 - GrGrPa, GrUn, etc.; 3 =* cousin. Two more 
dimensions come from the distinction between consanguineal 
and affinal kinsmen. The consanguinity dimension is given 
three values: blood relatives or consanguineals, structur­
ally equivalent affihals (i.e. stepkin), and nonstructurally 
equivalent affinals (i.e. in-laws). The other dimension 
derived from the field of consanguinity and affinity is 
based on the difference whether an affinal relationship 
results from a link where the marriage bond is in the 
senior generation, or from one where the bond is not in 
the senior generation. Added to these three dimensions are 
the simple contrasts of generation and sex. These five 
dimensions adequately distinguish the majority of English 
kinship terms from one another: only some modifiers remain 
to be defined. . "Great” can precede certain kin terms and 
can be applied recursively: with each use the value of
the sign of generational distance is increased by one.
The various possible modifiers of cousin either specify 
the degree of collateral distance (first, etc.) or show
how many generations separate the speaker from alter 
(once removed, etc.). Burling speaks of "dimensions 
of semantic contrast and the definitions of their 
various components" on the one hand, and on the other 
of "a description of the operators great etc." (loc. 
cit.: 33)* I expressed previously some reservation 
concerning the fact that Goodenough1s juxtaposition of 
features did not seem to account for the relative import­
ance of the various factors at play in the terminological 
system. A distinction, however, of the kind proposed 
here by Burling could, to some extent, assuage these 
feelings.
Cecil H. Brown has reviewed the essential points 
of the work on componential analysis (C.H. Brown, 197*0# 
concentrating mainly on the question of the psychological 
reality of analyses.' This aspect of his article will be 
considered in the next section. In the present one I 
would just like to point out in what way Brown’s analysis 
differs from the previous ones.
Brown agrees with Schneider that componential 
analysis has its weaknesses, the most obvious one being 
the limitations imposed on it by the way the analytical 
domain is defined (cf. Schneider, 1965)* Yet, his major 
criticism does not concentrate on this aspect of previous 
work but rather concerns the concept of ’meaning’ which 
his predecessors used. Brown - under the influence, of 
Wittgenstein - sees meaning as related with grammatical 
rules and with ordinary use and he defines it as follows: 
"The meaning of a word Is its actual use according to rules 
(loc.cit.: 425)* Consequently, he claims, a semantic
analysis should not study "perceptual properties of 
named objects" but the names those properties are given, 
and the linguistic uses these names are put to, i.e., 
the grammatical relationships they enter into with 
other names. This is what a componential solution 
should illustrate.
Classification on the basis of sex and relative 
age correspond obviously to ordinary use and so do the 
reciprocal uses to which Romney and D TAndrade have drawn 
attention as well as the bound-form usage which Goodenough 
made the basis of his division of terms into groups. The 
following two paradigms illustrate these last two approaches;
Romney and D TAndrade Goodenough
+ GrFa
i
GrMo 1
R2 | Un Au
GrSo GrDa i’
b-. i-ii . . -j-. i. l .i „■------i1
'h Fa
j
Mo ‘
R-, he NiX So Da ,
b2 Br
"■
Si 1 Co 
1
+
R.
Hi R5
b^: imperfect reciprocals 
b £ : perfect reciprocals 
R : specific reciprocal group
Fa Mo
So Da
Br Si
GrFa GrMo
GrSo GrDa
Un Au
Ne Ni
■ 
O o
a-, : terms used with foster, 
-in-law, and Step­
an : terms used with great 
(grand)
a~: terms used with first,
3 -----
second, third, etc., 
and with once removed, 
twice removed,, etc.
Brown now proposes to integrate these two out- 
looks into one analysis;, though this analysis is not, 
of course, a complete analysis of all the ordinary uses
of the terms.
u p a2
(Rx) r 2 R3
Fa Mo GrFa
1
GrMo , Un Au
bl So Da GrSo GrDa ,
............. 1
Ne Ni
b2 Br Si Co
(*V cr5)
<a3>
A B
: terms used with foster, -in-law, and step- 
& 2 : terms used with great (grand)
a^: terms used with first, second, third, etc., and with
once removed, twice removed, etc. 
b^; imperfect reciprocals 
b2 : perfect reciprocals 
R; specific reciprocal group 
( ); feature redundant with respect to partitioning 
A: can be a member of an ego's "family”
B: cannot be a member of an ego’s "family"
(cf.. Brown, 1974: 426-428).
The symbols A and B which are proper to Brown’s 
paradigm reflect the structural reality of American society, 
vis. the importance attached to the nuclear family. The 
terms which combine with foster, -in-law, and step- are
in fact the only types of consanguineal relatives who 
belong to ego’s "family": as a matter of sociological 
fact other relatives do not come under ego’s "family".
This means that the ordinary bound-form usage makes 
sense sociologically. Conversely, all other bound forms 
relate to the removal or distance away from the "family": 
they are in a sense ’degree’ words, indicating the degree 
or extent of the removal or distance, a characteristic 
which is apparent in the recursive nature of these forms. 
This leads Brown to the conclusion that his analysis, as 
opposed to previous attempts, gives us the structural as 
well as the psychological reality.
This issue of psychological reality is what 
Brown’s article is chiefly concerned with. Before going 
any further I would like to discuss this matter at greater 
length especially since the next type of analysis, 
relational analysis, is - at least in part - inspired by 
the quest for psychologically more real accounts of kinship 
terminology.
4.3.3. Cognitive Aspects of Semantic Analysis.
4.3*3*1 Some Preliminary Remarks.
As I have pointed out (4.3*1*)5 Kroeber's 
influence on feature analysis has resulted in a strong 
psychological interest among the practitioners of the art. 
They are out to find ’conceptual models’ which would 
reflect in some way the logic of the mind. The'analysis 
of language is a tool to help them to achieve this aim.
But when I say ’conceptual model’ I am not expressing
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properly and fully what many analysts really want to
achieve, which is to find the actual conceptual criteria
applied by the users of a given language: "An ethnographer
should strive to define objects according to the conceptual
system of the people he is studying" (Frake, 1962: 28),
I mentioned that componential analysis is, in a way, a
translation procedure, born from the conviction that there
is no easy one-to-one correspondence on a surface level
between items in two diverging cultures and languages,
e.g. between English uncle (FaBr or MoBr) and Latin
avunculus (MoBr only). Frake (loc.cit.) put it like this:
"Instead of 'getting words for things' 
the task of the ethnographer Is redef­
ined as one of finding the 'things' 
that go with words".
He means by this that we must look at people's cognition.
The interest in the cognitive side of language
has attracted attention ever since - earlier on in this
century - extensive contact with non-European languages
showed the untenability of ethnocentrism in linguistics:
languages are not just "itemized inventories of reality"
(cf. R. Brown and Lenneberg, 195*0* One answer to this
problem of linguistic ethnocentrism has been the theory
of linguistic relativity5 linked with the names of Sapir
and Whorf. This is not really a single, clearly outlined
theory but rather a wide range of views on the matter of
the relation between the language of a people and its
culture, mentality, world-view, beliefs, or whatever other
notion may have been used in this context. Whorf claimed
that each language embodied and helped perpetuate a
particular world-view, i.e. he claimed that the world is
experienced differently in different linguistic communities,
and that language Is causally related to these cognitive 
differences in both its lexical and its grammatical 
features.
While few people would support the more extreme
forms of linguistic relativism it would seem difficult to
deny that language plays an active role in man's mental
activity. The process of thought itself, though not
Identical with language, depends on it to some extent.
With A. Schaff (1973: 145 ff.) we could define cognition
as "a process of thinking which results in a description
of reality". Extreme relativism would claim that the
entire structure of cognition would depend upon language,
that language shapes our image of the world, A more
moderate claim would be that language affects the way in
which we perceive reality and - more importantly perhaps -
that the. conceptual possibilities of a given language have
an influence on the kind of questions we ask about reality
and on the way In which we ask them,
"Cognition at whatever level is a 
structuring activity .., . The struct- 
uralizations are patterns .., which 
the organism imposes, on the environment" 
(Fearing, 19541 62).
The cognitive function of language is a way of "digesting"
our experiences. It has not been possible to prove the
extreme form of relativism:
"The analysis of a culture's termin­
ological systems will not, of course, 
exhaustively reveal the cognitive 
world of its members, but it will 
certainly tap a central portion of it"
(Frake, 1962: 30).
This quotation is perhaps more intuitive and hopeful than
conclusive and precise. But supposing there is such a
thing as a conceptual structure in the minds of the 
speakers of a given language, and supposing that language 
would give us access to that structure at least in part, 
one would perhaps have to extend the criterion of ade­
quacy - the central criterion of any formal analysis - 
to cover this aspect of psychological validity as well.
It would not seem that there is anything in 
the nature of componential analysis that would make it 
absolutely necessary for this kind of analysis to be . 
psychologically relevant. But given the insistence on the 
need to concern oneself with the meaning of terminological 
systems to their users, one would expect the resulting 
rules which predict back the data to be as much as possible 
like the processes by which ordinary users decide which 
term to use for whom. The value of componential analysis 
does not depend entirely on this: for comparative or 
typological purposes4it can definitely be a very useful 
and accurate tool, quite independently of the question of 
psychological reality. It would, however, limit its 
relevance from a psycholinguistic point of view if there 
were no psychological validity at all to componential 
solutions.
4.3.3.2 The Psychological Validity of the Analysis of
Kinship Terminology.
Ever since kin terms have been analysed compon- 
entially there has been a certain apprehension about the 
possibility of alternative solutions. Goodenough was 
faced with a choice between a number of possible’alternat­
ive conceptual variables in his analysis of the Trukese 
cognitive world (1956: 119)** he merely indicated the
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different possibilities and left the choice open.
Others would seem to be less ready to settle for what
could possibly be construed as the easy way out. Wallace
wrote for example;
"The commitment to describe the 
psychological reality of culture 
requires that not just any model 
which predicts some overt class of 
action be accepted, but only that 
model which is used as a system of 
reckoning by the actor" (1962: 356).
Yet Wallace and his co-author Atkins were as 
we have seen - well aware of what they called the problem 
of indeterminacy or multiplicity of solutions (cf. above 
4.3-2.; Wallace and Atkins, i960: 76 ff.). They accept 
that more than one definition may be psychologically real - 
"in the sense of representing, how users think with and 
about that term" (loc.cit.: 78) - while not every struct­
urally real definition will- be real in more than a purely 
structural sense. Structural reality is achieved when 
the usage of a term can be predicted accurately from the 
definition. With psychologically real definitions things 
are not so easy: ways have to be found to identify the 
solutions which will be nearest to psychological reality. 
Wallace and Atkins are unwilling to rely on their definitions 
being in harmony with observed social facts in order to 
claim the likelihood of reality for a particular solution. 
Instead they insist that one should study the semantics of 
individuals, by asking for simple verbal definitions, by 
activities of matching and sorting, by getting them to 
answer hypothetical questions and describe relationships, 
all this "in order to reveal methods of reckoning" (loc. 
cit.: 78). Their claim for the outcome of such studies is
very modest:
"the degree of psychological reality 
achieved in ethnographic reporting 
is not only uneven hut on the average 
probably rather low. Social-structural 
reality can be achieved; psychological 
reality can only be approximated"
(loc.cit.: 79)•
Even so Wallace and Atkins maintain that it is important
to work towards even such imperfect, approximate definition
They really leave the question of psychological
validity wide open, except for this final remark that
psychological descriptions are of greater value. This
point is not proved or illustrated and the reason why
this is not done could well be the fact that it is one of
their basic assumptions: this is what ethnography is
about as far as they are concerned, to give
"not naturalistic or statistical 
descriptions of regularities in overt 
behavior but descriptions of the rules 
which the actors are presumably employ­
ing, or attempting to employ, in the 
execution and mutual organisation of 
this behavior. ... a set of such related 
rules forms a calculus which describes 
cognitive process" (Wallace, 1962: 351).
Romney and D 1Andrade (1964: 153 ff.) discuss
the question of alternative componential structures and
of isomorphism of componential analysis with cognitive
structure. They share the view of Wallace and Atkins
on the multiplicity of possible solutions:
"It is our feeling that there will 
usually be several alternative analyses 
possible for any set of kin terms. If 
we are to talk about psychological or 
cognitive implications of an analysis, 
we must specify what these Implications 
might be. Probably some analyses will 
be more useful for some purposes and less 
useful for others. Thus there may be no 
single best solution for a given system"
(loc.cit. : 154).
They also agree that special procedures will be required 
to evaluate cognitive aspects of kin terms. This is
the point they develop in the second part of their
article :
"The general prediction we have made
from componential analysis to cognitive
measures is that the more components 
any two terms have In common, the 
greater will be the similarity of 
response to these terms. This prediction 
Is derived from the assumption that the
components of a term constitute the
meaning of that term for an individual;
hence, the more components which are
shared, the more similar the meaning"
(loc.cit. : 154).
Three techniques are used in these evaluation procedures:
a listing of kin terms In free recall, the semantic
differential, and direct judgements of similarity and 
difference with the triad method.
In the listing task people were asked-to list 
all the names for relatives and family members they could 
think of. The result was intended to give an insight into 
the cognitive structure of the kin terms by the order of 
recall, the frequency of recall, and the productiveness 
of modifiers. The position of a certain term on the list 
and the number of subjects remembering it, both indicate 
the saliency of that term: on the whole the two measures 
of saliency gave the same result. An interesting result 
was that terms were in fact recalled in pairs. The pro­
ductiveness of the modifiers confirmed the anthropological 
view that terms for distant kin are less specific or 
differentiated than those for near kin. Modifiers go with 
sets of terms; as Romney and D*Andrade had come to discern 
the same range-sets by componential analysis they see this
as support for the claim that terms are classified 
according to their componential structure.
The semantic differential technique was used 
to investigate the effect the componential composition 
of a term has on other verbal responses made to that 
term, or, put differently, to see if subjects make a 
semantic differential rating of a term on the basis of 
the components which constitute the referential meaning 
of the term, or respond uniquely to that term as an 
indivisible lexical item. Though on the whole subjects 
tended to respond similarly to terms sharing a given 
component, there are too many unexplained discrepancies 
for this test to be really conclusive. One possible 
reason could well be that the semantic differential proc- 
edure was never meant to deal with the kind of minimal 
denotative meaning which is the characteristic aim of 
componential analysis. The triads test consists in 
designating from among three given terms the one most 
different in meaning, the assumption being that the more 
components are held in common by any two terms, the more 
similar those terms will be in referential meaning. It 
appears that all high-frequency pairings which result 
from this test differ in only one component according to 
the Romney and D*Andrade analysis but sometimes by more 
than one If one follows the Wallace and Atkins analysis. 
It is claimed that the same conclusion also holds good 
for middle and low-frequency pairings though it is less 
clear there and more difficult to prove. And there are 
indications that the subjects use distinctions in their 
sorting which are on the whole isomorphic with the compon
stress the need for further work in order to validate 
the method fully.
I would like, at this point, to make a few 
observations. If one accepts - as Romney and D 1Andrade 
do - a possible multiplicity of componential solutions 
there would not seem to be any reason why this could not 
simply be because there are actual different cognitive 
systems just as there are different analyses. Moreover, 
Romney and D !Andrade attributed the rather weak result 
of the semantic differential procedures to the presence 
In words of a connotative meaning. To my mind connotative 
and emotive factors are just as likely to affect the free 
recall listing and the triad test. For the whole purpose 
of these tests Is to get the.reactions of untrained 
observers and I would expect such people to recall more 
easily types of relatives who are important to them and 
group together relationships experienced more strongly 
by them. The last point seems to be confirmed by the
fact that subjects from the college age-group tended to 
undervalue the relationships of which they had as yet no 
personal experience. Finally Romney and D*Andrade state 
that "a major conclusion of this paper is that people 
respond to kinship terms as if each term contained a bundle 
of distinct meanings" (loc.cit.: 168). I find it difficult 
to accept such an atomic concept of meaning, the idea of 
meaning as a simple collection of a number of features.
I would see meaning as a structured whole, a "Gestalt".
And a ’Gestalt’ has as prime characteristic that It "als 
Ganzes mehr [1st] als die Summe ihrer Teile" (Porzig, 1950: 
199). The elements of such a structure form a stable
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configuration and are ordered hierarchically with one 
element often more prominent. But this criticism 
concerns perhaps more the general orientation of the 
componential analyses which we discussed rather than 
just the point of their psychological validity.
The assumption ahout psychological validity 
was not just met by critical questions of a practical 
nature which can be answered by practical tests: a more 
theoretical discussion of the issues involved was initiat­
ed at about the same time in a short paper by R. Burling, 
"Cognition and Componential Analysis: Godfs Truth or 
Hocus-Pocus?" (Burling, 1964 a). In it he made two points. 
First he showed that the number of possible solutions in 
dividing items of a set among individual cells becomes 
very large indeed as soon as there are more than a couple 
of Items in the sety  and the possibilities are practically 
infinite when certain complicating factors are added to 
the straightforward, mathematical possibilities. These
^ / factors are homonymy, the occurrence of empty semantic
0
spaces, the possible use of non-binary components, the 
presence of parallel components, and the acceptability of 
redundant solutions. This first point is perhaps not a 
very good one. Hymes, replying to Burling, has remarked: 
"The total number of logical possibilities is fully pert­
inent only if all solutions have an equal chance of being 
arrived at" (Hymes, 1964: 116). He claims that solutions 
do not all have this equal chance because componential 
analysis is question-dependent, i.e. dependent upon the 
questions asked by the participants in the culture: this
restricts the number of solutions actually possible. One
has to discover the questions which reveal the sortings 
made by the native speakers; only afterwards does one 
make the assignment of semantic features to the dimensions 
of the sorting, features which are discriminative 
semantically for native speakers. It is in the sorting 
that Burling’s calculations of possible solutions apply 
according to Hymes; in a rejoinder Burling has accepted 
this clarification (Burling, 1964 b: 120). Hymes claims 
that making the right sorting is "cognitively empty since 
it involves only putting the discriminated items into 
relation with each other" (loc.cit.: 117)* I think that 
it is going too far to make such a sharp separation 
between 'making the sorting1 and ’assigning the semantic 
features to the dimensions of the sorting’. When we 
assume that we are talking, not about scientifically trained 
analysts but about ordinary native speakers, I believe we 
could say that people tend to recognize the organization 
of a set at least in part because they know what to expect 
and look for. They are using in fact,, even if unconsciously, 
the semantic features of the items they are classifying in 
order to make their sorting. To call this ’cognitively 
empty’ Is perhaps not a very fortunate phrase. Burling’s 
second point of contention concerns the cognitive status of 
solutions. We can assume that Hymes is right in saying 
that Burling’s first criticism lacked foundation because 
only some solutions will in fact prove possible. If X am. 
right, moreover, in thinking that in this limited number of 
actually possible solutions the processes of sorting and 
of assigning semantic features of which the cognitive status 
Is here under discussion are to some extent interrelated,
then this second point really is the major if not sole
difficulty. Burling accepts that one or more solutions
may predict which term to use to denote an object, by
means of a set of rules which state the criteria for
such a decision: this is in fact the most modest claim
for what componential analysis can achieve. But this does
not mean that, because a solution predicts terms accurately,
this analysis represents the way in which people reach
their decision or construe their world: this more ambitious
claim is called an "illusory goal" by Burling. In his
view the usefulness of componential analysis is limited
to formulating rules which predict the use of terms and
providing a check on the completeness and adequacy of one's
data. In other words, he considers an analysis as a set
of rules which happens to work ("hocus-pocus"), not as the
discovery of some psychological reality which would be
present in speakers ("God's truth").
As for the tests against behaviour, proposed by
a number of authors (cf. above Wallace and Atkins, and
Romney and D'Andrade; also Frake, 1964) Burling holds that
the rules he advocates predict behaviour In a wide sense
including the use of terms, but he denies that cognition
could be inferred from behaviour. This makes it futile
to even seek what Is inside people on linguistic grounds
only: it is what he calls "the Whorfian fallacy" (1964 b:
120). Hammel shares this view: ‘
"That Internal essence which is 'inside 
people', in whatever form it may exist, 
is only knowable when it is outside them, 
and when it is outside them it takes 
a variety of forms which can, with 
effort and good fortune, only be summar­
ized in externally valid and verifiable
ways- Like Burling, I am an ’outside1 
man and, like Frake, I suspect that 
God’s truth i_s hocus-pocus" (Hammel,
1964: 1169).
Wallace, however, still refused to accept this 
view (Wallace, i960)* In his opinion a semantic analysis 
must give the meaning of terms to the native users, not 
to the analyst, or else the whole procedure Is senseless 
and gratuitous for him. The analyst has to relate Inform­
ation about the structure of classification to nomenclature, 
by means of techniques independent of the mechanics of 
componential analysis itself, In order to establish the 
validity of his analysis* He reaffirms his distinction 
between structural and psychological reality; while purely 
formal rules will be sufficient to establish the structural 
reality and predict the use of terms with parsimony, 
dlegance, and accuracy, more is required for establishing 
psychological reality, viz. both an accurate prediction 
and the criteria by which the native speaker arrives at 
his designation. This is the cognitive, truly semantic 
system, which requires additional techniques to identify 
dimensions of classification and logical operations which 
are demonstrably real to the native speaker, or on the 
other hand to demonstrate that certain dimensions or 
operations are the analyst’s, not the native speaker’s. 
Wallace Is quite correct, I think, when he states that 
the mere fact of using a universal frame of reference does 
not give an automatic claim to psychological universality 
for the elements of that frame. Tests will have to 
identify the dimensions used by the native speakers: here
he quotes with approval the tests by Romney and D*Andrade 
for measuring semantic saliency. Other tests will have to
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be devised to determine how the native speaker ’reckons1 
his kinship relations, which criteria he uses, both 
with regard to dimensions and logical operations,
Wallace accepts that it will be impossible to arrive 
at a unique solution: he does believe, however, that it 
should be possible to determine whether an analysis is 
psychologically real or only structurally real.
After this theoretical interlude we return to 
the practical work which has been done. This work continued 
what Wallace and Atkins and, more particularly Romney and 
D ’Andrade had started.
P.J. Pelto (1966) has made a number of interesting 
observations while comparing these two analyses. Romney 
and D ’Andrade claimed as their specific innovation and 
improvement of the Wallace and Atkins analysis their 
concept of reciprocity. Pelto points out that Ego does not 
figure in the Romney and D ’Andrade analysis: Ego is, as it 
were, looking in from the outside. In Wallace and Atkins 
Ego is present in the middle, looking around (cf. above 4,3*2 
for details of these analyses). This gives their solution 
an implicit, built-in factor of reciprocity. At any rate, 
terms which are clearly reciprocal (e.g. GrPa and GrSo) 
would be expected to show comparable salience to Ego; but 
Romney and D*Andrade’s own facts contradict this. This 
flaw can be explained partly by the non-denotative character 
of saliency (and what is non-denotative is not accounted for 
by a componential analysis), partly by the composition of 
their sample of test-persons. Pelto has reservations about 
the possibility of completely preventing connotative meaning 
from having an influence on the tests in question. Similarly
he feels that the reduction of all range-sets to single 
expressions involves a loss of information in cases of 
a wide range of application, by ignoring the '’closeness’1 
to Ego of the various kin-types within the range, Pelto 
concludes that Romney and D ’Andrade’s analysis is not 
necessarily better: their great merit is to have proposed
concrete ways of testing results. Pelto suspects that 
there may well not be one single American English kinship 
system cognitively speaking, but several systems, different 
possibly according to age-group, sex, etc. Society does 
not require that all values are commonly shared in order 
to be held together; it can function perfectly well as an 
organization of diversity, of different but congruent 
cognitive systems.
Romney and D ’Andrade had limited their triad test 
for practical reasons, (viz. the number of possible permut­
ations) to eight kin terms, all for male relatives. They 
/were satisfied that this would not affect the reliability 
of the test, Pelto claimed that leaving out such a natural 
dimension as'sex was bound to affect adversely the value 
of the results. Werlove and Burton (1972) applied different 
testing techniques to the data of Romney and D ’Andrade and 
found confirmation both of the adequacy of their dimensions 
of collaterality, generation, reciprocity, and sex, and 
of the assumption that the results would be the same for 
the whole set which would include both male and female terms. 
Fillenbaum and Rapoport (1971)? using a multidimensional 
scaling analysis, also come to the conclusion that Romney 
and D fAndrade’s analysis fits the data quite well and can 
be said to be psychologically valid.
Peggy Sanday has examined the psychological 
reality of English kin terms by means of an information- 
processing approach (1968). This approach Is intended 
to be complementary to componential analysis which is 
said to give a static view of the behaving organism.
Her study looks for the format by which kinship terms are 
stored in memory (cognitive structure) and looks at the 
way in which these terms are interrelated and used 
(cognitive process). Two listing tasks are set: (1) "List 
all the names for kinds of relative and family members 
you can think of In English", and (2) "List all of your 
own relatives using the name you would call each one If 
you were talking about him (her)". The order of recall 
usually starts with a primary relative, but it is after 
this that it becomes interesting because it is assumed 
that the next terms are generated according to the format 
by which people store the terms in their memory. Then 
there are the operators and decision rules by means of 
which the subjects operate over the structure: an analysis 
of the predominant emphasis in the selection of these rules 
forms the basis for the classification of the cognitive 
structure. On the whole the subjects produced similar 
cognitive structures for both tests. The differences 
between individuals were■hypothetically related to each 
Individual’s experiential knowledge of kinship. For 
this purpose data were collected for the relatives;listed, 
vis. geographical location, age relative to ego, frequency 
of contact, intensity of ego’s affect feeling, and whether 
the relative was alive or dead, The conclusion was that the 
psychological reality of kinship terms can be considered
to be the set of kin terms an individual remembers, 
i.e. the elementary discriminable units stored in the 
memory, plus the set of elementary operators and 
decision rules, also stored in the memory, which are 
the cognitive processes.
The interesting thing about Sandayfs article 
would seem to be, first that she takes the matter clearly 
away from a static, metaphysical level at which no 
solution seems to be forthcoming anyhow, onto a practical 
level where psychological reality is defined from the 
results of the tests, rather than the tests being used 
for proving the psychological reality In a general sense.
The second point of interest is her reference to operators 
and decision rules, a pointer towards a "generative" type 
of analysis (cf. below 4,4.).
The limitations of the componential analysis 
discussed above and 'the need for some other type of approach 
also appear clearly when the acquisition of kin terms is 
considered. Haviland and Clark (1974) noted that psycho­
logists generally agree about the different stages in the 
development of children’s definitions of kin. There is a 
pre-categorical stage where a question such as "What is an 
uncle?" would be answered either by giving a name, or by 
giving an irrelevant or wrong reply. The first or categor­
ical stage consists of the most primitive definitions by 
means of perceived property features, e.g. a brother is 
simply a boy. In the second or concrete relational stage 
the components have no longer direct perceptual correlates; 
at this point children would see the need for the presence 
of more than one child in the family for the word ’brother’
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to be of possible use, but the reciprocity of the 
relationship still escapes them. In the third or 
abstract relational stage the definitions are both' 
relational and reciprocal: you have to have a brother
or sister in order to be one yourself. The componential 
analyses of Wallace and Atkins and of Romney and D 1Andrade 
just do not provide us with components which could be 
matched with the different stages discovered in this 
acquisition hypothesis. In stage one a child could be 
said to have acquired the sex and generation components , 
but after that it becomes impossible to establish a 
correlation. This does not mean that the componential 
analyses are wrong. Haviland and Clark accept that notably 
the Romney and D'Andrade analysis may have considerable 
psychological validity for adult speakers of English: for 
the acquisition of kin terms, however, these analyses are 
Inadequate because - so it would seem - a componential 
system cannot cope with the relational and reciprocal 
aspects of the terms to the extent required by the data 
on the acquisition of kinship terms. A relational analysis 
would seem to be a good way to deal with the stages of 
acquisition of kin terms and even with the order in which 
different terms pass through these stages. This order is 
In fact linked with the semantic complexity of a term, i.e. 
what number of relational components there are in a term 
and, when several, whether these components (vis. PARENT 
OP and CHILD OF) occur alone or in combination, and with 
recursion or without it.
Haviland and Clark also tested the hypothesis 
that familiarity and experience with different family
members would affect the level of definition. This 
prediction, however, was not supported by their data 
(loc.cit.: 42-43)3 so that the complexity hypothesis 
remains the preferred explanation of the gradual acqui­
sition of kin terms. Only as an explanation for asymmetries 
or irregularities within a given level of complexity could 
one think of the child’s own roles as an influencing factor 
(ibid. 45).
Chambers and Tavuchis (1976) have studied child­
ren’s understanding of American kin terms. They insisted 
less on the linguistic aspects or on relational thinking 
but simply wanted to ascertain how well young children 
perceive the characteristics which define various kinship 
terms. They remark that the -centrality of personal exper­
ience makes it difficult at the cognitive level to handle 
certain relationships of which they have no personal exper­
ience or to recognize relationships, known to them from 
within their own generation, in a higher generation. Child­
ren are more easily struck by concrete traits; yet, there 
is a grasp of the "necessary and sufficient characteristics” 
of the terms, not just of ascribed traits. The frequency 
of contact with specific kin or the composition of the 
family are of little importance, but nuclear family terms 
prove less troublesome than extended family terms.
It would seem clear to me from this, research 
that a psychological explanation of the meaning of 
kin terms from the point of view of the individual cannot 
be upheld: if an "extension of sentiment” approach would
mean that, it would have to be rejected. If one does want 
to opt for a psychological explanation I would
suggest it should be a social-psychological one based 
on the concept of role. A role is defined by the expect­
ations of society, but at the same time we make a role 
our own. At one moment we are acting a role, the next 
moment we are in the ranks of the specators: it is this
double identity which a child learns to discern gradually. 
Whether it happens with or through the increasing complexity 
of their language remains an open question for the moment.
When I mentioned Nogle1s book on the semantics 
and cognition of kinship terminology (cf. above 4.1.2.) I 
referred to his contribution to the discussion and testing 
of psychological validity. First he showed the existence 
of cognitive non-sharing and redundancy (Nogle, 1974: 65 f.). 
This was done by presenting the informants with various 
presortings of a limited set of terms and asking them to 
identify the basis of*this presorting. All informants agreed 
in having dimensions for sex, nuclear/non-nuclear, senior/ 
junior, and generation. The presence of both senior/junior 
and generation points to redundancy. Their answers showed 
that they used the genealogical reckoning procedure of the 
relative product or folk definition (in which one traces a 
relationship until one reaches the designated kinsman), 
rather than componential definitions. This way of geneal­
ogical reckoning would seem to suggest that the genealogical 
model was real to the informants. The triad test led to the 
same conclusion. Next Nogle tried to correlate distinctive 
features of componential analysis with a set of features 
drawn from the field of ideal kinship behaviour, the 
assumption being that this correlation would bring out those 
features which would be most valid for a semantic-cognitive
analysis (loc.cit.: 68 ff.). The behavioural fact of 
primary legal responsibility, for example, appeared to 
correlate with the feature lineal/collateral. He came 
to the following list of valid features: kin/non kin, 
senior/junior, male/female, nuclear family/non-nuclear 
family, and lineal/collateral. As I mentioned, folk 
definitions were clearly psychologically real for his 
informants, more so than componential definitions; the 
psychological reality he speaks of is to be understood as 
meaning the natural way in which people talk about kin 
relationships rather than an abstract concept of logic 
of the mind. Folk definition is akin to generative analy­
sis which is in a sense one possible formal way of represent­
ing folk definitions In a systematic manner. So here once 
again the search for psychological reality seems to point 
to a generative type *of analysis rather than to componential 
analysis.
The conclusion fi’om all that precedes can only be 
that the search for one psychologically real or valid 
model of the domain of kinship in the heads of English 
speakers has proved inconclusive. This definitely takes 
away something from the attraction of componential analysis. 
Componential analysis generalizes - over-generalizes, one 
could almost say - In order to get at the essentials: if
all It achieves is to present one possible way of looking 
at things, one wonders whether the losses incurred :by 
generalizing are justified. However, before concluding 
this section I must still refer to the work of Cecil H.
Brown (1974, 1976) who has suggested a way of salvaging the 
linguistic premise he considers threatened by the outcome
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of this discussion, viz. that the meanings of words are 
shared by the speakers of a given language. After 
reviewing the psychological aspects of componential and 
relational analyses (1974: 417 ff.) Brown confirms our 
conclusion that practically everybody accepts the multi­
plicity of possible solutions with all the implications 
this has for psychological reality. However, he claims 
that there is another way of looking at it. To this end 
he proposes a distinction between empirical facts which 
are contingently real, and logical facts which pertain to 
necessary reality (1974: 422 f.; cf. also Brown, 1976).
A componential analysis deals with perceptual properties, 
with contingent facts, contingent upon decisions and 
interpretations by analysts and informants. Those facts 
can be interpreted differently by different analysts, hence 
the multiplicity of solutions. Kinship relational logic, 
however, does not relate to empirical reality but rather 
to relationships established solely in the human mind and 
agreed upon: relational logic is necessarily real, it 
does not involve individual interpretation and perception 
but a shared conception of what is logically and grammat­
ically correct. Brown bases himself on Wittgenstein!s 
view of language. According to Wittgenstein, he says, 
the meaning of a word is associated with the rule or rules 
for its ordinary use. Rules-of-usage or grammatical rules 
are&shared, conventional part of the public domain; this 
grammar or ordinary usage alone is shared, this alone deserves 
the name of semantics for meaning is shared, communicated.
The ordinary usage solution, he claims, will consequently 
have necessary psychological reality. The ‘dimensions of
ordinary usage1 are: use of terms with words for sex, 
use of terms with words for relative age, reciprocal 
usage, and bound form usage (cf. above 4.3*2. for paradigm). 
Brown has tested his theory on the fourth criterion of 
bound form usage (1976) by giving a group of subjects 
multiple choice questions consisting of a bound form 
followed by several alternative kin terms. The subjects 
had to fill in which term - if any - the bound form was 
used with most normally or naturally. The test is supposed 
to reveal the conceptual dimension of ordinary usage, i.e. 
how people think they ordinarily use kin terms and bound 
forms. The tests bear out the results of the ordinary usage 
hypothesis. Ordinary usage is general, is shared.
I accept that the link with grammatical rules 
makes Brown's solution perhaps a more explicitly linguistic 
one than some of the other solutions we have seen. But I 
am less convinced that a Wittgensteinian view of language 
is the best way to argue in defence of necessary psychological 
reality. Wittgenstein defines meaning as being constituted 
in use in different language-games: this surely makes meaning 
contingent, in the sense of depending on interpretation. If 
one would want to argue that this interpretation would somehow 
follow from the grammatical rules or rules-of-usage so that 
the solution would be necessarily real, I would want to make 
the point that to my mind the game we agree to play has other 
than grammatical rules. I think Brown's account of-American 
kin term usage is valuable and interesting, but I cannot 
see it as the final answer to the problem of psychological 
validity. That question remains unsolved if not insoluble. 
Perhaps Stephen Tyler's view is the best one to take (Tyler,
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1969 : 77) :
"Psychological reality is a limit 
theory that asserts, [that?] the con­
vergence of results from independent 
approaches (i.e., formal analysis and 
psychological tests) to a common 
problem provides a 'nearer approximation1 
to native cognition. Ethnographic pre­
dictability is a limit theory in which the 
imputed ability of the ethnographer to 
behave appropriately in some other culture 
is a 'nearer approximation’ to the rules 
of appropriate behavior in that culture.
The important difference between these two 
limit theories is that they call for 
’nearer approximations’ to quite dissimilar 
ends - unless we assume that there is an 
additional convergence of native rules 
and native cognition. In that case, both 
ethnographic predictability and psycholog­
ical reality could be ’nearer approximations’ 
to native cognition and the two limit 
theories simply different expressions of 
the same thing, albeit involving different 
methodologies".
Whether one doubts - as Tyler does - that native 
cognition will ever be knowable, or thinks that such a 
'nearer approximation' to native cognition is possible, 
it can, in either case, be a valid and worthwhile working 
hypothesis.
4.4* Formal, Generative Approaches.
4.4.1. Introduction Remarks.
John H. Winkelman has discussed briefly four
possible representations of kinship systems:
"The first representational system Is 
an associative system, which treats the • 
meaning of a word as the set (possibly 
ordered) of unlabeled associates to that 
word. The second is a semantic feature 
system, in which the meaning of a word is 
given by its values on a set of semantic 
dimensions* The third system Is based on 
formal logic, involving the use of pred­
icates, relations, quantifiers, and
logical connectives. The fourth is 
an algebraic system of set mappings 
in which complex kinship expressions 
are regarded as seausnces of mappings"
■ (Winkelman, 1975: 133 f.).
I am not quite sure which actual system Winkelman is 
referring to as 'associative': I think it must mean a 
system on a basis of folk definitions, where kin terms 
are linked with kinship expressions formulated as folk 
definitions,
The second system referred to is componential 
analysis. Winkelman considers this system to be inadequate 
as well because in none of its forms does it represent all 
kinship relations nor can It be extended to do so in any - 
natural manner . His criticism is perhaps severer than it 
need be: componential analysis does succeed in reducing 
the original list of kin-types to a minimal number of symbols 
and rules. It defines terms through the joint intersection 
of the classes formed by the distinctive features. There 
was, as we have seen (cf. above 4.3.1.) a distinct prefer­
ence for conjunctive or class-product definitions in semantic 
analysis. Not all classes, however, can be defined con­
junctively so that disjunctive definitions, based on the 
union of classes, may seem inevitable. It was in this con­
text that we were faced with the problem of homonymy and 
polysemy, D TAndrade (1970) mentions two ways of avoiding 
having to treat classes as completely disjunctive: one Is 
the extensionist technique (cf. below 4.4.3*):, the other 
is by formulating a relational concept, by finding a 
relation which holds between certain properties of each 
object in a class (see the next section, 4.4.2.).
Winkelman too comes to the conclusion that the
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right kind of approach must be relational, based on 
predicates and relations. He himself prefers the fourth 
system which uses an algebraic notation rather than 
logical predicates, connectives, and quantifiers because 
in his opinion it copes better with complex relations 
(cf. Winkelman, 1975: 136). He uses as basic predicates 
and relations ’parent’, ’spouse’, and ’male’; Greenberg 
had developed a very similar system already in an early 
article on the use of formal logic in kinship analysis 
(Greenberg, 19^9). Greenberg had even claimed to need 
only ’parent’ and ’male’, having reduced the marriage 
relation to ’parent of child (i.e. non-parent)’. He does 
this on practical grounds in order to achieve greater 
simplicity. I do not think it is a very fortunate solution; 
but since he is particularly interested in creating a 
descriptive meta-language for comparative purposes one can 
see some justification for such extreme simplification.
In a very different perspective M. Bierwisch (1970) 
also came to speak about the importance of relational com­
ponents. He touched upon this matter when he was discussing 
semantics in general, the explanation of how sentences are 
interpreted and understood, and how they are related to 
states, processes, and objects In the universe. This 
involves the analysis of word meaning on the basis of a 
type of feature analysis, an analysis into components. Not 
all components represent properties, however: one also needs 
relational components, ’’semantic components representing 
relations between two and perhaps more terms" (Bierwisch, 
1970: 172). This is illustrated by means of certain kinship 
terms: we shall return to this later.
The picture of the formal, generative approach 
which emerges from these introductory remarks is that 
of an account consisting of a set of rules.which operate 
on logical predicates or on semantic components. I 
would like to make a threefold distinction in this 
approach. First there are the relational analyses which 
- as was suggested on several occasions in the previous 
section (4.3*3*2.) - would seem to be relevant more 
particularly with regard to the discussion of the psychol­
ogical validity of kin analysis. Secondly we have the 
extensionist approach which has made a special contribution 
towards the study of polysemy and metaphor in kin terminology. 
Finally there is the linguistic approach, the study of kin 
terms as part of the lexicon in the grammar of a language, 
in a transformational-generative frame-work.
4.4.2. Relational Analyses.
Robbins Burling has presented an analysis of 
American kinship in a very clear and simple way which 
insists less on a complete treatment with parsimony and 
precision and more on the search for psychological reality 
(Burling, 1970 a). In this latter perspective one gives 
more attention to additional data, e.g. compatibility with 
children’s usage.
The child first recognises the categories of 
sex and age. This gives him four terms:
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Sex
father (husband)
age
mother (wife)
sister (daughter)brother (son)
The subsequent recognition of the relational aspects 
of the terms 3 i.e. the fact that they relate to some 
Ego 3 refines this system. There now are eight termsa 
displayed by Burling in the following scheme:
hu s b and-f— ---- > wi f e
father^c^^ ^^mother
daughterson 
brother ->sister
In discovering the special status of husband and wife 
the child discovers consanguinity as a dimension. At 
the same time ’age’ is replaced by the more abstract 
dimension of 'generation’:
gene­
ration
father mother
brother sister husband wife
son daughter sex
sex consan­
guinity
After learning the cover terms parent and child 
it becomes possible to define further terms. Finally the 
child learns how these further terms can be modified by 
one or more operators. Only after having learned the 
kinship system will the child get to know the application 
of kin terms to non-kinship domains.
Burling claims that this simple approach is 
more easily brought in harmony with ontogenetic development 
than is componential analysis, and in its simplicity it 
seems more natural, Moreover It makes a case for the
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existence of more uniform central parts of kin terminology 
with increasing variation when stretching out into the 
periphery. This characteristic cannot be shown in com­
ponential analysis which places all terms on the same 
level.
verbal definitions to be used next to the referential 
definitions which are formulated by means of feature 
analysis techniques. These verbal definitions, or more 
exactly the reckoning operations used both in overt 
utterances and in thinking in order to trace the connect­
ion between a relative and Ego, are the basis of A, Wall­
ace^ relational analysis (Wallace, 1970). Wallace 
considers a kinship system as a set of transformations on 
a basic sentence that states the relation between a 
specific X (the relative) and a specific Y (the Ego).
This sentence is;
The formula "member of the family of” is chosen because 
it also covers adequately the spouse-relationship.
in English which may be substituted for the core part 
of that sentence
Burling's simple analysis makes a case for
X is a member of the family of Y.
There are fourteen male/female pairs of terms
Consanguineals:
cousin/cousin brother/sister
uncle/aunt father/mother
nephew/niece son/daughter
Spouses:
husband/wife
Affinals:
son-in-law/daughter-in-law
brother-in-law/sister-in-law
uncle/aunt
father-in-law/mother-in-law 
Steps :
step-brother/step-sister 
step-father/step-mother 
step-son/step-daughter 
Each term can be replaced by a reckoning phrase made up 
of a subset of no more than three of the following 
relational phrases:
child of = a 
sibling of = b 
parent of - c 
spouse of = d
with generation distance written as an exponent on the 
relation, Exponent value 1 is not expressed. This 
results in:
Consanguineals: am b n 1c
cousin am b nc
uncle/aunt b cn
nephew/niece am b
brother/sister a b c
mother/father on
son/daughter ma
1. The top line after Consanguineals, Affinals a and Steps 
represents the general pattern of each of those types 
of relat ionship.
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, n , b e  d
b
b d
b cn
c d
Under ’’consanguineals" I would have expected the notation 
fb' for brother/sister, or ’a c*. I can only guess 
that Wallace’s notation is meant to stand for both poss­
ibilities though ’a c ’ would to my mind be more appropriate 
as the notation for "half-brother/sister".
As can be seen consanguineal reckoning from X to 
Y proceeds from X up_ a child-to-parent line, across a 
sibling link, then down a parent-to-child line to Y; 
affinal and step relations are simple transformations of 
this structure. Since the ’meaning’ thus defined is 
"essentially grammatical", i.e. in the form of a basic 
sentence, It leads allegedly to a unique solution, the 
only relational solution possible for the usage of adult 
English speaking Americans: for relational logic does not 
depend on any facts extraneous to itself and would there­
fore be ’necessarily real1 in Brown’s (197*0 terms (cf. 
above 4.3.3.2.). While the relational approach certainly 
has much to recommend itself, it is difficult to accept it
Affinals: d a
son-in-law/daughter-in-law d a
brother-in-law/sister-in-law d
uncle/aunt d
father-in-law/mother-in-law 
Spouses:
husband/wife d
Steps: , a d c
step-brother/step-sister a d c
step-mother/step-father d c
step-son/step-daughter a d
as the only ’natural’ one for English speakers. One 
could agree that it is unlikely that e.g. uncle would 
be defined other than as parent’s brother in the kin­
ship reckoning of ordinary speakers of English since 
the distinction between paternal and maternal uncles 
is inoperative. An absolute claim, however, on psycholog­
ical reality would seem to be too strong.
Wallace saw his system as a set of transform­
ations on a basic sentence. The predication analysis of 
G. Leech seems to have a similar basis. A predication 
can be compared roughly to a sentence consisting of two 
arguments linked by a predicate. Each of these three 
units is a cluster of features. Predicational analysis 
does not replace componential analysis: it is complementary 
to it.
Leech’s proposed predicational-componential 
analysis of English kinship semantics (Leech, 1974: 247 ff.) 
is worked out in much greater detail than Wallace’s and 
has the added advantage of being part of a complete approach 
to linguistic semantics. Leech starts off simply by two 
oppositions:
sex f +MALE ’male’ , and parenthood/— >PARENT 'is parent of’
^-MALE ’female’ PARENT ’is child of1
The second opposition is a relative one because of the
converse relation between parent and child. Kinship
relations are represented on the predicational level as
downgraded predications, i.e. as features which have the
structure of a predication, symbolised as <PN> .•
Let us take, for example, the term mother:
A1 P A2 
[the] [-^PARENT] [(null)]
or: -MALE ^  the .— >PARENT. 0 >  "female (who Is) parent of .
Since this downgrading structure is general to 
all kinship terms, the notation can be simplified to: -MALE. 
— ^PARENT. The application for lineal kinsmen is straight­
forward. Grandfather, e.g. will be: +MALE .—^PARENT. . —>PARENT. ,
where the two points ’ . . 1 indicate an unspecified linking 
kinsman.
When we try to extend this notation to collateral 
kin we meet with a problem, as would any analysis using 
the features 'male1 and tparentt only. Defining brother 
as +MALE PARENT. . -APPARENT. , would make me my own brother, 
and by the same token my uncle and my father, and my cousin 
and myself would be identical. This can be avoided by the 
introduction of a further semantic primitive, the symmetric 
relation of siblinghoodSIBLING. Brother can now be 
redefined as +MALE.^SIBLING. The derived nature of the 
siblinghood relation is captured in a ’Rule of implication’ 
which defines it in terms of the basic relation of parent­
hood:
"x. PARENT.— ^PARENT.y" entails "x.f->SIBLING.yrt where Xr'y. 
This siblinghood relation appears in the analysis of all 
collateral terms. Uncle e.g. is defined as: +MALE.£->SIBLING.. 
—^PARENT. However, as this definition of uncle covers only 
FaBr and MoRr, Leech introduces an optional marriage link
for the kin-types FaSIHu and MoSiHu, where square 
brackets are used to indicate optionality. The full 
definition for uncle now reads: +MALE [ .f^-MARRY. ] .^-SIBLING. . 
—>PARENT. To account for the terms ancestor and 
descendant without having recourse to recursive listing 
and while maintaining the identity of meaning of, .e.g., 
descendant and grandchild, great-grandchild, etc., another 
Rule of implication is introduced which derives two new 
semantic oppositions from the relation of parenthood, viz. 
(— >LINEAL/^— LINEAL) and (1 GENERATION/2 GENERATION/... etc.). 
Lineality will also help provide a unitary definition for 
cousin. A third rule of implication will revise this 
definition so as to incorporate the distance-modifiers 
"once removed, etc...". A fourth rule of implication will 
finally define the notion of kinship itself. Rules of 
implication are substitutions of one semantic formula for 
another. Such rules are sometimes necessary when In an 
area of lexical meaning different conceptualizations are 
possible though they destroy the one-to-one relation between 
formula and meaning. Kinship semantics is such an area. 
Kinship relations can be seen in terms of the nuclear 
family relations of parents and siblings, or in a much 
wider perspective of a family tree, or as a combination of 
both. For example, nephew can be defined simply as +MALE.
PARENT. .^SIBLING. , or one can bring in the question of 
ancestry and define ’nephew* as:
+MALE . . £—LINEAL . ,<->SIBLING.
1 GENERATION
The simpler definitions are Intuitively felt to be more 
appropriate and matching with psychological reality.
The advantages of predication analysis are 
said to be the correct representation of converse 
relations and symmetric relations while it shows more 
clearly, moreover, how the specification of a given 
meaning (e.g. BrDa, SiDa) Is subsumed under a general 
definition (viz. niece). Leech sees the basic oppositions 
of ’sex’ and ’parenthood* as biologically founded and 
universal, while the derived relations of siblinghood, 
ancestry, and cousinship, introduced by means of the 
rules of implication, can be defined in terms of rights, 
duties, and other social correlates and are culturally 
relative aspects of kinship semantics.
I mentioned in my introductory remarks to this 
section (4.4.1.) that Bierwisch had suggested one needed 
relational components as well as property features in a 
semantic description of certain parts of the vocabulary, 
notably for kin terms (Bierwisch, 1970: 172 f.), Haviland 
and Clark (197^: 29 ff.) have worked out his brief suggest­
ions to show the kind of analysis which would, in their 
opinion, fit in best with the findings of psychology on 
the acquisition of relational concepts (cf. above 4.3.3*2). 
There Is a basic relational component [X PARENT OF Y] with 
its inverse [Y CHILD OF X]. These combine with simple 
property features such as [MALE X] and [FEMALE X], to give 
simple definitions, e.g. for mother: [XPARENT OF Y][FEMALE X] 
By redundancy rules we know that a more complete definition 
would contain the features ADULT X^ > AND <( ANIMATE X )> , and 
that all components are joined by an ’and* connection.
Sometimes there will be a recursion of certain 
relational components in lexical entries which relate X and Y
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The introduction of dummy entities deals with this, as 
e.g. in grandmother: [X PARENT OF A][A PARENT OF Y][FEMALE X]. 
The entry for brother can be expanded by a redundancy rule 
to an underlying primitive entry containing a dummy: [X 
CHILD OF A][A PARENT OF Y][MALE X],
Since the sibling relationship is such an important 
one a simple notation is given for this redundancy rule, viz:
[X CHILD OF A] [A PARENT OF Y][X ^ Y]^4>[X SIB Y]. 
Together with the PARENT OF and CHILD OF relationships the 
SIB relationship will give the essential entries for the 
terms of the English kin system. A further relation SPOUSE 
OF will make it possible to write the entries for terms 
which may or may not involve a blood relationship, while 
a 'not* marker,/^*, will open the way for the entries for 
half-brother and step-brother.
A very interesting suggestion is added at the end 
of this short description (Haviland and Clark, 197^: 32 f.): 
there probably are besides the defining features other, 
merely characteristic features which could well be culture- 
specific. An example would be the fact that an uncle will 
only be called an uncle if he is an adult. This could be 
added to the definition, using curved parentheses. We 
then have for uncle:
[X SIB A][A PARENT OF Y][MALE X] (ADULT X).
By similar devices one could account for the use of uncle 
in address towards a close friend of the family: '
(ADR) : [X-R-A][A PARENT OF Y][MALE X][ADULT X] where [X-R-A] 
represents the relationship 'good friend of'. It must be 
noted that ADULT X in this last case is a defining, not a 
characteristic feature.
The analyses of both Leech and Haviland and 
Clark are interesting, I believe that a preference 
for either one or the other would not so much be a 
preference for a specific form of kin term analysis as 
a choice for a particular semantic system and theory.
Their great attraction is that they both present a bal­
anced mixture of universal and culture-specific elements,
Wallace's analysis is very brief, less an 
analysis than an illustration of a theoretical point, 
viz. his claim for a psychologically necessary solution.
I remain convinced that no absolute claim on psychological 
reality can be justified for any analysis, at least at 
present. I believe, however, that both the section on 
psychological reality and this section on relational 
analysis have shown that we can establish a working hypo­
thesis on the psycholpgical implications of aspects of kin 
term analysis even if we may never be able to reach com­
prehensive and firm conclusions.
4.4.3. The extensionist approach.
At the end of his detailed analysis of Seneca 
kinship terminology by means of componential analysis 
Lounsbury discussed multiple denotation (1964 a: 207).
He indicated two ways of dealing with this, either by 
total class definitions, or by basic member definitions 
and supplementary rules of extension. What was at first 
presented as an alternative way of handling a particular 
problem has since grown into a whole body of theory and 
application; it is of great importance from the semantic
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point of view because of the light it has thrown on
matters of polysemy* homonymy, and metaphor, and it
is important for the study of kinship because of the
explicit stand it has taken in defense of the biological
genealogical foundation of kinship.
The semantic background to extensionism is
identical with the one we discussed in connection with
Lounsbury*s work on componential analysis, viz. Morris's
concept of semantics. There is a similar kind of strict
delimitation here: one does not pretend to give a complete
analysis of all the meanings of the kinship terms in a
given language, the analysis is concerned solely with the
system of classification as such (cf. Scheffler and Louns-
bury, 1971: 2).
"The real problem is not what kinship 
terms mean but the nature of the 
relations among the genealogical 
designata and significata of certain 
words and between those designata and 
any other designata those words may 
have" (Scheffler, 1972: 311).
In other words: analysis concerns denotation, not connot­
ation or status relationships (Scheffler and Lounsbury,
1971: 58; Scheffler, 1972: 316 f.). By equating social 
categories with connotation Scheffler and Lounsbury make 
it very clear what the position of extensionism is: kinship 
relations are, at base, relations of genealogical connect­
ion.
"In this view, kinship reckoning is 
based' squarely on genealogical reckon­
ing. Extensions are not seen as 
blanket labelings of 'social groups’ ■ 
characterized by lineage, locality, 
age-grade* etc., but rather as resulting 
from a series of derivations, reckoning 
genealogically from one individual to 
another in accordance with the principles
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that are normal for any given system"
(Lounsbury, 1964 b: 244).
This brings us right into the heart of the discussion 
about the biological vs. the sociological interpretation 
of kinship,whether, in other words, kinship is a matter 
of genealogy, or of relative statuses (with correlated 
role expectations) between members of different social 
categories in whose definition the biological connections 
of individuals are not necessarily relevant (cf. Lounsbury, 
1969: 17 ff.). The social interpretation takes its origin 
in certain anthropological data, e.g. the discrepancy 
between physical paternity and ascribed social fatherhood, 
the practice of adoption, etc., and is considered to receive 
confirmation from certain linguistic data, viz. the class- 
ificatory terms which are said to denote social groups.
The social point of view was put very strongly by Radcliffe- 
Brown and has since been defended by all anthropologists 
who call themselves "social" anthropologists, as well as 
by Levi-Strauss and other protagonists of various types 
of alliance theory (cf. Scheffler and Lounsbury, 1971.* 
chapter 2),
Lounsbury and others reject this interpretation,
In a general way it is considered by them to be an extreme 
form of cultural relativism which has eyes only for what 
is culture-specific, viz. social structure, at the expense 
of what is universal, viz. the facts of biology. More 
particularly, as- far as kin terminology is concerned', it 
is felt that the social interpretation makes the mistake 
of considering the terms of classificatory systems to be 
monosemic: Lounsbury has called this "the total category 
approach" (1969: 21), In such an approach It is assumed
that the meaning of a word is the highest common factor 
(product of common features) In all of its denotations; 
and implied in this is the assumption that every denotatum 
of a term is on a par with every other. Extensionism 
challenges both assumptions: many words are polysemic, 
and they have a primary sense and various secondary, 
extended senses. Polysemy and the process of extension 
depend on the sharing of some of their distinctive features 
between words. Polysemy can be based on the narrowing of 
reference by imposition of additional constraints on the 
use of a word, or on the widening of reference by the 
suspension of certain restraints (cf. Scheffler, 1972: 313 f»)* 
It is the sharing of distinctive features, not of features 
of connotative meaning which is being considered: the 
former are necessary and sufficient conditions for member­
ship of a class, the .latter only accidental conditions and 
as such unlinkable with the process of extension. If one 
or more defining features of the primary sense of a word 
is suspended and replaced by some feature of connotative 
meaning associated with the primary sense, we have an 
extension of a special kind, the metaphorical extension: 
the feature of connotative meaning becomes here a criterial 
attribute, a sufficient though not a necessary condition 
for membership (cf. Scheffler, 1972: 318 f.).
When one speaks of primary sense, the word 
'primary5 needs clarification. It does not refer to what 
children learn first, nor to the sense which is psychol­
ogically more salient or has historical priority (cf.
Scheffler and Lounsbury, 1971: 66): one is looking for 
structural primacy, for the sense which is logically prior
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(Scheffler, 1972: 31*0- This will In fact be one of 
the first steps in the analysis. One begins by listing 
the kin terms in a given language and after that one has 
to establish the focal referents of each term, i.e. the 
kin-types that fall within the ranges of the various terms 
when used in their primary senses. It is assumed that 
the focal types are the genealogically closest kin-type 
or types in each class (cf. Scheffler and Lounsbury, 1971:
86 ff.). In a next step one has to define eomponentially 
these primary ranges of denotations, and eventually their 
broadest ranges as well. All this leads to the first kind 
of rule required in the analysis: the defining rule.
Each language has at least as many defining rules as it 
has terms, more if some of the terms are polysemous. In 
a second phase we have to formulate extension rules which 
specify the conceptual operations whereby the broad or 
extended sense (senses) of a term is (are) derived from 
Its most narrow or primary sense. These rules are also 
called equivalence rules since they specify a structural 
equivalence of two or more kin-types, an equivalence which 
is purely terminological (ibid.: 106).
Contrary to what we have seen previously in the 
case of certain practitioners of componential analysis or 
relational analysis no claim is made here that this procedure 
for the reduction of kin-types is the procedure used by 
native speakers when they reckon the classificatory•status 
of kinsmen of the same kin-type. The concern of extension- 
ists is about the structure of a well-formed cognitive 
system, not about the structure or operation of the cogn­
itive processes whereby that system Is put to use (ibid.: 126).
This does not mean that Scheffler and Lounsbury would 
accept the distinction introduced by Wallace and Atkins 
between structural and psychological reality of analyses: 
on the contrary, they reject this distinction. They 
maintain that the multiplicity of possible analyses stems 
from a lack of clarity about the question whether kin 
terms are kin terms; they claim to eliminate this 
uncertainty in their approach which is based on the 
primary sense of genealogically defined focal referents 
with a range of extended senses. A native speaker does 
not need to know anything about componential definitions 
of terms in narrow and broad senses or about equivalence 
rules In order to use the terminology correctly. These 
definitional and equivalence rules are general structural 
principles underlying and relating a number of more 
specific relationships between terms and the kin classes 
they designate. If one wants to speak of a psychological 
or cognitive reality it must be of a type comparable to 
the (unconscious) reality of linguistic structures (ibid.: 
136-150).
The assumption of the social meaning of kin 
terminological systems was precisely that the terms were 
socially relevant and that one had to look consequently 
for the social explanation of a particular type of 
classification. Extensionist theory does not attempt 
to explain by reference to social factors why a certain 
system of kin classification has the structure It has, 
for social and terminological systems do not always 
coincide. All extensionists will want to do is to try 
and show that the system of kin classification is at least
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logically and functionally consistent with certain 
other aspects of a given social order (ibid.: 151 ff.).
The extent of isomorphism will vary from society to 
society.
Extensionist theory does not only disagree 
with causal explanations on the basis of social factors 
but also with Schneider’s cultural approach (cf. above 4.2) 
Now that we have discussed both approaches it is obvious 
which are the principal points of disagreement. Schneider 
does not work on the basis of the distinction 'denotative 
vs. connotative vs. metaphoric meaning’ as understood by 
Scheffler and Lounsbury. Code-for-conduct is a distinctive 
feature of kinship and of the categories designated by 
American kinship terms in Schneider’s view. He bases 
himself on cultural values, and these values are by 
definition all of the same kind. Each of these values 
can give a different meaning to a terra3 e.g. real father 
vs. step-father, father-in-law, etc.: in this sense there 
is polysemy, not in the sense of one meaning being primary 
and the others being derived. It always comes down to 
the alleged biological foundations of kinship and one’s 
assumptions about multiple meaning: while I have to admit 
that Schneider does not always convince me on every point, 
I cannot see any conclusively convincing argument for 
either style of analysis. Which one to prefer will depend 
on what aspect one wants to study more particularly. 
Whether one or. the other can or must be preferred in a 
linguistic study of kinship is a question I would like to 
leave open for the moment.
Scheffler has proposed an alternative inter­
pret e.tioa of some of Schneider’s most crucial arguments
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(Scheffler3 1974: 33 ff»). Starting from the fact 
that in the American system a relative is a person who 
is related by blood or by marriage, Scheffler claims 
that this concept is genealogically based. When there 
is no such link of blood or marriage - the case of 
adoptive and foster "relatives" - we are dealing with a 
metaphoric extension of 'relative® since standards of 
interpersonal conduct are not distinctive features of 
that category. Step- and in-law relatives are also 
extensions of the category of blood relatives, but not 
metaphoric extensions. These are instances of extension 
by neutralization of a genealogical distinction, viz. the 
distinction between one's own parents and siblings and 
those of other people, rather than the introduction of a 
new criterial attribute. This type of extension is there­
fore genealogically based: consequently they are cases of 
polysemy, not of metaphor.
How the terms are used is a different matter from 
how to give an account of their meaning: sometimes the 
use of a given expression may be thought to be connotatively 
inappropriate in a given situation, but this does not affect 
the definitive meaning. Scheffler points out that in some cases 
kinship terms are extended metaphorically beyond the domain 
of relatives: not even the connotative feature of "diffuse 
and enduring solidarity" is present in such a case, e.g. in 
the case of a priest being called "father". Schneider calls 
this and similar usages "all members of the same set" (1968: 
100), i.e. members of the set of relatives by law only; in 
his eyes this usage is therefore not a metaphorical extension.
He holds that kinship terms are both terms for kinds of
relatives and terms for relationships; the term 
father used for a priest indicates such a social 
relationship, a relationship of the father-child kind.
At this point I shall limit myself to the 
following observations. Metaphor is a traditionally 
accepted concept in the study of meaning though the 
understanding of what a metaphor is exactly can differ 
considerably from one author to the next. Scheffler's 
use of this concept is determined by Morris's theory' 
of signs with its denotation/connotation distinction 
(cf. Morris, 1946: 136 ff.): he is quite clear and expl­
icit on this point. In Schneider's case, however, I 
cannot see how he would define a metaphor or whether 
perhaps he would reject the notion altogether. Presumably 
he does not reject it altogether: when he says that callin 
a priest "father" is not a case of metaphor, one must 
assume that he accepts that there are extensions of mean­
ing in certain unspecified cases that would be metaphoric. 
But the lack of explication of the concept of metaphor 
diminishes the value of the negation of its occurrence in 
a specific case as, for instance, that of the priest/ 
father.
As the example of the use of the term "father" 
for a priest plays such a crucial role in this debate it 
may be useful to summarize briefly Scheffler*s interpret­
ation of this usage and to add my own comments. Being a 
priest myself, addressed as "father" in my church and 
accustomed to addressing and referring to fellow priests 
by that same term, I may be able to throw some more light 
on this particular usage. Scheffler says that the use of
the term "father” for priests does not express the 
intention of asserting that priests are genitors or 
relatives : it only implies that, in some limited 
respect, the social relationships between priests and 
other church members should be like the social relation­
ships between genitors and their offspring (Scheffler,
1974: 8 ff.). The similarity is limited: both genitors 
and priests are entitled to respect, both are expected 
to look after the welfare - physical and spiritual ■ 
respectively - of their dependants. But the similarity 
does not cover the whole field of rights and duties of a 
genitor and his offspring. A priest is referred to as 
"father" as by a title. The criteria for belonging to 
this category are not that he would be acting in some 
limited way like a genitor should act; they are simply 
those required for a valid ordination. Scheffler sees 
this confirmed by the fact that a priest will be called 
"father" by all church members, not only by his own 
parishioners; he even receives the title when he does 
not have a parish at all. Another indication can be 
found in the practice of priests to refer to or address 
each other as "father" (loc.eit.: 10 and 17)* Priests 
are metaphoric ’fathers’ but they are not metaphoric 
’relatives’ (ibid.: 47).
I suppose It is correct to say that the dominant 
feature in the relationship of a church member towards a 
priest Is one of respect and that this has no biological 
or legal basis but derives from the fact of ordination. 
This certainly is the way the members of a- church would 
feel about It. However, one could perhaps argue that, on
a deeper level, there is more similarity between a 
priest and a genitor than the one outlined by Scheffler.
It could perhaps be said that a priest is expected to 
act like a genitor in some limited way after all. The 
priest gives new, spiritual, life by conferring the 
rites of initiation. He is duty-bound to provide susten­
ance for this spiritual life by his teaching and by the 
administration of the sacred rites. He Is entitled to do 
this by virtue of the powers which he has received through 
ordination. I would suggest, therefore, that there Is a 
similarity not only on the behavioural level but also on 
a functional level of right and duty. Perhaps similarity 
is not the best word: one might prefer to speak of parallel­
ism. For we are not dealing with the extended use of just 
one term, there is a group of terms Involved: life, father, 
mother, son, daughter; brother, and sister, all interpret­
able in a physical, biological sense and in a spiritual 
sense. One could consider the possibility of setting up 
two separate systems, parallel to one another. I believe, 
however, that one would miss a possible generalisation if 
they were seen as unrelated. It strikes me as interesting 
that the points mentioned by Scheffler to support his 
interpretation, viz. the fact that all priests are called 
"father" regardless of their work or position, and the fact 
that priests call each other "father", have their parallel 
in kin term usage. The first fact is a typical case of 
classificatory use where ’father* Is the term used to refer 
to the whole category of ’potential fathers’ (cf. above, 
2.4.2); the second fact has Its parallel in the custom of 
parents calling each other "father" and "mother", sometimes
even when there are no children present. But it must 
be admitted that the parallelism between the two systems 
is far from perfect: the most notable difference is that 
nothing in the spiritual system corresponds to the father/ 
mother relationship. The two terms are used in very 
different contexts in their spiritual usage: ’father’ 
defines a relation with the totality of the members of 
a church, while ’mother’ only refers to the head of a 
religious community of women. It would seem to depend on 
the scope of the analysis whether or not to deal with 
these uses as extensions of ordinary kinship terms or to 
take them as a special - albeit parallel - system.
After this general discussion of the extensionist 
theory I would like to give a brief account of two 
applications of this theory to the kinship terminology 
of American English. . The two accounts appeared more or 
less simultaneously,' in 1973*
R. Casson (1973) accepts the point of departure 
of Scheffler and Lounsbury (1971) concerning the polysemic 
nature of kin terms, their genealogical basis, the 
distinction between primary and secondary senses, and the 
use of equivalence rules to specify the relation between 
these various senses. His analysis is concerned with the 
polysemy of unitary lexemes, I.e. lexemes whose meaning 
cannot be deduced from their grammatical structure, and it 
deals with the relation between the focal and the extended 
members of a given category. He considers ’grandfather’,
1 grandmothergrandson’, and ’granddaughter’ to be unitary 
lexemes as well as all in-law terms. The analyses discussed 
previously took the same line with regard to 'grandfather*
250
etc.3 but not for in-law terms. CassonTs reason for
doing so is that the denotata of, e.g., father-in-law
are exclusive of those of father; I do not consider this
to be a compelling argument. He uses the kin-type notation
of Romney and D ’Andrade (see above *1.3*2.). He introduces
an asterisk superscript to indicate provisional expansions
in order to account for the phenomenon of fussy boundaries,
i.e. for the fact that not all speakers agree on where to
draw the line in reckoning people as relatives. For
example, the term grandfather covers the kin-typas PaFa,
PaPaFa, PaMoHu, SpPaFa, and the extended range expression
0 1^reads: a(=a)(+a) +a+(f=)m, where the non-parenthesised
symbols represent the focal kin-type.
In his equivalence.or re-write rules he uses 
the following conventions:
- ’ x' represents male, or female (m or f is required, a is 
not allowed)
- a single dot indicates either the initial or the terminal 
element of the genealogical chain, i.e. either Ego or 
the designated kinsman
- three dots Indicate either a non-initial or a non-terminal 
element of the genealogical chain.
Three unordered extension rules will generate all of the 
extended kln-types of American English. The rules are 
named after the modifiers they introduce (cf. loc.clt,: 195 
f f .) . '
Rule I : Great (or Lineal) Merging Rule.
+a.. .-- $>+ata. ..
I!Let any person’s parent of either sex 
as a link to some other kinsman be 
regarded as equivalent to that person’s 
parent's parent of either sex as a link 
to saia kinsman".
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Rule I: Reciprocal Corollary 
. • .a ~  *.a—a-
"Let any linking kinsman's child of 
either sex be regarded as equivalent 
to that linking kinsman’s child's child 
of either sex".
This first rule accounts for all extensions to secondary
and more distant consanguineal kinsmen, i.e. for the
parentheses which enclose plus signs (or minus signs'
for the reciprocals) in the kin-type notation, as shown
in the extended range expression for grandfather.
Rule II: Step-kin Merging Rule.
. . .x.--->. . .x . =x .a
"Let any linked terminal relative (alter) 
of one sex or the other (m or f , but not a) 
be regarded as equivalent to that linked 
relative's spouse (naturally, of the 
opposite sex, ij^ j ) " .
Rule II: Reciprocal Corollary.
* cl * * *  ^  » ct*'* cl * * *
c
"Let any initial kinsman (ego) of either 
sex as a linking relative be regarded as 
equivalent to the spouse of that kinsman 
as a linking relative".
This rule is also known as the "married pair principle"
or the equivalence of spouses. It accounts for all
extensions of affinal kinsmen, indicated in the notation
of the range expressions by parentheses containing the
symbol for marriage,
Rule III: Half-Subling Merging Rule.
. . .0 >. . .+a-
"Let one's sibling be regarded as equivalent 
to one's parent's child".
The rule is its own reciprocal corollary. It Is a near
universal rule which accounts for the fact that half-siblings
are terminologically equated with full siblings.
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Frank Wordick*s analysis (Wordick, 1973)
differs from Lounsbury and Casson on a number of points 
though his rules are not really that much different 
from Casson*s. Wordick uses transformation rules as 
well as expansion/reduction rules: these transformation 
rules do not reduce or expand kin-types but only rewrite 
them3 and they are not recursive. Furthermore he 
distinguishes three different levels of classification: 
deep structure, surface structure, and superficial 
structure. The deep structure
The categories found at the level of surface structure
"represent the output of taxonomic rules. Kinship terms
as they are used in everyday speech are labels for these
classes’1. On the level of superficial structure
"taxonomic categories may be subdivided 
with even more precision. Modifying 
elements added to the kinship terms 
identify these narrowly defined sub­
classes" (loc. cifc.: 1535).
Wordick uses the following operators in his 
rules (loc.cit.: 1635):
To avoid having to reproduce Wordick*s personal way of 
kin-type notation 1 have preferred to adapt his notation 
to the one I have been using.
"contains categories which are the 
direct output of the semantic rules. 
Stems of kinship terms (i.e., basic 
terms) label these superclasses".
— is structurally reduced to 
> :  is structurally transformed into 
==: is called
/X/*: is the reciprocal of
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On the level of deep structure there are 
thirteen categories (cf. loc.cit.: 1637 ff.), displayed 
componentially along three dimensions: type of relation­
ship (lineal, collateral, affinal), generation removal 
(+1, 0, -1)3 and sex of referent:
Pa Mo MoBr MoSi
Br Si MoSiSo Hu Wi
So Da SiSo SiDa
The following ordered reduction rules are necessary and 
sufficient to derive these basic categories: 
l.a. Half-Sibling Rule (Global)
i. PaSo —  ^Br iii. FaDa— > Si
ii. M0S0 Br IV. MoDa ->S1
b. Affinal Incorporation Rule (American)
> Ch 
->Ch 
->Sb
H
I. HuCh— > Ch
ii. WiCh 
iii. HuSb
iv. WiSb Sb r v
v. HuPa— >Pa yxA
vi . WiPa— > Pa /"\y
vii. PaWi -— > Mo
viii. MoHu -— >Pa
ix. BrWi -— >Si
x . SiHu-— >Br
xi. SoWi -— > Da
xii. DaHu -— >So
2.a. Ascendant/Descendant Rule (American).
i. PaFa >Fa fiii. ChSo— > So
r x y  J
ii. PaMo— >Mo ChDa — >Da
Rule l.a corresponds with Casson1s Rule III, which Casson 
called "near universal1 and Wordick "global11. Rule l.b, 
corresponds 'with Casson’s Rule II: its function is^to 
make consanguines out of affines. Where Casson and 
Wordick differ is in the second part of Rule l.b which
1, Wordick does not explain the status of the genealogical 
cover symbols Ch, Sb, and Pa in his rules. I presume 
they are used merely as notational devices for the sake
of a simole , balanced oreseuration.
deals with in-law relatives whereas its first part 
dealt with step-kin. Casson considered terms for in-law 
relatives as unitary lexemes: this seems rather counter­
intuitive and unconvincing to me. While Wordick keeps 
step-kin and in-laws separate he deals with them under 
one rule and, as he shows (loc.cit.: 1639) , Rule l.b i-vi 
can be conflated and reduced to two simple forms:
or: "Let a man’s wife as linking relative be regarded as
equivalent to that man as linking relative".
"Let a woman’s husband as linking relative be regarded 
as equivalent to that woman as linking relative".
The fact that this generalization is possible shows to my 
mind that Wordick’s solution concerning the position of in­
laws is to be preferred. But both Casson and Wordick agree 
on the explanation of this affinal incorporation rule which 
is said to originate in the strength and importance of the 
bond between spouses within the nuclear family.
While Wordick's Rule 2.a is similar to CassonTs Rule I 
it is different in covering also grandfather, considered by 
Casson .to be a unitary lexeme. At first sight one would be 
inclined to agree with Casson that the equivalence rule only 
starts operating v/hen the "great-" modifier is applied.
Wordick’s claim, however, is situated at another level, at 
deep structure level. His claim is that descent is irrel­
evant in the American social structure as a structuring 
principle. Rule 2.a reduces all relatives at the level of 
deep structure to immediate or primary relatives and it is 
applicable to both lineal and collateral ascendant s/descendants
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At that level no kinsman can be more distant from ego 
than one generation level, nor can he fc*e more than one 
degree of collaterality away. The fact that, for 
instance, father and grandfather are two completely 
different kinsmen in the way they are perceived by 
their relatives and in the way these relatives behave 
towards them is a fact of surface structure.
At this level of surface structure the analysis 
becomes taxonomic, i.e. establishes classes and attaches 
labels to them. But first Wordick introduces his trans­
formation rules in order to simplify the taxonomic section. 
This simplification is achieved by ensuring that only 
single kernel referents exist for all kinship terms (loc. 
cit. : 16*41 ff.) .
3.a Bilateral Symmetry Rule
fi. FaBr >  MoBr"^ fill. BrSo SiSo")
jii. FaSi >  MoSiJ |^ iv. BrDa >  SiDaJ
3*b Sex-Neutralization Rule 
MoSiDa >  MoSiSo 
Rule 3.a expresses the existing situation in which con- 
sanguineally related males and females of otherwise similar 
status are considered to be equal for purposes of computing 
relationship. Wordick's choice of transforming paternal 
relatives into maternal ones rather than the other way 
round is based on psychological tests which show that most 
people feel closer to maternal relatives than to paternal 
ones. Rule 3.b avoids having up to eight different refer­
ents for the term cousin. Having thus established the 
thirteen kernel kin-types one can now label them. If a 
term labels a class the basic term will be the correct
kinship term; if it labels a superclass a taxonomic 
rule must be located which corresponds to the reduction 
rule used in the reduction of the genealogical string 
to the kernel form. This taxonomic rule will lead 
to the correct affix to be attached to the basic term.
A few selected examples from WordickTs list (loc.cit.:
1644) will serve to illustrate the method:
Kernel Kin-Type Associated Terminology
Fa superclass father
via 2.a grand......
via l.b p ......-in-law
via l.b e*. step......
MoBr superclass uncle
via 2.a great or grand ......
Si superclass sister
via l.b p   -in-law
via l.b (X - s t e p - ......
via l.a half- ......
MoSiSo class cousin
Wordick has introduced a third level, that of the super­
ficial structure. At this level excessive information 
and overspecification are provided through the use of 
linguistic modifiers (cf. loc.cit.: 1643 ff.). Some of 
these means of subclassification are quite simple, e.g.
"by blood", "by marriage", "paternal", "maternal".
Wordick deemed it sufficient to provide rules for the two 
more complicated cases, grandrelatives and cousins.
The solution for grandrelatives is the simpler of 
the two. One applies at the end of the process of reduction 
the following equation:
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or: "the number of times the modifying
element 1 great' appears before the 
grandrelative term in question is 
equal to one less than the number of 
times Rule 2.a was applied in the 
reduction of the kin-type to which 
the term refers".
Wordick gives as example how to determine the proper
term to be used for one’s FaMoFaFaSoWi:
FaMoFaFa(SoWi)■— >FaMoFaPa(Da) 1.b *xi
FaMoPa(PaDa)— >FaMoFa(Si) l.a.iii
Fa(MoFa)Si— >Fa(Fa)Si 2.a.i
(FaFa)Si— >(Fa)Si 2.a.i
(FaSi) >  (MoSi)
MoSi = grandaunt taxonomy
j' = # 2.a-1
X* 2-1
r 1
Consequently the proper term for one’s PaMoFaFaSoWi is 
great-grandaunt.
The subdivisions withan the cousin class are 
more complicatedj we need two equations in fact* one 
to compute the degree of collaterality3 and one to compute 
the distance in generation removal. The two equations 
are respectively: K = 2,a.i + # 2.a.ii) +1, and
e ■ (# 2.a.i + § 2.a.ii) - (#2.a.iii + #2.a.iv)
When applied after the reduction of MoFaMoSiSoDaDaSo the 
appropriate term proves to be "third cousin once removed".
Finally Wordick deals with variety in usage, 
alternative terms, and with what Schneider called ’fuzzy 
boundary’ (loc.cit.: 1645 ff.). When faced with the 
question whether a particular genealogical type is or is 
not a relative and, if a relative, what term to use for him,
he proposes to approach the problem as transformational 
generative grammar handles the question of deciding on 
the grammaticality of doubtfully grammatical sentences.
The logic of the system itself, established on the 
basis of data which are clear and unambiguous, will tell 
us what the decision must be in each case. Wordick state 
in fact explicitly (loc.cit.: 1652, note 4) that he 
wants to give an account of the ideal American kinship 
system, he wants to describe a competence model, not a 
performance model. This explains what he means when he 
speaks of
"boundaries on the extensiveness of 
their [i.e. the speakers’] kindreds 
which are narrower than those placed 
on them by the rules of the system"
(loc.cit. : 1647)• •
Elsewhere (ibid.: 1651) he speaks of "sheer arbitrariness
in certain cases”:
"It is evident that such ’soft’ or 
’optional1 boundaries, which are not 
defined by the kinship rules, are not 
really a part of the kinship system, 
but are Imposed on It".
He suspects that at the level of deep structure American
kinship Is a fairly monolithic institution, though there
can be a great deal of variation on a more superficial
level (cf. loc.cit.: 1650).
WordickTs analogy with grammaticalness calls for
a short comment. He says that he feels sure that the
native speakers will readily accept the results of his
reductions and term assignment in problematic cases.
This suggests to me, however, that he is thinking of
acceptability rather than of ’grammaticalness’: and
acceptability belongs to the realm of performance, not of
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competence. The notion of grammaticalness is a much
more theoretical concept and is not based on experience.
Moreover, there are degrees of grammaticalness: it
is overoptimistic to expect that a clear-cut answer
can be found for all doubtful cases. It is not Impossible
that his analogy with competence really is a way of
making a claim in an implicit and indirect manner for
the absolute value of his solution. All in all the
analogy does not seem very helpful or enlightening. As
for a possible claim to absolute value I would like to
say that the differences which exist - notwithstanding
all the similarities - between Casson’s and his analyses,
have strengthened my conviction that at present no such
claim can be upheld for total systems. All one can say
about alternative solutions is that they may possibly
highlight better one sor other aspect of kinship or kinship
terminology, or that0 they reflect a particular field of
interest. When David Kronenfeld tested the extensionist
hypothesis by means of a computer analysis (Kronenfeld,
1976) he seemed to express a similar point of view in
speaking of "the proliferation of alternative analyses of
particular systems (especially of English)":
"The proliferation has forced considerations 
of alternative goals to which different 
semantic analyses may be directed, and of 
the possibility that somewhat different 
analyses may be required for different 
goals" (Kronenfeld, 197&: 916).
^ ^ .4. The Transformational-Generative Approach.
At the end of t.he previous section we saw 
that Wordick borrowed certain concepts from transform­
ational generative grammar. He distinguished deep and 
surface structures, introduced transformation rules, 
spoke of competence vs. performance, and drew a parallel 
with grammaticalness and acceptability in assessing the 
result of his reduction rules. But basically he intended 
his analysis to be of the same type as Lounsbury’s, albeit 
an improved version of that type.
In this section I intend to deal with two things. 
First there are a few contributions which have borrowed 
substantially from the notions and notation used in trans­
formational grammar, even applying the name "transformational- 
generative" in some cases. These studies try to show 
what contribution a general transformational generative 
framework can make to analyses of kinship terminology.
Secondly I shall deal with the studies which 
are concerned with the light issues of kinship terminology 
can shed on problems in syntactic-semantic theory within 
a transformational generative framework.
D. Schneider (1965: 289) remarked already that 
the domain of kinship is in principle infinite though In 
practice it is kept finite by what he called "fade-out".
It was this characteristic of open-endedness which made 
analysts look for inspiration towards transformational 
grammar since it appeared to provide a formal, rule-based 
model which - while being finite itself - was.devised to 
account for an infinite number of sentences. The format
of this model seemed to he an excellent way of generating 
the set of kinship terms - both differentiating them 
from each other and at the same time showing the inter­
relationships between the terms.
M. Durbin and M. Saltareili were the first
scholars to borrow various notions from transformational
grammar in their article "Patterns in Kinship" (1967)*
They advocate a formal, i.e. rule-based, account and
they refer to the potentially infinite number of terms;
they speak, furthermore, of competence vs. performance.
The use of a set of kinship terms in any one particular
culture and the system that can be induced from those
terms is analogous to performance. The study of the
universal, non culture-bound maze of relations among the
members of a potentially non-finite set of kin-types is
analogous to competence. This non-finite set serves as
Input to the formal mechanism of the kinship rules. These
rules are, according to the authors, neither rewrite rules,
nor expansion rules, transformation rules, or realizational
rules; they call them "identify rules": "an element x
is identified as of the category A in the environment -W-".
Their first rule, for instance, is: x — ^P / x /, or:
"an element x is identified as of the 
kinship category parent (P) in_a 
context relation / / with x (which
Is the opposite value of x)n (loc.cit.: 10).
Other rules Identify the categories Offspring and Spouse
while a fourth rule is an indexing rule, increasing the
index of any category by one. The rules are iterative
as Indeed is the entire set of rules. I fail to see what
these rules achieve that cannot be achieved more simply by
a genealogical tree, except stress the potentially 
non-finite number of kin-types. But as the number of 
actually recognised, kin-types is always finite this 
is not much of a gain. Moreover, the notion of "identify" 
rule is somewhat obscure to me. Since the notion is 
hardly explained I cannot really make out what this kind 
of rule is supposed to do.
After having given these identify rules Durbin 
and Saltarelli complete their method with a lexical com­
ponent, a set of unordered rules which map the finite 
number of kinship terms of a given language onto the - 
correct kin-types generated by the kinship rules. This 
lexicon provides for a pairwise distinct subclassification 
of kin-types. The subcategories used in the (American) 
English system are: male vs. female, Offspring vs. Parent, 
and Offspring vs. Sibling. Again I am not quite sure how 
to interpret these Categories. It would seem they are 
rather like logical relations than like distinctive 
features. I would prefer in any case other proposals, 
e.g. Wallace’s relational phrases (cf. 4.4.2), or the 
notation used by Kay (see below in this section), or any 
of the forms of componential or feature analysis, provided 
they do not split up the category "cousin" In such an 
arbitrary way as Durbin and Saltarelli would seem to do, 
viz. 2nd, 4th, etc. Cousin vs. 1st, 3rd, 5th, etc. Cousin 
moreover, for some unknown reason they place their second 
group of cousins In the same set at the in-lav/s (cf. loc. 
cit.: 8). Unless I have completely missed the point of 
this article I do not think it is particularly revealing 
or helpful towards a better understanding of kinship and
kinship terminology In general, or English kinship 
terminology in particular.
Others who have been inspired by transform­
ational grammar without actually working within a 
generative framework are Philip K. Bock, "Some Generative 
Rules for American Kinship Terminology" (1968), and
H. Stephen Straight, "The Transformational-Generative 
Grammar of American English Kinship Terminology: A Revision 
of Bock’s 1968 Analysis" (1976). The title of Straight's 
article is Interesting: kinship terminology is not studied
as part of the lexicon or of the semantic component of 
the grammar of a given language. Kinship terminology is 
itself seen as a language, and the analysis of that 
terminology as a grammar. In Bock’s words, this grammar
"will automatically generate (as 
'terminal strings’) all American 
kinship terms and only terms which 
are acceptable parts of the 
American system of terminology"
(Bock, 1968: 1).
The result Is said to account
"for certain intuitions which most 
English speakers have about their 
kinship terminology (especially the 
ambiguity of several terms)" (ibid.).
The rules "can generate an infinite number of kinship 
terms.... They also assign a structural description to 
each term" (ibid.: 4). These few quotations from Bock's 
article read almost like a short characteristic of trans­
formational grammar but transposed onto kin terminology. 
Straight subscribes completely to Bock’s objectives 
(Straight, 1976: 157 and 163)5 he merely wants to intro­
duce some refinements and improvements.
I shall now sketch briefly how the analysis
operates and I shall follow Straight’s version for 
this purpose. The differences between his analysis 
and Bock's come down to two things mainly. Bock gave 
separate derivation rules for step-, half- , and -in-law 
terms v;ithout reference to the rules which generated the 
corresponding consanguineal terms. Straight makes this 
connection quite explicit. He thus makes it clear that 
we are not dealing with homophones while, moreover, the 
extra step now required in the derivation of the compound 
terms makes it possible to read off more accurately from 
the number of rules used the difference in ’distance' 
between, e.g. father and father-in-law (Straight, 1976: 163). 
Secondly Straight proceeds In a more systematic manner, 
giving first the taxonomic expansion rules, then the trans­
formations, and finally the lexical-insertion rules. In 
Bock's analysis all the rules were ordered but not separated 
by kind. Straight’s “method makes it possible to assess 
more easily the role of the transformational component : 
this is where the special character of any given kinship 
system allegedly shows itself (loc.cit.: 164).
Straight uses the following symbols and operators 
(loc.cit.: 159) :
R relative
Af affine ('relative by marriage’)
Con consanguine ('blood relative') 
m Male 
f female
Sp Spouse
RSp relative through (marriage to) spouse 
RP relative through ancestor(’s sibling or through
parent)
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RSb
RCh
P
Sb
C
Pa
Ch
relative through sibling (or sibling's child) 
relative through child
ancestor*
sibling
descendant
parent
child
& 'who isT
T t
0 (null symbol)
X (variable)
( ) optional symbol
— rewrite
ran s format ion ' 
^#*lexical insertion 
A selection from each of the three sets of rules will 
illustrate the method of analysis (cf. loc.cit.: 159 ff.): 
- Symbol-expansion Rules
1. R~>iAf 1
\ConJ
2. Af->fsp J 
RSp 
RP > 
RSb 
RCh
4. RP >fPa + Sp ( i Ch)
I p
6. RCh Ch + Sp
(P) (+ Sb) ( + C)7. Con
) Pa ( + P)8. P
- Transformations
11. (Chi) Sp ( + & | )
1 2  3
13. Pa + Ch
m 
f i
■4*
^l-f-3+4+INL (unless 1 and 
3 are both null)
^ HLF + Sb
- Lexical-insertion Rules
20. INL *g55|>-ln-law
21. HLF H=E^half~
2bb
26. (Sp &) Pa & Sb (& Sp) & 5 l l r }
jfm =
1 -p ~
I" '
28. Ch sondaughter
mpq qk 9 y-' brother
29* Sb & jf = #  sister
Applying some of these rules we can produce the following
sample derivations (loc.cit.: 161 ff.):
T half-sister'
R
1 — > Con & f 
7 —  ^Pa + Ch & f 
1 3 = ^ H L F  & Sb & f
21 ieee#  half- & Sb & f
29 Era—* half- & sister
’uncle'
MoBr, FaBr 
R
1  > Con & m
7 — + Sb & m
8  >Pa + Sb & m
26 uncle
MoSiHu, FaSiHu 
R
1  >Af & m
2  >RP & m
4 ---^ p + Sb + Sp & m
8 —— > Pa + Sb + Sp & m 
2 6 uncle
’son-in-law1 
R
1 ---> Af & in
2 -->RCh & m
6 -->Ch + .Sp & m
XI ^  Ch & m & XNL 
20 = s ^ C h  & m & -in-law 
28 e=rfr^  son & -in-law
The two derivations of 'uncle* show how this analysis 
deals with ambiguity of terms. Variance in usage could 
be handled by means of optional rules.
The rules given by Bock and Straight are not 
complete, they do not cover all possible cases of 
extended usage, as Straight admits. E.g. as the rules 
stand they would not generate the terms nephew or niece 
for the child of a half-sibling (loc.cit.: 165). There 
is no reason to doubt, however, that the rules could be 
developed to cover such usage. There are other restrictions 
to which he admits which are of more interest. The rules 
as given are insufficient to explain syntactic facts. He 
gives the example of "wife’s brother" vs. "brother-in-law", 
seemingly identical expressions. Yet, one can say: "My 
wife’s brother gave her a present", intending her to refer 
back to wife. This reference is excluded in the paraphrase: 
"My brother-in-law gave her a present". This would seem 
to be an example of the phenomenon of "anaphoric islands" 
one of the problems which generative semantics was intended 
to deal with (cf,, e.g. Leech, 1974: 338). But it is 
not so clear how one could block the choice of this type 
of alternative designation within the framework of the 
present analysis. It is just one more manifestation of 
the limitations of what I have called "minimal meaning", 
i.e. definitions on a genealogical basis only (see above 
4.3.1). Such kin-type definitions make it difficult to 
distinguish between "wife’s brother" and "brother-in-law". 
Both Bock (loc.cit.: 5) and Straight (loc.cit.: 165) ~ 
the latter in stronger terms than the former - indicate 
that a genealogical model will never be sufficient to
describe adequately actual usage of kin terms. They are 
thinking at this point less of syntactic problems such 
as pronominal reference than of the question of connot­
ation .
Expressive and pragmatic connotations often 
take precedence over genealogical significations. Such 
connotations, too', constitute a kind of meaning which 
must find a place in a semantic description. Relegating 
non-genealogical usage to an area of associated meaning 
is, In Straight’s view, rather uninformative.
The transformational-generative analysis proposed 
by Bock and Straight would seem to be a valid alternative 
to other rule-based types of analysis, nothing more, 
nothing less. Each type has its own special interest: 
relational analysis approaches the subject from the way 
we reckon kinship, equivalence analysis insists on the 
hierarchical structure of the domain and the relations 
obtaining between primary and secondary senses of kin- 
types, while transformational-generative analysis concen­
trates chiefly on the potentially infinite number of 
relationships, the open-endedness of the field of kin-types, 
and relates this to the limited number of kin terms avail­
able. Transformational analysis achieves its aim by 
treating kinship structure as a grammar with non-terminal 
elements, taxonomic rules, transformations, and lexical- 
insertion rules. We should not, however, draw too qlose a 
parallel with the original meaning of these notions and 
their mutual order and relations. For where lexical insertion 
takes place, what the transformations operate upon, and 
whether there is a taxonomic base component are highly
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sensitive and crucial questions in the present-day 
debates among transformational grammarians. The 
discussion of kin terms within the generative framework 
is very much linked with these discussions* The last 
developments in the study of English kinship terminology 
take us right into the heart of this discussion.
The discussion of the place and function of 
semantics in a transformational grammar has crystallized 
around the notions of interpretive and generative semantics, in 
terpretive semantics recognises a base component which has 
the deep structure as output. This deep structure is 
semantically interpreted by the semantic component. The 
lexical items inserted in the deep structure are in the 
form of sets of distinctive features. Only after the 
lexical insertion do transformations apply, though in 
the Extended Standard Theory some aspects of the surface 
structure, notably word order, can also serve as input 
into the semantic component; semantic interpretation thus 
can take place at more than one stage. The semantic 
component translates deep structures into symbolic repres­
entations of the meaning of sentences. Into semantic 
representations.
In generative semantics the structures generated 
in the base component are semantic representations, not 
deep structures. The claim is that not only sentences 
with the same deep structure have the same meaning but 
that the reverse is equally true: that sentences which 
have the same meaning share the same underlying structure.
This underlying structure must be understood as more abstract 
in nature than the deep structure of the Standard Theory.
Generative semanticists claim to be able to establish 
wider generalizations. In the Standard Theory trans­
formations were used to account for non-lexical synonymy; 
in generative semantics the same means are also used to 
describe lexical synonymy. Internal semantic structure 
is, in other words, no different from sentence structure 
generally. Consequently this semantic structure can be 
represented in the form of tree structures instead of 
sets of distinctive features. It is inappropriate here 
to examine all details of this discussion and the various 
arguments used. Whatever either side may claim, it would 
seem to me that the matter is still wide open. Moreover, 
though the cover terms ’interpretive' and 'generative' 
semantics have their use, It .is not always easy to char­
acterize the position of any single author in such a clear- 
cut manner, nor do all scholars who defend either inter­
pretive or generative semantics agree in every detail on 
the theory they support.
All those who have discussed how to account for 
English kinship terminology within a generative framework 
would seem to favour on the whole the position of generative 
semantics. But before I come to those accounts it might be 
useful and interesting to refer briefly to a study by 
Chomsky in which he uses kinship terms as illustration of a 
particular point, and to a reaction by P. Seuren on Chomsky's 
understanding of the meaning of kin terms. ’
In order to prove that semantic representation 
must be different from the deep structure of sentences 
Chomsky develops an argument in which he gives the following 
three expressions (Chomsky, 1972; 85 f.) :
(1) John's uncle
(2) the person who is the brother of John's 
mother or father or the husband of the 
sister of John's mother or father
(3) the person who is the son of one of John’s 
grandparents or the husband of a daughter 
of one of John's grandparents, but not his 
father
Generative semantics would allegedly claim that these 
three expressions must have the same semantic represent­
ation. But when each of these expressions is inserted 
into the following context:
(4) Bill realized that the bank robber was _____
the resulting sentences will not be paraphrases; given 
the right conditions each might be true and the other
two false. Consequently these three sentences have 
different semantic representations. Standard Theory 
accounts for this fact by deriving (l)-(3) from three 
different deep structures. It further assigns such in­
trinsic lexical semantic properties to the verb realize 
that the meaning of sentences with this verb (and other 
similar verbs) of the form UNP realizes that pu depends 
not only on the semantic interpretation of p but also on 
the deep structure of p. Seuren (1975: 113 ff.) does not 
think that these objections by Chomsky against generative 
semantics can be upheld. He claims that Chomsky' s .'reason­
ing is based on two misunderstandings. Firstly, there Is 
a confusion between the meaning of p and what p entails. 
The truth of a proposition p can contain the truth of a 
complicated disjunction as the truth of (1) entails the
the lengthy disjunction of (2) and (3). But it would 
be absurd to require that the complete disjunction be 
included in the semantic representation of a sentence.
There is no reason why somebody who "realizes that p" 
should also be aware of all the propositions that follow 
logically from p : meaning and entailment must be kept 
separate. Secondly, the or disjunction in (2) and (3) is 
not necessarily part of the semantic representation of 
uncle, it can very well be considered to be part of the meta­
language of the grammar in the sense that the grammar would 
specify that the term uncle can be inserted into the phrase- 
marker to replace either the subphrase-marker "brother of x ’s 
mother" or the subphrase-marker "brother of x ’s father" or
... etc. Or^  does not normally form part of the semantic
specification of lexical elements except perhaps in the case 
of homonyms. Seuren does not believe that uncle is homonymic 
in any of our West European languages: it forms one coherent 
notion. He sees no problem in explaining how the sentences 
resulting from the insertion of (1), (2), or (3) respectively 
into (4) differ in meaning. Only In the case of (1) can the 
normal semantic realization for uncle be used. In the other 
two cases, what Bill realized was the truth of a rather 
complicated disjunction, a sentence in other words with as 
highest predicate the semantic verb or, and not ’uncle’.
Chomsky has one further reference to kinship terms
in the book quoted (1972: 143, note 20):
"If a child were born to a brother-sister 
marriage, the father would not be its 
uncle. Laws against incest is [sic] no 
part of the meaning of uncle. Therefore Q 
[I.e., the subphrase-marker generating uncle] 
must contain the information that an uncle is
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distinct from the father, a fact 
that requires still more elaborate 
collapsing rules".
It would seem that the information that an uncle is
distinct from the father will have to be part of the
semantic description of 1 uncle* anyhow and this is
bound to bring about some extra complication in any
system. But more interesting is Seuren's comment (loc.
cit.; 116) that Chomsky’s observation only goes to prove
that objective reality is less relevant for the way we
speak than the way our cognitive system is organised.
In the cognitive world of the child of a brother-sister
marriage the father is not an uncle. This is not a
linguistic fact but a fact of cognitive reality. It is
only this cognitive reality, at work in our language,
which can explain changes in the range of application of
certain terms. Consequently, this cognitive reality will
have to be taken into account in a semantic study of
kinship.
One of the first linguists to feel dissatisfied 
with the semantic approach within the Standard Theory 
was Jeffrey S. Gruber (of. Gruber, 1965)* Gruber began 
to give the semantic-syntactic information in the form of 
a true structure which consisted of syntactic categories 
as well as feature-like subcategorizations. Lexical elem­
ents are not all inserted at the same point in the deriv­
ation and not necessarily before the transformations are 
applied. The lexical attachment Is polycategorial, i.e. 
a lexical item may be attached to more than one terminal 
node at the same time. In later developments of generative 
semantics lexicalization will take place whenever a suitable
configuration occurs in the normal course of the 
transformation processes; the separate lexical component 
will then have disappeared altogether.
\
In his transformational analysis of #Hoa 
Kinship Terms Gruber draws up the following base struct­
ure containing the categories with which categorical 
meaning assignment takes place (Gruber, 1973: 440):
N
(EXTENDED)
(COMPEER) SELF
OFFSPRING
PARENT
OLDER J
MALE
FEMALE
where COMPEER stands for "kin on the same relative age
level (as a given kin)" (loc.cit.: 443)? and I and J
respectively for ”on father’s side” and "on mother’s
side” (loc.cit.: 435)*
”The categorial specifications of 
meaning are to be regarded as the 
environments (with a constituent 
structure as yet undescribed) in 
which the respective kinship terms 
are attached to the base, consisting 
of categorial constituent structures 
generated by a system of rewrite rules.
The lexicon consists of the set.of 
lexical entries, each of which is a 
term or item paired with its environ­
ment for attachment” (loc.cit.: 438).
Casson has tried to show that - though the basic 
orientation is very different - the approaches of trans­
formational linguists and of anthropologists have much 
In common fundamentally and are complementary in a way 
(Casson, 1975). He has adapted Gruber's base structure 
for English kin terminology:
N(EXTENDED) 'KIN
/l i n e a l1" \ 
(COLLATERAL)
PARENT 
SIBLING > 
CHILD j
(MALE \  
/FEMALEJ
and given the following samples of lexical entries:
LINEAL- PARENT
N
i
N
/ - I
KIN : EXTENDED KIN
M
COLLATERAL PARENT j ; COLLATERAL PARENT
MALE i ‘ MALE
^father# #uncle# #great~uncle#
(cf. Casson, 1975: 324 f.).
Comparing this Gruber-type of analysis with 
anthropological studies Casson points out first of all 
the similarity between the semantic categories of the 
lexical entries in the transformational analysis and 
the semantic components of componential analysis. Gruber 
himself calls the semantic categories "specificatory 
categories rather than distinctive features" (1973: 438) 
since it is their presence or absence which specifies 
meaning, not a particular value of an obligatorily present 
feature. Though the exact status of semantic features or 
components will probably differ slightly from author to 
author there can be little doubt that there Is considerable 
similarity. Consequently Casson would seem to be right in 
saying that anthropologically inspired componential 
analyses are useful and relevant to linguistics. The 
second aspect on which he comments, viz. the optional 
inclusion of such categories as EXTENDED, brings him to a
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similar conclusion: categories of this kind deal in a 
succinct way with the facts accounted for in detail by 
the rules of equivalence analysis and the extensionist 
theory.
The relevance of the anthropological or ethno- 
linguistic analyses for linguistics may seem clear.
Their position vis-a-vis linguistics, however, is less 
clear. R.W. Langacker, for example, agrees - as we shall 
see shortly - that equivalence rules of some kind are 
necessary but he considers them to be ejgtralinguistic 
conventions (1969: 848). However, I would first like to 
present another attempt at bridging the gap between anthro­
pological and generative approaches made by Paul Kay (Kay, 
1974) . Kay explicitly sides with the generative semant- 
icists: he does not think that sets of features are power­
ful enough to account for the structure of the meanings of 
English kinship terms (loc.cit.: 120).
An analysis which would capture what is known 
about English kinship semantics from existing analyses 
and bridge the gap between anthropological and generative 
approaches will according to Kay have to satisfy four 
conditions. First it must have the capacity to generate 
an indefinitely large number of semantic representations, 
it must have the recursive capacity which, for example, 
componential analysis misses. Next it must make explicit 
all instances of co-variation between sound and meaning, 
i.e. it must specify the meaning of the composing parts 
of compound kin terms and show the meaning of the compounds 
to be composed of the meaning of the parts. Furthermore 
an analysis should account for the minor variations between
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speakers and even between varying usages of a single 
speaker by showing how meaning may be extended, or 
not extended, in varying ways. Finally an analysis 
must provide an account of the relations of paraphrase, 
entailment, contradiction, sequitur, etc., that obtain 
between the sentences which contain kin terms (cf. loc. 
cit. ; 121).
Conceptually English kinship has two primitive
terms, "offspring of" and "spouse of", plus the predicates
"male" and "female". The notion of parenthood which is
presupposed by this and is used in genealogical reckoning
is not a simple but a complex notion, contained in what he
calls the "Rule of true and legitimate parenthood" (loc.
cit.: 123 f.). This rule expresses the fact that our
normal genealogical reckoning is based on the assumption
that all parents are true and legitimate parents except
when preceded by the rule suspenders "step-" and "half-".
It is Kay^s way of restating what many scholars before him
have said, viz. that kinship reckoning is basically concerned
with normal genealogical relations, with biology rather
than with sociology so to speak. The notation Kay uses
was developed by John Atkins. Any blood relationship is
analysed as a sequence of "child-of" relations (Q) followed
by a sequence of "parent-of" relations (P) and is established
by counting the ascending and descending steps to and from
the common ancestor (cf. loc. cit.: 124). The general form
for any consanguineal relation is Q1 . A restriction
must be added to rule out the form P^. The nota.tion is
not a relative product: it may not be so to exclude the
1 1
possibility of doubling back to an individual. E.g. Q- P
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must be sibling and cannot be self,
Kayfs analysis proceeds in three steps; basic 
predicatesj immediate derivatives* and predicates derived 
via functors (loc.cit.: 125 ff.).
Basic Predicates
Glass Notational expression Primitive Predicate
of English
0 Q° P° SELF
I Q° p1 PARENT-CHILD
II Q1 P1 SIBLING
III
1-1a P2 NUNCLE-NIBLING1
IV Q2 P2 COUSIN
Immediate derivatives
Class I P(ARENT) (x,y) * PARENT-CHILD (x,y)
CHILD (y5x) just if P (x,y)
MOTHER (x*y) just if P (x,y) and FEMALE (x) 
etc. for FATHER* SON* and DAUGHTER.
Class II BROTHER (x*y) just if SIBLING (x,y) and MALE (x) 
SISTER (x 4y) just if SIBLING (x,y) and FEMALE(x) 
Class III NUNCLE (xay) =• NUNCLE-NIBLING (x,y)
NIBLING (y*x) just if NUNCLE (x,y)
AUNT (x,y) just if NUNCLE (x3y) and FEMALE (x) 
etc. for UNCLE* NIECE * and NEPHEW.
Predicates derived via functors.“
Rule 1: GREAT (Q1 P ^ ) just if Q1 PJ*+1 i ^ l
or phrased differently:
X - Q1 PJ* - Y X - GREAT - Q1 P^ ”1 - Y i-^1
j >i+l
1. NUNCLE is the cover term for uncle and aunt* NIBLING
for nephew and niece.
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As long as j-1 is still greater than i+1 the rule 
is reapplied, yielding GREAT - GREAT - Q1 PJ* "2 , etc., 
till the exponent on P equals i+1. Then the rule 
is blocked.
Similar rules deal successively with STEP-, HALF-,
IN-LAW, BY-MARRIAGE, -TH, and TIMES REMOVED.
These rules account for the underlying semantic 
facts regardless of the variation in surface lexical 
Items as used by different speakers. It is by these 
rules that the first three conditions laid down by Kay at 
the beginning of his article are met while the kind of 
notation adopted automatically achieves an explicit state­
ment of relations of paraphrase and the like, his fourth 
condition. As he admits, however (loc.cit.: 130), a very 
important thing remains to be done, in fact an essential 
point I would have thought if one really wants to claim 
to have bridged the gap between anthropologists (or lingu­
ists with an ethnological interest for that matter) and 
transformationalists in their approaches to kinship termin­
ology. One will have to show how to connect these semantic 
representations directly to what we know of the structure 
of English sentences, containing kinship expressions, be it 
via projection rules, meaning postulates, equivalence rules, 
or ordinary transformational rules. However, because the 
semantic section of transformational grammar is at present 
in a state of uncertainty and upheaval, any proposal for 
a solution to a particular question is almost bound to 
become an issue in the methodological debate. In those 
circumstances it may take quite some time before this final 
condition is met to everybody's satisfaction.
Ronald W. Langacker's interest in English 
kinship terms is linked with his examination of lexical 
evidence for the mirror image convention (Langacker, 1969). 
Though his concern was explicitly with a type of analysis 
which formed part of a transformational grammar, he 
recognized that his rules and the feature definitions of 
previous approaches both intended to capture the same 
generalizations and that, consequently, the two types of 
approach were not as different as they might appear at 
first sight (loc.cit.: 849). He was critical of compon­
ential analysis on some points, though, first because it 
took the molecular rather than the atomic approach, a 
point which we shall come to shortly; secondly because 
the features it used were perhaps not unanalysable and 
because it did not show that some kinship terms are more 
closely related than others. This last weakness Is really
a consequence of the* minimal-meaning approach of compon­
ential analysis (loc.cit.: 850 f.; cf. also above 4.3.1).
Langacker holds that semantic representations should not
be conceived of as bundles of semantic features but rather
as structures with sub-parts ordered and connected in a
specific way (loc.cit.: 845). His views on the nature of
the lexicon of a language place him squarely in the camp
of the generative semanticists as he states explicitly:
"Lexical items are then conceived as 
transformational rules that associate 
phonological matrices (together with 
grammatical and other Information) 
with sub-trees of the input semantic 
structure" (loc.cit.: 847).
Assuming that the basic semantic elements are 
PARENT, CHILD, SIBLING, SPOUSE, MALE, and FEMALE one can 
think of two possible ways of representing those structures.
One can set up another basic element, 'FOSS' (possessive), 
that links the elementary semantic units in an ordered 
structure; or alternatively one can treat the elements 
PARENT, SIBLING, etc., not as noun-like entities but as 
relations on the semantic level (cf. loc.cit.: 845 f»)*
E.g. "Bill's cousin" would be either:
(1) Bill 'POSS' PARENT 'POSS' SIBLING 'POSS' CHILD 
or: (2) w such that w CHILD x; x SIBLING y; y PARENT z; 
and z = Bill.
Both structures are ordered structures, both use the same 
semantic units, both have the same element as the 'head' 
of the structure, viz. CHILD.
In the framework of generative semantics one 
can then expect lexical transformations of the kind which 
follows (loc.cit.: 74?) :
(T 1) X, PARENT + 'POSS' 1 SIBLING + 'POSS' + CHILD ,Y#>1, cousin ,
31 2
(T 2) X, MALEPARENT 3 Y -==>1, father, 3 
1 2  3
Langacker also discusses the question of equivalence rules 
and extensions (loc.cit.: 847 f.). He admits that these 
equivalence rules are absolutely necessary In order to 
account for certain types of kin classification. He is 
less certain, however, about the precise status of these 
rules. He doubts whether they can be interpreted as 
syntactic transformations and - at least for the moment - 
prefers to look upon them as "extra-linguistic conventions 
that define the classes of kin relations considered equiva­
lent in a culture". I hope to show below (cf. especially 
6.1.3 and 6.2.3) bow equivalence in kin type classification
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can in fact be given a linguistic interpretation by 
linking it to the deictic nature of this part of language.
The extensions by means of compounding of nouns 
make Langacker opt for atomic rather than molecular 
lexical insertion rules, if only because the compounding 
process is in principle unlimited in languages like 
English. This is why componential analysis was criticised 
on this point: pushed tc its logical conclusion the mole­
cular approach is impossible in principle and it does not 
capture possible generalizations which transformational 
rules do capture.
A particularly powerful way of explicating 
generalizations is the mirror image convention which
"allows two rules to be collapsed into 
a single rule when they are mirror images 
of one another - i.e. , when the terms 
of their structure indices and output 
sequences are identical, but occur in 
exactly reverse order" (loc.cit.: 844).
The mirror image rules will be marked here with an asterisk.
The clearest example of a mirror image rule in
English kinship terminology is the rule which inserts -in-law
(loc.cit.: 851 ff.). In order to be able to deal with this
instance we must first return to our four basic semantic
elements, PARENT, CHILD, SIBLING, and SPOUSE. Of these
four PARENT and CHILD are more similar to one another than
to either of the other two and are clearly connected In some
way. If we define PARENT as [+ lineal, f parent] and CHILD
as [+ lineal, - parent] we can Indicate this similarity to
one another and difference from both the other elements by
[+ lineal]. This will be the feature we shall use In the
formulation of the rules whenever we want to specify PARENT
or CHILD as opposed bo all other kin relations.
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The term brother-in-law is ambiguous : it 
can either be a spouse’s male sibling or a sister’ s 
male spouse, with their respective underlying structures:
(3) SPOUSE 'POSS'
I o  x  J d  JLj I m  Kji 
L~" ' ' .
(4) SIBLING ’POSS’ MALE
SPOUSE
Other possible meanings of brother-in-law (WiSiHu, HuSiHu, 
BrWiHu, etc.) are disregarded for the moment but it would 
be possible to integrate them into these rules. The source 
of brother in the underlying structures Is given in the 
underlined capitals: the placing of the feature MALE does 
not cause a problem as in English the surface head: noun of 
a kinship expression always inherits the gender of the 
rightmost element of the underlying semantic structure.
The non-underlined portions must, as a consequence, be 
the source of -in-law'.
The following transformation rules will insert 
-in-law into (3) and (4):
(T 3) X, SPOUSE, ’POSS’3 SIBLING, Y=4>1, 0 , 0, 4-in-law, 5 
1 2 3 4 5
(T 4) Y, SIBLING, ’ POSS’, SPOUSE, X ==>5 s 4-in-law, 0, 0, 1 
5 4 3 2 1
These two T-rules can be collapsed by mirror image convention 
(T 5)*X, SPOUSE, ’POSS’, SIBLING, Y=^l, 0, 0, 4-in-law, 5
1 2 3 4 5
Disregarding the features O  parent] and [~ parent]"and 
just using the feature [+ lineal] as explained above, we 
can draw up a similar mirror image rule deriving father- 
in-law and son-in-law:
(T-6)*X, SPOUSE, 1 POSS 1 , [ + lineal] , Y=^l, 0,0,4-in-law ,5
1 2  3 4 5
Finally we can collapse (T 5) and (T 6):
[s i b l i n g
(T 7)*X, SPOUSE, 1 POSS r , V  + iineal]^*^1* 0 >0 » ^-^ - l a w ,5
1 2  3 4 5
In a similar way one could analyse the special 
relationship which is felt intuitively to exist between 
uncle, aunt , nephew, and niece, a relationship which 
Romney and D fAndrade characterised by the feature [collateral] 
(cf. Langacker, 19&9: 353 ff.). A simple way of showing 
this relationship is by drawing up lexical transformation 
rules for these four terms: all four rules will use the 
elements [ + parent], 'POSS' SIBLING, and MALE/FEMALE in 
different order. Here too it is possible to propose a 
mirror image rule. ’’POSS' and SIBLING are the common 
elements which set the group of four apart from all others.
To distinguish the four from one another one can write a 
mirror image rule which will mark the particular underlying 
structure by a new element to be Introduced, vis. [+ oblique]. 
Together with [Flineal] and MALE/FEMALE this rule will 
derive the four terms, e.g.
(5) SIBLING 'POSS' FEMALICHILD =? (T rule "oblique")
niece
FEMALE 
+ oblique 
CHILD
Another instance of mirror image would be the 
rules of grand- insertion. One simple transformation rule 
will account for the derivation of both grandfather and
more rules will give granduncle and grandnephew. Using 
again the feature [oblique] and the alpha notation these 
two rules can be collapsed into a mirror image rule, 
and eventually there is a way of collapsing this mirror 
image rule with the earlier rule for grandfather/grandson.
There is no doubt whatsoever that allowing 
transformation rules to apply to lexical elements results 
in a clear insight into certain aspects of this part of 
the vocabulary of English. This type of rule is different 
from the equivalence rules as proposed by Lounsbury: yet,
I think It is going too far to call Lounsbury's rules 
extra- or pre-linguistic. It is true that Lounsburyfs 
position has much to do with what is an anthropological 
debate about the genealogical or social basis of kinship 
reckoning. Yet, his rules also deal - and deal adequately 
- with linguistic elements. Certainly, his rules are not 
an integral part of a linguistic theory in the way and to 
the extent that LangackerTs rules are part of his brand of 
transformational grammar. The significance of this differ­
ence, however. Is greatly diminished by the uncertainty 
about the shape transformational grammar might take: at
present it does not seem possible to predict whether trans­
formational grammar will develop more along the lines of 
the Extended Standard Theory or Generative Semantics and 
for that matter whether transformational grammar will be 
the dominant theory.
As for Lounsburyfs anthropological interest I can 
only say that I, too, believe that anthropological factors 
are important for the understanding of kinship terminology. 
To be aware of the anthropological Implications and to make
one's position In this respect known and explicit is a 
positive value whatever option one takes. Kay did make 
his option clear: a genealogical point of view starting 
from the nuclear family. Seuren and Langacker unfortun­
ately did not make clear in an explicit way where they 
stand in this matter though, as we saw, they did make 
some fairly important observations - on homonymy and 
equivalence rules respectively - which would have gained 
by showing an awareness of the related anthropological 
problems and Implications and by making clear which position 
they take on these matters.
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5 * Evaluation: Criticisms, Problems, and Questions,
5.1. Introductory Remarks.
C. Hockett once remarked: “Ethnography without 
linguistics is blind. Linguistics without ethnography 
is sterile" (cf. Hoijer, ed. , 195*1: 225). This remark, 
made in a discussion about Whorf's theory of linguistic 
relativity, was meant to express an Intuitively felt 
conviction that the relativity hypothesis was worth 
pursuing notwithstanding all the theoretical problems 
as well as the practical dangers and pitfalls. As a 
matter of fact this Idea was explored long before Whorf, 
e.g. by J. de Josselin de Jong (1913, e.g. page 212) in 
a study which he entitled "ethno-psychological". He later 
adopted the term ethnolinguistics which he defined as 
follows:
"De studie van de functionele samenhang 
- zowel synchronisch als diachronisch - 
van de linguistische en niet-linguistische 
aspecten der cultuur" (de Josselin de Jong,
1951: 161),
’the study of the functional connection - both synchronic 
and diachronic ~ between the linguistic and non-linguistic 
aspects of culture1. De Josselin de Jong's 1951 article 
is still tentative after a life-time of high quality 
scholarly work. When one looks back over more than a 
century of research into kinship and kinship terminology, . 
of ethnolinguistic research, any conclusion seems bound to 
be equally tentative.
Some authors take a very gloomy view of what 
has been achieved. R. Keesing, for example, said at a 
special occasion marking the Morgan Centennial Year:
"Had W.H.R. Rivers addressed a similar 
gathering fifty years ago, he could 
have argued convincingly that Morgan's 
vision of kinship terminology as an 
anthropological Rosetta Stone was on the 
verge of fulfilment. Yet after a second 
half century of concerted effort, we 
apparently have not yet learned how a 
people's kinship terminology enciphers 
the structure of their social universe.
The code is not yet broken, the mapping 
of the social order not yet understood"
(Keesing, 1972: 17).
This opinion Is an intentional exaggeration towards the 
pessimistic side. It must be quite clear, however, from 
all that precedes that it is not possible to select one 
solution as the definitive one, as totally satisfactory 
In every respect. I have already quoted Kronenfeld's 
opinion (cf. above end of 4.4.3) that the facts seem to 
force us into accepting that alternative forms of analysis 
may be directed towards different goals: a different 
goal may well require a somewhat different analysis. Jean 
Jackson seems to take a similar view in her analysis of 
Bara, kinship terminology ( 1977). She examines this termin­
ology by means of three different approaches to kinship 
semantics, the genealogical approach, the alliance theory 
approach, and the sociogeographieal approach which is 
primarily concerned with the local distinction between "own 
group" and "other group":
"These analytic approaches are a first 
attempt at specifying three postulated 
semantic domains in the Bara language.
Although the approaches and the domains 
they represent are analytically contrasted 
with one another in this paper, I do not : 
feel that one of them must eventually be 
chosen as absolutely correct" (loc.cit.: 83).
Scheffler takes a different view (1972: 323 ff-)» He
argues that there is such a variety of alternative models
that one can be excused for wondering whether to take any
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of it seriously. There is, however* in his opinion a
reason for this :
irIt has not often been made clear why 
a particular method has been chosen* or 
why it should be chosen* or how it 
relates to a conception of the nature 
of the object under analysis. In other 
words* too many studies of kinship semant­
ics have been based on ad hoc* unsystemat- 
ic* and largely implicit semantic theory 
or ~ what Is worse - on no clearly 
semantic conceptions at all’1 (loc. cit.:
324) .
He goes on to argue that if one accepts that his basic 
assumptions about polysemy* primary meaning* and extension 
of meaning are correct* it becomes possible to judge the 
relative validity of the different methods.
I would agree with Scheffler about the importance 
of one’s basic assumptions. This is* as a matter of fact, 
exactly what I have been trying to do: to unravel not only 
the techniques developed for analysing kinship systems but 
also the background to each particular form of analysis.
As Scheffler points out* and as I have shown in detail* 
the semantic theory was mostly Implicit in some cases or 
simply deficient in others. My aim has been to let each 
method speak for itself since I believe that the questions 
a given form of analysis tries to answer are of equal if 
not greater interest than the solutions proposed.
After having studied the main representatives 
of the study of kinship and kinship terminology since 
Morgan I have come to the conclusion that particular 
answers are arrived at because of the kind of questions 
which were being asked; and on the whole these answers are 
valid and reasonably good answers to those questions even 
though I may have been able* with the benefit of hindsight*
to discover certain omissions* inconsistencies * or 
weaknesses. I have, therefore, no difficulty In agreeing 
with Kronenfeld and Jackson that there probably are no 
absolutely correct answers. There are correct answers 
to specific questions. Scheffler - spoke about the 
relative validity of the different methods In the light 
of the criteria of the extensionist theory; I would 
rather speak of the relative validity of all solutions.
I would now like to examine a bit more closely 
some of the fundamental questions connected with the 
study of kinship terminology and try to establish some 
of the remaining areas of uncertainty. This may lead us 
eventually to consider kinship terminology in a different 
way, to restate the question .of the relation between 
language and culture, exemplified by kinship terminology.
In a new way.
5*2. Some Problems and Questions arising from the history 
of the study of kinship terminology.
We are assuming that the theories discussed In 
Chapters 2, 33 and 4 have, on the whole, proposed valid 
answers to questions asked in a particular way about the 
connection between language and culture. Since the 
questions were determined by a specific Interest the 
answers were bound to be partial, and at times they were 
not quite perfect even within their self-imposed limitations. 
If one were to judge the achievements of one century of 
kinship studies in absolute terms the verdict could be 
rather negative. No single unequivocal answer has come 
out of it, indeed there is not even agreement on whether
one should expect a causal connection between kinship 
terminology and social structure (and if so which would 
be cause, and which effect), or whether one should be 
content to establish co-variation. Some theories are 
so wide-ranging or so abstract that there is little 
hope of ever testing and proving them in a comprehensive 
way. Other approaches have strictly limited objectives; 
at times, however, their preoccupation with exact detail 
becomes so great that the wider view, necessary for an 
integrated language and culture study, is no longer 
considered. It will be clear that the first group of 
theories forms part of the work done in a perspective of 
causality, be it historical or structural-functional, 
while the second group consists mainly of types of formal 
analyses.
5.2.1. Causal historical explanations.
Scheffler (1972: 312 f.) considered one of the 
major weaknesses of the historical approach to be an 
implicit assumption of monosemy. Though he does not give 
much attention in his review of kinship semantics to the 
historical approach and his choice of the word 'monosemy1 
is clearly inspired by his personal view on the Importance 
of polysemy in the study of kinship terminology, there is 
an element of'truth in this. All too often scholars were 
led by the assumption "one label - one thing", the .-two 
being isomorphic at least at the outset.
When we are talking about evolution we must be 
very careful in establishing a connection between terms 
and social categories or concepts. One may well be justified
in seeing social development In terms of a hypothesis 
of a very simple beginning with a gradual increase In 
complexity and diversity.
There are at least some indications In the 
historical facts at our disposal that development of 
social life does imply a growth in complexity. The 
distinction simple vs. complex society may therefore be 
acceptable in social science. As far as language is 
concerned we have no indication what soever for degrees 
of structural complexity so that a simple parallel devel­
opment becomes hard to imagine let alone to reconstruct. 
Indeed, when we mention the word "reconstruction" it must 
be remembered that reconstructed forms do not represent 
a previously existing reality: they are merely a theoret­
ical statement of an alleged relationship between histor­
ically attested forms. This is why evolutionary solutions 
are unacceptable even without taking into account unaccept­
able prejudices about e.g. original promiscuity (cf. above 
2.1.1 and 2).
Even if one does not pretend to go right back 
to the origins but simply wants to explain the structure 
of a terminology in relation to the social structure at a 
given moment in history it is not always easy to establish 
the presence of the hypothesised correlation. It is in 
connection with this difficulty that we find the explanation 
of cultural lag:
"A change in social structure which 
significantly alters the social equal­
izers and differentials affecting 
particular kin-types will be followed 
by adaptive changes In the pertinent 
kinship terms only after a lapse of 
time" (Murdock, 19^9: 137)*
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Paul Friedrich (1967) has made a study of the change 
in Russian kinship and kin terminology from the Tsarist 
to the Soviet period. His assumption is that the change 
in social system "precedes and predetermines change in 
the corresponding semantic systems" (loc.cit.: 31). The 
fact that there is no perfect fit at a given moment can 
be explained as having three causes: the inadequacy of 
the symbolic resources to express all nuancesj the fact 
that language forces us to overrepresent or underdifferent- 
iate reality; and finally the fact that "the linguistic 
system always lags behind the evolving natural and cultural 
environments to which it is meant to relate" (ibid.: 32).
He goes on to say that "fundamental changes in any basic 
social institution should be reflected within a generation 
or two by correspondingly fundamental changes in the 
semantic system". An example of such a change would be 
the disappearance of the dimension of the sex of the 
linking relative with regard to collateral and affinal 
kinsmen in the Russian kinship system* due to the diminish­
ing importance of the extended family in favour of the 
nuclear family. This trend is well attested in Western 
Europe as a whole: the four Latin terms avunculus * patruus * 
amit a * and matertera are now reduced to only two in the 
vocabulary of many European languages* e.g. English uncle 
and aunt.
I do not want to challenge these facts* on the 
contrary* I think they are important. But it is not always 
the case that changes in the social system are followed by 
this kind of changes in the kinship nomenclature. E.Dozier 
has discussed an interesting case which illustrates this
294
point * the ca.se of the Arizona Tewa (Dozier , 1955).
They used to have a bilateral, generational kinship 
system which the related Tewa from New Mexico still 
have. The Arizona Tewa, however, moved away from New 
Mexico around the year 1696 to Arizona where they 
settled down and developed, under the influence of their 
new neighbours, the Hopi Indians, a matrilineal structure: 
their kinship terms which were formerly adjusted to a 
bilateral system were now made to fit into a lineal system 
and changed in meaning as a result.^" We do know in 
this case how to explain the discrepancy between social 
system and kin terminology: my point is that if the one 
can change without the other, there can be no certainty 
about a necessary causal link existing between social 
system and kin terms. Our certainty does not go beyond 
the observed co-variation in specific, documented cases.
Another reason for being extremely prudent is 
the uncertainty about the duration of this lag. Friedrich 
speaks of "a generation or two". Two comments come to 
mind here: is there ever any real inadequacy experienced 
by the people In their use of kin terms, and secondly, is 
either the social or the terminological system ever com­
pletely stable and Is it therefore realistic to imagine the 
process as a development in leaps with the terminology 
following the social changes and catching up? As far as 
I can see the answer is negative on both counts. X. do 
not want to deny the value of historical explanations for
1 . e.g., ko* o : New Mexico Tewa: mother's or father's
younger sister. Arizona Tewa: mother's younger sister 
(loc.cit. : 252) .
precise, limited questions but I doubt if it Is mean­
ingful or wise to ask a historical question in order 
to try and find a global solution.
There is another example which illustrates 
my point about limited questions. It concerns single 
factor explanations, i.e. explanations of particular 
ways of classifying relatives by reference to one single 
social practice or fact. This type of explanation is 
found in structural-functional accounts as well: my 
reflections concerning their use in a historical approach 
would be equally valid for those. An example would, for 
example, be Sapir's use of the levirate as the factor 
which explains the terminological equation of step-father 
with uncle, step-mother with aunt, and step-child with 
neppew or niece in certain American Indian languages 
(Sapir, 1916; cf. above 2.4). These explanations, though 
interesting as hypotheses, are very limited since they 
concern themselves with a few terms only. One is not 
really discussing the social relevance of a given kinship 
terminology. Even if one disregards the ethnocentric 
prejudice which sees a need for explanation only for those 
terms which are unusual by our standards, and if one assumes 
that some parts of kinship terminologies are fairly similar 
across many cultures, It would still require some sort of 
explanation in what way and to what extent kinship termin­
ology, and not merely certain kinship terms, can be*said 
to be socially relevant.
5.2.2. Causal structural-functional explanations.
Many of the theories we discussed in Chapter 3
were primarily anthropological theories. Their chief 
interest was culture, culture in the sense of 'the man- 
made part of the environment' as opposed to 'nature1. 
Language was considered to be a part of culture. When 
anthropologists discovered exotic systems of social 
organization and faced the problem of trying to understand 
their structure they would look at the whole of a given 
culture to try and gather whatever information might be 
helpful to them in this analysis. Language - and in the 
case of social structure, kinship terminology - was for 
them a valuable tool to help discover at least some of 
the basic principles which were supposed to govern the 
native ways of classification. Since, therefore, their 
interest was mainly directed,towards social organization 
one would expect that the social structure would, more 
often than not, be seen as the cause and a given type of 
terminology as the effect, the result. Murdock, for 
example, wrote about various forms of social structure 
that they "tend to produce different types of kinship 
terminology" (1949: 180). When one takes into account 
the anthropologists' rather broad view of culture It is 
understandable that they should want to speak of "types", 
i.e. fairly broad generalizations which are not necessarily 
very specific as to details. As, moreover, language was 
studied as a tool one would not expect anthropologists to 
maintain their interest in it when conflicting detail 
would make It more of a troublesome burden than a useful 
tool. Anyhow, exceptions are accepted as Inevitable in 
cross-cultural studies. Kobben made this point very 
strongly in a major study on this question: when there Is
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a rule in anthropology there are bound to be exceptions 
(Kobben , 1967 : *0 •
All this does not mean that no claims are 
ever made for a perfect correlation between social 
structure and kinship terminology. In a fairly recent 
article about the kinship system of the PIramalai Kallars, 
from the Madurai district in Tamil Nadu in India, we 
read;
nThe kinship terminology is a salient 
aspect of the kinship system of the 
Piramalai Kallars. The study of 
the kinship terminology itself will 
sufficiently throw light on how the 
kinship system is structured in the 
Piramalai Kallar community. Kinship 
terminology Is so structured that It 
is in perfect harmony with the kinship 
rules and customs. As a matter of 
fact, it is the kinship rules and 
customs which determine the terminology" 
(Natarajan, 1976: 1*17) •
Without going into detail, the Piramalai Kallar kinship
system is basically characterised by the dichotomization
of the relatives into parallel and cross kin (cf. loc.cit.:
151); this principle works its way through all aspects of
that society including its kinship terminology. Three
generations are affected, as the following tables show:
Generation Parallel kin Cross kin
Same generation 
as Ego
m f m f
annan 
tamp I
akka; 
tankacci
macca:n 
maccunan
matini 
koluntiya:1
Senior gener­
ation appa:eriya-/-
a : 11 a : 
nalla-) 
(periya-/-
ma:man 
nalla-)
at t ai
Junior gener- 
j atIon
makan makal marumakan marumakal
In general category terms this means:
Generation Parallel kin category Cross kin category
Same generation Siblings-in-law
Senior generation Parent s Parent s-in-law
Junior generation Children Children-in-law
1The kin-types of the various terms are as follows : 
annan eB, PBS(e), MZS(e)
tampI yB, FBS(y), MZS(y)
akka: eZ} FBD(e), MZD(e)
takacci yZ, FBD(y), MZD(y)
macca:n MBS(e) , FZS(e), eZH, WeB
maccunan MBS(y),'FZS(y), yZH, WyB
matini MBD(e), FZD(e), eBW, WeZ
koluntiya:1 MBD(y), FZD(y)3 yBW, WyZ 
appa: P, PB, MZH
(perlya-/-nalla-) e/y (obligatorily used with "appa 
a:tta: M, MZ, FEW
(periya-/~nalla-) e/y (obligatorily used with
"a;tta:")
matman MB, FZH, (H/W)F
attai FZ, MBW, (H/W)M
makan S, BS, WZS
makal D, BD, WZD
marumakan ZS, (MBS/FZS)DH, WBS :■
marumakal ZD, (MBS/FZS)SW, WBD 
*
(cf« Natarajan, 1976: It8, 153)•
1. In this kin-type notation Z stands for sister, S for 
son, e for elder and y for younger.
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Assuming that we have here an example of 
perfect correlation, the fact still remains that imper­
fect correlations do occur. Whenever these are found 
to exist different explanations are given for this lack 
of harmony. As we saw before, the traditional explanation 
was to put it down to social change’ this kind of solution 
is still proposed occasionally. For example, when Kay 
(197*1: 123) discussed his basic assumption of true and 
legitimate parenthood (cf. 4,4.4 above) he noticed deviat­
ions from this principle and contradictions, the indeter­
minacy of the data to which Schneider has drawn our 
attention, and he remarked:
"It should be recognized that such 
indeterminacy resides not in the 
language or culture per se, which is 
internally consistent, but from the 
fact (sic) that we have to make do 
with this language-culture in a world 
of social arrangements for which it 
was never made'1.
Another explanation is based on the non-necessary 
character of the correlation between terminology and social 
system, first hinted at by Levi-Strauss and developed 
further by R. Needham and R, McKinley. As we have seen 
(cf. above 3*5.2) Levi-Strauss distinguished "systems des 
appellations" and "systeme des attitudes" (1958: 45 f.): 
the two systems are said to be interdependent in particular 
by providing the possibility of overcoming problems and 
tensions which may exist in one system with the help of 
the other one, not necessarily in the sense that one 
reflects the other,
R. Needham (1966/1967), too, has argued that we 
really have two objects of study: categories, and social
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groups and action. Both can be analysed independently, 
so that there is no need to regard either as peripheral 
to the other. Ideally one would probably want to subsume 
both analyses under one formulation. As things are it 
would seem to be a matter of temperament whether one 
thinks that the more fundamental insight can be expected 
from the study of social organization or from that of the 
organization of categories. But Needham’s empirical tests 
show clearly that a given type of relationship terminology 
is not necessarily correlated with any type of social 
grouping.
It may be worthwhile to continue a line of 
thought of Needham’s - though not necessarily in the 
direction he would have pursued it. Given the limited 
success of attempts to establish a systematic correlation 
between kinship terms, and social structure, would one not 
be justified, indeed well advised, to approach the matter 
from another angle and ask: how do people actually integrate 
the two? Robert McKinley (1971 a) has been thinking along 
similar lines. His starting point was the Crow/Omaha 
terminology systems. These systems are characterized by 
three basic features: cross-cousins are distinct from 
siblings and parallel-cousins; patrilateral cross-cousins 
are distinguished from matrilateral cross-cousins- and - 
most typically - the cross-cousins on one side are classed 
with relatives of an ascending generation while those on 
the other side are classed with relatives of a descending 
generation. Allegedly the general assumption has usually 
been reflectlonist, i.e. an assumption that terminologies 
’reflect* specific attributes of social organization; the
terminologies were considered to be purely passive in
these cases. In the Crow/Omaha cases the specific
attribute in question was taken to be the presence of
unilineal descent: several generations of unilineally
linked relatives are included under a single term. While
this seems a reasonable explanation one is faced with
difficulties when inverting the pattern of investigation
and starting from the presence of a unilineal descent
system. It appears that In the majority of the societies
with such a system we do not find a Crow or Omaha type
of kin terminology. There Is, therefore, no necessity
for a given type of terminology to be the result of a
specific form of social organization. The reflectionist
assumption has clearly taken too simple a view of what
are very complex and subtle relationships of interaction
between terminology and social structure. One question
which is never asked would be what the significance of
non-reflection might be in a given case. It is. obvious,
then, that the whole problem is far from solved. The 
answers given so far are too easy, too mechanistic,
definitely incomplete and perhaps slightly superficial.
The fact remains, however, that kinship nomenclatures
are embedded in social life: that is sufficient reason
for continuing to examine in what way kin terminological
usage mas? be said to be socially determined or relevant.
Another difficult case which has been reported 
by Maurice Bloch concerns kinship terms on Madagascar 
(Bloch, 1971)- The kinship terminology is practically 
uniform throughout the island, but the social organization 
and the kinship systems which use these terms vary to an
extreme degree ; this would seem to deny all connection 
between terminology and social organization. Levi- 
StraussT s and Needhamrs proposals for solving such 
difficulties involved a distinction between two systems, 
a system of behaviour and a system of (terminological) 
categories. Bloch proposes a different distinction. He 
speaks of two ways of considering kinship terms, viz. from 
the point of view of the place they hold in the system of 
values, and from the point of view of which tactical uses 
they can serve. This would clearly take the study of 
meaning of kin terms beyond the denotation of genealogical 
positions’: it would involve strategic use as well as 
denotation of already existing roles, and kinship terms, 
when considered as value-judgements, may well contain 
elements which need a much wider framework than merely the 
realm of kinship in order to be defined properly (cf. below 
5.2.3*3)* There is no doubt that this proposal is at 
variance with Lounsbury's hypothesis concerning the 
extension of meaning: I shall return to this aspect later
(cf. below 5*2.3)* At this moment I would like to draw 
attention to the possibility of solving an apparent contra­
diction between linguistic and social facts by asking a 
different question. Instead of asking how to correlate 
kin terms and social structure, one tries to establish 
what the moral scheme of a particular language is, its value- 
judgements. One then places terms into this scheme and 
finally considers their use as strategies.
There is another factor I must discuss in this 
section. As a rule descriptions of kinship systems tend 
to display a homogeneous set of kinship terms, though
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Schneider's reference to alternative usages is one
of the exceptions. I am thinking less, however, of
variation in individual usage than of regional variations
of which a few examples have been recorded. One such
case has been studied by Stanley and Ruth Freed (1970) ,
viz. the regional variation in Navajo kinship terminology.
The Navajo Indians use Iroquois cousin terminology, i.e.
they extend sibling terms to parallel cousins but have
separate terms for cross-cousins, the same ones for
cross-cousins from either side (bilateral). In some
localities, however, this terminology has taken on
features of a unilineal type, viz. the matrilineal Crow-
type writh its shift across generation boundaries. Though
more research is required, the first indications are that
the explanation for this variation is to be found in the
influence of the nearby matrilineal Hopi who - as we have
seen - completely changed the social system of the Tewa
who settled in their vicinity. This case confirms our
earlier observations about the difficulty of establishing
a firm link between kin terms and social structure. If 
accidental circumstances can destroy similarity of
structure between the two, there is no guarantee that
in other cases the presence of similarity could not
equally be accidental. With so little research done on
regional variation (or even individual variation,
especially in simple societies), it is difficult to assess
the importance of this factor.
At this point I would like to consider what, 
in my opinion, is one of the most awkward but also one of 
the most challenging facts concerning the hypothesis of
the social relevance of systems of kin terminology, 
vis. the question whether this hypothesis can he stated 
with any confidence with regard to the terminologies of 
our complex, industrialised societies. From a linguistic 
point of view one could argue that there is no parallel 
in the field of languages to the simple or primitive vs, 
complex or developed distinction which social scientists 
make. Kinship terminology as a linguistic phenomenon 
is, therefore, an object of study in its own right whatever 
language one selects. If, however, one takes an ethno- 
linguistic point of view and is interested consequently 
in the area where language and society meet and interact,
It becomes more difficult to keep linguistics and social 
science strictly separated. .As a result the ethnolinguisti 
study of kin terms has to deal with more than strictly 
linguistic differences. These differences, however, cannot 
be all that great. After all, anthropology is trying to 
understand man, not merely man in a certain type of society 
Levi-Strauss asked the following question in this connect­
ion t
"Should we try to include modern societies 
in our sphere of Investigation, and may 
we do so by applying the same conceptual 
framework which has proved so valuable for
the study of simpler societies?"
His answer is unequivocal:
"It is useless to attempt to find out what 
kinship really is before we succeed in_ 
ascertaining whether its field of operation 
covers all types of human society, and in 
this case to what extent, and in which way 
its modes of operation change as it passes 
from simple societies to complex ones"
(Levi-Strauss , 1965: 18).
This is not easy, however. Haudricourt and Granai, In
their critical discussion of Levi-Strauss1s early work,
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mentioned several reasons why, in their opinion, there
is a considerable difference. Their remarks are valuable
even if one would like to take a more hopeful view of a
possible solution:
uL rethnologue travaille traditionellement 
sur des societes differentes de la sienne 
propre; la langue est, pour lui, un aspect, 
difficilement dissociable, de la society 
envisagee, - et un aspect privilegid puisqu* 
il lui donne acces aux autres phdnomenes 
sociaux. Le sociologue, au contraire, qui 
traditionellement analyse sa propre societe 
tend a oublier le caractere social de la 
langue qu'il emploie spontanbment. D Tautre 
part, les societes auxquelles '1‘ethnologue 
srinteresse (societes archaiques) sont 
generalement des socidtes globales tres 
limitees (ou qui paraissent telles) qui 
coincident bien souvent en extension avec 
la langue. En d !autres termes, systeme de 
la langue et systeme de la soeibte apparaissent 
comme homogbnes et semblent se correspondre 
’membre a membre1. ... Enfin ... 1‘importance 
des structures et des comportements axiologi- 
ques dans les societes traditionelles ... 
conduit aisement 1 1observateur a l ’idde de 
la societe comme systeme symbolique de 
comportements qui a son homologue dans le 
systeme de la langue" (Haudricourt et Granai, 
1955 : '128) .
The authors believe that it is this special relationship 
between the anthropologist and his object of study, and 
the conditions of his work, not the fact that language
and society are truly eo-extensive and homologous, which 
lie at the root of theories of the kind advocated by Levi­
s' c rau3 o .
It certainly is the case that the analysis of 
the kinship terminology of a complex society seems much 
more convincing and satisfactory when there is a point of 
comparison, either diachronic or synchronic. Weisgerber 
took the view that comparison is a necessary condition 
for an analysis xfhich is to reveal "das sprachliche Weltbild”
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(196*1: 97 3 cf. above 3.6.3). But when we try to assess 
what all the various forms of analysis of English kin 
terms have shown us about the corresponding social 
structure we have cause to feel disappointed. To a 
large extent psychological interest gradually took the 
place of the social orientation of most structuralists 
and functionalists (cf. 4.3.1). Parsons gave some 
indications as to the way in which American English kin­
ship terminology could be said to reflect the actual 
institutional structure of kinship (1943: 27); as I 
have noted above (cf. 4.2), his list of characteristics 
is entirely negative and derived from comparison with 
structures prevalent among non-literate peoples. It is 
to be expected that the relative importance and the degree 
of integration of the elements which are common to all 
cultures (e.g. economics, religion, language, social 
organization) vary considerably: but the very idea of 
culture supposes some form of integration of those elements 
and, though it may be difficult to analyse, there is no 
reason why a positive outcome to a search for the nature of 
this integration would be Impossible. The only thing 
which could frustrate such efforts would be a deep crisis 
within a given culture which would destroy - at least 
temporarily - the proper integration of the various con­
stituent elements. Whether or not our society is passing 
through such a crisis Is in Itself an interesting question 
but one beyond the scope of this study. Even if there were 
some measure of a crisis, our society does not seem to be 
affected to the point of total disintegration of the fabric 
of its social structure.
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We can, however, observe clearly certain 
tensions connected with change. P. Willmott has given 
an interesting example of this in an article which 
examined how the changes in social legislation in Britain 
after World War II compared with people’s intuitive 
feelings about kinship (Willmott, 1958). Statutory 
liability is imposed by the National Assistance Act 19^8, 
only upon husband and wife for each other and for their- 
children under the age of sixteen. This Act reduced 
the range of responsibility for one’s relatives which had 
been much wider under the three centuries old Poor Law; 
it was seen simply as an official and belated legal 
recognition of a sociological change which had started 
with the industrial revolution. One might think that, 
having released people from the duty of maintaining their 
Impoverished relatives, the State would now be no longer 
under any obligation to assist those who still are in 
fact supporting their relatives. Social legislation, 
however, still takes some account of the kinship obligations 
that are voluntarily accepted, the State now recognises 
two degrees of kinship obligations - those which are 
legally enforced and others, towards a wider range of 
relatives, which may be voluntarily undertaken. The 
acceptance by the State of chese two degrees must be 
attributed to the strength of feeling among the public to 
continue considering relatives as different from oijher 
people; the State gave way to this pressure even though 
the distinction did not always fit In easily into the 
original concept of the 19^8 Act. One can then take a 
list of terms for relatives ox7 kin-types and see how this
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compares with these developments. The resulting 
picture lacks consistency due to the way legislation 
came into being but it is quite obvious that there is 
still a good deal of kinship recognition beyond the 
immediate3 nuclear family. If one looks at the legis­
lation on national insurance benefit, war pensions, legal 
aid assessment3 income tax relief, and inheritance on 
intestacy an almost universal recognition appears to 
have been given to spouse, child, grandchild, parent , 
step-parent 3 grandparent 3 sibling 3 half-sibling 3 and 
step-sibling. The list of relatives who are mentioned 
in connection with certain aspects of the Act contain, 
for example, foster parents, siblings and half-siblings 
of one's parents, cousins, nephews and nieces, the parents 
and possibly further relatives of one's spouse, etc. One 
wonders x^hether all this shows anything more than incid­
ental, haphazard facts of association of responsibility/ 
rights and certain kin-types: very little systematic 
structure would seem to emerge from the data.
Regardless of the value or importance of these 
particular facts I would suggest that we have here an 
indication that It may well be necessary or at least 
profitable to look at the matter from a different angle,
At some later stage I shall introduce the concepts of 
'nearness' and 'distance': I am hoping that these may 
prove to be suitable notions for discussing kinship term­
inology and Its function In society, be It a simple or a 
complex type of society. It would certainly seem Indicated 
to rethink this question of the relevance of ways of 
classifying kinsmen. In the past there were good legal
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reasons why one should distinguish between paternal 
and maternal relatives: fcerminologically this was 
reflected in, e.g.., the terms for 'uncle' and 'aunt' 
as shown in the Latin avunculus (MoBr) - patruus (FaBr) 
and amita (FaSi) - matertera (MoBi). When the reasons 
for the legal distinction ceased to exist the termin­
ological distinction disappeared as well in many cases, 
but not in all: Swedish, for instance, continues to 
distinguish between FaBr, farbror, and MoBr, morbror, 
though the reasons for the distinction in terms of legal 
implications (basically the question of responsibility 
for one's sibling's children and the matter of inheritance) 
have ceased to exist in Sweden as they have in the rest 
of We stern Europe (cf. Malmberg, 1966: 192 f.). Another 
puzzling case for which as yet no satisfactory explanation 
has been given is the development in some Germanic languages 
of the word of which the modern English form is nephew.
In Middle High German the term neve can be defined as 
follows:
"neffe wle oheim, besonders: schwester- 
sohn und mutterbruder ... geschwister- 
kinder von der mutterseite ... verwandter 
uberhaupt, besonders in der anrede"
(quoted in Bjerke, 1969: 30-32).
In M G  the following kin-types are indicated by the
term neve according to Narroll (1358: 753 f.): PaPaSb,
GrNe, Un, Ne , Co(m). Perhaps one would hardly have
expected this vagueness of reference to non-lineal'kin
well before the nuclear family had achieved the exclusive
position it holds at present. I find It even more puzzling,
in the light of this commonly proposed theory concerning
the growing importance of the nuclear family, that the
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terminology on this point, rather than becoming less 
specific, has in fact become more precise, though not 
so much in Dutch where neef still means both Ne and Co(m) 
though no longer Un. I may as a native speaker of Dutch 
confuse occasionally the words nephew and cousin in 
English: I fail to see, however, in what-way Dutch and 
English social organization or individual feelings might 
be significantly different with regard to the kin-types 
concerned. If both the sociological and the psychological 
explanations fail to give satisfaction, we must conclude 
once again that existing theories cannot be accepted as 
final and that, at least in order to deal with certain 
questions, it may be advisable to try and approach the 
problem from a different angle, to formulate our question 
differently.
5.2.3. Formal Approaches.
Our remarks and observations concerning the 
various formal approaches can be fairly short. Since 
our historical account of these studies followed fairly 
closely the discussion in this field, we have touched 
already upon a good number of issues. The present assess­
ment will complement earlier remarks. I will consider 
three issues: the basic assumption of most types of formal 
analysis, aspects of componential analysis, and the 
extensionist theory. Other matters, not formal in .themselves 
but which have come up in connection with formal studies, 
will also be mentioned briefly: they are matters of usage, 
of how language Is used creatively. I shall discuss in 
particular the notions of metaphor' and role.
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5•2 * 3 -1- The Basic Assumption,
When I discussed briefly Buchler and Selby’s 
book on kinship and social organization (cf. above 4.1.2)
I mentioned among other things the balanced view they took 
concerning the discussion of the biological vs. social 
conception of kinship relations. They did not, in fact, 
choose between the two methods but saw them as complement­
ary: the genealogical method, especially when using some 
kind of formal analysis as a discovery device, will display 
more clearly the internal consistency of a set of linguistic 
data by mapping them onto biological kin-types, while the 
sociological method is more satisfactory from the anthrop­
ologist's point of view because it shows kinship terms 
to be category words by means of which an individual is 
taught to recognize the significant groupings of the 
social structure into which he is born. They reject any 
absolute claims for either solution and prefer a middle 
position:
"Biological kin type is a misnomer, 
and it would be more proper (if more 
awkward) to call these notational 
symbols [i.e. the symbols used to 
refer to kin types], sociological 
construct s, based in part upon 
biological c on si derat ion s"
XBuchler" and^Selby , 196~8T 35).
This issue has been under discussion from the
very beginning of the study of kinship. Morgan related
kin terms to genealogical positions; McLennan denied that
they represented a system of blood-ties, he saw merely
a social side to kinship nomenclature, viz. "a code of
courtesies and ceremonial addresses in social intercourse"
(cf. above 2.2.1 ). The social point of view became
predominant from Rivers onwards, not in such an extreme
form as advocated by McLennan, but in a more moderate 
way, similar to the position of Buchler and Selby. The 
preference for the social interpretation became more 
marked in the period of structuralism and functionalism.
As Buchler and Selby intimated, the opposite point of 
.view tended to be held by those who advocated various 
kinds of formal analysis. I did not come across any 
explicit mention of this matter in Kroeber who is, in 
a way, the fore-runner of present-day feature analysis.
He did, however, reject all social explanations of kinship 
terminology and many of the categories of analysis he 
proposed were in fact biological in nature, Davis and 
Warner (cf. above 3*3.2. ) spoke very explicitly of -the 
biological foundation of kinship structure; theirs 
was, in fact, the most formalized analysis of the struct­
uralist period. In fnore recent times the association 
between formalism and the genealogical/biological view 
can be in no doubt. It is in particular an Integral part 
of the extensionist approach to kinship terms developed 
by Lounsbury; In fact, the whole of the second chapter 
of Scheffler and Lounsbury's study of Siriono kinship 
semantics is taken up by this argument. I shall return 
shortly to the extensionist sT point of view; meanvrhile, 
the general argument can be Illustrated by reference to an 
exchange of articles initiated by Ernest Gellner’s "Ideal 
Language and Kinship Structure" (1957) wrhich provoked a 
forceful reaction from R. Needham (I960) , followed by a 
rejoinder from Gellner (I960). J. Barnes (1961) joined 
in the debate to state clearly an anthropologist’s view 
on physical and social kinship which made Gellner restate
once again, and very explicitly, his position with
regard to kinship (1963). His original concern had
been to develop an ideal language in reaction to
"ordinary language" philosophy, He had chosen to try
it out in the domain of kinship structure because he
considered this to be an important and well developed
part of social anthropology, a reasonably tangible
aspect of society which could be stated with a fair
degree of accuracy and would lend itself to comparison
between societies (cf. Gellner, 1957: 235). He saw
kinship as a sub-group of the relationships which make
up society, and he observed:
"On what principle is this sub-group 
isolated from the total mass of 
relationships? Answer: by selecting 
those relationships which systematically 
overlap, in the anthropologist’s view,
(without being idential with) physical 
kinship. It is for this reason that he 
translates the Indigenous words, which he 
finds used to denote those relationships, 
as ’father’, ’brother’ and so forth.
What other principle could he conceivably 
employ for selecting ’kinship1 relations?" 
(Gellner, 1963: 237)*
An answer to this rhetorical question was given
by John Beattie (1964); the following quotation from his
article sums up well the opposite point of view:
"Kinship as it is studied by social 
anthropologists is not a set of geneal- 
ological relationships. This is so even 
though these relationships may (or may 
not) be denoted by terms having a geneal- 
ological reference, and even though they may 
(or may not) overlap with ’real’ genealogical 
links' between the parties concerned. Kinship 
can no more be reduced to a set of statements 
about genealogical connexion than, say, an 
enquiry into the social significance of 
funerary feasting can be reduced to a set 
of statements about the physiology of human 
metabolism. People eat, and people copulate 
and have children; the social scientist does
not doubt these facts, but in the 
context of his own enquiries he takes 
them for granted: they form no part
of his explanatory apparatus1' (loc. 
cit. : 101).
"The reason why an 'ideal language’ 
based on the kinds of real genealogical 
connexion found in human (as in other 
animal) societies, can never have any 
relevance to the socio-anthropological 
study of kinship, Is simply that the 
categories of kinship, as social 
anthropologists study them, are social 
and cultural categories, not biological 
ones. And there is no one-to-one 
correlation between the categories of 
kinship, and the kinds or degrees, or 
even the presence, of genealogical 
connexion. Entirely different levels of 
investigation and analysis are involved"
(ibid. : 103).
In Beattie's view people use the language of
kinship to talk about social relationships. This idiom
is sometimes expressed in terms of genealogical connection,
but It is not these biological connections the anthropologist
is Interested in. He points out that some kinship terms
contain no reference at all to genealogical links in
themselves:
"For example, the term mwihwa (or one 
like it), found in many Bantu languages, 
is usually translated as ’sister’s child1.
But It does not mean ’sister’s child*, 
and in fact a man applies it to a large 
number of persons besides the children of 
his sister. And the term nyinarumi, 
usually translated 'mother's brother’, does 
not mean unis; literally it me an s 'male 
mother’, or ’mother man’. ... Kinship 
terms are not the names of genealogical 
connexion, even though they may be assoc­
iated with such connexions; they are the 
names of categories, sometimes groups, of; 
people, socially defined" (loc.cit.: 101).
I do not consider the actual examples convincing. First
of all, if one takes a sociological point of view one
cannot refer to ’Bantu’ as to one group: with regard to
culture and social structure there are quite important
differences within the linguistically defined Bantu 
group. Secondly, of the terms quoted, mwihwa is, by 
the author's admission, applied to the sister's child 
even If also to other individuals and could be said 
to be genealogically defined for that reason, while 
the example of nyinarumi is said to have the literal 
meaning 'male mother*: one would like to know, however, 
if this is really the meaning as understood by the ordinary 
native speaker or merely an etymological analysis which Is 
interesting for its own sake but Irrelevant to present 
understanding of the term.
There are, however, more precise data available 
for one particular Bantu language, vis. Luganda, which 
can serve to illustrate the dilemma of the biological vs. 
social meaning of kin terms. M. Southwold (1971) distin­
guishes four categories of Ganda kin terms: those correspond­
ing with straightforward English kinship terms (e.g. nnyina = 
mother), terms formed on similar principles to regular 
English kinship terms though not found in normal English 
usage (e.g. muganda - sibling of the same sex), terms 
which may be considered to combine English principles of 
formation albeit with unusual modifiers (e.g. nnyina omuto = 
little mother_) , and terms formed on principles quite alien 
to English social usage (e.g. rnu.j,iwa ~ child of female lineage 
member; koj j a - male of mother's lineage). It is this last 
group which causes difficulty, for in Ganda culture ^lineage' 
is not a descent group, not a genealogical notion in other 
words: it indicates a group one can become a member of in 
various ways, though admittedly mainly by birth. It remains 
a fact, however, that these 'lineages' are more like
corporations, alliances, with social and political 
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rather than geological overtones. I intend to return 
below (5.2,3*3) to the extensionists1 claim to have 
found a way of dealing with facts such as these. Here 
I have developed this argument merely to show the basic 
difficulty of the notion of kinship and the delimitation 
of the kinship domain. The terms mujjwa and kojja are 
part of an intuitively recognised lexical domain, but 
at the same time it would seem that they do not refer 
to typically genealogical categories. If one argues that, 
since the other terms of the domain are genealogically 
based kinship terms, the whole domain must somehow be 
genealogically based, one is clearly courting circularity. 
If on the other hand one accepts that the two terms under 
discussion are not genealogical, the whole set would change 
in character, or if one continues to speak of the set of 
’kinship terms’, much of the theory on kinship would risk 
becoming meaningless.
It is not easy to see a way out of this dilemma,
if there is one at all. It may well be a matter of temper­
ament, or of the kind of question one is interested in, 
which of the two options one prefers. It remains, however,
a basic option, a choice one must face up to, Consequently
one would expect any study on kinship to be explicit on 
this point and as clear as possible considering the diff­
iculty of the problem. My own position on this point Is 
the following. It would seem to be fairly general practice 
that in determining the lexical domain of kinship scholars 
rely on meaning rather than on form: this meaning can be 
controlled, e.g. by the question "Who calls whom what?”.
It has traditionally been accepted that there is a 
genealogical, biological foundation to the kinship domain.
I accept that it would be unrealistic not to take into 
consideration this genealogical, physical aspect. I 
feel at the same time, however, that - though this geneal­
ogical side is part of the concept of kinship - it is not 
the decisive factor. The decisive factor is the social 
decision which gives the physical facts their meaning. I 
base this opinion on the following argument. I consider 
kinship to be a special type of relationship which obtains 
between limited numbers of individuals. If, however,'we 
accept the physical unity of the whole of mankind (and 
for the sake of this argument we can take a monogenetic 
point of view in order not to complicate matters unnecessar­
ily) while the notion of kinship is always applied to a 
very restricted group*of people, we must conclude that this 
decision to recognize socially a bond of a special kind 
between such a restricted number of individuals only, is 
of paramount, indeed crucial importance. I call it a 
social decision because it is not forced upon us by physio­
logical facts. It may well be that the whole Issue Is too 
complicated to be resolved either way by a decisive argument, 
especially such a brief one as I have just given. But I 
believe that my reasons carry a certain weight; for me they 
carry more weight than the arguments in favour of the geneal­
ogical position, and I see confirmation for my point of view 
in certain conclusions reached by anthropological theory.
For example, Barnes (1961) has made the point that it is not 
sufficient to make a distinction (as was customarily done) 
between pater and genltor, I.e. between, social father* and
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physical father, since even genitor merely indicates 'he
who is considered by the community to be the physical
father1. Whether he really is what Barnes calls the
"genetic father" is not at issue*
It may seem that my argument about the domain
of kinship remains solely In the realm of anthropology
and does not concern us from a linguistic point of view-
I believe It does. I believe that a distinction similar
to the genealogical/social one can be made concerning
terminology: kinship terminology Is not identical with
1genealogical nomenclature , This point is not always
clearly made, Weisgerber, as we have seen (cf, above 3.6.3),
distinguished between "sprachliche Zwischenwelt1 and
"Aussenwelt" , and he stated clearly that they should not
be confused or simply treated as equivalent. Yet, at
one point he seems to make an exception for kinship terms
when he says:
"Es gibt gewiss Falls, in denen Wortfeld 
und Sachbereich sich so nahe stehen, 
dass man den Sachbereich zum Ausgang der 
sprachlichen Betrachtung nehmen kann 
(etwa im Fall der Verwandtschaftsworter)"
(1962c: 151).
"Sachbereich" refers - as is clear from his writings, 
e.g. 1951: 35 - to the 'objective kinship system' or the 
genealogical framework. I consider that this view is 
begging the question and see no reason for making an 
exception in the case of kinship. The only exception 
which might be acceptable would be - as Porzig (1950: 118) 
suggests - the special field of man-made objects with
1, I shall return to this distinction in my discussion of
the deictic interpretation of kin terms (cf. below 6.2.3).
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man-given names as long as and to the extent to which 
these names are technical terms.
Perhaps 5 however, my perspective is different 
from Weisgerber's. I would say that in an ethnolinguistic 
perspective I examine the way in which I verbalize the. 
reality as I see and live it ’hie et nunc’. This intro­
duces an element of subjectivity into objective reality, 
an element of relativism into what might seem natural and 
universal. Relativism - though not extreme or absolute 
relativism - is part of my basic assumption. Again it 
would seem that the findings of anthropology confirm this 
view. Adrienne Lehrer gave a number of these findings when 
she discussed the problem of semantic universals in conn­
ection with kinship (Lehrer, 197^: 168 ff.). She pointed 
out that Greenberg had suggested that three of Kroeber’s 
eight categories were, universal: generation (parent of, 
offspring of), consanguineal vs. affinal (relative by blood 
or marriage), and sex of relative (male/female)(Greenberg, 
1966: 86 f.). While this is true in almost all cases, 
there are cases where these features are not valid or at 
least take on a very special value. The institution of 
parenthood, for example, among the Nayar of southwestern 
India who practise polyandry, is irrecognizably different 
from ours; the Ijo in Nigeria have two kinds of marriages, 
a big payment marriage which gives complete control to the 
man over his wife, and a small payment marriage which establi­
shes a relationship that may be only temporary, a kind of 
marriage institution which does not seem to fit easily into 
a universally valid definition. Lehrer summarizes her 
examination of semantic universals and the dilemma these
pose, as follows:
"If a semantic feature is to be 
universally valid, it must be so 
vague that it has to be defined for 
each language or group of languages.
This makes it of limited value as 
a prime. On the other hand, if a 
feature is given a clear and unambig­
uous explication, it ceases to be 
universally valid, although Its 
application may be widespread (op. 
cit. ; 170).
Though I am Inclined towards a moderately 
relativist position I also feel that the own world view 
of each culture and the way it Is worded can only be 
fully appreciated and understood in the light of cross- 
cultural comparison. The same ethnolinguistic Interest 
which led me to relativism now makes me look for some 
sort of universal frame of reference. How I view this 
universal perspective I hope to discuss presently (cf. 
below 5*3). How I conceive of the mixture of subjectivity 
and objectivity in the verbalization of kinship relations 
will be among the points to be discussed in chapter 6.
5.2.3.2 Componentlal Analysis.
The remarks I would like to make with regard 
to componential analysis can be brief. A certain number 
of reflections have been made in the section dealing with 
this analytical technique (above 4.3)* while certain 
developments in the study of kinship terminology, In 
particular relational analysis and extensionism, came 
about because of dissatisfaction with the limitations 
of the simple componential approach. Moreover, what I 
have called the "basic assumption" in the preceding 
section is of immediate relevance to this and the next
sections. The reason why I return briefly and more 
specifically to this aspect is that I believe it will 
help us to take a different look at kinship terms 
which is complementary to the one presented by componential 
analysis. This alternative approach will, in fact, be 
suggested by the various criticisms and remarks which all 
seem to point in a similar direction.
The points I am going to make have to be under­
stood with reference to the study of kinship terminology, 
not to semantic feature analysis in a wide sense nor in 
relation to some syntactic framework. I simply want to 
consider the adequacy of componential analysis as it has 
been used In connection with kinship terms, whether or not 
- or better perhaps: to what extent - it is a satisfactory 
way of studying the meaning of a socially important set of 
lexical Items. My specific purpose puts limitations on 
the attention I give’ to (and the use I make of) formalism. 
Rather than leave my attitude towards formal analysis 
vague and In the dark, it would only seem correct to state 
that I feel a measure of sympathy with those anthropologists 
who are wary of too much formal analysis for fear of over­
looking "what is important In the search for what is 
verifiable" (cf. Berreraan, 1966). I have no real objections 
to the use of formal methods and techniques: on the other 
hand, however, I am quite prepared to forego some of the 
rigour and precision of formalism In order to get an answer 
to the question which seems important to me, viz. the search 
for an understanding of man through the study of language.
I do not think we would stand to gain much from a discussion 
of the choice between what one might call ’formalistic’ and
'humanistic' approaches since it Is most probably a 
matter of difference of emphasis rather than of principle.
As the value of a work, however, depends largely on 
whether it achieves what it sets out to do I thought it 
right to add this ’caveat' about my goal to my remarks 
about the formal technique of componential analysis.
Linguists who do not necessarily share my views 
on formalism often seem to recognize the limitations and 
as yet unclear aspects of componential analysis. All forms 
of feature analysis are still grapling with the concept 
of feature itself: what is the status of features, are 
they universal, do they have to be binary, etc.? Some 
factors are difficult to reduce to components, e.g. 
relational opposites: this requires that the components 
be made directional In some way. The hierarchy of hypo- 
nymy is a difficulty, which has been met by the introduction 
of redundancy rules. It is sometimes doubted whether the 
exercise is worthwhile. If the components are lexical 
items it may be impossible to decompose them all and the 
definitions could be circular; if, on the other hand, they 
are, e.g.^ concepts it will be difficult to justify their 
choice. F. Palmer goes even further: he argues that the 
method Is unworkable because we are faced with a potentially 
infinite set of components since in principle any piece 
of information may be used to disambiguate a sentence; 
and disambiguation of sentences is precisely the purpose 
and defining character of features in his view (cf. Palmer, 
1976: 90 f.). I would not go as far as calling componential 
analysis unworkable; I would rather speak of its limitations 
I have discussed this before (cf. 4.3.1) in terms of
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'minimal meaning', i.e.: componential analysis of 
kinship terms tends to be restricted in extent by the
delimitation of the lexical domain, e.g. by means of a
restricting control question.; and it tends to give only 
a single kind of meaning, via. denotation, ignoring all 
other aspects and kinds of meaning. Both the question 
of the delimitation of the domain and the exclusive 
concentration on some kind of objective referent are 
linked with the basic assumption that kinship is connected 
with ’biology' (cf. Leaf, 1971, especially p. 5^5 f.)*
Roger Keesing called this restriction a 'conjuring trick' 
to make disappear a number of important problems of 
semantics: the trick consists in ’holding the context 
constant’:
"What better way to make semantics look 
easy than to study kinship terms in
their genealogical sense? Componential
analyses, reduction rules, and many other 
solutions are possible; they are tidy, 
formally equivalent, and formally trivial.
By taking only the genealogical senses of 
kinship terms, we define a frame and, at 
the same time, acquire a logically handy 
metalanguage for mapping them onto their 
denotata" (Keesing, 1972: 18 f.).
One of the problems componential analysis did not do
justice to was polysemy: Keesing recognizes that Lounsbury's
work on extension rules has come to grips with this aspect
though he stresses the fact that the simplification of
context is still found there (ibid.: 27 f*)* He insists
on the fact that possible meanings are sorted out precisely
by context:
"To specify formally the spectrum of 
meaning of a kin term as it moves through 
different contextual frames is another 
matter [i.e. : from considering the geneal­
ogical sense only]. We lose both the
controlled constant frame and the 
metalanguage for mapping words onto 
the world. Nor can we specify the 
range of possible contextual frames 
and how they are interpreted. Consider 
English ’father' - simple enough in its 
genealogical sense. In its non-geneal- 
ogical senses ('He was a father to me',
’Our other Father will take confession’,
'Don’t father me I’, 'Our Father Who art 
...’), we are often hard-pressed to 
analyse the meanings, how they are related, 
or what contextual information enables us 
to understand them. What defines 'father- 
ness' in these senses is not a common 
feature or a common behavioral role but a 
relational pattern of which each sense is 
a transform" (ibid.: 19).
Others have claimed as well that contextual features must
have a place in a semantic description (cf. e.g. Michelle Z.
Rosaldo, 1972); Tyler has actually enumerated a number of
contextual factors to be taken into consideration:
"social setting, audience composition, 
sex and age of speaker/hearer, linguistic 
repertoires of speaker/hearer, and ~ 
most difficult of all - something that 
might be called the speaker's intention"
(Tyler, 1972: 268).
It is far from clear yet how these factors actually shape
the use and the significance of terms. It would seem,
however, that it will only be by asking this kind of
question however difficult to answer, that we can hope
to gain really new insights into kinship terminology.
Removing artificial restrictions will also require
that the matter of other aspects of meaning than denotation
be included in our considerations. Words often signify a
good deal more than the objects designated as their peferents
"Formal analyses remain inconclusive at 
the ethnographic level to the degree that 
they fail to exhaust the semantic 'value' 
of the elements they analyse" (Fox, 1971:
219) •
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In a general way this shift of attention towards context 
and towards kinds and aspects of meaning other than 
denotation will also mean that more attention will be 
given to the actual use of words. Fillmore has expressed 
the opinion that a number of difficulties encountered 
in semantics could be traced back to the wrong question 
being asked. The question generally asked is: What is 
the meaning of this form? It should be: What do I need 
to know in order to use this form appropriately and to 
understand other people when they use it? (Fillmore, 1971 a: 
274). It Is this question of the relationship between 
the meaning of a word and its use, between the form of 
the definition of a word and the conditions under which 
that word can be used, which is not touched upon in component- 
lal analysis (cf. Mounin, 1972: 127). The importance of 
this point lies in the fact that in real life there are 
no perfect systems which can be analysed in a clear-cut 
manner: there are potential conflicts, departures from 
the strict logic of the system, M. Hammer in discussing 
this point referred to E. Leach’s description of the Kachin 
marriage system which appears to be governed by the 
following characteristics (cf. Hammer, 1966: 362 f.):
(a) Sub-groups are hierarchically ordered; if A is higher 
than B, and B is higher than C, then A is higher than C.
(b) A man marries a woman of a higher-status subgroup.
(c) There Is no set of people who cannot marry. ;
It is clearly impossible for all the three rules to be true 
if they were to be pushed to perfect consistency of 
application. In fact, the practice is flexible enough 
either because theoretical distinctions are being blurred
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or because substitute values are accepted, e.g. geograph­
ical distance instead of hierarchy. It would seem to me 
to be worthwhile Investigating whether the way we use a 
system (be it a social or a linguistic one) can help 
us to understand better the nature of the system itself. 
Some of the work done on fictive kinship"*" (e.g. Norbeck 
and Befu, 1958) would seem to go in the same direction. 
Eventually I would expect this line of research to link 
up with the discussion around linguistic pragmatics. The 
outcome of this discussion is, however;, far from clear at 
present (cf. e.g. Schlieben-Lange, 1975) and there is a 
long way to go yet. But I believe that this avenue must 
be explored though I am well aware that the danger of 
oversimplification and of vacuous generalities is, If 
anything, much greater still in pragmatics than it is in 
semantics,
5.2.3 * 3 * The Extensionist Theory.
Keesing, in his provocatively critical discussion 
of kinship studies praises Lounsbury's and Scheffler's 
work on the hypothesis of the extension of meaning in 
kinship terms as a major contribution to the understanding 
of polysemy (1972: 2 7). Though he continues to disagree 
with their basic choice of the genealogical approach, he 
recognizes the great advance this work has brought about 
compared with the achievements of simple feature analysis: 
for the neglect of the polysemic nature of kinship terms
1. Fictive kinship: a socially defined equivalent of 
affinal or consanguine ties.
was his second major objection to componential analysis 
(ibid.: 18- cf. 5 -2 .3-2).
The question of polysemy is a difficult one 
which normally arises in contrast with homonymy, whether, 
for example, the different meanings of flight are unrelated 
and therefore several homonymic words or whether they are 
somehow related meanings of one word. In the study of 
kinship terms ’polysemic1 is rather used in contrast with 
’monosemic’, a term not very widely used in linguistics, 
presumably because - apart from strictly defined technical 
terms perhaps - words tend not to be unambiguously monosemic
When we are dealing with a polysemic word we will 
want to consider the relations between the various meanings. 
We distinguish a central or primary meaning and derived or 
secondary meanings. We may find, furthermore, instances 
of metaphoric use. With regard to primary and secondary 
meanings we will have to determine which kind of criterion 
to use In establishing this distinction: histoi’ical, 
psychological, etc. In the case of metaphors we have to 
distinguish between living and dead metaphors: again this 
distinction implies certain assumptions about the criteria 
we are using in making it.
It Is a simple matter of fact that the extension™ 
ist theory (possibly out of a universalist bias) has firmly 
linked together its treatment of primary and secondary 
meanings of kin,terms with the assumption that kinship is 
genealogically, biologically based. I do not see any 
compelling reason why the genealogical assumption and the 
concept of primary meaning should be linked together, but 
I am left with the impression that some of the principal
protagonists seem to see it as an either/or choice.
Scheffler has attacked J. Lave for holding that both 
genealogically based terms and non genealogical ones 
were equally fundamental or basic to the structure of 
the alleged 'kinship* domain: instead he claims that
the system of "culturally posited relations of genealogical 
connection" forms a different system from other systems of 
classification of interpersonal relationships and must 
therefore be analysed independently (Scheffler, 1976: 338).
I would have thought that, at least logically, there should 
be room for the possibility of the various meanings not 
being equally fundamental but being grouped and ordered 
with reference to some criterion other than genealogy.
Whether this would be workable- in practice, or at least be 
easy enough to make it worthwhile, would be a totally 
different matter. As it is, however, the alternative to a 
genealogically based polysemy Is monosemy in its anthro­
pologically inspired sense.
The argument in defence of the case for a monosemic 
interpretation of kin terms seems sound in itself. It was 
clearly formulated forty years ago by A.M. Hocart and, 
though he wrote from a historical linguistic point of view, 
his reasoning is equally valid in a synchronic perspective,
He claimed that the extensionist point of view originated in 
cultural prejudice. When people discovered that the Fijian 
word tama was used to refer to a person's father It ^as 
labelled 'father'. When later on it was discovered to be 
applicable to other men besides the father, these uses were 
considered.to be extensions of the original meaning. This, 
in Hocart's view, was a fallacy: one should have given another
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label to express the essence of tama-ship instead (Hocart, 
1937)* Scheffler (1972: 314 **•) rejects this argument, 
mainly because in defining the category *tama' Hocart 
referred to Ego’s own father, i.e. its genealogically 
primary meaning. Hocart’s definition is: ”tama = all 
males of the previous generation on the father's side"'
I am not convinced that Scheffler*s reasoning holds good:
I feel he makes rather too much of the reference to Ego's 
father in this definition. Equally the fact that tama 
can mean my father, real father, does not cause unsurmount- 
able difficulties: if one holds a monosemic position one 
will simply claim that use and context specify the general 
meaning of tama. One may not find this approach very 
attractive or not very promising: this would be a good 
enough subjective reason not to pursue it. It would seem 
unwise, however, to ignore the challenge of a theory which 
appears to be coherent and internally consistent.
hounsbury admitted in 19&9 that the debate was 
undecided though he did not have any doubt in his own mind 
as to the validity of the extensionist hypothesis (1969: 27) 
I do not know of any argument advanced since then which 
could be considered to have settled the issue. There has, 
however, been an atbempt at reconciling the two points of 
view by Maurice Bloch (1971)* 7 have referred to his
article before (cf. 5 -2.2) in connection with the problem 
of the apparent lack of correlation between the Malagasy kin 
terminological system and the different forms of social 
organisation found on the island. The special approach to 
kinship terminology he develops Is also meant to reconcile 
the social category approach and the extensionist hypothesis
330
Bloch states that
"certain words, including many 
kinship terms, are best looked at:
1) in terms of the place they hold 
in the system of values; and 2) from 
the point of view of which tactical 
use they can serve" (loc.cit.: 80).
This means that in Bloch’s view both schools of thought
were wrong in concentrating exclusively on denotation
of already existing roles and ignoring strategic uses.
"Kinship terms do not denote kinship 
roles; rather they are part of the 
process of defining a role relation 
between speaker and hearer and they 
must also imply much more than the 
mere establishing of a kinship-line 
of communication" (ibid.).
One of the examples he gives is the term havana, used
by the Merina of central Madagascar (loc. cit.: 81 ff.).
The term havana can be translated as ’kinsman’,
but in practice the word is used for anybody with whom
one is claiming an obligatory relationship which is not
based on contract. This might suggest to some that the
primary meaning of the term is not genealogical. However,
people speak of tena havana, i.e. ’true kinsmen’, in
contexts which unmistakenly refer to procreation and
genealogical links. The difficulty for an extensionist
interpretation arises from the data concerning address
rather than reference: one would not normally address
genealogical kinsmen as havana, indeed the term is used
for non-kinsmen on purpose, precisely because of the absencn
of genealogical links. Bloch’s proposed solution consists
in distinguishing the concept itself expressed by the term,
and the tactics of the use of that term in given social
situations. It does not make sense to try and list the
possible referents of a term like havana; but it is 
possible to list the. tactics it can perform, viz* it 
can
"1) exclude non-genealogical kinsmen;
2) include non-genealogical kinsmen;
3) exclude genealogical kinsmen; and
4) include genealogical kinsmen"
(loc.cit * : 82) .
The tactics depend on the context while the concept is
constant. This concept is - in Blochrs view - a moral
concept, a judgement on people rather than a label.
"This means that as value judgements, 
kinship terms may contain elements of 
great significance which have nothing 
to do with what we normally think of
as kinship and need to be defined in a
much wider framework" (loc.cit.: 80).
It is claimed that this distinction between moral and
tactical meaning makes the problem of extensions disappear
"No particular use of a term need be 
more or less problematical since, 
given the concept, the use is seen 
always as a particular attempt to use 
a tool for transforming a social 
situation. The notion of extension 
at its most useful implies manipulation 
of a new social situation by using a
term which has been given meaning in a
previous context. In the perspective 
that I have stressed here all uses are, 
in the terms of the extensionists,
’secondary’ and the meaning as a moral 
concept is an aspect of a culture’s 
moral scheme" (loc.cit.: 86).
There would seem to be an added advantage in
relating meaning of kin terms to a culture’s moral scheme.
Nogle (1974: 21) had pointed out that the extensionist
hypothesis was very much linked with kinship analysis
and dependent upon the particular characteristics of that
domain. If it were true that this hypothesis (at least in
its value for semantics generally) had a restricted applic
ability Its value would diminish somewhat. Bloch’s 
approach would seem to be valid for all category terms 
referring to people, all terms which qualify people in 
various ways, for all such terms are moral terms in 
the sense defined. His proposals may have originated 
In his anthropological work: I believe, hoivever, that 
they converge with linguistic ideas about meaning and 
use and about context, and deserve to be taken Into 
consideration in linguistic studies about context and use.
5 .2 . 3. 4. Metaphor.
We discussed at some length earlier on (cf. 4.4.3) 
the question of metaphor with reference to the debate 
between Scheffler and Schneider on the use of the term 
"father" for a priest. After having assessed the discussion 
of the notion of extension in the previous section I thought 
it useful to add some separate comments on the subject of 
metaphor. It wrould have been possible, of course, to include 
metaphor In the section on extension: after all, metaphor 
is a form of extension of meaning. However, since the 
extensionist hypothesis in its actual form is so closely 
linked with a genealogical framework and with denotative 
meaning it seemed preferable so deal with metaphor separately 
because of what Scheffler called "the distinction between 
simple extension within the domain of kin classification 
and metaphoric extension" (1972: 318).
The concept of metaphor has been studied for 
centuries but this is not the place to go into the history 
of this subject. In any case, many of the studies were 
carried out from a literary point of view, with special
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reference to poetry and to stylistics, or from a
philosophical point of view concerning problems of
reference and meaning. I would simply want to consider
briefly the question of metaphor in relation with formal
analysis or feature analysis, the subject I am concerned
with in this part of my evaluation. Scheffler defined
metaphor with reference to semantic features: in a metaphor
one or more of the defining features (criterial attributes)
of the primary sense of a word are suspended while some
feature of connotative meaning is substituted in its place;
this feature then becomes criterial for the use of the term
(cf. 1972: 319)* The idea that a metaphor can be analysed
semantically in terms of features obviously appealed to
scholars working on formal grammars and the concept has
been studied in relation to the notions of deviance,
anomaly, selection restrictions, etc.
<
From 1969 to 1975 the concept of metaphor was 
the subject of a series of articles along-these lines in 
Foundations of Language (cf. Bickerton, 19&9> R. Matthews, 
1971; Price, 197^; Loewenberg, 1975)* Without going into 
detail I would like to point to some interesting aspects 
of the debate. Bickerton presented metaphor as a process 
of invention. This idea combined well with his assumption 
that meaning does not exist in language: if it exists 
anywhere, then it is only in the relationship speaker- 
language-hearer. For him, therefore, meaning is somehow 
and to some extent linked with use. He goes on to develop 
the theory that certain lexemes are marked as potential 
metaphors: when these lexemes are used in a way which is 
deviant because of rule-violation we shall have metaphors.
Not all rule-violations result in metaphor, however.
Matthews objected to this theory; moreover he levelled 
the general criticism at Bickerton that his theory was 
one of performance, not of competence. He saw metaphor 
as a selectional restriction violation as well, but 
not in connection with individual words: he considered 
sentences to be metaphoric. However, when he distinguished 
between simple deviance and metaphor he invoked the 
intention, on the part of the speaker, to be metaphorical:
I would interpret this as a form of use-theory, and I do 
not think that the speaker’s intention would fit into a 
competence model. This was exactly Price’s objection to 
Matthews’ article: since a metaphor cannot be interpreted 
without an appeal to its use'and the intention of its 
user it must be characterized partly with reference to 
performance. Metaphor is an expression of the creativity 
of language, not the rule-governed creativity of linguistic 
competence but rule-changing creativity. Once a metaphor 
can be characterized with reference to a competence model 
only, it is a dead metaphor. Loewenberg discussed at 
length all preceding contributions to the debate as well 
as the work of Katz and Fodor and of Weinreich. At the 
end oT it ail she concentrated on the crucial point of how 
to identify utterances as metaphors. Inevitably the 
intentions of the speaker play an essential role and also 
the fact that, though the utterances in question are 
incorrect, they are not mere false statements. They fail 
as assertions, yet there Is a presumption of truth and a 
willingness on the part of the hearer to Interpret them in 
the context. A special speech-act is thought to be involved
when a hearer identifies an utterance as metaphorical 
he does not understand it as making a truth claim about 
certain referents but as a proposal to view and under­
stand those referents in a particular way. This speech 
act of 'making a proposal' gives an utterance a special 
heuristic value.
Max Black's philosophical reflections on meta­
phor would also seem to be relevant to our discussion (cf. 
Black, 1962). He distinguishes three views of metaphor: 
the substitution view (i.e. a metaphorical expression Is 
used in place of some equivalent literal expression), the 
comparison view (i.e. a metaphor consists in the presentation 
of an underlying analogy or similarity, a condensed or 
elliptic simile), and the interaction view of metaphor. 
Interaction means that in a given context the focal word 
of the metaphor obtains a new meaning which is not quite 
its meaning In literal uses: the new context imposes an 
extension of meaning upon the focal word. The hearer is 
forced to connect two ideas and "in this connection resides 
the secret and the mystery of metaphor" (loc.cit.: 39)*
Blade gives as example "Man Is a wolf". '.We know the meaning 
of 'wolf', I.e. we know a system of associated commonplaces, 
standard beliefs about wolfs. This system is evoked by 
calling man metaphorically a wolf. The use of this metaphor 
will suppress some details of the commonplaces normally 
implied by the literal use of ’man', and emphasize -others. 
What is happening in fact Is that the wolf-metaphor is 
organizing our view of man (cf. loc.cit.: 40 f.). While 
the other two types of metaphor can be replaced by literal 
translations with little more than some stylistic or 
poetic loss, the Interaction type of metaphor has a cognitive
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content of its own (ibid.: 45 f.).
The conclusion of these linguistic and
philosophical reflections seems to be that an adequate
treatment of metaphor involves more than mere feature
analysis: it involves notions of use, context, and
speaker's intention. And if the metaphor has a cognitive
value of its own it must be studied on a par with the
semantics of primary or focal meanings of lexical items,
not as an afterthought. The combination of the creative
intention of the speaker and the cognitive value of the
metaphor could well make this study of great relevance
to ethnolinguistic studies, as indeed J. Pox has suggested:
"If one accepts as an ethnographic goal 
some attempt to represent the social 
classification of a'people, ... it Is 
precisely these metaphoric usages that 
appear to be Indicators of significant 
forms of native semantic patterns" (1971: -
220).
Perhaps we could say with Tyler:
"Variants are not mere deviations from 
some assumed basic organization; with 
their rules of occurrence they are the 
organization" (Tyler, ed., 1969 : 5}•
Michael Reddy in his study of metaphor (1969) has also
argued that we should not set apart metaphor too much.
It is not the case in his opinion, that language has a
literal meaning which describes external evencs, the
world outside: speakers of a language speak about their
experience of the world, they construct their world, albeit
functionally and according to rules. There Is, in other
words, a subjective element to any form of language usage.
It is not pure idealism he advocates but a moderate form
of realism, a relativist position in fact. Once again we
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discover the importance of one's basic assumptions.
5.2.3.5 . Role.
It will surprise no one that we find the 
concept of role used particularly by linguists who are 
interested In factors of context or use In language.
The idea of role was developed, for example, by J.R. Firth 
(cf. Firth, 1935: 28 ff.). I have used the notion of 
role earlier on (cf. above 4.3.3.2) with regard to the 
discovery by children of the relational character of 
kinship terms. My use of the term 'role1 is rather loose, 
more in line with the metaphor of the stage with all its 
connotations of free acceptance of a role, and of creative 
play and interpretation. In sociology the general tendency 
would rather be to understand the concept in terms of 
social determinism: a role is a bundle of norms for 
behaviour, of social expectations. Sociolinguists use 
this deterministic concept, e.g. Bernstein when he speaks 
of a person learning "to subordinate his behaviour to a 
linguistic code which is the expression of the role" (1967: 
127)j though it is never denied that there will always be 
an idiosyncratic element in speech. In anthropology and 
anthropological linguistics the concept of role has been 
used in a less strictly defined manner. I would like to 
discuss two uses which have been made of this notion.
It has been suggested that an exploration," of 
role elements in human behaviour might provide us with a 
means to bridge the gap between kinship rules and actual 
behaviour (Keesing, 1972: 22 ff.). In an over-simple, 
idealized model of kinship any discrepancy causes difficulties
Given, for example, the hypothesis that in a particular 
society relatives on the father's side have an obligation 
to support one another in difficult times - a social 
fact which would be reflected in special kin terms for 
this group of relatives - , we face problems as soon as 
we come across counter-examples, especially if these are 
fairly frequent and cannot therefore all be put down to 
ill will* An approach in terms of roles could possibly 
solve this problem. We could say that each member of 
society enacts many roles, an Increasingly large number as 
society becomes more complex. One never enacts all these 
roles simultaneously; though some role-obligations, 
notably kinship roles, may count heavily in life, there 
will be times when, by a personal decision, one will let 
obligations from other roles outweigh the kinship obligations. 
Rather than treat this as an embarrassing or annoying 
breach of the rules we should consider the context in 
which fuch a decision was reached, in order to detect the 
underlying strategy. In this way the concept of a social 
identity as a cluster of different roles proves its 
usefulness. We can go further and pursue this same idea 
on a smaller scale and say that a specific role, e.g. the
role of the father, Is not a simple role but has a composite
character and contains several role-elements. We could 
also see it perhaps in terms of a focal point towards which 
several roles converge. The fact that not necessarily all 
these roles or role-elements are enacted by all the referents 
of a term labelled "father", as was the case for the Fijian
tama discussed above (5.2 .3.3), does not present any problem
once we take the context and the situation of each individual
Into account. Some usages may be less typical but, 
unless they surprise the native speakers, they must 
be part of the system and enter into any explanation 
given.
A second use which could be made of the role 
concept would be more directly in connection with kinship 
terminology, viz. by examining what Tyler has called "the 
role specificity for variations in terminology" (1972: 254). 
It would consist in an effort to determine which role- 
functions or role-elements correspond with certain 
variations in terminology. This approach would make it 
possible to discuss a kinship terminology more fully, 
taking into account alternative forms and paying attention 
to both denotative and connotative aspects (cf. e.g. Yassin, 
1977)•
Sociologically relevant behaviour always has a 
purpose. Role systems such as kinship are being used by 
society for organizational ends (cf. Banton, 1968: 12): 
social relationships are made the basis for social organ­
ization. It would seem that if we want to examine the 
practical usefulness of the role concept and other related 
ideas we will have to look at the question of the purpose 
and function of relationships. I shall turn to this matter 
now by way of conclusion to this chapter of evaluation and 
assessment.
5 .3. Conclusion.
I have tried in this chapter to explain and justify 
the background bo my approach to kinship terminology. My 
position is that of a relativist. I do not deny the reality
of the world around us, but what matters in the study 
of man, of which the study of language is a part, is what 
Is real to man, or better perhaps, what is the objective 
reality in as far as and in the way man perceives it: that 
is his reality. It is in this sense that I accept that we 
create our own world, socially and linguistically; and 
this means that in a limited sense each cultural group 
has Its own world and world-view. I am inspired by the 
ideas of VJ. von Humboldt without necessarily following 
the neo-Humboldtians in every aspect or detail. Yet I 
recognize .at the same time the need- for universalism.
On a general, philosophical level this Idea imposes itself 
fox’ the simple reason that I accept the unity of mankind: 
whatever differences there are can never touch the core 
of our being human. On a mere practical level I see a 
need for universalism precisely because I hold a moderately 
relativist position :* it only makes sense to hold such a 
position if things are retentive in mutual comparison and 
with reference to some standard. I do not look, however,
In searching for this universal standard towards an 
objective outside reality seen as the 1 substance' which 
underlies the 'accidents' of the different cultural forms, 
according to the Aristotelian model. I see this universal­
ity as one of purnose rather than of substance- I favour, 
in other words, a teleological explanation.
I must acknowledge here my second source of 
inspiration, the work of C. Levi-Strauss (cf. above 3»5)* 
His theory was tbleological (cf. Maranda, 1964: 524) which 
means that in order to explain a given phenomenon he 
indicated its purpose, its aim. Concretely in the field 
of kinship this meant that Levi-Strauss explained the ■
structure of kinship by stating its function, viz. to 
assure communication. This one function operated both 
on the level of kinship behaviour and on that of the 
language of kinship. These two, as he saw it, were 
not causally linked; they were complementary in achieving 
one and the same aim, viz. integration of social relation­
ships within society (cf. Levi-Strauss, 1958: 47):
"exogamie et langage ont la m@me fonction fondamentale: 
la communication avec autrui, et 1!integration du groupe" 
(1949: 612). From the philosophical point of view the 
teleological method of explanation may be fraught with 
difficulties (cf. Bochenski, 1954: 115)> hut it is an 
accepted method and I see no objection to using it 
provided it is done with great caution. I feel all the 
more justified to use this method of explanation since 
the causal explanations - in principle a much more power­
ful and reliable type of explanation - have not really been 
able to produce general and comprehensive answers to the 
problem of the social relevance of kin terms.
To say that I share Levi-Strauss's teleological 
orientation does not mean that I am convinced that the 
precise function of communication Is a good explanation 
of our problem. I have expressed my reservations on this 
point above (cf. 3-5.3). I would like to propose another 
function, not * communication1 but 'situating people, 
defining their place'. On the social level this would 
refer to the creation of social relationships "which make 
people socially dependent upon one another and build up 
sentiments of solidarity1 (cf. Bant on, 1968: 10). Bloch's 
work (Bloch, 1971), referred to in this chapter, on the
strategies of use of kinship categories would fit in 
well with this approach, as would e.g. Titiev's view 
of kinship as "an effective mechanism for disseminating 
Important sociocultural values" (Titlev, 19c?: 48) or 
many other studies on use, context, and variation In 
kinship systems. Each society may have its own particular 
social structure, but all societies have the same aim: 
to situate people in a network of relationships so as to 
achieve integration.
On the linguistic level we can equally find a 
mechanism which has as its aim to situate people - with 
linguistic means - in space and in time: this is achieved 
through the deictic mechanisms of a language. Jespersen 
speaks of "shifters", "a class of words ... whose meaning 
differs according to the situation" (1922: 123). I would 
like to suggest that this deictic character is not only 
used to situate speakers/hearers of a '-language spatially 
and temporally, but that there also Is a social deixis 
which allows speakers to situate themselves socially through 
language. It is this suggestion I would like to develop In 
my final chapter.
6. Kinship Terminology As A Deictic System.
6.0. Introduction.
In suggesting that considering kinship terminology as 
a deictic system may lead to a new, complementary, and 
possibly better insight into the nature of this part of 
language, one must obviously explain how exactly 'deixis' 
and 'deictic system' are to be understood. When linguists 
use the term deixis they normally refer to certain elements 
In language, e.g., tense, pronouns, etc., which relate an 
utterance to the situation in which it is produced. 
Weinrelch, for example, mentions in this respect the time 
of discourse, its place, and the participants in the speech 
act (cf. Weinrelch, 1963; 154). The anthropologist Malinow­
ski, on the other hand, used the concept of deixis in a 
very different way, referring to the non-verbal activities 
which accompany the act of speech, viz. "deictic gesture 
as an integral part of language" (1935, vol. II: 30). What 
is common to both ways of using It Is the fact that some 
kind of extra-linguistic point of reference is deemed to 
be necessary for interpreting correctly linguistic utter­
ances. Neither point of view,, however, would seem to be 
adequate for use In connection with kinship terminology.
The first thing to be done, therefore, will be to re-examine 
the notion of deixis with a view to establishing Its scope 
as well as determining a concrete, practical way of: using 
it in an analysis.
After that I would like to present the terminological 
material on which I intend to test the usefulness of this 
deictic view. I have decided to present my personal use of
Dutch kinship terms for this purpose, for a number of 
reasons* I have quoted above (5-2.2) Haudricourt and 
Granai who warned that ethnologists studying cultures 
and social structures which are totally strange and 
unfamiliar to them can easily be misled in their evaluat­
ion of what is crucial in them: they may end up describing 
and analysing what is difficult to understand from their 
own point of view rather than what is of central import­
ance to the society under examination. By opting for my 
own native tongue I hope to avoid this trap. Moreover, 
when dealing with one’s first language one has an inside 
knowledge of the system which goes well beyond a mere 
scheme of classification and allows one to use this system 
for various social or personal purposes, to play games 
with it so to speak. Though I am reasonably fluent in 
both English and Frer\ch I have never felt quite confident 
that I could do the same in these languages. I believe 
that one of the main reasons for this may well be that I 
have not acquired kinship terms as part of a personally 
lived experience in any other language than Dutch. When 
I say that I feel totally confident about the use of kin 
terms in Dutch I do not want to suggest that there are no 
areas of uncertainty in this usage. It means rather that 
1 know that when there is uncertainty this is more likely 
not the result of an insufficient knowledge of the language 
but of a complex situation where the difficulty of linguistic 
expression merely reflects unclarity of personal feeling 
or of social position: such uncertainty can itself some­
times be very revealing. Finally I preferred to choose the 
terminology of a modern complex type of society rather than
one of a so-called simple society. The great importance 
of kinship in the latter type of society may, by the 
sheer abundance of its forms and its ramifications, 
make it more difficult to discern what is basic and 
essential from a universal and comparative point of view. 
Perhaps we will reach those basic elements more quickly 
when studying a type of society where the importance of 
kinship is less overwhelming.
One could possibly object to this concentration 
upon personal use that it may prove to be too idiosyncratic, 
too individual to be of general interest. The whole point, 
however, of this approach is to show that there is more to 
kinship terminology than its being a rather impersonal, 
general classificatory system: there is, in Bloch's words,
the use of kin terms as tools for "transforming a social 
situation" and "the manipulation of a new social situation" 
(1971: 86; cf. 5*2.3*3).
In presenting the Dutch kinship terms I shall 
follow at first the pattern of the standard ethnolinguistic 
procedure of listing the terms and of analysing them by 
means of a distinctive feature technique. C.J. Fillmore 
has pointed out (1971 b: 220) that an examination of deictic 
elements is often rendered difficult by the fact that the 
data are incomplete and inconclusive at crucial moments 
because they were not collected with a view to a deictic 
analysis. For this reason I shall add extensive observ­
ations to this first analysis about actual usage of kin 
terms not normally given in traditional, genealogically 
based descriptions. In conclusion we shall then try to 
indicate how all these data may be interpreted deictically.
3^ 6
6.1, The Notion of Deixis.
6.1.1. General Remarks about Deixis.
If I had to choose between the various 
definitions proposed for the notion of deixis I would 
perhaps prefer the following definition by Charles J.
Fillmore:
"Deixis is the name given to those formal 
properties of utterances which are 
determined by, and which are interpreted 
by knowing, certain aspects of the 
communication act in which the utterances 
in question have a role" (1971 b: 219).
This definition offers scope for a wider interpretation
of deixis than a mere way of dealing with the spatial,
temporal, and (inter)personal coordinates of an act of
speech.
This wish for widening the notion of deixis 
is not merely, an ad hoc device which I am trying to intro­
duce. I believe it to be part of a whole set of trends 
in linguistics, some more recent than others, which would 
all seem to have one thing in common, viz. a growing real­
ization that - though linguistics has been right in 
emphasising the study of language for its own sake and in 
its own right - it would be wrong to study language 
completely and exclusively "in vacuo" so to speak. There 
is, for instance, the need for considering context, lingu­
istic as well as extra-linguistic. Furthermore the way we 
use language is * important. The growing interest in*pragm­
atics reflects this concern, while the study of speech acts 
tries to discover not merely the structure of utterances 
but also what one can do with them. Presuppositions and 
the extent to which they are shared are points which retain
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the attention of scholars, as do the various levels of
speech and. so-called social dialects- Robin Lakoff has 
written:
"What I am saying, then, is that the 
pragmatic content of a speech act 
should be taken into account in 
determining its acceptability just 
as its syntactic material has been, 
and its semantic material recently 
has been” (R. Lakoff, 1973: 293).
She outlines three areas of pragmatic behaviour: the 
speaker’s assumptions about his relations with his 
addressee, his real-world situation in which he is comm­
unicating (viz. the importance of the communication, the 
seriousness of his effort to communicate, the formality 
of the speech-act situation), and his decisions based on 
the two previous points as to the effect he wishes to 
achieve through his communicative act (ibid.: 293, 296).
D. Wunderlich has put 3forward a similar view:
nEs kann keine Frage sein, dass die 
Erforschung der pragmatischen Aspekte 
der Sprache die sukunftigen Aktivitaten 
im Bereich der Linguistik wesentlich 
bestimmen wird" (1970: 8),
Among the linguistic elements
"die sich nur dann adaquat behandeln 
lassen, wenn die Theorie der sprach- 
lichen Kompetenz auch die Elemente von 
mogliehen Sprechsituationen einschliesst"
he mentions "deikaische Ausserungen" (1971: 156). P. Ant-
inucci, too, links ’context’ and ’deixis': deixis is
defined with reference to the notion of context or "-la
situazione in cui vienne prodotto un atto linguistico" (197*1:
225).
Wolfgang P. Schmid has claimed that the foundations 
for a pragmatic component in grammar were.laid on the one hand
by the work of certain philosophers, notably C.S. Peirce
and J. Bar-Hillel, and on the other hand by linguistic
work on deixis:
"In den Blickpunkt der Sprachwissenschaft 
wird das, was wir mit pragraatischer 
Komponente bezeichnet haben, erstmals von 
K. Buhler geruckt. Er entwickelt - gest- 
utzt auf Yorarbeiten von Ph. Wegener und K. 
Brugmann uber die idg. Demonstrativpronomina 
- eine Zwelfelderlehre fur die menschliche 
Sprache und analysiert ihre Satse in ein 
Zeigfeld und ein Symbolfeld. Im Mittel- 
punkt des Zeigfeldes stehen die drei Zeig- 
worter ich, hier und jetz.t1 (1972 : 7)*
Of the philosophers mentioned Bar-Hillel discussed the
case for pragmatics in his article "Indexical Expressions"
(195*1), referring both to Indexical sentences and indexical
non-sentential expressions. The term ’indexical' was
taken from Peirce's classification of signs according to
their way of signifying, viz, symbolically, indexically,
or iconically. A sign represents its object to its inter-
pretant indexically "by being in existential relation with
its object (as in the case of the act of pointing)" (Burks,
19*19: 67*1). Unfortunately this term has been understood
and defined in many slightly differing ways (cf. Lyons, 1977
105 ff.). However, this is not the moment to enter into a
philosophical debate and I therefore prefer to concentrate
on the linguistic leads -which the quotation from Schmid? s
paper has given us,
Brugmann, in his comparative study of Indo-
European demonstrative pronouns (1904), tried to establish
In parallel with the "Aktionsarten" of the verbs the
"Demonstrationsarten" or deictic functions of the pronouns
(op.cit.: 9). He considers pronouns as merely standing
"pro nomine", instead of a noun, and their use as an
ellipsis (ibid.: 4 f.). Situational features or gestures 
ensure that adequate communication is achievedj histor­
ically the phenomenon of deixis is thought to be linked 
with the gesture of pointing (ibid.: 7 f<). He distingu­
ishes four "modes of pointing" (ibid.: 9 ff.):
- Der-Deixis: this is the basic deictic function of pointing
towards an object without specification of 
distance
- Ich-Deixis: the speaker directs the attention of his inter­
locutor onto himself or his own sphere of 
interest
- Du-Deixis: this is the Der-Deixis in so far as it has a
special link with the interlocutor
- Jener-Deixis: these pronouns point towards what is distant
either in space or in time, or to what is on 
the'other side.
This four-way division is not as clear as one might perhaps 
have wished in strict logic. K. Buhler mentioned already 
proposals for changing Ich-Deixis and Du-Deixis to hic- 
Deixis and istic-Deixis since it Is allegedly not the person 
bufc the place where a person finds himself which is pointed 
at (Buhler, 1934: 83). This reflects the idea that the 
spatial location is the most fundamental category In lingui­
stic expression. E. Cassirer has claimed that languages 
as a rule specify place, situation, and distance obligator­
ily and meticulously:
"All other specifications are thrust into 
the background by this spatial character­
ization, or are represented only indirectly 
through It" (1953j vol. I: 200).
A similar idea is reflected in a proposal by J.A.F. Wils
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(1938) that the whole pronominal system has developed 
as a deictic system starting from the demonstrative 
pronouns. In this process, it is suggested, the spatial 
dimensions come to be used for other forms of personal 
and emotional distance.
Earlier theories may, in fact, have stressed 
the Importance in deixis of the pointing gesture accompanied 
by, or possibly replaced altogether by, a vocal gesture of 
deixis. Gradually, however, it was seen in a more system­
atic and abstract way as the basic structure of a speech 
situation centered around a speaking subject, the "I".
There was a certain shift of emphasis from a purely localist’ 
ic point of view to a more psychological one. Buhler 
distinguished the "Symbolfeld" of the "Nennworter" from 
the "Zeigfeld" of the deictic elements; central to this 
’Zeigfeld1 are the words hler, jetzt, and ich. Another 
psychologist wroVting about deixis in language, Ragnar 
Rommetveit, has presented the same idea in the following 
more elaborate diagram:
There
>You (listener)
That -"
■ This
Before
0 ^
I (speaker)
Js.I
Now ' Afterwards
This J
Tha
There (Rommetveit, 197^: 36)
The fact that "I" is more basic than "here" and "now” is not
only demonstrated by the fact that "here" and "now" 
are defined with reference to "I" but also by the 
development of communicative skill in children. A 
young child tends to be "egocentric" in his deixis, 
i.e. he assumes "that the world is unequivocal and 
monistic: his immediate here-and-now constitutes the 
centre of whatever world he can share with others" 
(Rommetveit, 197*1: 42). At this stage a child is unable 
to adopt the perspective of the other person: only grad­
ually his capacity for decentration, and with it his 
mastery of deixis, develops (ibid.: 43). Fillmore refers 
to the person who produces a linguistic expression as "the 
center of the associated communication act" (1971 b: 222).
Wunderlich has claimed that nine aspects must 
be considered In the study of a speech act: the speaker, 
the hearer, the time of speaking, the place, the phonol­
ogical and syntactic properties of the utterance, its 
cognitive content, various preconditions (about what the 
speaker knows and assumes the hearer to know, about 
their social relationship, etc.), the Intention of the 
speaker, and the relation which is established between 
speaker and hearer as a result of the utterance (1971*. 178).
Without commenting on the details of this proposed list, it
must be clear that so many things are now considered as
being part of what was traditionally known as deixis that
some subdivision of this concept seems indicated. Fillmore 
has proposed a five-way distinction:
"One speaks of person deixis (references 
to the speaker and the addressee), place 
deixis (references to the locations of 
the speaker and the addressee), time deixis
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as well as references to portions of 
the utterance itself (discourse deixis), 
and references to the relative social 
statuses of the speech act participants 
(honorific systems, etc.)" (1972: 18).
Once we enlarge the scope of deixis we must 
also reconsider the conditions for deictic elements to 
be effective in communication. These elements have a 
wide domain of potential reference in the case of pron­
ouns; the same is true for other words but in a different 
way. It remains true in fact for words which have not 
only a literal meaning but also - depending on the social 
situation - various extended meanings. Which precise’ 
reference is going to be realised In an utterance will 
depend on what Is cognitively salient at a given moment 
in a particular situation. Rommetveit says:
"The message is thus mediated by words.
Its specific content, however, stems 
exclusively from my temporary cognitive 
representation of a domain of particular 
persons and places" (1968: 188).
The words which are used are not the whole message, there
is a non-linguistic constituent established by a particular
convergence of cognitive orientations on the part of the
participants of the speech act: "There is thus a peculiar
dynamic complementarity between linguistic and non-linguistic
constituents" (ibid, : X895 -
Brugmann, as we saw, spoke of 'ellipsis' in
connection with the use of deictics which replace nouns or
names, Rommetveit reverses the situation: "Ellipsis", he
claims,
"appears to be the prototype of verbal 
communication under ideal conditions of 
complete complementarity in an inter- 
subjectively established, temporarily 
shared social world" (197*1: 29).
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One might not want to reverse the problem simply in
order to establish once.again an order of preference
where, in fact, we have an interaction of elements
which are blended according to the requirements of
the situation in such a way that communication is ensured.
I think it is wiser to follow Buhler (1934: 154) and
Wunderlich (1970-' 8) in replacing "elliptisch" by "emprak- 
q
tisch" . In any case, the shared social world is essential;
in this world a sentence - or word - is assumed to be used
correctly when it is used
’’appropriately with respect to the 
speaker’s intentions and with respect 
to the norms of interpretation for 
the language community in which the 
communicating event takes place"
(Fillmore, 1973: 100).
The fact that utterances are embedded in speech 
act situations may seem to set us a hopeless task since 
particular situations are unpredictable and cannot be listed. 
It would be a wrong approach, however, if one were to try 
and start from single situations. What matters is discover­
ing the mechanism which makes it possible for a language 
to be effective. This is what gives unity to the variety 
of speech act situations. The dimension along which this 
mechanism operates with regard to place, time, and person 
is that of distance:
"Categories of person, place and time 
deixis can be distinguished according 
to the opposition proximal and distal"
(Fillmore, I971 b: 222). ;
1. Buhler speaks of "empraktische Rede" in the case of
"Einbau des Sprechens in anderes sirmvolles Verhalten" 
(1934: 52).
Obviously, if need be, this distinction can be refined
as Fillmore has done, for instance, for place deixis
where he proposed a three-way distinction into proximal,
closer distal, and farther distal (ibid.: 225), or
proximal, medial, and distal (1966: 221). These dimensions
are a means of locating the participants in place and in
time, a way of determining their position with regard to
the coordinates of the speech act situation. It can be
claimed, however, that there are other dimensions involved
than mere physical distance. R. Lakoff has examined the
demonstrative pronouns this and that, and she has claimed
that there is a case for distinguishing spatio-temporal
deixis, discourse deixis, or anaphora, and emotional
deixis in the use of these pronouns. This, for example,
can serve to convey greater vividness, or familiarity, or
even contempt :
"He kissed her with this unbelievable passion"
"This Fred Snooks turns out to have .24 cats".
(Lakoff, 1974 : 3^7 f *)*
She concludes:
"I have shown that there is a clear 
linguistic link between emotional and 
spatial 'closeness' and 'distance': 
these are not mere accidental metaphors.
And the rules that correctly predict the 
spatial uses of this_ and thas should 
somehow also serve to account for their 
discourse and emotional uses. How this 
is to be done remains mysterious" (loc. 
cit. : 355).
My proposal to consider kinship terminology as a 
deictic system is similar in inspiration to Mrs. Lakoffs 
discussion of demonstrative pronouns. As I intend to go 
beyond the field of pronominal deixis, however, It seems 
desirable to proceed in two stages. Firstly I shall consider
the case of pronominal deixis to see if I can throw any
further light on the "mysterious1 question of integrating
the "spatial" and "emotional" parameters of the categories
of closeness and distance. I have chosen to examine
deixis in the personal pronouns for the simple reason
that, in my opinion, every speech act is centered round
the "I" of the speaker and must be interpreted, with
reference to the person of the speaker. L.L. Becker and
I Gusti Ngurah Oka summarize their study on person in Kawi
as follows:
"A central thread - perhaps the central 
thread in the semantic structure of all 
languages is the cline of person, an 
ordering of linguistic forms according 
to their distance from the speaker.
Between the subjective, pointed, specific 
pronominal "I" and the objective, generic 
common noun, between these poles the words 
of all languages - words for people, 
animals, food, time, space, indeed words 
for everything - are ordered and categorized 
according to their distance - spatial, 
temporal, social, biological, and meta­
phorical - from the first person, the speaker. 
The cline of person also underlies most 
linguistic systems as well as words, systems 
of deixis, number, -definiteness, tense, and 
nominal classificatlon among others" (Becker 
and I Gusti, 1974: 229).
One may feel that this is too sweeping a statement; yet
I remain convinced that the personal pronouns are the most
basic, the most widespread, and the most efficient means
of identifying the participants In a discourse (cf. Krupa,
1976: 150), not only with regard to the roles of speaker
and hearer but also to their relative social status '(ibid.
154) .
This last aspect leads me on to the second stage 
in which I shall argue the case for the possibility of 
extending the notion of deixis beyond pronominal systems t
social categories and consider some of the implications 
of such an extension.
6.1.2, Person Deixis.
6 ,1.2.1. General discussion.
When we analyse the personal pronouns In English 
we only need the features 'person1, 'number', and, to a 
lesser extent, 'gender' to account adequately for the 
members of this set. However, when one considers other, 
especially non-European, languages it Is obvious that such 
an analysis is far from universally valid, and one might 
argue that an analysis in terms of universally valid 
features Is preferable, not merely when wanting to compare 
systems but under all circumstances. Ira R. Buchler and 
R. Freeze have attempted to summarize the findings of 
analyses of a wider range of pronominal systems and have 
deduced from them a number of distinctive features with a 
view to establishing a typology of this class of words 
(Buchler and Freeze, 1966). The notion of universally 
valid distinctive features Is taken from Jakobson and 
Halle's study of phonology (1956). The distinction these 
authors had made in the case of inherent features between 
sonority and tonality features is said by Buchler and Freeze 
to correspond, in the field of pronouns, with on the one 
hand formal features, on the other hand social and cultural 
features. It Is not my intention to examine the Buchler 
and Freeze article, the claims they make, and the analyses 
they propose in every detail. I would simply like to 
present the features they have selected with a few words of
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explanation^ and then look at the way they present the 
Dutch pronominal system in terms of this typology,
I shall then try to present a 'deictic’ analysis of 
that same system., taking into account as well the way 
the system is used.
The first of the formal features is symbolized 
as M : M, i.e. minimal/non-minimal membership. This 
corresponds with singular/non~singular (i.e. dual ... 
plural). The second feature is S : S, i.e. inclusion/ 
exclusion of speaker; the third one is H : H or inclusion/ 
exclusion of hearer. These two features serve to 
distinguish first, second, and third person pronouns from 
one another. They are also instrumental in characterizing 
the distinction between inclusive and exclusive first 
person plural pronouns which a number of languages make. 
Gilyak, for exampledistinguishes nin = we, exclusive, 
i.e. I and they (not-you), or S H M, from mirn = we, 
inclusive, i.e. I and you, or S H M (cf» .Austerlitz. 1959: 
102). The last formal feature which Buchler and Freeze 
propose is MM:MM, i.e. maximal membership/non-maximal 
membership. They introduce this feature to account for 
pronouns which, as far as number is concerned, mean "two or 
more” and "three or more", as a way of avoiding a three-way 
division Ml, M2, and M3 for the feature of minimal member­
ship. One of their examples is taken from Totonac (Mexico) 
where we find_^ . ■
ama he, she, they
huix you (one only)
huixin you (two or more) (loc.cit.: 95) »
Ama is a cumulative term which can denote "one only", "two
only", and "more than two11; hence it has the feature
’maximal membership range'. I have no doubt that some
feature of this kind is required for facts of this
nature. I find it difficult, however, to decide
whether the proposed analysis is satisfactory as some
obvious questions remain unanswered and unanswerable
from the data published, e.g. what is one to make of the
overlap between "two or more" and "three or more" in their
Tzeltal data from Mexico. Since this feature does not
play a role in the Dutch personal pronouns, and since I
intend to analyse these pronouns primarily with a view to
demonstrating the possibility and likely shape of a deictic
analysis, not to contributing directly to the typology of
pronominal systems, I feel fully justified in suspending
■ judgement on this matter.
The four social and cultural features are SL:SL‘,
i.e. solidary/non-solidary, ML:ML, i.e. male/non-male,
P:P, i.e. person/non-person, and PR:PR, i.e. proximate/
non-proximate.
There is no explanation why the feature male/
non-male is treated as a social and cultural feature.
When Paul Friedrich discussed the ten components of Russian
pronominal usage he spoke about "discriminations that are
‘biological’ in a sense, although defined in terms of the
culture" (1966: 229). Among these he counted relative sex
because it could decide usage
"in the sense that two speakers of the 
same sex were normally more prone to 
use familiar terms, whereas speakers 
of opposite sexes would exercise 
greater restraint" (ibid.: 230).
It is possible that Buchler and Freese had something 
similar in mind, although Friedrich Is dealing with 
the usage of personal pronouns in mutual address and 
the role of relative sex in that event, while Buchler 
and Freeze seem more interested In the analysis of the 
terms as an abstract system of reference. I find the 
classification of the person/non-person feature as 
social and cultural equally difficult to understand.
However, I will return to these questions directly or 
indirectly when I propose my deictic analysis of the 
Dutch personal pronouns. From that analysis It will appear 
that in Dutch the issue of person/non-person is chiefly 
a matter of anaphora and gender rather than of person deixis.
The feature of solidary/non-solidary derives 
its name from the solidarity semantic discussed by R. Brown 
and A. Gilman in their article "The Pronouns of Power and 
Solidarity" (i960). In it they examined the covariation 
between the pronoun used in address and the objective 
relationship existing between speaker and addressee. If 
the relationship Is asymmetrical with one person having 
power over another they speak of a power semantic: the 
superior says T and receives V, Solidarity is a symmetrical 
relationship. The former type of relationship is associated 
with respect, the latter with intimacy. As pronouns are 
analysed from the point of view of the speaker the feature 
has sometimes been characterized as "inclusion of the status 
of the hearer/exclusion of the status of the hearer" (Buchler, 
1967: 39); it is also known as the honorific dimension.
Various factors can enter into play here. Friedrich lists 
ten components as I mentioned already: the topic of discourse
the context of the speech event, age, generation, sex, 
kinship status, dialect, group membership, relative 
jural and political authority, and emotional solidarity 
(cf. Friedrich, 1966 : 229)- Brown and Gilman (op.cit.:
255) spoke mainly of institutionalized roles, also of 
sex and age, and, to a lesser extent, of physical strength 
and wealth as bases for power. Respect and formality were 
associated with V, intimacy and condescension with T (ibid. : 
2p8). Jerome C. Ford (197*0 has re-examined the question 
for French after the social upheaval of May 1968 and its 
aftermath in France. His findings are that V is used to 
express respect based on power; V is also used without a 
power basis as an expression of formality, and it is even 
used with disdain as a refusal of ’camaraderie’ and Intimacy. 
What appears to be constant in all cases is the notion of 
distance. T is used ..not merely to address those without 
power: it basically marks solidarity, including the 
solidarity of those wTho share power. The use of T can 
become a bid for acceptance, trying to bridge the gap, to 
come nearby, hoping for 'camaraderie' and eventually 
intimacy. It seemed important to me that throughout the 
various usages the same mechanism appears to be at work, 
viz. that of creating or maintaining distance, or of 
diminishing it.
Once we accept that ’distance' is the crucial 
aspect in the feature of 'solidarity', one might wonder 
how to relate this to the feature proximate/non-proximate 
which indicates physical distance, proximity to the speaker. 
This was in fact the question left open by R. Lakoff in her 
article on the demonstrative pronouns in English (1973; see
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above), I pointed out when first referring to her 
study that I would want to come to some sort of integrat­
ion of spatial and emotional distance, or better perhaps: 
to an integrated view of the feature 'distance*. I am 
bound to say5 however, that it is not my intention simply 
to do away with the distinction between spatial and 
emotional distance and retain one, unanalysable concept 
of distance, or introduce a highly abstract notion of 
distance which could be realised as either 'spatial* or 
'emotional* distance. One very good reason for maintaining
the separation between the two kinds of distance is the
fact that the two can and do in fact occur in opposition 
as distinctive features within one system. A clear example 
of this is provided by the third person pronouns in Bengali,
reported by R.J. Di Prieto (1971: 127):
ini uni * tin! era ora tara e o se era
human + i + + + + T + + 4*
honorific + T + 4* - _
number - - + 4* + - ~  +
proximal + - + + +
ora tar a eta ota §eta ■egulo ogulo segulo
human + + “ - - - -
honorific - -
number - - _ + 1 +
proximal - + - + -
These data show three things. First of all it is possible
for pronouns to be marked with a different value for each 
of the two kinds of distance (i.e. honorific and proximal); 
this is the case for uni, ora, e, and era. Secondly it
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appears that certain pronouns can be marked for one 
of the dimensions in question but unmarked for the 
other one: they are tini, tara, ge , tara, eta, ota,
egulo 3 and ogulo. The last and decisive fact, however, 
is that certain pairs of pronouns are distinguished by 
the opposition honorific/proximal only, viz, ini and 
uni, 'era and ora,, era and era, ora and era, and and o.
If, therefore, we cannot suppress the 
distinction between the various kinds of distance (spatial, 
social, or other), in what way can we arrive at an integrated 
view of this category? I would see it as follows. Deixis 
is a mechanism in language which serves the purpose of 
situating people and events relative to the speaker, 
from zero distance or identification with the speaker to 
any distance away from the speaker. This mechanism 
operates both on the syntactic and lexical levels of 
language.
Not all languages will use the same means 
to achieve this expression of distance but the mechanism 
does exist and operate in every language (cf. R. Lakoff,
1972: 908). Five "modes" of distance have been proposed 
and seem adequate considering the present state of our 
knowledge. They are different kinds of ‘distance’ but 
they are ideologically one (cf. 5*3 above), in that they 
all achieve one and the same aim.
’Distance’ is one concept as a value o.r moral 
meaning in Bloch’s sense (1971; cf, 5-2.3*3 above): this 
moral meaning is put to use in different strategies 
resulting in various tactical meanings. We saw, for 
instance, how the socio-emotional distance of V in French
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could in practice be used to express either respect 
or its opposite, disdain: in the first case one does 
not dare to come too close to the other; in the latter 
it is a question of not wanting to get too close to him. 
Physical and emotional distance may reinforce one 
another or cancel one another out. Suppose I owe someone 
respect and formal behaviour because of his superior 
position. If he lives, moreover, outside my immediate 
environment, this formality may increase. On the other 
hand I may be less overawed by his superior position since
1 do not experience his authority directly: as a result I 
may behave in a more relaxed, less formal manner. Which 
strategic use is made of the basic value of distance and 
how to interpret it will normally be clear when one takes 
into account what is ’cognitively salient in the temporarily 
shared social world of speaker and hearer’ , to use Rommet­
veit *s terminology (cf. Rommetveit, 1968, 188 f., 197^:
2 9 ff.: see above 6 .1.1).
6,1.2 .2 . Dutch Personal Pronouns.
Buchler and Freeze conclude their study of 
the distinctive features of pronominal systems by a 
tyoological characterization of a number of systems, 
listing for each one the number of units It has, which 
features are crucial in it and for how many terms. Their 
typological summary of the Dutch personal pronouns reads:
number M ^ S;g R sL:5E ML:ML P:P PR:PR MM:MM 
of units
9 Y 5 7 if 2 0 0  0
(loc.cit. : 100) .
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I am not quite sure which nine terms were
selected, nor are the details of their analysis completely
clear to me from this information, I presume they did 
not include gij. This would be understandable since it 
is a little used form, Moreover, it would actually be 
impossible to distinguish between gij and U, as can be 
seen in the matrix below, merely on the strength of the 
features proposed here* This, too, makes me think that 
gij must have been omitted. If this is the case, however, 
it would mean that they did include het (it): but then I 
do not understand why the column for person/non-person 
has zero marked on it. It may be the result of the fact 
that they do not mark in their feature representations 
any component which is not strictly required to distinguish 
the representation of one particular form from that of all 
the other ones in the set. Not marking het for male/non­
male Is, in fact, sufficient to distinguish it from all
other forms.
I shall now give the complete matrix for 
the personal pronouns in Dutch, using Buchler and Freeze’s 
features:
M S H SL ML P
ik + + - +
jij(je) + - + + +
U + +
gij (ge) + +
hij + + 1
zij (ze) + +
het + -
wi j (we) + +
jullie +
zij (ze)
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The forms in between brackets are the unstressed ones.
They are used in normal speech in Dutch while the 
stressed forms are reserved for emphatic speech.
The spaces left open in the matrix indicate 
that the feature in question is unspecified for the 
pronoun concerned. This presentation does not, however, 
give a complete account of the facts. The fact that het 
is [- person] implies more than the mere lack of specific­
ation with regard to [+ or - male]: it actually rules out 
that possibility. The third person plural pronoun zij , 
on the other hand, which can be [+ male], [- male], or 
[- person] shows that [- person] and [+ or - male] are 
compatible within one and the same form unless, of course, 
one decides that there are two homophone pronouns zij, 
one [+ person], the other [- person]. These points are 
not made explicit in the-matrix as it stands.
Other observations concerning the third.person 
singular pronoun point to further, no less important 
problems. First of all there is the question of anaphora. 
Anaphora is sometimes considered to be a special form of 
deixis. Antinucci (1974: 225) calls it 'internal deixis', 
while Fillmore seems to treat it under the heading of 
discourse deixis (1971 b: 227). The pronouns hij and zij 
can be deictic, in the strict sense or they can be anaphoric. 
They are aerobic m  as far as m e y  are potential parsicrpants 
in the speech act. Hat_ can practically only be anaphoric.
0nce bij and zij are used anaphorically the 
question of gender rather than sex becomes the most important 
criterion in the choice between the two, at least in refer­
ence to inanimates. The case of using she for ships.
however, goes beyond these rules and in fact breaches 
them. It could be argued that what is primarily involved 
here is a change from [- person] to [+ person]j once 
the word is transferred into the category [+ person] 
the choice between [+ male] and [- male] imposes itself.
In such a case it appears that the choice of the female 
variant is felt to express greater intimacy or personal 
involvement. I am not sure how much importance to attach 
to this last aspect in relation to general usage unless 
perhaps an inverse relation could be established between 
the sex of the speaker and the value selected for [male].
But I do not know of any evidence for female speakers 
using the feature [+ male] to express greater intimacy 
and the like. If such evidence cannot be found it may be 
merely a feature of men's speech, not of general usage.
There Is an indication of a different kind that the choice 
between [- person] and [+ person] may at times be socially 
or emotionally relevant. I am referring here to anaphora 
in connection with neuter nouns. When we compare, for 
example, kind (child) and meisje (girl), both neuter nouns, 
we see that the anaphoric pronoun for the former can be 
either masculine or feminine, i.e. hij or zij, or neuter 
het for kind, while it can only be feminine zij for melsje. 
The social reason usually given for explaining this differ­
ence Is the fact that sex Is felt to be irrelevant in the 
case of children. As a matter of fact the neuter anaphoric 
pronoun can only be used as long as w e are speaking of small 
children. However, the example of kind is unique in being 
a simple noun: all other possible examples of neuter nouns
referring to human beings are diminutives. Their neuter
gender is merely a grammatical feature.
When we look at the second person pronouns 
we note first of all that an extra feature becomes 
necessary if one Includes gij in the list of pronouns.
In standard Dutch gij is used exclusively in very formal, 
mainly written, language and more particularly in religious 
language, though in southern dialects it is simply the 
normal form of the second person singular. It occurs 
only in the subject case* standard Dutch uses U for all 
other cases. The special character of gij could be called 
[solemn]. The normal form of polite address is U, both 
for the singular and the plural. This pronoun originated 
most probably in a nominal expression like Uwe Edelheid 
(cf. Your Honour): this made it grammatically a distant, 
third person expression. This still shows in the fact that 
with reflexive verbs we find the third person reflexive 
pronoun as often, If not more often, than the formal second 
person reflexive pronoun when the subject pronoun is U.
For instance, we would rather say rtU vergist zichn (You are 
mistaken) than "U vergist U". Politeness demands distance, 
and third person implies distance.
In addressing one of my parents I shall always 
use U, never the solidary jij. However, in the plural I 
can use the solidary jullie as well as the formal U. My 
interpretation of this would bo the:; the plural maxes the 
deixis less concentrated, as a result distance is more 
easily kept and too much familiarity Is avoided. The use 
of an U which would combine plural and formality might, 
by a kind of cumulative effect, come across as too formal 
in certain family relationships. However, when I am
addressing an audience in, for example, an academic 
or an ecclesiastical context I must use U.
The use of j ij/i ullle or U is not reciprocal. 
When I am teaching in a primary or secondary school I will 
address the pupils with j ij/j ullle, while they are expected 
to use U. When I address the whole class I will not 
automatically use the plural jullie. I could say, for 
example: nHoe zou je dat vertalen?" (How would you translate 
that?) with the intention to suggest or stimulate a greater 
and more direct personal involvement. If there is no such 
reason one uses j ullie, e.g.: nJullie kunnen nu wel gaan" 
(You may leave now). Another way of achieving a similar 
result of suggesting or stimulating more personal involve­
ment is to switch from the second person plural to the first 
person plural, e.g.: !,Hoe zouden we deze zin kunnen ontleden 
(How could we parse this sentence?). There certainly are 
different nuances in the use of jij or wl j in these class­
room situations, chiefly dependent on the degree to which a 
teacher identifies himself with the student body. I see, 
all the same, an Indication hare of a certain similarity 
between the two usages. Deixis relaxes to the extent it 
moves away from the MIn; it also relaxes w h e n  it Is spread 
out over more than one referent. This would explain why 
both the shift of person and the change of number do achieve 
similar, albeit not quite idencitai, results.
This interpretation of the way we use pronouns 
would seem to be confirmed by the indefinite pronoun men 
(one) and its alternatives, viz. the (unstressed) jjp and ze 
(third person plural). Men is totally unspecified, remote, 
and - if used frequently - gives an impression of formality
which borders on pedantry. 2e_ is an alternative which, 
by virtue of being third person and plural, is fairly 
remote and vague; but since it is a personal pronoun 
it lacks the rigid impersonal formality of men. Je_ is 
much more colloquial, suggesting closer personal involve­
ment, but it can only be used in an unofficial, informal 
setting.
After discussing the Dutch personal pronouns 
with reference to the distinctive features proposed by 
Buchler and Freeze and adding some observations on my use 
of these pronouns I would now like to present this lexical 
field in a way which incorporates all of these data. This 
’deictic' presentation will consist (as explained above
6.1,2.1) of two parts. First we shall analyse and present 
the basic value of each element of the set; after that we 
shall try to formulate^ the tactical meanings which may 
result from the use of these elements.
My presentation of the system of personal 
pronouns is inspired in part by Henira Hurley's present­
ation of deictics in general (1970: 145). However, I 
wanted to incorporate the singular/plural distinction too. 
It seemed preferable not to use a branching tree for 
this presentation in order to avoid the problem of cross­
classification. I therefore decided to adapt M.A.K. 
Ralilday1s semantic network (e.g. Holliday, 1973: especial 
p.47) which allows for simultaneous systems having entry 
condition.
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This scheme needs a few words of explanation. First 
of all I have to point out that the distinction between 
deictic and anaphoric pronouns as given here can be 
misleading if this graphic representation were read as 
if they were on a par: I tend to think that anaphora 
is a derived form of deixis. Moreover, a proper study 
and analysis of anaphoric usage would also have to examine 
its relationship with the demonstrative pronouns. I have 
not carried out such an analysis here and have simply listed 
the pronouns in question. It seemed desirable, however, to 
mention them in order to delimit more clearly the range of 
person deixis.
Secondly, I have given the stressed and unstressed 
forms as alternatives: there is no reason to complicate the 
analysis by trying to account for these variants by means of 
extra labelled nodes where a single rule will do. The rule 
is that in spoken language the unstressed forms are normal, 
the stressed ones are used to mark emphasis. The emphatic 
use is impossible by the nature of things in the indefinite 
uses of j_e_ and ze. The unstressed form ge^  is rare in 
standard Dutch: its very character of extreme formality 
practically rules out a simple, non-emphatic use. Thirdly,
I have added - at the cost of an extra feature - the indefinite 
pronoun men, mainly because I had referred to it in my 
previous discussions. Whether this would be the best way 
of accounting for this term in a complete treatment of 
pronouns remains to be seen.
Lastly I would like to explain the terms I intro­
duced to mark the singular/plural distinction: focused and 
diffused. This use is inspired by R,. Austerlitz’s analysis
of Gilyak pronouns. He used focus to indicate that 
deixis was directed at one single point, and spectrum 
when focus was relaxed (Austerlitz, 1959: 104). He 
interpreted a politeness form equally as a case of 
relaxing the deixis, and the use of the third person 
pronouns rather than the second person ones between newly- 
wTeds in the culture he was describing as a manifestation 
of timidity, a relaxing of deixis out of shyness (ibid.: 106).
When we come to discuss the strategy or tactics 
of person deictics we shall take as our starting point the 
various aspects of the deictic mechanism. First of all 
there is the aspect of distance, the distance away from 
the speaker, from "I". Next there is the direction of this 
pointing movement, either between the interlocutors or 
turning away from this main axis towards a non-participant. 
Finally there is the concentration or focusing of the deixis. 
These aspects must be*seen as complementary rather than as 
opposites.
The following tactical meanings can be achieved 
by using these possibilities:
- distance can express respect, contempt, or informality
- direction can express impoliteness or rudeness (e.g., 
when speaking about someone who is present in the third 
person within his hearing and with the intention of being 
heard by him), cr timidity, delicacy, extreme respect 
(compare the origine of U or German Sie, or the use of 
impersonal men in tactful reproach: "One should not do 
this").
- concentration can serve to express either separation (e.g. 
the jullie of our class-room example; perhaps also the
royal VJij ) , or inclusion and personalization (cf. 
the we_ of the same class-room example). Though I 
have dealt with the emphatic forms of pronouns 
separately one could possibly consider to deal with 
them here as a case of sharpening of the focus.
These various tactical rules can either reinforce each 
other in a cumulative way (e.g., the distance, direction, 
and relaxed focus of the impersonal use of ze as opposed 
to the impersonal use of je), or keep each other in balance 
(e.g. when the diffusion of jullle compensates for the lack 
of the politeness factor in It when I use this term to my 
parents instead of U). These rules would seem to be 
sufficient to interpret and disambiguate any use of personal 
pronouns In Dutch. Each particular interpretation will 
obviously only be possible within a given situation and be 
dependent upon it. We .are merely concerned here with matters 
relating to competence; the analysis of a system of values 
and their possible tactical uses.
This, I believe, shows that It is possible to 
perform an analysis of elements like personal pronouns in 
terms of deixis, and what form such an analysis could take.
It is one thing, however, to give a deictic analysis of 
pronouns but quite a different thing to claim that it can 
be done - and can be done to good effect - with a set of 
nouns. Before I attempt, therefore, to analyse deicticaliy 
Dutch kinship terms I would like to return for a moment to 
the notion of social deixis in order to consider the just­
ification of this expansion of deixis and deictic analysis, 
and its limitations.
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6.1.3* Social Deixis.
In my general remarks about deixis (cf. above
6.1.1) I quoted the abstract of an article by L.L. Becker
and I Custi Ngurah Oka (197*0 in which it was claimed
that words for everything
"are ordered and categorized according 
to their distance - spatial, temporal, 
social, biological, and metaphorical - 
from the first person, the speaker".
R. Rommetveit speaks about the openness which characterizes
not merely deictic words but also definite expressions :
what is identified by such expressions must be assessed in
terms of the intersubjectivity at the moment of speech
(1974: 44 f.). This - In his view - makes speaking about
literal vs. metaphorical readings of sentences as such
rather uninformative. I believe claims of this kind to be
exaggerated. 1 am afraid that if complete vocabularies
were seen as organized according to the one criterion of
’distance1, even with five modalities, such a classification
would be highly artificial and pretty well meaningless.
As for Rommetveit's view, I have made it clear earlier on
(cf. above 5,2.3.4) what my position is on the question of
metaphor. There is a subjective element to any form of
language usage but it goes too far to say that definite
expressions have the same ’openness’ as' deictic elements,
that they ace empty shells, as it acre, -which arc only being
filled with meaning by virtue of being deictically anchored
(to use Rommetveit’s favourite term) in the intersubjactively
established ’here-ancl-now’ of the act of speech, •
Can it, then, be meaningful at all to speak about
social deixis in connection with general vocabulary, or at
least some parts of it? When we accept Buhler’s clear-cut 
distinction between "Zeigworter" which depend for their 
meaning on the "Zeigfeld", the experiential, ever-changing 
context of a speech act, and "Nennworter" which are symbols 
and are meaningful within a given semantic field (cf. 1934:
80 f.) it is impossible to speak of the deixis of "Nennworter" 
It is perhaps significant In this respect that the widening 
of deixis to include social deixis has started with, and 
has until now been chiefly concentrating upon, marginal cases 
of pronominal deixis, viz. those cases where the relative 
social position and relationships of the participants have 
an Influence upon and are reflected in the choice of special 
pronouns, the so-called honorifics. Wunderlich referred to 
these explicitly (1971: 159) 3 as did Fillmore (1971:b; 224), 
and most of R. Lakoff’s article "Language in Context" (1972) 
was an analysis of an example of context-bound usage, viz. 
honorific expressions. As the choice of pronouns is dictated 
by politeness, intimacy, or rudeness, a certain amount of 
attention is also given to the question of speech levels. 
Generally speaking these studies did not concentrate exclus­
ively, or not necessarily even principally, on lexical 
elements, they also consider ’appropriateness’ In sentential 
expressions. A good example of this is R. Lakoff’s article 
on "The Logic of Politeness" (1973)*
Within systems of polite address, however, we find 
not only pronouns but also certain pronominal expressions, 
e.g. "Your Honour", or "Your Majesty". More significant, 
however, are probably the words for certain roles or function 
used In some cultures as forms of polite address, Howard H. 
Hatton mentions in his study of Thai pronouns that the old
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watchman at his appartment used to greet him with the 
honorific title of ?aacaana "teacher", to which he replied 
using the kin term lurj , "uncle" ( 1973: 228). Dieter Wunder­
lich mentions among the examples of "sprachliche Ausdrucks- 
mittel von delktischer Oder situationsexplizierender Art"
(1970: 24) first of all deictic expressions but immediately 
after-wards "Formen der Kontaktaufnahme" (ibid.: 26). With 
this general formula he refers to various forms of greetings, 
expressions of politeness, respect, or intimacy, but even 
more, in his view, to different role relations that exist 
between speaker and addressee. Since such social roles 
involve two or more persons, each one of those relationships 
can be specified according to the relative positions of 
the persons involved. The linguistic utterances related to 
these roles are equally specified according to the relative 
positions of the role-bearers. Probably the most fundamental 
social role system, one which exists in every society, is 
the kinship system. One is, therefore, fully justified in 
approaching such a system in terms of deixis, social deixis.
I mentioned in my general discussion of person deixis (cf. 
above 6.1,2.1) that P. Friedrich distinguished ten discrim­
inations or cognitive components underlying Russian pronominal 
usage’ in a postscript to his study he pointed out that "the 
discriminations, in modified form, also underlay the equally 
important symbolism of the kinship terminology" (Friedrich, 
1966: 252). This would seem to confirm my conclusion.
J.L. Fischer, in an article entitled "Words for Self and 
Others in Some Japanese Families" (1964) proposed a new 
approach to the study of kinship terminology. Rather than 
study various formally defined lexical categories separately
he began to look at the entire range of forms used to
refer to "self" and "addressee" within the household.
Suzuki Takao has taken up the same idea in a perspective
which seems similar to my deictic approach, as the
following quotation shows:
"Upon examination it becomes clear that 
although the Japanese use so-called 
personal pronouns, we also use many other 
words in conversation to identify speaker 
and addressee. For example, in many 
families today fathers identify themselves • 
in conversation with their children as 
otosan (father-polite) or papa. But if 
that same man who calls himself 'papa’ to 
his children is, let us say, a school­
teacher, then he will probably call himself 
sensei (teacher) when he is talking to his 
pupils in school. And should he find a 
lost child by the roadside, he will like as 
not call himself ojisan (uncle; general term 
for male adults when addressed by children), 
and say something like, ’Stop crying, now. 
Ojisan will see that you get home all right1. 
The same may be said for modes of identifying 
the addressee in a conversation. In the 
last example of the man who found the lost 
child, he might well have said, 'Onlichan (big 
brother, endearing), stop crying,1 and the 
child could just as well have answered, ’Does 
Ojic.han (mister) know where I live?’ When 
looked at this way, words for identification 
of speaker and addressee in Japanese conver­
sations are more complex than generally 
thought. Personal pronouns are, if anything, 
in the minority.
I have decided to call the phenomenon of 
speakers using different words to indicate 
themselves ’speakers’ linguistic self­
definition’. Linguistic self-definition 
constitutes a determination of the speaker's 
location of himself along the axis of language 
Further, I call the speaker’s behavior in 
choosing a word to identify the addressee, 
’linguistic other-definition’. This too sets 
a linguistic coordinate, and, in tandem with 
linguistic self-definition, serves to conform 
linguistically the human relationship Involved 
(Takao, 1976: 255 f*)*
If there is this similarity between pronominal
and kinship systems and if, as we have implied, anaphora
or reference Is not the most essential part of deixis, 
we could ask ourselves what to make of the traditional 
distinction In kinship studies between terms of reference 
and terms of address. Was John P. McLennan right after 
all when he claimed that kinship terms were.merely na code of 
courtesies and ceremonial addresses in social intercourse" 
(1886: 273;* cf* above 2,2)? I made it clear when I discussed 
his position that the distinction would have to be looked 
at again in connection with use, context, and pragmatics*
In the light of my deictic approach I would see this matter 
as follows. What is essential is that kinship terms are 
the linguistic means of indicating the position of relatives 
In relation to one another, as seen from the point of view 
of whoever happens to be the Ego in a given situation. These 
terms have a basic value and, moreover, are used according to 
certain strategies. Which term fits a particular situation 
depends on those two things. When we are referring to a 
relative we are In a different situation than when we are 
addressing him: this will be one of the aspects to be taken 
into account, but then so will, for example, the purpose for 
which we refer to him or address him, the mood in which we 
address him, etc. Certain terms are more suitable in some 
situations than in others; some are exclusive to a special 
kind of situation. Under this last heading would cone the 
terms which are traditionally classified as 'terms of 
reference only* or ’terms of address only’: their tactical
use is limited. Some languages have such strict restrictions 
on the use of certain terms that other uses are not merely 
uncommon but outright unacceptable. In many other languages 
it will be a matter of certain terms being more appropriate
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in certain situations with some overlap between different 
uses. These appropriateness conditions will depend, for 
instance, on what we want to achieve by a particular 
speech act, what kind of feeling we want to convey, or, 
in a given context, who is in our audience, whether a 
person is being- addressed directly or merely listening in, 
etc.
My claim is that there exists a similarity 
between the pronominal and kin terminological systems, and 
that consequently the latter too can be analysed deictically. 
I shall now present the Dutch kinship system in order to
try and verify this claim.
6*2. The Dutch Kinship System.
6,2.1. A First Analysis.
The Dutch kinship system was described thirty 
years ago by the anthropologist H.T. Fischer (19^7) with
a view to deepening our understanding of society by the
study of kinship terms, It was an effort to broaden the 
scope of kinship studies and include modern Western European 
societies in the range of these studies. I will take 
Fischer’s article as my starting point.
He distinguishes between terms of reference and 
terms of address in accordance with common practice. As 
I have explained earlier (cf. above 6.1.3) I hope to. account
for this difference in use in another way, within the frame­
work of the general tactical rules of appropriate usage.
Fischer gives a list of 33 terms; square brackets 
indicate the terms or the kin-types which presuppose a female 
Ego.
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This is his list:
1, vader (Fa)
2. moeder (Mo)
3* vrouw [man] (Wi [Hu])
4. kind (Ch)
5- zoon (So)
6. dochter (Da)
7. broeder (Br)
8. zuster (Si)
9. oom (FaBr3 MoBra FaSiHu, MoSiHu)
10. tante (FaSi3 MoSi, FaBrWi MoBrWi)
11. neef (BrSo, SiSo, WiBrSo, WiSiSo, [HuBrSo, HuSiSo]a FaBrSo,
MoBrSo, FaSiSo 3 MoSiSo)
12. nicht (BrDa, SiDa3 WiBrDa, WiSiDaa [HuBrDa, HuSiDa],
FaBrDa, MoBrDaa FaSiDa, MoSiDa)
13* grootvader (FaFa., MoFa)
14. grootmoeder (FaMoa MoMo)
15. oudoom (FaFaBr, MoFaBra FaMoBr, MoMoBr, FaFaSiHu, MoFaSiHu,
FaMoSiHua MoMoSiHu)
16. oudtante (FaFaSi, MoFaSi, FaMoSia MoMoSia FaFaBrWi,
MoFaBrWi 3 FaMoBrWi, MoMoBrWi)
17- achterneef* (BrSoSoa SiSoSoa BrDaSo., SiDaSoa FaFaBrSo 3
MoFaBrSo a FaPaSiSo, MoFaSiSo, FaMoBrSoa MoMoBrSo a 
FaMoSiSo, MoMoSiSo, FaBrSoSo,, MoBrSoSo, FaBrDaSo3 
MoBrDaSo a FaSaSoSc3 i-ioSaocSOj i! 2.Srra3o 3
18. achtornicht (Bi’SoDa., SiSoDa, BrDaDa3 SiDaDas FaFaBrDa3
MoFaBrDa 3 FaFaSiDa, MoFaSiDa, FaMoBrDa, MoMoBrDa, 
Fal-loSiDa, MoMoSiDa, FaBrSoDa3 MoBrSoDaa FaBrDaDa, 
MoBrDaDa, FaSiSoDa3 MoSiSoDa, FaSiDaDa5 MoSiDaDa)
19. kleinkind (SoSoa DaSoa SoDa3 DaDa)
20. kleinzoon (SoSo, DaSo)
21. kleindochter (SoDa3 DaDa)
22. overgrootvader (FaFaFa, MoFaFa, FaMoFa, MoMoFa)
23. overgrootmoeder (FaFaMo, r'loFaMo, FaMoMo, MoMoMo)
24. achterkleinkind (SoSoSo, ■ DaSoSo3 SoDaSo, DaDaSOp
SoSoDa3 DaSoDa, SoDaDa, DaDaDa)
25. achterkleinzoon (SoSoSo, DaSoSo, SoDaSo,. DaDaSo)
26. achterkleindochter (SoSoDa, DaSoDa, SoDaDa, DaDaDa)
27. schoonvader (WiFa, [HuFa])
28. schoonmoeder (WiMo, [HuMo])
29. schoonbroeder/zwager (SiHu, WiBr, WiSiHu, [HuBr, HuSiHu])
30. schoonzuster (BrWi, WiSi, Wi3rWi3 [HuSi3 HuBrWi])
31. schoonzoon (DaHu)
32. schoondochter (SoWi)
(cf. Fischer, 19^7: 105 f-)
I will return below to the elements one could
add to the list (see 6.2.2). Before commenting further
on these matters I will first discuss the analysis of the 
data listed,
K. Ishwaran, who had direct experience of both 
Indian and Dutch cultures, noted the great importance of 
the nuclear family for the understanding of Dutch kinship 
(Ishwaran, 1965: 2*). This does not mean that the relations 
between parents and children are not particularly important 
In every human society: there is} nov.rever, a clear snilc 
of emphasis towards a greater Importance of the nuclear 
family in complex societies like the Dutch one. The precise
degree of importance is difficult to measure: if we accept ,
howeverp that the occurrence of a special term In a given 
language for a particular social institution can give an
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indication of its importance to the speakers of that 
languagej we certainly find confirmation for the sociol­
ogical claim about the centrality of the nuclear family 
in Dutch social life in the fact that we distinguish in 
Dutch between gezin and familie. Gezin is the unit of the 
nuclear family, familie refers to other relatives. As a 
matter of fact * in everyday usage familie can be used as 
an alternative for verwant , ,rrelative,!, probably an elliptic 
use. We say, for example: "Is hij familie van jou?" (Is he 
a relative of yours?). If the person in question were my 
father or brother I would not deny it but, unless I did not 
want to specify the exact relationship, I would answer: "Ja, 
hij is mijn vader/broer" (Yes, he is my father/brother), not: 
"Ja, hij is familie van mi j" (-Yes, he is a relative of mine). 
The relationships within the nuclear family are highly 
individualized, too special, I feel, to be adequately covered 
by the general term familie.
A Dutchman normally belongs to three families (in 
the sense of gezin): his family of origin, his family of 
procreation, and the family of origin of his wife. This 
finding Is supported by a number of facts. With regard 
to kinship terminology Fischer (loc.cit.: 112) has pointed 
out that the terms used for relatives in these three families 
are all either ’descriptive1 (i.e. indicate one person only, 
vis, vader, mo e d e r , mar,, vrouw , schoonv.ad.er , 3 c h o on in os 15 r ) 
or 1semi-descriptive' (i.e. may Indicate more than one relative 
but no relatives in different kinds of relationship, viz. 
broer , zus, zoon, dochter, schoonbroer, schoondochter), 
while outside these three families no relative is referred 
to by these descriptive or semi-descriptive terms. From the
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sociological point of view Ishwaran (loc.cit.) points 
to the lack of continuity in the Dutch family which, at 
least in an urban setting, seldom consists of more 
than two generations. Moreover, the nuclear family Is 
neolocal,1 and has usually little or nothing to do with 
the economic occupation of its members. If we think of 
Wilmott’s study (1958; cf. above 5.2.2) of kinship in 
connection with social legislation and the range of statutory 
liability, we see that legislation in force in the Nether­
lands since 1 January 1965 (almost twenty years after Fischer’s 
article was published), the so-called ’’Algemene Bij standswet11, 
has in fact reduced this range to husband and wife, children, 
parents-in-law, and children-in-law. The case of foster 
parents who enter into this obligation voluntarily and 
temporarily is clearly different. A similar picture emerges 
from the legislation on inheritance "ab intestato”. It 
divides the relatives into four groups of potential inherit­
ors. Group one consists of the marriage partner and the 
children, group two - which Inherits in case there is no 
relative from group one - contains the parents, and the 
brothers and, sisters. When one gets to groups three and four 
of the more remote relatives the system of partitioning 
the inheritance changes. No longer does one consider the 
individual relative: parts of the inheritance are assigned 
to the patrilineage or matrilineage taken as a group. This 
would mean, for example, that a patrilateral grandfather 
would get the same share as a matrilateral second cousin 
if both happened to be the first in line In their respective 
groups.
However, even though the nuclear family appears to
1, i.e. , it establishes itself as an Independent household.
be the most striking characteristic of the Dutch kinship 
system* the distinction between lineal and collateral 
relatives is not wholly to be discarded. In fact* 
certain terms are used exclusively for lineal consang- 
uineal relatives- they are never used for any other type 
of relative. The terms for collateral relatives (with 
the exception of broer and zus) are also used for affinal 
kinsmen.
Another important feature of the Dutch kinship 
system is the distinction of.generation * reflected in a 
number of prefixes (groot * overgroot * klein * achterklein * 
oud) which make it possible to mark generation difference 
with accuracy. The only terms for which this Is not 
possible are nee I* and nicht : their referents* as well as
the referents of their derivatives with the prefix achter * 
belong to two or three different generations respectively. 
Fischer explains the importance of this feature in terms 
of the need for authority in a properly functioning society 
while he also seems to accept the anthropological theory 
that this need is the real reason for the existence of the 
(near universal) incest prohibition (loc.cit.: 110), It 
Is doubtful whether many anthropologists would still accept 
this explanation for the incest prohibition (cf. e.g. Fox* 
1967: 54 ff.)* but this need not concern us here. He does* 
however* put forward an opinion in this context concerning 
marriage regulations and kinship terminology which requires 
comment. He mentions that by law marriage is forbidden 
between uncle and niece* or between aunt and nephew* and 
he writes:
"De sociale onaanvaardbaarheid van dit 
soort huwelij ken springt in het oog* 
wanneer wij de consequenties* die zij
voor de verwantschapsnomenclatuur hebben, 
be schouwen"
(The social unacceptability of this kind of marriages 
is obvious when we consider the consequences they have 
with regard to kinship nomenclature). He refers to 
the fact that, e.g. Ego's father would become his/her 
brother-in-law, that he would be both grandfather and 
uncle to Ego's children, etc. However, I am totally 
unconvinced by this reasoning. In the previous chapter 
I have discussed the concept of role (cf. 5*2.3-5): every 
member of society enacts many roles, it was said, but not 
necessarily all of them simultaneously. If in a given 
society forms of marriage which are prohibited in our 
Western European culture are socially acceptable, no 
problems of the kind mentioned by Fischer seem to arise.
As a matter of fact the uncle/niece marriage is common in 
many parts of Africa (cf. Fox, 1967: 58). When such a 
marriage is contracted the niece simply exchanges her role 
of niece for that of wife. The fact that we make a problem 
out of the possible terminological confusion merely reflects 
our uneasiness about this kind of marriage but is in no 
way an explanation for existing prohibitions. When the 
Civil Law concerning marriage regulations was changed In 
the Netherlands in 1970 the prohibition of the uncle/niece 
uv02 of marriage was maintained after much, discussion. an 
all the twenty years it took to prepare this major legal 
reform of 1970, the main arguments in favour of maintaining 
the prohibition in question were related to matters of 
genetics and decency. The argument of generation distinction, 
authority, and proper functioning of society (if ever it was
an argument at some previous time, which is not certain), 
was never used.
A last feature which has to be taken into account 
in analysing Dutch kinship terms is sex. The only terms 
in Fischer's list to which this does not apply are 
kind and its complex derivatives. This exception is of 
negligible importance, especially since (as if often 
pointed out) these terms refer primarily to relatives of 
non-marriageable age.
We could represent the characteristics of the 
Dutch kinship system more sysmematically in the following 
way. I would call the first dimension we discussed, viz. 
the place and importance of the nuclear family in the 
system, the nature of the relationship; the second dimension 
would be generation, the third one sex.
- Nature of the relationship.
I make the following distinctions here:
1) Relationship within the families of origin or 
procreation, or not:
N - near relatives, belonging to either the family of 
origin or the family of procreation 
R - remote relatives, I.e. all relatives outside those 
families
2) Relationship through blood or by marriage 
K =» cons anguine al Kin
A = Affinal kin
3) Relationship in direct line or not:
L = lineal
C “• collateral
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The dimension of collaterality requires further 
specification into C = collateral up to fifth degree 
relativesj and for fifth degree relatives, i.e. relatives 
who are five steps removed from Ego in their genealogical 
link reckoned through their common ancestor, for instance:
-GrGrFa
GrGrFaSo GrFa
2
GrGrFaSoSo Fa
(in Dutch: achterneef) 1
Ego
I have based the N/R distinction on the families 
of origin and procreation only., not adding - as Fischer did 
in his analysis - the family of origin of Ego’s marriage 
partner. This allows me to single out the husband/wife 
relationship as the special type of affinal relationship 
which it is in comparison with all other more remote types 
of relationship through marriage.
The lineal/collateral distinction is not completely 
superseded by the near/remote distinction: it remains 
necessary in order to distinguish, for example, between 
achterneef and kleinzoon, and to support the distinction 
between the husbands/wives of aunts/uncles and the parents-in- 
law. The details will be clear from the sample list of 
feature definitions given below. My main concern in choosing 
these features has not been to achieve the greatest possible 
economy of statement. I have chosen this solution because 
I wanted to represent the elements which play a part in the 
way people view and experience kinship. I consider that it
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is only from an understanding of that reality that we can 
hope to come to an understanding of the actual use of 
kinship terms in a variety of contexts and situations.
- Generation.
On this dimension we need a seven-way distinction in 
order to account for the terms in Fischer's list, viz. :
G3, G2, Gl, G, G-l, G-2, G-3-
It must be remembered that generation is used as a social 
concept : age difference between marriage partners is 
Irrelevant, through marriage they both belong to the same 
generation.
- Sex.
Here I will use the symbols 'mT and Tf  for male and 
female, and 'x' for 'unspecified with regard to sex'.
We are now in a position to define the kinship 
terms of our list componentiaily in the form of class-products. 
I shall only give a limited number of definitions as the rest 
can easily be supplied either by replacing 'm' by 'f (or 
'xf by 'm' or ’f), or by changing the index of the gener­
ation dimension.
1. vader m.Gl.N.L.K
2. moeder f.Gl.N.L.K
3. vrouw f.G.N.A
4. kind x .G-I.N .L .K
p . soon m . G— . *i , L . a
6 . dochter f.G-l.N.L.K
7. broeder m.G.N.C.K
8'. zuster f.G.N.C.K
9. oom m.Gl.R.C.K or m.Gl.R.C.A
11. neef m.G-l.R.C.K or m.G.R.C.K
13. grootvader in. G2 . R . L . K
15. oudoom m .G2,R .C .K or m.G2.R.C.A 
m.G-2.R.C.K or m .G-l.R .C2.K or
m.Gl.R.C2 .K
17* achterneef
19- kleinkind x.G-2.R.L.K
27. schoonvaaer m.G1.R.A
29. schoonbroeder m.G.R.A
31. schoonzoon m.G-l.R.A
6.2.2. Further Observations Concerning Dutch Kinship Terms.
Fischer's list of kin terms is reasonably complete. 
There are, however, alternative usages which he does not 
mention. I will take this point up now. One would not 
normally replace a term by an alternative regardless of 
certain social and/or personal factors: these must, therefore, 
be included in our considerations. Moreover, there are 
certain extended or metaphorical usages which may reveal 
something about the value judgements of the people who use 
them. I would also want to discuss the general term ouders 
which Fischer does not list. Finally I would like to examine 
the complete list of prefixes used in connection with kin 
terms. In my discussion of alternative usage and Idiomatic 
use of kin terms I will follow the order of our list of kin 
terms (cf. 6.2.1), and I shall concentrate on my personal 
use and understanding of them as I explained in the intro­
duction to this chapter (cf. 6.0).
6 , 2 . 2 ,1. Kinship terms and their use.
The term vader has a number of alternatives, 
basically variants of the same form. We find: pa, paatje, 
pap(p)a , papaatj e , paps , pappie. We also know the. use of 
mijn oude heer (cf. English "my old man"). This last usage 
is either affected or lacking in respect in my appreciation, 
and therefore to be avoided. Of the forms I mentioned before 
I would use pappa or the diminutive paatj e most often in 
address. They are more intimate than vader which I hardly 
ever use In address, with the exception of the context of 
letter writing. Paatje reflects greater intimacy still 
than pappa. My sisters make a still wider use of these 
various forms of intimacy than I tend to do. When I refer 
to my father to outsiders or remote relatives I will say: 
mijn vader, but with the Immediate family I normally refer 
to him as pappa. I believe that this distinction is fairly 
common. It seems relevant in this connection that there 
Is a change with age: children will use mijn pappa (or 
pappie perhaps which is more typical, though not exclusively, 
of children’s usage), even when referring to their father 
to outsiders. It is an interesting fact, moreover, that 
reference to the father within the near family or outside 
it is connected with the absence or presence of the possessive 
pronoun, very much like in English "Where is father?" as 
opposed to "Where is my father?", lr. rne iat ter sentence 
the possessive my emphasises the unity of the nuclear family 
with regard to those outside it. In Dutch - though this 
may be a regional rather than a general feature - we can use 
the first person plural possessive pronoun ons with kin term 
or proper name for reference to other members of the tightly
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knit Immediate family. The plural expresses the idea 
of "we-as-a-group" , as distinct from all others. All 
Idiomatic or metaphorical use is restricted to the term 
vader. In some cases it stresses the aspect of 
’responsibility for looking after dependents’, e.g. vader 
for the man In charge of a youth hostel or an orphanage, 
or also the expression Vadertje Staat (Father State). At 
other times it stresses authority and dignity, e.g. 
de Heilige Vader (the Holy Father, i.e., the Pope), Vader 
Cats (a famous Renaissance Dutch poet whose highly moral­
izing work was read extensively for several centuries ■ 
because of its edifying qualities). Vie do not have in 
Dutch the equivalent of the use of English father for a 
priest, at least not In everyday usage. Vader is used 
to address a priest in the context of religious worship 
with its rather hieratic liturgical language: the emphasis 
would seem to be on authority and respect though there may 
be a possible meaning of ’giver of spiritual life1 as I 
have pointed out previously (cf. above 4.4.3). One form 
of use which does not carry the connotation of authority 
or dignity is the diminutive vadertje as a familiar, 
slightly ironical or condescending form of address, e.g. 
nDat gaat zo maar niet, vadertje11, meaning roughly "You 
cannot do that, my friend, and get away with it". I find 
It difficult to explain this usage. I would suggest that 
the element ’vader’ evokes a certain closeness which may 
well serve to take the edge of what could be impolite, 
rude, or too harsh if said impersonally, while the diminut­
ive suffix conveys the ironical or condescending connotat­
ion .
The term moeder has a similar range of altern­
atives : raoe, moes , moeke, m a , mam(m)a , maatj e , mamaatj e , 
mammle, Here again my personal preference goes to mamma 
and maatje: in this case , however, I would also use it 
in letter writing. Fox1 purposes of reference the usage 
is the same as for father, i.e. mijn moeder to outsiders 
and mamma within the close family, while children normally 
do not yet make this distinction and use mijn mammie 
throughout. The abbreviated forms of moeder, viz. moe, moes, 
moeke, may well be in part regionally determined variants, 
the diminutive form moeke again expressing special intimacy.
The term moeder is used as well in a non-kinship 
context for the woman in charge of a youth hostel or some 
institution, or as moeder overste (i.e. mother superior) 
for the head of a religious-community of women. In proverbs 
moeder stands for source, origin, e.g. ,:Ledigheid is de 
moeder van alle kwaad" (Idleness is the mother of all evil).
We also speak of "Onze Moeder de heilige Kerk" (Our holy Mother 
the Church) in connection with the Roman Catholic Church: the 
Idea behind this expression is both the notion of loving care 
and of giver of (spiritual) life,
There is a very colloquial form moer which occurs 
in a number of idiomatic expressions, e.g. "Loop naar je moer” 
(roughly translated: "Get lost"), "Naar zijn moer zijn" (to be 
beyond repair, said of things). I doubt, however, if the 
connection with moeder still plays a role at present in 
these expressions with moer.
The terms vrouw and man are the terms people 
normally use for wife and husband. If one wants to turn 
them into terms of endearment one can do so either by suffixing
lief to man or vrouw, or - in the case of vrouw - by
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using the diminutive vrouwtj e or vrouwke. The diminutive 
of man, though possible as a term of endearment, is not 
so easily used for this purpose. The usual connotation 
raannetj e or manneke is rather one of disdain or dis­
paragement .
In official language we tend to use echtgenoot (Hu) 
and echtgenote (Wi). To-hear these terms actually used 
as terms of reference gives the impression of (perhaps 
slightly outdated) formality or of affectation. Still more 
archaic are the terms gade or eega (both meaning 'spouse',
Hu or Wi) which are now so far removed from actual usage 
that people will only use them jokingly, with mock reverence. 
Man and vrouw are the standard terms of reference, and for 
some people even of address. My impression Is that this 
last type of usage was^ originally connected with the position 
of husband and wife at the head of the "extended household" 
of, for example, the big farms. Just as parents tend to call 
each other "father" and "mother" within the nuclear family, 
they may well have called one another by the terms which 
were linked with their special position in the 'extended 
household', viz. man and vrouw.
Everything concerned with the legal side and 
consequences of marriage is qualified by the adjective
for divorce is echtscheiding.
The term kind refers to either son or daughter, 
regardless of age. In this sense, for instance, one can 
say, "Zij hebben vijf kinderen" (They have got five children). 
Nevertheless, the narrower meaning of 'young child' is probably
more common. It is the one found as well in certain 
expressions , e.g. "Hij is er maar een kind bijI! (In 
comparison he is a mere child, a beginner), or nHIj is 
geen kind meer'! (He is no longer a child) .
Kind is used as term of address: it usually gives 
expression to either tenderness or to slight impatience 
tempered by kindness and love. Parents can continue this 
usage even when the children are grown-up, though the 
occasions for using it will naturally be less frequent.
It can even be used to express tenderness by a husband 
for his wife, as a term of endearment.
Corresponding with the use of moeder in a 
spiritual sense for referring to the Church we find kinderen 
used in a spiritual sense for the members of the Church.
The term zoon is in my experience a term of 
reference only. Apart from using the first name of course, 
parents would address' their son as jongen (boy) , or with 
greater tenderness jongetje or jongenlief. This is not a 
typical kin term, however. 1 Jong I" can be used by anyone 
to address a yo,ung boy (cf, English "lad"); boys use jongens 
among one another, and one can even hear girls use this form 
of address among each other when, for example, they are 
cheering on other girls at sports. This particular use by 
girls is limited to younger girls. When boys grow up they 
too, stop using it among one another. However, -it always 
is an acceptable way for adults to address a group of boys, 
e.g. in class at a primary or secondary school. Parents, 
too, can continue to address a son as j ongen regardless of 
his age: it evokes, and possibly keeps alive, the special 
intimacy between parents and young children.
One could also mention the use of j ongen as a 
term of reference. To the question: How many children 
have they got?, one possible answer would. be: "Ze hebben 
drie jongens" (They have got three boys). In fact, one 
is more likely to hear this answer than "Zij hebben drie 
zoons" (They have got three sons). If a parent says:
"Dit is mijn oudste jongen” (This Is my eldest boy), it 
sounds more personal - with a note perhaps of parental 
pride and protectiveness - than when he says: uDIt is mijn 
oudste zoon'! (This is my eldest son).
Very much the same thing can be said about 
dochter and meisje or meisjelief. It must be noted,however, 
that the diminutive form meisje must be used: the word meid 
has pejorative meaning. Furthermore, as a term of reference 
meisj e is probably less used in the sense of daughter since 
mijn meisje is the normal way of saying "my girl-friend".
The term for brother is in practice always the 
shorter form broer. The longer broeder is nowadays used 
only for members of certain special, non-kinship groups.
This can be mankind as a whole (*Alle men sen zijn broeders", 
All men are brothers), a Church ("Broeders en Zusters in de 
Heer" , Brothers and Sisters in the Lord), a religious 
community of men, or the like. In a similar sense we find 
the expression: "Ret is een zwakke broeder op school" (He 
Is a weak brother In school, i.e. he is one of those who 
are not doing too well).
Broer is never used as a term of address (as 
opposed to the term broeder within the special groups 
mentioned), though it is sometimes given as a first name.
The ease of the word for sister is very similar. 
The shorter form here is zus. The longer form zuster is 
used for female members of a Church, and particularly for 
members of religious communities of women. As many of 
these religious communities were working in hospitals 
and in nursing zuster is now the normal term of addressing 
all nurses.
The respect due to one's sisters can indirectly 
be inferred from slightly rude expressions: one tries to 
be more forceful by shocking people through the inappropriate 
use of terms with a high emotional value, e.g. "Je sud !,T 
(Your sister!, I.e. You are wrong if you think that!), or 
l,Je zal je zus bedoelen" (You must be referring to your 
sister: a way of expressing incredulity).
With the term for uncle, oom, we go beyond the 
nuclear family. There is a slightly familiar variant of 
this term, viz. ome. This variant is also used in the 
expression "hoge omes" (high^ placed uncles) , said of 
people in authority who supposedly care for us but who 
remain distant all the same. The expression conveys a fair 
amount of scepticism, albeit good-natured. This resembles 
the remoteness of i^ eal uncles who often do not play a 
great role In our lives unless they are close to us as 
individuals. This explains why non-kinsmen can and do 
fill the role of uncle just as well. It is quite normal 
for a good friend of the family to be called oom. Seuren 
(1975: 116) reports the fact that in a certain part of 
Amsterdam the man a woman is living with will be called oom 
at first by her children; after about six months they tend 
to switch to vader. He is neither their uncle nor their
father in a genealogical sense, but the terms translate
a social situation of growing closeness. In this same
context of a certain vagueness in the use of oom,
especially as a term of address, I would like to refer
back to my componentiai definitions. The definition
of oom is m.Gl.R.C.K; in the same generation there is
2an achterneef who Is defined as m.Gl.R.C . K. The only 
difference is the degree of collaterality, but as the term 
oom is somewhat vague anyhow in Its use it is likely that 
this type of achterneef will be addressed as oom if he is 
referred to by a kin term at all.
The word tante, aunt, is as vague as its male 
counterpart oom. It is also used in an expression similar 
to one mentioned among the usages of the term for sister, 
viz. "Je tanteI" (Your aunt I), mainly used for expressing 
incredulity. Moreover, an interfering lady or one who 
tends to cause problems is called "een lastige tante" (an 
awkward aunt): I believe that we have here the same kind of 
connotation as we had in "hoge omes" , viz. of a person who 
claims certain rights or a certain amount of attention, 
while we do not really feel close enough to accept such 
claims as natural or rightful. The expression "een tante 
Bet” (an aunt Betty) means a chatterbox: here again we have 
an example of a critical appraisal being expressed by means 
of a term which denotes a relative who does not automatically 
share in the respect and affection, and consequently-in the 
tolerance too, which characterize relationships within the 
limits of the close family.
As for the term neef it should be said that though 
Dutch does not distinguish between cousin and nephew
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terminologically, there are ways of specifying what 
one means. If one wants to refer to a sibling’s son 
one can speak of een voile neef (a full nephew). Altern­
atively we find comzegger/oomzegster for nephew/niece, 
i.e. 'he/she who calls a given person uncle’3 the context 
must indicate clearly who this person is, either by means 
of a possessive pronoun used with the term or by mentioning 
by name whom one is oomzegger of. Complete clarity can 
obviously be achieved by using compound nouns, e.g. neefs- 
dochter (NeDa), oomsdochter (UnDa). The fact remains,
however, that the term neef is extremely vague. We defined
2
one type of achterneef componentially as m.G-l.R.C .K, 
while neef was m.G-l.R.C.K, a distinction of degree of 
collaterality only. In practice they would both be called 
"neef so-and-so" if the kin term were used at all. Fischer 
claimed that no in-law qualification is added to neef: his
list of kin-types includes, for instance, both. BrSo and 
WIBrSo (loc.cit.; Ill and 106). Schneider (1968: 80)has 
made a similar claim for English cousin. While I would 
certainly agree that the prefix schoon (In-law) cannot be 
used with neef, the adjective aangetrouwd (married-to, by 
marriage) would be quite acceptable to me.
The only supplementary remark about the female 
counterpart of neef, nicht, is that this term is used as 
a slang word for a male homosexual. I believe the express­
ion began to spread ten or fifteen years ago and found Its 
way into the dictionary only a couple of years ago. I am 
unable to explain this particular usage.
The terms grootvader and grootmoeder came into 
the Dutch language in the 16th century as translations from
the French. Before that time the prefix used was beste, 
not groot. I use the terms as terms of reference only, 
but this usage is not necessarily universal or even 
widespread. As terms of address I use exclusively opa 
and onia, words which originated in children Ts language.
This preference is no doubt based on the greater affective 
connotations of these latter terms.
The expression ,TJe grootmoeder! ,r (Your grandmother!) 
is used very much like "Je zus!" and "Je tante!", mentioned 
before, colloquial ways of expressing incredulity or similar 
feelings. An alternative form for oma, opoe, can sometimes 
be used in an disrespectful and derogatory way when one 
speaks of "een ouwe opoe" (an old granny).
Before we turn our attention to prefixes, suffixes, 
and compound nouns I would like to discuss briefly the word 
for parents: ouders. Fischer included kind in his list of 
kin terms but not ouders. His reason for omitting the term 
is the fact that the word is not used in the singular (loc. 
cit. : 108). Apart from the use of the singular ouder in 
one or two standing expressions this observation' is correct. 
I believe, however, that the use of this term reflects the 
idea of the strong unity of the nuclear family vis-a-vis 
the outside world. When one says mijn ouders rather than 
mijn vader en moeder one is definitely more formal and 
one keeps one .j.i» v 2 iT o c 11 u o j,n o a ^ s -i e une per so rial reia^xoriohip , 
so to speak, by presenting a closed front. When speaking 
about my parents to close relatives I would never use ouders 
as a term of reference; very few people would, I believe.
One does hear occasionally the familiar de oudelui (the old 
folks) or de oudjes (the old ones); I suppose that the easy
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familiarity of these expressions compensates for the 
absence of the strong personal feelings which the words 
vader and moeder convey automatically. The intention of 
the speaker and the whole context are extremely important, 
however, for the same expression could be used in a disdain­
ful, insulting manner.
To establish a connection between this point 
and what I was saying earlier about the use- of alternative 
terms for father and mother, it would seem to me to be 
significant that in my way of speaking I tend to refer to 
my parents as vader en moeder when speaking with my brother, 
but I prefer pappa en mamma when I talk to my sisters.
6 ,2 .2 ,2 , Affixation processes.
We can now discuss briefly the various affixation 
processes. Generation,difference is accurately expressed 
by a number of prefixes:
- ascending generation: G2 groot
G3 overgroot 
G4 betovergroot 
I suppose Fischer left out the last one because there 
is no parallel original device for G-4. But the 
expression betovergrootvader or -moeder is certainly 
quite common. It is to be expected that there is a 
term of reference for persons who - chough they may be 
deceased now - have played a role in the family history.
It is unlikely, on the other hand, that there will often 
be a need for a term for the fourth descending generation. 
The terms of address for all the ascending generations 
above the second are the same as the ones described in
in the previous section (6.2.2.1) for the grand­
parents, the second ascending generation.
- descending generation: G-2 klein
G-3 achterklein 
G-4 achterachterklein 
The question of address does not arise here. One uses 
either the first name, or j ongen/meisje.
- for collateral kinsmen:
oud is normally reserved for the terms oom and tante 
though some people use it as an alternative prefix 
with grandparent terms in the fourth or fifth ascending 
generations.
An oudoom will be addressed as oom.
achter is used with neef and nicht but less to express 
generation than collateral distance. In forms of 
address the generation factor may appear: one type of 
achterneef will be called oom, the others neef, or more 
likely by their first name.
To express relations by marriage we have in the 
first place the prefix schoon, used exclusively in reference. 
In address one copies the use of the marriage partner: here 
too the nuclear family operates as a closely knit unit.
This means, for example, that the relative called zwager, i.e 
BrLa, can be SiHu, HuBr, VJiBr, WiSiHu, or HuSiHu. Strictly 
speaking the in-law relationship does nos extend beyond tne 
eonsanguineal kin of one’s marriage partner: this wopld rule 
out WiSiHu and HuSiHu from the BrLa category. A little used 
expression, koude zwager ("cold” brother-in-law), reflects 
this fact. Normally, however, one uses the same term as one’ 
marriage partner, viz. zwager.
Other relations established by marriage ai^ e 
half and stief (step) relationships, The complex terms 
formed with these prefixes are used in reference only.
What way of address is used will depend on each individual 
case, but there is no doubt that the ideal, most natural 
situation is considered to be the mode of address of the 
nuclear family. Due to the isolation in which every family- 
unit lives any other solution is bound to lead to severe 
tensions in the long run. This may be different in the case 
a Pleeg (foster) relationship which by definition is 
meant to be merely a temporary arrangement.
Spiritual parenthood is expressed by a limited 
number of terms. Franco-Gallic church language, a form 
of late Latin, had the terms ’-patrinus’ and ’matrina' for 
godfather and godmother. From these the Dutch terms peter 
and meter were derived. A prefix peet or pete is formed 
from the word peter. This prefix has a fairly limited 
application. We find peet-ouders (godparents) and petekind 
(godchild)^ the distinction between son and daughter is 
hardly ever made here. The relationship stresses the 
element of responsibility for the child’s (spiritual) well­
being. In Roman Catholic Canon Law this link results in 
the prohibition of marriage between a godparent and his or 
her godchild.
The only other terms the prefix peet combines wish 
are oom and tante since those kinsmen were often chosen for 
this role. Nowadays the tendency is to choose godparents 
on merit so to speak: the moral pressure to choose from 
among one’s relatives, preferably in turn from among the 
relatives of husband and wife, has disappeared as the nuclear
family unit grows towards an ever greater independence 
and isolation. N^n-kin godparents are referred to as 
peter and meter• they will often be addressed by the 
godchild as (peet)oom or (peet)tante according to the 
general tendency which was explained when we discussed 
the use of the terms oom and tante.
6.2.3* A Deictic Interpretation of Dutch Kinship Terms.
In my conclusion to the previous chapter I defined 
the aim or teleological function of kinship systems as 
that of 'situating people’ in a network of social relation­
ships (cf. 5*3)* la this chapter I have shown how people 
are situated by means of pronominal deixis in Ego’s ”Zeigfeld” 
according to three parameters: distance from ”1", direction
of deixis, and concentration or intensity of deixis. Using
those same parameters I would now like to summarize more 
systematically the findings of my analysis of Dutch kin 
terms as an instance of social deixis.
The dimension of the distance away from Ego is
basically represented by the distinction between near and 
remote relatives, i.e. the relatives in the nuclear families 
Ego is a member of, and his other relatives. It is possible 
to refine the distinctions along these axes further, 
especially for the remote relatives. Among these the lineal 
ones are considered uo be nearer to Ego than the collateral 
ones: lineal descent is an important feature of the Dutch 
system. In either case consangaineal kin are considered to 
be nearer than affinal kin.
In the near family such distinctions are less 
important given the tight unity of this group’ there are
indications3 however, that these same degrees of distance 
are valid here too; albeit in a limited way. It is the 
case, for example, that when the children grow up and 
start their own families the ties between brothers and 
sisters become looser to a greater extent and more 
quickly than the bond between each single one of them 
and the parents: lineal relationships are nearer and more 
important than collateral ones. The difference in feeling 
concerning consanguineal and affinal relations, too, can 
sometimes be noticed in the nuclear family when, In cases 
of divorce, the affinal husband-wife relation can be broken 
off more easily than the parent-child relation.
The following figure sums up the characteristic 
of 'distance away from Ego':
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The dimension of the direction of deixis corresponds with 
generation. A two-way distinction must be made here: an 
upward direction (Gl, 2,etc.), and a downward direction 
from zero Included (G,G-1, etc.). This distinction is 
supported by differences in the way of address and, to a 
lessee extent, of reference . 7'or upward rale o 10:13 one 
uses kinship terms in address as well as in reference. For 
zero generation or downward relations one uses the proper 
name or terms of endearment In address- for reference one 
uses kin terms, though the use of a proper name with a 
possessive pronoun Is fully acceptable. It must be noted
here that the term neef is ambiguous with regard to this 
dimension: as a result the term is deictically extremely
weak and vague.
The last parameter is the concentration or 
intensity of deixis. In our study of the pronouns (cf. 
above 6.2.2.2) we have made a distinction between focus 
and diffusion. When we apply this distinction to kin 
terms we see first of all a confirmation of our division 
of relatives into near and remote relatives. When the 
deixis Is concentrated, a kin term indicates one relative, 
or at the most one kind of relationship, only; Fischer 
spoke in this connection of descriptive and semi-descriptive 
terms as we mentioned earlier (cf. 6.2.1). When terms 
covered more than one kind of relationship, e.g. oom, he 
called them classificatory. 1 consider these terms to be 
cases of relaxed or diffuse deixis. The deixis gets more 
diffuse when It moves from the lineal to the collateral 
relatives. Within the area of concentrated or Intense 
deixis distinctions can be ma.de as well. Here, however, 
they cannot concern the number of relationships involved 
as the terms of this range stand for one type of relation­
ship each; in this case it becomes a question of degrees 
of emotional intensity resulting in a variety of alternative 
usages (e.g. vader, pappa, paatje, etc.).
These dimensions determine the value or moral 
meaning of our kin terms, they provide the coordinates on 
the chart of our social behaviour. But the points of refer­
ence they create are still unoccupied, empty. Not empty 
In the same sense as pronouns for, as nouns, they carry a 
much more precise meaning, but empty in the sense that they
have yet to be put to use; and in that process we can 
use them tactically to serve our basic aim of building 
up social relations by situating people at their appro­
priate place, appropriate according to the situation and 
to our intention. These points of reference are carved 
out, so to speak, in genealogical material, but according 
to social specification. If our intention is to refer to 
genealogical positions, then the terms will be genealogical; 
if not, the genealogical base merely serves to carry a 
different tactical meaning.
The genealogical terms require precision: this is 
provided for by the processes of affixation. However, the 
genealogical meaning Is not the most important one from our 
present point of view. We are- examining how social relations 
are established between people, and, more particularly, how 
language operates and is used in this connection. In my 
opinion this is done primarily in verbal exchange, through 
the system of address. It Is only when we speak about our 
social relationships that the genealogical basis gains in 
importance. The two systems, of reference and of address, 
are both essential aspects, however, of a full linguistic 
study of the way we situate people by means of words.
The tactical meaning which complements the basic 
value of the kin terms determined by their deictic dimensions 
will provide specification on owe points.
First of all it will specify which referents can 
fill the various positions in the social network. There 
are different degrees of flexibility in this respect. When 
the deixis Is focused sharply it Is directed at single 
individuals. In the Dutch kinship system one can only have
one vader and moeder, man or vrouw. The uniqueness of 
sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters is safeguarded 
by addressing them by their first name only, never by a 
kin term. No individual can move into any of these 
positions unless the basic unit of the nuclear family 
is adapted officially according to socially and legally 
accepted regulations, e.g. by marriage, re-marriage after 
divorce, adoption, etc. It is possible, however, to use 
the basic kinship values tactically in other social 
Institutions, e.g. Churches, where vader, moeder, broeder, 
ana zuster are used in a related, non-genealogical meaning.
In as far as the genealogical base is not fully congenial 
to this context one is justified in calling this use a case 
of metaphorical meaning. As the focus relaxes it becomes 
more and more a matter of a personal decision which referents 
are possible for a certain position. There are no specific 
regulations for such decisions, and they do not have any 
official social consequences. All that is required is that 
the person is of the right sex and age-group, and lives up 
to the normal expectations of a given kinship role, and - 
most importantly - that both Ego and that person accept the 
relationship. The possibilities are still fairly limited in 
the case of lineal relatives: they become much wider, however, 
with collateral ones, especially oom and tante_>
The second point which the tactical meaning will 
specify Is the question of alternative terms for one-single 
referent. This is a matter of intensifying emotionally the 
deictic focus by a speaker’s choice of a term depending on 
context (reference or address; who am I speaking to; who 
is listening in; written or spoken language; etc.) and on
intention (various kinds of speech acts, etc,). Greater 
intimacy is achieved by using terms derived from children's 
language, e.g. pappa, etc., mamma:;. etc. The same effect 
is sought by the continued use of terms like kind, j ongen, 
meisj e , regardless of age: one aims at recalling or keep­
ing alive the bond of deep feelings which exist, as a matter
of course almost, as long as a child is young and dependent.
The use of diminutives is particularly apt for 
expressing familiarity and affection: calling a person or a 
thing by a diminutive noun makes them very much our own. 
Affection can be expressed explicitly by the suffix lief: 
this device, and the use of a diminutive form, are the 
only ways of manifesting one's feelings through the choice 
of terras for more remote relatives.
A number of linguistic facts highlight the strong
emotional unity of the nuclear family. There is the general
practice by husband and wife of adopting one another's 
relatives, frequently to the extent of Imitating the idio­
syncratic ways of address or reference used in the family 
of one’s marriage partner. Next, I would see the pair of 
terms man and vrouw as opposed to echtgenoten as words 
which are at the same time more intimate, less formal, and 
express the living unity rather than the legal, institutional 
side of marriage. It would seem to me, moreover, that the 
habit of parents of calling one another vader and moeder 
(or their alternatives) in front of the children can, at 
least in part, be seen as an expression of the unity of the 
nuclear family. At an early stage In the children's lives 
this may have something to do with taking their point of 
view and using the terms ostensively rather than denotatively.
During that same period, however, parents talk to
their babies in the third rather than in the second-
person; this they discontinue after a while, whereas
calling one another vader and moeder continues as long as
the children live at home and possibly longer. I would
suggest that this can be explained at least in part by a
desire not to stress too much the difference between
the parents on the one side, and the children on the other.
By using vader and moeder almost like names, the younger
generation can address their parents in a way similar to
the one they are addressed in, viz. by name only. The 
politeness expected from the children is reduced to its
minimal manifestation in the use of the pronouns of polite­
ness with the corresponding plural verb endings: the 
required distance is maintained. Another factor expressing 
this intimate unity is the special use of the possessive 
pronoun ons. One of the children in a family could say 
both ons vader, to refer to the father in the presence of 
other members of the nuclear family, and, for example, ons 
Piet, to refer to one of the male children in the family.
Deixis would seem to be more easily emotionally 
intensified when male speakers address women, or refer to 
them, or refer to others in their presence. The expectation 
of deeper feelings in connection with the use of female 
terms by men explains why it is susn an effective way of 
being rude when one uses them out of context or in a 
derogatory way.
I believe that it is significant for the very 
personal character of the intensified deixis of such 
alternative usages as "pappa11, "mamma", etc. that they are
never used within metaphors. Whatever metaphors and 
expressions we have found were based on the standard, 
more formal, or at least more neutral terms. The 
emotional implications of the alternative terms are 
simply too strong to allow their use in a different 
context.
The solution here proposed does not give one, 
unequivocal answer to the question "Who calls whom what?", 
for the simple reason that there is no such answer. The 
system is used differently by different people, but always 
according to its inherent possibilities and in line with 
its basic function. What I have tried to describe is the 
mechanism of this system and the way in' which people, by 
using its possibilities judiciously, succeed in realising 
its basic function: establishing precise social relations 
between each other.
It would seem that our study has established 
several points. The claims for the explanatory value 
of the historical approach in the late 19th and early 
20th century are not all acceptable but the more prudent 
and balanced views of recent representatives of the hist­
orical comparative school of linguistics show that there 
is room for some form of historical approach. However, 
the fact that theories In this field cannot always be 
verified in detail means that their validity does not rank 
as highly as one might wish. The problem Is not unfamiliar 
to philologists; it merely becomes greater when we set our 
sights on the reconstructIon of language and culture, or, 
more accurately perhaps, of language as the reflection of 
a lost culture. Nevertheless, the basic issues stood out 
clearly from very early on: the genealogical basis of 
kinship systems, the use of terms in reference or address, 
the importance of social factors, the role of psychology, 
and an Interest in cognition.
As in linguistics, the historical approach was 
pushed into the background by the structural or functional 
approach. While the type of explanation thus changes, the 
basic issues remain very much the same but now reformulated 
and supported by more and better evidence. Some of the 
contributions here were very restricted in linguistic 
insight : specialization is growing. Each theory tends to 
stress certain aspects and on the whole many partial and 
valuable insights are gained. None of the theories, however, 
would seem to qualify as the one and only, the definitive
There was a growing feeling that more rigour 
was required in order to arrive at verifiable statements. 
Similar developments within linguistics in general 
provided the means for these more formalised types of 
analysis. The question of correlation between termin­
ological and social systems is not completely forgotten 
but the main effort goes into internal analysis. If 
anything, it is interest in psychology and cognition 
which tends to become dominant rather than concern about 
the social structure. On the whole, however, the conclusion 
has to be that most of these analyses are satisfactory' 
judged from the point of view for which they were devised, 
or as part of a wider linguistic or anthropological 
framework. But the multiplicity of different analyses, 
often carried out on the same data, throws considerable 
doubt on the possibility of establishing a clear, direct 
link between a type of terminology and a form of social 
organization, or of cognitive structure.
In my evaluation I believe to have shown that 
If we want to break the- dead-lock (If it can be done at all) 
we have to rephrase our question. There did not seem to be 
any point In expecting an answer to the question of the 
correlation between the linguistic and social aspects of 
kinship in terms of efficient causality. Consequently we 
decided co settle i or a soiucioc based on * cS-aSdi-i ,
specifically the aim of "situating people".
In our last chapter we developed this idea in 
the form of a deictic theory and analysis of the linguistic 
aspects of kinship, Vie were able to indicate certain legal 
and social factors which seemed to confirm our interpretation
of Dutch kin terms. The main advantage of this approach 
is its flexibility. One is no longer obliged to force 
elements into a theory, or to admit to a number of 
baffling exceptions. This flexibility may entail a 
certain loss of formal precision in the analysis. It 
seems, however, to be a very adequate way of capturing 
the intricate and delicate relationships between language 
and culture in the domain of kinship. It provides a 
framework but is not deterministic: man uses the available
possibilities in order to achieve the basic aim of establish­
ing one’s relative position vis-a-vis another person on 
the basis of, or in parallel with, the genealogical network.
This proposal needs without doubt to be tested 
further. I can see two ways of pursuing fruitfully the 
findings of this study, A first way would be to apply 
the same form of analysis to several languages. The main 
advantage to be gained would, I believe, be a better insight 
into the tactical part of the meaning of kinship terms.
Dor the moment I would be inclined to expect that there 
may well be a fundamental similarity of system in this 
respect between languages - with, however, differences of 
emphasis corresponding to the place kinship holds in the 
general scale of values in a given society. It would be 
necessary, however, to ensure that the data for each 
language cover the whole range of she use of kinship terms, 
not merely their use in genealogical classification:
Another point to pursue further is the place of 
the deictic approach to language. Though I see no objection 
to developing an analytical technique specifically for
dealing in depth with a single, particular linguistic 
problem, one would hope to be able eventually to extend 
its application to similar problems. The things which 
come to mind here are the whole of the pronominal system, 
expressions for time and place, parts of the vocabulary 
which play a role in the social structure, and perhaps 
vocabulary in general In as far as its use is socially 
determined (e.g. in social dialects) or emotionally coloured.
I would hope that a cross-cultural comparison 
based on analyses of this kind would lead us to establish 
basic universal values and tactics, while the linguistic 
relativity would be expressed in the particular configuration 
of strategic use In each language. It may eventually form 
the basis for an approach to the problem which started me 
off on this track: how to translate correctly with full 
respect for both the source language and the target language, 
and for their associated cultures.
415.
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